# Anarchy

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080>\
**Category:** CSG1999\
**Created:** [February 4, 1999, 10:29pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080 "1999-02-04T22:29:12Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 2

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**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b19c9b/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor)\
**Post date:** [February 13, 1999, 3:23pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/21 "1999-02-13T15:23:55Z")

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[Martin Taylor 990213 09:52]

> From [Fred Nickols (980213.0655)] --

> Rick (990211.0930) writes --
> 
> > Governments (and anarchies) aren't "really" out there, any  
> > more than trees or colors are "really" out there. All these  
> > experiences (according to PCT) are perceptual constructions,  
> > based (I am sure) on something that is "really" out there;

> Here's the question (and I guess it's for Rick and for Bill P):
> 
> Is it the view/belief/theory of PCT that there is nothing out there and, as  
> Rick says above, "Everything is perception"

Since Rick says he is sure there is something "really" out there, I would  
think that your first characterization is wrong, especially as he goes  
on to say...

> > perceptions are a map of that reality; constructions  
> > produced by perceptual functions in the brain.

But you don't have to go by what Rick is "sure" of, because he isn't  
guaranteed to be right. You can look at the theory itself.

PCT starts from the premise that there exists an environment external to  
every elementary control unit (ECU). The output of the ECU affects  
its environment, and, in some way the ECU cannot detect, the effect  
propagates through the environment until it affects the input to the  
Perceptual Input Function (PIF) of the ECU.

The PIF has (in the canonical form of PCT) an output consisting of a  
single scalar value, which we call the value of the "perceptual signal."  
That signal is the only thing internal to the ECU that relates to the  
environment of the ECU, which is why the phrase "it's all perception"  
is so often seen flying around CSGnet. It's only a shorthand for "the  
perceptual signals are the only representation of the environment that  
we can ever have."

Rick goes too far when he says "Governments (and anarchies) aren't  
'really' out there," because every perceptual signal involves some  
signals from outside the ECU. Not all of these signals are derived  
directly from the sensors, even through the transformations done by  
lower level PIFs. Some of the inputs come from imagination and memory,  
for example. But all come from outside the ECU, and some come, directly  
or indirectly, from outside the skin of the individual--the boundary of  
the individual hierarchy. These provide what we can know of what is "out  
there."

As Rick says. Governments and Anarchies are "out there" no more than are  
trees and colours--but to add to that, the theory suggests (but does not  
require) that the higher the level of perception, the more of the PIF  
inputs may come from imagination and memory, meaning that they are  
parts of feedback loops with two properties: (1) they don't depend on  
the "realities" of the outer environment, and (2) they have potentially  
very long time lags.

Long time lags in a control loop are important, because they affect the  
rates at which output changes can influence the perceptual signal without  
causing the loop to go unstable. High-level ECUs may find that there are  
long delays between changes in their output and corresponding changes in  
their perceptual signals, not only because of the loops that are completed  
within the hierarchy, but also because the propagation of their effects  
through the external environment goes through many complex (unperceived)  
pathways before influencing the perceptual signal.

Necessarily, then (as Rick argued in his "Hierarchy of Perception" paper),  
the higher-level ECUs perceive things in the environment that are not  
only complex, but also very slow to change (most of the time), in comparison  
to the time it takes for a change of, say, muscle tension. When we  
perceive something as complex as a government, changes usually occur on  
a time scale measured in years, not milliseconds.

We could, in principle, perceive something as complex as "government" as  
quickly as we perceive muscle tension. But there would be no benefit, in  
the evolutionary sense, to do so, because any attempt to control such a  
perception would lead to unstable control loops instead of controlled  
perceptions. That kind of ECU would tend to vanish through reorganization,  
leaving only slowly changing things in the external world to be  
perceived by high-level ECUs. And at the top level, changes may occur  
only "once in a blue moon" (which, in UK experience, is about once per  
lifetime--1950 and 1883 being the most recent two occurrences).

Martin

---

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**Author:** ![Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/a8b319/32.png) [@Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Acree_Mike)\
**Post date:** [February 15, 1999, 9:03pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/22 "1999-02-15T21:03:17Z")

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[From Mike Acree 990215.1304 PST)]

Since the issues overlap substantially, I'm attempting a composite  
response to Rick, Martin, Bruce, and Tracy.

Rick's argument, as I have consistently understood it through a long  
string of posts, is as follows (Martin's argument seems to me  
essentially the same): (a) Many complex tasks, such as building a 747,  
require coordination through hierarchical organization. (b) Any  
hierarchical organization is, or has, government. (c) Therefore  
government is necessary.

The first premise, though it has often been repeated, has never been  
disputed by anyone to my knowledge. The second premise uses  
\_government\_ in a metaphorical sense which leaves it utterly inadequate  
to support the conclusion, understood in the usual specific political  
sense which is the topic of this entire thread, namely an agency which  
holds a legal monopoly on the use of coercion in a given territory (with  
anarchy being the absence of such an agency). \_This\_ is the "verbal  
trick," and not a very subtle one at that. I'm with you (Rick and  
others) in favoring in general an abstract approach; and there are  
surely things to be learned from considering the similarities between  
families, baseball teams, corporations, governments, and other  
hierarchical organizations. But we will run into trouble in practice if  
we ignore the important distinctions between these. Possession of a  
legal monopoly on the use of coercion distinguishes government from all  
the other kinds of hierarchical organizations you mention; and, given  
your apparent agreement (Rick) with Bill on the concept of coercion, I  
would expect you to find this a crucial rather than a peripheral  
distinguishing feature. I had thought, in fact, that we agreed, thank  
goodness, at least on what we mean by that concept, since I agreed with  
Bill on virtually all his discussion of that concept last year, and you  
did, too--against Tim, Bruce Gregory, and others. But you've been using  
the concept lately in a very much looser way. One example was your  
remark (990210.1330) to Gregory that "resistance is itself a form of  
coercion." If you actually believe that, then you believe that if a  
woman fights off a rapist, they should both go to jail. It may be  
possible to build a livable society on that basis, but I think it's a  
harder sell than anarchy. More recent, and more extreme, was your claim  
(990212.0830) to Tracy that

> when one tries to get people to  
> accept \_any\_ system concept -- even one that says people  
> should be free and uncontrolled -- there is control of  
> behavior (coercion).

A year ago you would not have agreed that you and I had been coercing  
each other throughout this discussion. I would still say that we're  
not. We do speak metaphorically of the "force" of an argument, but we  
recognize the usage as metaphorical. Trivializing the concept of  
coercion by lumping it together with persuasion makes political  
discourse pretty much impossible.

Perhaps we can determine the relevance of coercion (restricted sense)  
for you as follows. Suppose that government were a voluntary  
association like your other examples, so that membership or  
participation occurred only under joint agreement of the individual and  
the organization. Membership contracts--formal or informal, implicit or  
explicit--include conditions for dissolution if either party ceases to  
be satisfied--divorce, resignation, firing, expulsion, or secession. I  
think all the evidence from existing privatization projects suggests  
that government would quickly disappear. For every service currently  
provided by government--education, police, fire, mail--I think people  
would use the money they now pay in taxes to buy the services from  
competing private firms. (The opposition to privatization among  
government employees suggests that they know this, that their job  
security depends on government-enforced monopoly, and that the market  
would demand higher standards.) Services that nobody wanted to pay for,  
like conscription, would disappear. This would be anarchy. If you  
would object to such an arrangement, then you are granting the crucial  
relevance of coercion. The difference between us is then just that you  
favor it--and you can no longer lump government indiscriminately with  
orchestras.

Your example of airplane manufacture can, in fact, be used to  
characterize anarchy in a slightly different way. If you actually look  
at the way airplanes are manufactured, what you will see is several  
large, complexly organized corporations. \_Several\_. Note especially  
that there is no Airplane Czar overseeing the whole industry and  
deciding which aircraft get produced at what times and in what quantity,  
for what price. Such a concept isn't impossible (some countries have  
tried it, with less than encouraging results); it just isn't necessary.  
Each company has a person or group who makes such decisions, but there  
isn't anything or anyone at the top of the hierarchy, over the whole  
industry. Nor is the aircraft industry unique. Consider food  
production, an enormously complex, sprawling, coordinated set of  
organizations. Yet there is no Grocery Czar. (We do have a Secretary  
of Agriculture who intervenes forcibly in the process to do things like  
legally enforcing \_minimum\_ prices for dairy products which are 50% to  
100% above the free-market price--as a special courtesy to wealthy dairy  
producers who contribute to legislative campaigns, and as a special,  
ongoing, gratuitous act of cruelty toward the poor. That arrangement  
has worked so well that Secretary Glickman is planning to implement a  
similar program for pork, which has also been far too affordable for  
poor people. But I see no reason why we couldn't do without management  
at this level.) Now anarchy is simply allowing \_all\_ services and goods  
to be provided in the same way as airplanes or food or insurance, on the  
basis of voluntary negotiation and contract. We don't need  
government-enforced monopolies for fire or police or anything else.  
\_Some\_ kind of organization and coordination will obviously be important  
in handling the maverick problem, but there is no reason to suppose that  
it has to be a protected monopoly. (Those "services," of course, that  
are inherently coercive and uniquely governmental, like conscription and  
taxation, may not find much of a market.)

Bruce (990210.1345) has raised the question of

> what  
> happens in an anarchy when negotiations break down and contracts are

abrogated.

I've answered that question in a previous post: If negotiations break  
down, no transaction takes place. If you want a Stanford library card  
but don't want to pay $500 a year for it, there's no sale. Contracts  
generally include provisions for abrogation; especially nowadays, they  
often stipulate arbitration, just as they would under anarchy. I take  
it as understood that reference to contracts and negotiations doesn't  
imply that they are always formal and explicit. I don't need to sign a  
contract every time I enter a restaurant; any restaurant that refused  
restitution or arbitration in a case of food poisoning or fraud would  
find its customers going elsewhere after a single such report.

> I wonder what  
> it would be like to negotiate the speed limit  
> on the Mass Turnpike? I suppose that those who were not part of the  
> negotiations (visitors from Montana, for example) could legitimately  
> feel free to drive at any speed they liked. Come to think of it,

that's

> what they seem to do now...

Similarly, it doesn't seem much more likely to me that individual  
drivers would negotiate driving speeds with the highway owner (though  
it's not totally out of the question that safe drivers might be granted  
more latitude) than that individual consumers negotiate the ingredients  
of Big Mac sauce. Owners would presumably be free to set limits if they  
wished, and to deny access to those who violated them; drivers might  
choose companies/routes (U.S. 20 or Route 9, etc.) according to policies  
on safety vs. speed.

Actually, I think there are more difficult issues with respect to  
privatization of roads, like liability for drunken drivers (the driver  
vs. the highway owner that admitted the driver). I don't mean they're  
insoluble, but I don't think they've received a lot of attention yet,  
probably just because privatization of roads is far from the top of most  
libertarians' list of priorities.

But let me assume you meant to ask the next question, which is what  
happens when someone refuses to abide by the decision of the arbitration  
agency (and assuming the process of appeals to other agencies has been  
exhausted). I've already answered that question, too (990201.1100):  
Such a person makes himself thereby an "outlaw," placing himself outside  
the realm of negotiation and contract. Nobody else will feel any  
obligation to honor contracts with him, and he will have a tough time  
purchasing any insurance or protection services. Most importantly, he  
would not be due restitution for harm done to him, which makes it more  
or less open season for anyone who has a grievance against him. That  
seems a pretty strong deterrent to flouting arbitration decisions.

So let me raise the next question for you and answer it (Martin  
indirectly raises this question): Wouldn't private arbitration agencies  
be subject to the grossest corruption? Couldn't they easily be bought  
by the rich? No, that's much more of a problem under a  
government-enforced monopoly. If a private arbitration agency were to  
acquire a reputation for favoring wealthy clients, that might well make  
them more attractive to the wealthier party in any contract. But it  
would make them unacceptable to the less wealthy party, and most  
contracts will have one party who will fear discrimination and refuse to  
deal with that agency. A scrupulously maintained reputation for  
fairness looks like the only way an arbitration agency could stay in  
business.

I have referred, in this and earlier posts, to restitution as the basis  
for the justice system under anarchy. Restitution is a discriminable  
concept from punishment; and, as a contract-based concept, I think it is  
compatible with PCT in a way that punishment is not. Martin  
(990210.1700) has made the interesting point that

> there \_cannot\_ be a fair contract between individuals of unequal

power.

I might well agree, at least if the concept of power is properly  
specified. If it is defined, as Martin does (earlier in the same post)  
to include economic power, then that claim invalidates heterosexual  
marriage, as many feminists have argued. (I don't necessarily take this  
as an argument against the claim.) I think the relevant dimension to  
support Martin's claim is political power, and under anarchy there are  
no \_political\_ inequalities.

Martin's concept of inequality of status points up an important  
distinction between restitution and punishment, but we must be careful  
about the meaning of words. Rick (990210.1030) plays loose with this  
concept again, when he responds to Lee's advocacy of training children  
in the use of guns:

> I presume this was to solve problems by shooting the people with whom

they disagree.

> Isn't getting shot a rather severe punishment? If you train people to

shoot other people aren't you teaching them to be

> punitive?

Lee was undoubtedly talking about self-defense against government  
soldiers who were shooting at them. Self-defense is not generally  
considered punishment. Picking up Martin's distinction, I would say  
that punishment can occur \_only\_ between those who are unequal in  
status. I can do things to hurt you, but I have no power or authority  
to punish you. We speak figuratively of my "punishing" you with a  
sarcastic reply, or of a "punishing" hurricane; but we recognize the  
figurative use with quotation marks. I think punishment can also be  
usefully distinguished from retaliation, which would be applicable to  
equals. In this respect (like practically all others), I think Bill was  
careful in his usage in Chapter 17. When one stretches concepts as far  
as you do, on the other hand--government, coercion, punishment--they can  
be used to support virtually any position; but that doesn't accomplish  
anything beyond making your position look desperate--"any stigma will do  
to beat a dogma."

Rick (990210.1030)--

> It looks like you are \_defining\_ anarchy and government  
> as different approaches to conflict resolution: the word  
> "anarchy", by your definition, seems to mean "conflict  
> resolution by negotiation and contract"; the word  
> "government", by your definition, seems to mean "conflict resolution

by

> punishment-based rule of law". Given these  
> definitions it's easy to see why [you] think B:CP Chapter 17  
> is a celebration of anarchy and a condemnation of government.

You write as though my reading of Chapter 17 were strange, but the  
strange thing is: that's what the author meant. You (and others) have  
yet to say how you interpreted the arguments of that chapter. I remind  
you that if you reject anarchy but accept the arguments of that chapter,  
there are, so far as I can see, but three logical possibilities:

"(a) Punishment-based rule of law, however feckless and  
counterproductive, is nevertheless necessary. (b) Punishment-based rule  
of law, contrary to the arguments of Chapter 17, is \_not\_ feckless and  
counterproductive after all. (c) Government, in some sense besides  
enforcement of the whims of a dictator, is possible without  
punishment-based rule of law. Bill appears to hold (a), referring me  
for support to Gibbons; I have explained twice before why I found  
Gibbons unconvincing. You (and possibly Tracy?) hold (c). No arguments  
have been advanced in support of it (or (b)), and so far as I can tell  
it is simply incoherent." (990204.1440)

Tracy has tried to carve out a fourth position by distinguishing two  
meanings of "rule of law"; I have given my reasons (990209.1652) for  
doubting whether that will get him where he wants to go.

Rick (990211.0930)--

> The solution (I think) is to stop trying to analyze society  
> in terms of system concepts (like socialism, capitalism,  
> libertarianism, etc) that were developed before we had a  
> scientific understanding of the nature of humans as  
> perceptual control systems. If we really want to figure  
> out how people can best organize themselves I think we  
> should start looking at human societies in terms of the  
> nature of the systems that make them up.

I've already expressed my support for this approach (990204.1440), when  
I described Bill as having done that in Chapter 17. He didn't spell out  
the details about how such a system might be implemented to the degree  
that I have in this thread, but that's no criticism of the book. If you  
follow through on your proposed project, I'm confident that you'll find  
the anarchic system I've described the only one consistent with PCT:  
it's the only one that doesn't \_build in\_ any involuntary, coercive  
relationships, like taxation.

When I say that anarchy is unique in not \_building in\_ coercive  
relationships, I am not saying--to repeat--that coercion cannot occur in  
an anarchic society. Nothing can guarantee that. Anybody can hold a  
club over your head at any time and demand your wallet. What I have  
said, and given reasons for believing, is that anarchy can \_minimize\_  
the coercion in a society. Rick also persists (e.g., 990210.1330) in  
equating anarchy with pacifism, despite my previously having argued that  
anarchy does not imply pacifism. As Tracy (19990211.0800) has pointed  
out, a few anarchists have been pacifists, but most are willing in  
principle to use violence in self-defense, whether against government or  
individual muggers. If I fight off an attacker, I'm not coercing him to  
do anything but stop his coercion. If you see us as equally guilty of  
coercion, then, as before, I should go to jail for not allowing him to  
succeed in robbing me. I'm not especially interested in arguing against  
pacifism; I admire Gandhi's strategy of nonviolent resistance; but, like  
Bruce Gregory (990212.0517), I wouldn't expect it to work as well  
against Hitler or Stalin as against the British, with their (somewhat  
bizarre) genteel code of conduct for war.

Rick Marken (990211.0930)--

> anarchists . . . are  
> advocating coercion as much as any advocate of government  
> regulation; they are talking about depriving people of  
> their freedom to choose non-anarchy.

That's not only total b.s.; it's another claim I've already denied  
(990204.1440). I've said explicitly that in an anarchic society you and  
your friends would be perfectly welcome to secede and form your own  
dictatorship if you wish. To enslave each other to your heart's  
content--but not anybody else. I gather that the freedom to run your  
own lives isn't good enough for you. I also pointed out that the  
generosity wasn't mutual--that governments wouldn't let anarchists  
secede. Remember?

Some miscellaneous responses to various posts:

Me:

> > The Founding  
> > Fathers of this country were pretty radical for their time (and I'm

sure

> > would be perceived as dangerously anarchistic today

Rick Marken (990210.1030)--

> Now I'm confused. I thought your definition of "anarchy"  
> is "conflict resolution by negotiation and contract". Now  
> you are telling me that the Founding Fathers were anarchists  
> because they went to war over a tax on tea or whiskey (War  
> instead of negotiation? How is this anarchistic?

I was not implying that the Founding Fathers \_were\_ anarchists; their  
intention was obviously to set up a different government. I \_did\_ say  
"would be perceived." I was assuming that anyone today who signed a  
public declaration that it was the right of people to abolish  
governments that become oppressive, and who proceeded to violently  
overthrow the existing government for reasons like a tax on tea, would  
likely be labeled a dangerous anarchist. Am I wrong?

Bruce Gregory (990210.1345)--

> don't most governments encourage conflict  
> resolution by negotiation and contract among citizens? It is only

when

> these fail that a punishment-based rule of law is invoked.

I'm not sure what negotiations between citizens you're referring to as  
having broken down when the government puts people in jail for smoking  
marijuana.

Martin Taylor (990210.1700)--

> It was my understanding that the US Constitution  
> was pretty much a codification of the English unwritten constitution

as

> it was at the time (Gearge III) with the exception (insisted on by  
> Washington) that an elected President replaced the hereditary King.

Is that not correct?

As I said above to Rick, I was not labeling the Founding Fathers as  
anarchistic myself; I was only saying that I thought people with their  
beliefs and actions would be commonly labeled that way today.

> Both English and US revolutionary systems seemed to rely on the notion

that

> the rich knew better than the poor what was good for all of them.

The Revolutionary War was not fought just by the rich; and if the  
colonists had perceived it as a war to benefit the rich, it's hard to  
imagine that they would have won. Some of the signers of the  
Declaration of Independence were rich, but many of them lost everything  
they had as a result of signing (at least their lives and fortunes).

> When there is  
> conflict, the stronger usually eliminates the ability of the weaker to  
> control. The stronger thereby often gains strength, making it easier

to

> win the next conflict (this is very clearly seen when the conflicted  
> environmental variable is money). What we have is a positive feedback  
> process, and they lead either to explosion or to a limiting condition.

Precisely this positive feedback mechanism was one of the reasons I gave  
previously for favoring anarchy. Because it applies to government as  
well as to anything else. Even though the authors of the Constitution  
thought they were placing careful checks on the growth of government  
power, the government they set up was still stronger than any other  
agency or group in the society. It took a few decades before the  
government began seriously undermining those checks, but the process has  
drastically accelerated in the 20th century. It won't be an easy  
process to stop.

You (Rick and Martin) speak, sincerely I'm sure, of using government to  
take money from the rich and give it to the poor. But if you look at  
any actual government, you'll see that it functions much more to the  
benefit of the rich and powerful than of the poor. The dairy price  
supports I mentioned are a typical example (along with pork, sugar,  
tobacco, etc.). All the money spent on transfer programs, if it  
actually went to the poor, would amount to something like $40,000 a year  
for every family of four below the poverty line. That's not what they  
get, of course: the rest goes to help make the Maryland and Virginia  
suburbs of DC the wealthiest counties in the country. But when I say  
"any actual government," I'm including socialist governments as well:  
Sweden, Cuba, the Soviet Union. Sweden has always been the showcase of  
socialism, and one of the reasons for its success thus far was that it  
started out with the highest per capita income of any country in the  
world. (That is no longer true.) But my observation has been that  
those Swedes who are wealthy enough to travel do as much of their  
shopping as possible abroad--furniture, clothes, toys, computers,  
everything--to avoid the huge Swedish taxes. Those who are too poor to  
travel, of course, are stuck with the tax--which is now still larger  
because the wealthy have the means to evade it. So I still count your  
argument about positive feedback as a point distinctly in my favor: If  
you set up one institution much more powerful than the rest, it's the  
rich and powerful who will manage to use it for their ends, to increase  
their money and power still further.

> In  
> social structures, that [positive feedback] means riot and civil war,

or strong dictatorship.

> (You noted this as a disappointing reason why some historical anarchic  
> societies succumbed, but did not note that it is a natural consequence  
> of the anarchy, which it is.)

This is certainly a possible historical eventuality, but I haven't given  
it as a reason why any historical anarchic society succumbed. The only  
examples I gave were historical conquest, which is not a unique fate for  
anarchic societies. (Whether they are especially vulnerable to foreign  
conquest is a separate, nontrivial question, with considerations on both  
sides.)

I did discuss in an earlier post the hypothetical case of one clan  
becoming much larger than the others (than the others put together), so  
that it was in a position to constitute a government. This outcome  
seems to me more likely in a clan-based than in a modern, industrial  
society, though I gave (speculative) reasons even there why I thought it  
might not be so likely. The same concern can be raised about a single  
protection agency coming thoroughly to dominate the market in an  
industrial society; but, again, I have considered this case before. If  
a single such agency were to achieve a virtual monopoly, it could hold  
that position only by continuing to provide such superior services that  
no other agency could compete. Not much basis for complaint there. It  
could not easily constitute a dictatorship, or otherwise proceed to  
wield arbitrary power, just because this would not be a society, like  
Nazi Germany, which had been disarmed by the government. Any move in  
that direction would be perceived as threatening, and would open the  
door to the immediate formation of other agencies to take all its  
business. These are only plausibility arguments, of course; but I  
haven't heard them effectively challenged.

> If we accept the principle that reorganization within an individual is  
> more likely to change the hierarchy when there is substantial error

than

> when the error is low, we must then argue that people's hierarchies

will

> be more likely to change when their social environment makes it hard

for

> them to control than when the social environment makes it easy. I

think

> it is this that provides the limiting conditions that eventually cause  
> dictatorships to be overthrown (or to be softened to a tolerable

degree)

> and that causes anarchies to give way to systems based on government  
> and the rule of law. As with individual reorganization, there is a

negative

> feedback system that resists disturbances. Departures in either

direction

> from government and the rule of law tend to be resisted.

If I understand this paragraph and those preceding, your argument seems  
similar to that made by Gibbons: that governments will tend  
intrinsically to increase their power (positive feedback), up to a point  
which provokes a revolution (or, less drastically, a  
"softening"--negative feedback). Most often, perhaps, the revolution  
simply substitutes one dictatorship for another, but occasionally there  
are gains in freedom at the expense of government power. It is less  
obvious to me what mechanism would drive a society back from anarchy  
toward government, even though I've observed such a process in  
nonpolitical settings. When I started graduate school at Clark  
University in 1968, the Psychology Department at that time was as  
anarchistic as one could be and remain accredited: no grades, and  
absolutely minimal structure in terms of timelines or requirements.  
During my first year, a second-year student was dropped because, so far  
as anyone knew, he had never done anything but sell drugs; he had not  
attended a class or written a paper or showed any interest in the  
program at all. But his dismissal precipitated a panic among students.  
Without the usual requirements as a guideline, nobody was sure how  
nearby the axe had fallen. To my astonishment, they proceeded to demand  
grades, deadlines, and requirements--all of which they got, and which  
are still in place. I think there's an important lesson here for  
anarchist theorists--I've talked about the issue before under the rubric  
of self-responsibility--at the same time that I'm unsure how direct a  
translation can be made to the political realm.

Me:

> > To my mind the most interesting aspect of your argument, however, is  
> > that it amounts to a secular version of the Argument from Design: If  
> > there is organization, there must be an organizer--someone or some  
> > agency in charge, constantly intervening to keep things in proper  
> > running order, breaking up the monopolies of IBM and Microsoft,  
> > enforcing the monopolies of the post office and the fire department,

and

> > so on.
> 
> I'm not clear either how the two parts of this quote fit together (the

part

> before and the part after the colon). It doesn't strike me as related

to

> the Argument from Design. Neither can I see that what I wrote could  
> reasonably lead you to either part of the quote.

Perhaps I read too much into your specific arguments. I understood your  
argument to be the one that I criticized at the beginning of this post:  
that some necessary tasks require hierarchical organization of people,  
and that such organization implies someone or some group at the top:  
hence government. The second premise was my inference from what you  
were saying, and was my basis for imputing to you the view that  
organization implied an Organizer. But perhaps I've stretched a  
metaphor here too far myself. The argument is what counts in any case,  
rather than the label.

A summary comment--repetitious, like the rest of this post, and the ones  
to which it responds: I'm still looking for what I entered this  
exchange for in the first place: a good argument for the necessity of  
government--understood in the usual, specific, political sense, and not  
just as hierarchical organization per se--or a good argument for why  
anarchy wouldn't work--anarchy, not pacifism or chaos or the lack of any  
organization. The exchange so far has been useful mainly just in  
creating the strong impression that nobody has such arguments to offer,  
though that's never been said. If that's going to be eventual  
conclusion, I don't need any more evidence at this point. I think  
Tracy's approach may have possibilities, but they have yet to be  
developed. In the meantime, I'm feeling impatient again with the  
process, which feels to me (and perhaps to others) too much like a  
monologue, especially since I don't have the sense that anything I've  
ever said has gotten through. But if I drop off the screen, I'll still  
be listening in.

Mike

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b19c9b/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor)\
**Post date:** [February 15, 1999, 9:20pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/23 "1999-02-15T21:20:45Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 990215 16:12]

> [From Mike Acree 990215.1304 PST)]
> 
> Since the issues overlap substantially, I'm attempting a composite  
> response to Rick, Martin, Bruce, and Tracy.
> 
> Rick's argument, as I have consistently understood it through a long  
> string of posts, is as follows (Martin's argument seems to me  
> essentially the same): (a) Many complex tasks, such as building a 747,  
> require coordination through hierarchical organization. (b) Any  
> hierarchical organization is, or has, government. (c) Therefore  
> government is necessary.

Not having yet read the rest of your message, I can't comment on its  
content. But I am most interested to discover why you think that the  
above is even close to representing my "argument."

Could you explain what I have said that leads you to that conclusion?  
If there is anything in my previous messages that could legitimately be  
interpreted the way you state, I must write a lot less clearly than  
I thought...and for that I have to apologise.

My "argument" if that's what it is, goes in quite different directions.  
It simply follows the consequences of believing in PCT so far as to  
accept the hypothesis that reorganization tends on the whole to a reduction  
of the error in perceptual control throughout the individual hierarchy.  
Your (b) and (c) comments have no relation to that, so far as I can see.

Martin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory8](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/5f8ce5/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory8](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory8)\
**Post date:** [February 15, 1999, 10:07pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/24 "1999-02-15T22:07:05Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (990215.1705 EST)]

Mike Acree 990215.1304 PST

> A summary comment--repetitious, like the rest of this post, and the ones  
> to which it responds: I'm still looking for what I entered this  
> exchange for in the first place: a good argument for the necessity of  
> government--understood in the usual, specific, political sense, and not  
> just as hierarchical organization per se--or a good argument for why  
> anarchy wouldn't work--anarchy, not pacifism or chaos or the lack of any  
> organization.

You'll excuse me for doubting that this is what you are looking for. It  
seems to me that you have a well-defined position that you are defending  
against any disturbance. Mounting such a disturbance will not lead you  
change your mind, but only to dig in deeper. Let me simply restate Enrico  
Fermi's question about extraterrestrial intelligence: If anarchy is viable,  
where are the anarchic societies?

Bruce Gregory

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/R_Marken)\
**Post date:** [February 16, 1999, 5:53am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/25 "1999-02-16T05:53:41Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (990215.2150)]

Mike Acree (990215.1304 PST) --

> Rick's argument...is as follows...: (a) Many complex tasks,  
> such as building a 747, require coordination through hierarchical  
> organization. (b) Any hierarchical organization is, or has,  
> government. (c) Therefore government is necessary.

This is not my argument. My argument (one aspect of it, anyway) is  
that societies are collections of interacting input control systems.  
"Government" and "anarchy" are words that refer to different states  
of a perceptual variable (call it "governmental") that represents  
aspects of the collective behavior of these control systems.

> Possession of a legal monopoly on the use of coercion distinguishes  
> government from all the other kinds of hierarchical organizations  
> you mention;

So having a "legal monopoly on the use of coercion" is an aspect  
of the "governmental" perception. If there is a perceived "legal  
monopoly" then you are seeing "government"; if not, you are seeing  
"anarchy". Is that it?

> and, given your apparent agreement (Rick) with Bill on the concept  
> of coercion, I would expect you to find this a crucial rather than  
> a peripheral distinguishing feature.

Coercion occurs whether there is a "legal monopoly" on it or not.  
Coercion is control of the behavior of one control system by another  
(stronger) one. Both governments (with a "legal monopoly on the use  
of coercion") and non-governments (which have no such monopoly) can  
coerce.

> But you've been using the concept [of coercion] lately in a very  
> much looser way. One example was your remark (990210.1330) to  
> Gregory that "resistance is itself a form of coercion." If you  
> actually believe that, then you believe that if a woman fights off  
> a rapist, they should both go to jail.

I use the word "coercion" to describe the control of the behavior  
of a weaker by a stronger control system. Assuming that the party  
exerting "resistance" to control is stronger than the one trying  
to control it then the one exerting resistance is doing the  
coercion.

> More recent, and more extreme, was your claim (990212.0830) to  
> Tracy that

> > when one tries to get people to accept \_any\_ system concept --  
> > even one that says people should be free and uncontrolled -- there  
> > is control of behavior (coercion).

People who successfully force other people to adopt "freedom" as  
a system concept have coerced those people. The US rebels coerced  
the British (made them leave); the Jacobins coerced the aristoracy  
(made them die). If anarchists successfully force anarchy on people  
then those people have been coerced.

> A year ago you would not have agreed that you and I had been  
> coercing each other throughout this discussion.

I still don't think we are. Neither of us is using physical force  
to get the other to agree with his point of view so there is no  
coercion.

> Suppose that government were a voluntary association... I think  
> all the evidence from existing privatization projects suggests  
> that government would quickly disappear.

Maybe it would. I just don't think coercion would necessarily  
disappear. The coercion might not be carried out by a "legal  
monopoly" (since there is no government) but it would surely be  
carried out by individuals or small vigilante groups. If I decide  
that it would be fun to let all the air out of the tires of your  
Private Fire Dept. trucks I bet \_someone\_ would try to stop me  
if they got wind of my plans. If they stop me then they have  
coerced me; they are foring me to do something I don't want to  
do (leave the air \_in\_ the tires).

> Restitution is a discriminable concept from punishment; and, as a  
> contract-based concept, I think it is compatible with PCT in a way  
> that punishment is not.

Punishment is just as "compatible" with PCT as restitution; both  
are things that happen to or can be done by input control systems.

Me:

> Given these definitions it's easy to see why [you] think B:CP  
> Chapter 17 is a celebration of anarchy and a condemnation of  
> government.

Mike:

> You write as though my reading of Chapter 17 were strange,

No. I think your reading just misses the main point of Ch. 17,  
which is that \_we are the problem\_ because \_we are controllers\_.  
Government isn't the problem; anarchy isn't the problem;  
socialism isn't the problem. The problem is that we -- each one  
of us\_ -- wants the world (including the people in it) to be  
the way \_we\_ want it to be; this almost inevitably leads to  
conflict. We have to learn how to deal with our own nature as  
perceptual control systems; and to do that we first have to  
learn what that nature is (and how it works); we have to learn  
PCT.

> but the strange thing is: that's what the author meant.

I don't believe that is what the author meant; I do think it's  
what you desperately wanted the author to have meant because  
you were committed to the wonders of anarchy before you knew  
anything about PCT.

> You (and others) have yet to say how you interpreted the arguments  
> of that chapter.

I have explained (above and in a couple other posts) how I  
interpreted the arguments of Ch. 17. Again, what I believe was  
meant in the chapter is that \_we\_ are the problem -- NOT  
government. We are the problem because we are input control  
systems -- a problem that exists whether there is a government  
or not.

> I remind you that if you reject anarchy

I'm not rejecting anarchy; I just don't believe that you can  
eliminate coercive relationships between people by privatizing  
everything or declaring a society to be an anarchy. Coercion  
exists because people are controllers, not because there is  
a big, mean "government" out there; government -- any government -  
\_is\_ people, even if it's a dictatorship (dictators and dictatees  
are people, too).

Me:

> anarchists . . . are advocating coercion as much as any advocate  
> of government regulation; they are talking about depriving people  
> of their freedom to choose non-anarchy.

Mike:

> That's not only total b.s.; it's another claim I've already denied  
> (990204.1440). I've said explicitly that in an anarchic society  
> you and your friends would be perfectly welcome to secede and form  
> your own dictatorship if you wish.

But my friends and I don't want to secede; we want to take over.  
Now what do you do? Or do we just not exist in your society?  
You keep avoiding answering this question. The question is "how  
do you deal with people who work against the rules of you anarchic  
paradise"? If you evict them or restrain them or do \_anything\_  
to keep them from violating the rules then you are doing (without  
a legal monopoly) exactly what governments do (according to you);  
you are \_coercing\_.

> The stronger thereby often gains strength, making it easier  
> to win the next conflict (this is very clearly seen when the  
> conflicted environmental variable is money). What we have is a  
> positive feedback process, and they lead either to explosion or  
> to a limiting condition.

It's a negative feedback process; there is a controlled variable  
(the variable that is the object of the conflict); the negative  
feedback control is just becoming stronger (better control).  
Positive feedback systems amplify; they don't really control.

> Precisely this positive feedback mechanism was one of the reasons  
> I gave previously for favoring anarchy.

It's not a positive feedback system.

> I'm still looking for what I entered this exchange for in the  
> first place: a good argument for the necessity of government--

Ah, No wonder you are unsatisfied. PCT can't tell you what  
perceptions to have; it can only tell you what perceptions  
are controlled, and why.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --
> 
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net  
> [http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b19c9b/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor)\
**Post date:** [February 16, 1999, 1:24pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/26 "1999-02-16T13:24:58Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 990216 7:56]

> [From Rick Marken (990215.2150) to Mike Acree (990215.1304 PST) --

Rick, you quote the following as if it were Mike's. It isn't. It is  
mine, and I think you have misunderstood it.

> > The stronger thereby often gains strength, making it easier  
> > to win the next conflict (this is very clearly seen when the  
> > conflicted environmental variable is money). What we have is a  
> > positive feedback process, and they lead either to explosion or  
> > to a limiting condition.
> 
> It's a negative feedback process; there is a controlled variable  
> (the variable that is the object of the conflict); the negative  
> feedback control is just becoming stronger (better control).

Each individual in each individual conflict is in a negative feedback  
loop. The stronger coerces the weaker and wins the conflict (e.g. getting  
more mooney).

The argument is that in many such conflicts, especially those that involve  
one party getting richer at the expense of the other, the winner of the  
conflict is in a better position to win subsequent similar conflicts,  
even conflicts against other people. Even when the conflict does not  
involve money, learning successful strategies (reorganizing effectively)  
means that the winner is more likely to win the next time. The positive  
feedback is in that a slight imbalance in strength tends to be amplified,  
becoming an ever-larger imbalance of strength. Jack the Rock becomes  
John D. Rockefeller, and can successfully coerce just about anybody.

> Positive feedback systems amplify; they don't really control.

Exactly the point. They amplify. That's why anarchy as a system is  
unstable, and why the ones we see always succumb after a short while,  
as Mike dolefully pointed out in a message a couple of weeks ago.  
If conflicts led to the loser getting stronger for the next conflict,  
there would be negative feedback that would keep the system stable, and  
we might see other kinds of systems developing into stable anarchies  
but never the reverse. Instead, what we see is occasional transitions  
into anarchy or something rather like it, but some kind of government  
always develops out of the anarchy. More often the form of government  
that develops is a dictatorship, and PCT shows why this is so.

Democratic government is a relatively new idea in the world, only around  
2500 years old, and the idea that everyone has a voice in it is much  
newer, perhaps 100 years old. It's more stable than anarchy, but it's  
still vulnerable to take-over in the same way, by the powerful gaining  
more power as a consequence of the exercise of power. There has to be  
a better way to construct a government, but we don't know what that  
way might be. Large-scale simulations of interacting reorganizing  
hierarchies might be a way to find out, but Nature has been conducting  
that experiment for a long time without coming up with an answer.

Whether or not simulations could lead to the discovery of mechanisms for  
"better" government, analytic PCT theory might do so. But first, the  
criterion for "better" has to be decided. Different people have different  
views on that. Some say that "better" means the opportunity for some  
people to have no limits on their ability to control (implying that most  
people have very restricted ability to control). Other people say that  
everyone should have the same ability to control (which I suspect implies  
that everyone has a very small range of perceptions they can control).  
One PCT-based answer might be that "best" is the minimization of control  
error summed over all the controlled perceptions in the entire population.

If that is a reasonable criterion, then there is one apparent fact and  
two questions. The fact is (according to PCT), this criterion leads to  
the lowest overall rate of reorganization among the individuals in the  
population.

Question 1: Reorganization in individuals is always changing the conflicts  
that occur among them, and therefore is always changing the overall  
error rate in the society. Is this a stable situation in the sense that  
the reorganization in individuals tends to restore the same situation  
after other reorganizations disturb it--is it like the bottom of a bowl  
being continually shaken, where the ball never sits but where it always  
tries to return?

Question 2: Is there one unique distribution of ability to control that  
is consistent with a stable situation, or do many such distributions  
exists--or are there none?

There are probably lots of other questions. But I think an examination  
of PCT is a more helpful approach to their solution than is an argument  
between ideologies.

Martin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/a8b319/32.png) [@Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Acree_Mike)\
**Post date:** [February 17, 1999, 7:02pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/27 "1999-02-17T19:02:34Z")

</div>

[From Mike Acree (990217.1101 PST)]

Bruce Gregory (990215.1705)--

Me:

> > I'm still looking for what I entered this  
> > exchange for in the first place: a good argument for the necessity

of

> > government--understood in the usual, specific, political sense, and

not

> > just as hierarchical organization per se--or a good argument for why  
> > anarchy wouldn't work--anarchy, not pacifism or chaos or the lack of

any

> > organization.
> 
> You'll excuse me for doubting that this is what you are looking for. It  
> seems to me that you have a well-defined position that you are

defending

> against any disturbance. Mounting such a disturbance will not lead you  
> change your mind, but only to dig in deeper.

You're welcome to doubt, but I don't promise to excuse. That sort of  
attribution is risky, being close to an insult which is not subject to  
disconfirmation. At least, it's not obvious what you would take as  
disconfirmation other than my changing my mind. I have made some  
psychological attributions myself, in my post on liberalism  
(990209.1650), but I also attached some mild tests of that conjecture  
(which no one has challenged). I grant you that I have no evidence to  
offer but my word, and I have also stated positions with deliberate  
provocativeness, just as I would if I were totally convinced. But  
anarchy is still a position to which I have been skeptically drawn  
myself--I've never had any friends who were anarchists, for example, and  
haven't read very much in support of such a position. But your comment  
invites me to point out in return that my interlocutors are obviously  
convinced at least as strongly of the necessity of government, despite  
an unwillingness or inability to articulate any support for that view.

> If anarchy is viable,  
> where are the anarchic societies?

And if PCT is a viable theory, why isn't everyone using it? I've  
already suggested (990210.0920), in response to the same question by  
Rick, that the answers are similar. Anarchy, as a political philosophy,  
is new, especially in relation to industrial societies. I also offered  
some speculation on why the concept of anarchy emerged only  
comparatively recently.

Mike

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/4bbf92/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory)\
**Post date:** [February 17, 1999, 7:17pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/28 "1999-02-17T19:17:09Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (990217.1412 EST)]

Mike Acree (990217.1101 PST)

> \>If anarchy is viable,  
> \>where are the anarchic societies?
> 
> And if PCT is a viable theory, why isn't everyone using it?

If you perceive these statements to be comparable there is nothing I can  
say at this point that would be helpful.

Bruce Gregory

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/a8b319/32.png) [@Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Acree_Mike)\
**Post date:** [February 17, 1999, 7:02pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/29 "1999-02-17T19:02:10Z")

</div>

[From Mike Acree (990217.1100 PST)]

Martin Taylor (990215.1612)--

I'm sorry that I wasn't following your argument. I had some concern  
that that might be the case, just because it wasn't clear to me that  
what you said added up to any sort of challenge to what I was saying.  
So I filled in the missing steps to create something relevant. Your  
last paragraph in this post presents me with the same problem:

> My "argument" if that's what it is, goes in quite different

directions.

> It simply follows the consequences of believing in PCT so far as to  
> accept the hypothesis that reorganization tends on the whole to a

reduction

> of the error in perceptual control throughout the individual

hierarchy.

If I understand it, it seems to imply that, for example, the French  
Revolution--which I take as a massive "reorganization"--reduced error  
throughout the hierarchy (whatever this is exactly in this case). That  
seems to me in the first place not obviously true, and in the second  
place not obviously relevant. I'm not happy being such a dunce, but one  
doesn't always have much choice.

Martin Taylor (990216.0756)--

> Jack the Rock becomes  
> John D. Rockefeller, and can successfully coerce just about anybody.

I don't think you can coerce anybody with money alone. The usual path  
is that of Netscape or the dairy industry, to use your money to buy  
legislators who coerce (an option not available in anarchy). It's  
often, as in the case of Netscape, a tactic of the losers. If JDR did  
that, I'm not aware of it.

> > Positive feedback systems amplify; they don't really control.
> 
> Exactly the point. They amplify. That's why anarchy as a system is  
> unstable, and why the ones we see always succumb after a short while,  
> as Mike dolefully pointed out in a message a couple of weeks ago.  
> If conflicts led to the loser getting stronger for the next conflict,  
> there would be negative feedback that would keep the system stable, and  
> we might see other kinds of systems developing into stable anarchies  
> but never the reverse. Instead, what we see is occasional transitions  
> into anarchy or something rather like it, but some kind of government  
> always develops out of the anarchy.

You evidently wrote this before reading my post that day, where I  
clarified that I had never made such a claim about anarchies succumbing.  
I believe I indicated that it was by no means impossible, but I pointed  
to some checks against it happening. The only examples I know of  
anarchies succumbing were to conquest by invaders. I know of no  
instance of government developing out of anarchy without foreign  
invasion, as happened in Somalia.

> More often the form of government  
> that develops is a dictatorship, and PCT shows why this is so.

Yes, I think we agree on the positive feedback phenomenon.

> Whether or not simulations could lead to the discovery of mechanisms

for

> "better" government, analytic PCT theory might do so. But first, the  
> criterion for "better" has to be decided. Different people have

different

> views on that. Some say that "better" means the opportunity for some  
> people to have no limits on their ability to control (implying that

most

> people have very restricted ability to control). Other people say that  
> everyone should have the same ability to control (which I suspect

implies

> that everyone has a very small range of perceptions they can control).  
> One PCT-based answer might be that "best" is the minimization of

control

> error summed over all the controlled perceptions in the entire

population.

> If that is a reasonable criterion, then there is one apparent fact and  
> two questions. The fact is (according to PCT), this criterion leads to  
> the lowest overall rate of reorganization among the individuals in the  
> population.
> 
> Question 1: Reorganization in individuals is always changing the

conflicts

> that occur among them, and therefore is always changing the overall  
> error rate in the society. Is this a stable situation in the sense that  
> the reorganization in individuals tends to restore the same situation  
> after other reorganizations disturb it--is it like the bottom of a bowl  
> being continually shaken, where the ball never sits but where it always  
> tries to return?
> 
> Question 2: Is there one unique distribution of ability to control that  
> is consistent with a stable situation, or do many such distributions  
> exists--or are there none?

I'm actually uncomfortable with this whole line of reasoning; the  
utilitarian approach of averaging over individuals feels contrary to the  
approach of PCT. Definition of a criterion of "good" or "better" may  
pull us into ideologies as well. I've appealed, explicitly at times I  
think, to "minimization of violence" as the criterion; that was as close  
as I could come, off the top of my head, to formulating the apparent  
criterion by which Bill criticized punishment-based rule of law. But it  
may be subject to the same objection; I wouldn't doubt that a better  
(more PCT) one could be formulated.

> There are probably lots of other questions. But I think an examination  
> of PCT is a more helpful approach to their solution than is an argument  
> between ideologies.

No disagreement there.

Mike

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/a8b319/32.png) [@Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Acree_Mike)\
**Post date:** [February 17, 1999, 7:02pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/30 "1999-02-17T19:02:46Z")

</div>

[From Mike Acree (990217.1102 PST)]

Rick Marken (990215.2150)--

Me:

> > Rick's argument...is as follows...: (a) Many complex tasks,  
> > such as building a 747, require coordination through hierarchical  
> > organization. (b) Any hierarchical organization is, or has,  
> > government. (c) Therefore government is necessary.
> 
> This is not my argument. My argument (one aspect of it, anyway) is  
> that societies are collections of interacting input control systems.  
> "Government" and "anarchy" are words that refer to different states  
> of a perceptual variable (call it "governmental") that represents  
> aspects of the collective behavior of these control systems.

Then what was the 747 stuff about?

Me:

> > Possession of a legal monopoly on the use of coercion distinguishes  
> > government from all the other kinds of hierarchical organizations  
> > you mention;

You:

> Coercion occurs whether there is a "legal monopoly" on it or not.  
> Coercion is control of the behavior of one control system by another  
> (stronger) one. Both governments (with a "legal monopoly on the use  
> of coercion") and non-governments (which have no such monopoly) can  
> coerce.

You miss completely the significance of the word \_legal\_. I never said  
governments had a monopoly on coercion. I've denied it about six times,  
including in the post you were responding to. Now it's your turn to  
point out that coercion will still occur under anarchy, and we can go  
around again.

> I use the word "coercion" to describe the control of the behavior  
> of a weaker by a stronger control system. Assuming that the party  
> exerting "resistance" to control is stronger than the one trying  
> to control it then the one exerting resistance is doing the  
> coercion.

How often does someone try to coerce someone stronger? It does happen,  
as with Hitler, but it's a good way to get your ass killed. Your  
definition would imply that Hitler was not coercing Allied countries  
when he invaded them, since they proved stronger.

> If I decide  
> that it would be fun to let all the air out of the tires of your  
> Private Fire Dept. trucks I bet \_someone\_ would try to stop me  
> if they got wind of my plans. If they stop me then they have  
> coerced me; they are foring me to do something I don't want to  
> do (leave the air \_in\_ the tires).

You're usage of \_coercion\_ here is one you criticized when Tim and  
others used it that way a year ago. Nothing wrong with changing your  
mind about what the word means every time you use it, but it's confusing  
when the changes are unannounced.

But it may be instructive to pursue this scenario hypothetically. The  
possibility you usually bring up is that we shoot it out, but that would  
occur only if you \_really\_ wanted the air out of my tires. If you  
succeeded in letting the air out, and refused to pay restitution, I'd  
take it to arbitration. (I might even if you simply tried.)  
Theoretically the arbitration agency could decide for either of us. But  
we don't need to consider any \_should\_s in relation to their decision;  
PCT-style, we can look simply at what is likely to happen. If an agency  
decides in favor of vandals, even just occasionally, how likely is it to  
get any business? Would you patronize them if your own property were  
vandalized? (I've already discussed the issue of evading arbitration  
decisions.)

Me:

> > Restitution is a discriminable concept from punishment; and, as a  
> > contract-based concept, I think it is compatible with PCT in a way  
> > that punishment is not.
> 
> Punishment is just as "compatible" with PCT as restitution; both  
> are things that happen to or can be done by input control systems.

No doubt whatever people do or believe, it can be explained by PCT. But  
it's a vacuous sense of \_compatible\_ that thereby makes PCT compatible  
with S-R theory and everything else in the universe.

Me:

> Given these definitions it's easy to see why [you] think B:CP  
> Chapter 17 is a celebration of anarchy and a condemnation of  
> government.

> I think your reading just misses the main point of Ch. 17,

which is that \_we are the problem\_ because \_we are controllers\_.

Needless to say, I think \_you\_'re the one who still hasn't fully grasped  
this point, so I predict no resolution on this one for a long time.

You:

> > > anarchists . . . are advocating coercion as much as any advocate  
> > > of government regulation; they are talking about depriving people  
> > > of their freedom to choose non-anarchy.

Me:

> > That's not only total b.s.; it's another claim I've already denied  
> > (990204.1440). I've said explicitly that in an anarchic society  
> > you and your friends would be perfectly welcome to secede and form  
> > your own dictatorship if you wish.

You:

> But my friends and I don't want to secede; we want to take over.  
> Now what do you do? Or do we just not exist in your society?  
> You keep avoiding answering this question. The question is "how  
> do you deal with people who work against the rules of you anarchic  
> paradise"?

I hadn't perceived myself as avoiding the question; I hadn't perceived  
the question. It is still incomplete, lacking a direct object: \_what\_  
is it that you aspire to take over? State Farm? Starbucks? The Boy  
Scouts? My house? There isn't any government to be taken over. That  
is in fact one argument (perhaps not decisive) in favor of anarchy with  
respect to defense: In a society with a government, and a  
hierarchically organized military, if you capture just the  
commander-in-chief you've got the whole country. We've been finding  
lately that guerrilla wars, especially on enemy turf, are often harder  
to win.

Your reference to "the rules of you anarchic paradise" makes it clear  
that you're still thinking of anarchy as just another kind of  
government.

> > I'm still looking for what I entered this exchange for in the  
> > first place: a good argument for the necessity of government--
> 
> Ah, No wonder you are unsatisfied. PCT can't tell you what  
> perceptions to have; it can only tell you what perceptions  
> are controlled, and why.

I don't know what you're saying. PCT doesn't say I can't be looking for  
something, and I wasn't looking to PCT to tell me what to look for.

> > but the strange thing is: that's what the author meant.
> 
> I don't believe that is what the author meant; I do think it's  
> what you desperately wanted the author to have meant because  
> you were committed to the wonders of anarchy before you knew  
> anything about PCT.

I refer you to the response I just gave Bruce Gregory on the same point.  
In your case I can make an additional observation since you were at the  
1994 CSG conference in Durango where I spoke (totally impromptu, at the  
startling but very kind encouragement of Mary) about what I called  
problems of scale, which I had just begun to think about. Bringing  
together work by Joel Kaye and Theodore Porter, I argued that there was  
a rather close parallel between the monetization of Western European  
economies around the 12th century and the development of the concept of  
scientific objectivity a few centuries later. I believe I went on there  
to identify briefly the implications for political theory (unless I felt  
I were taking too much time; I can't remember for sure); my intent in  
any case was to pose a challenge to anarchy, which I assumed at that  
time was advocated by all PCTers. My view then was that anarchy was  
limited by the same problems of scale as barter and a personal knowledge  
community: it seemed to me that it could work only in small,  
face-to-face communities of mutual knowledge and trust; the anonymous  
life of the city would be vulnerable to a serious maverick problem. No  
surprise that my impression of anarchy would be so limited; I don't  
think much has been written yet to address the question. But I later  
came to think that I had given insufficient consideration to the  
operation, and the stabilizing effects, of security or protection (and  
arbitration) agencies, serving a geographically dispersed clientele.  
The whole concept is still, of necessity, too much a figment of my  
imagination for me to be fully confident of its viability, which is why  
I was hoping for some mutual exploration of the possibilities. None of  
this proves that I was "desperately committed to the wonders of anarchy  
before I knew anything about PCT"--unless we can get hold of a tape from  
the conference and find that I indeed addressed political theory  
explicitly--but I think it ought to be enough.

Mike

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b19c9b/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor)\
**Post date:** [February 17, 1999, 8:22pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/31 "1999-02-17T20:22:44Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 990217 15:00]

> [From Mike Acree (990217.1100 PST)]
> 
> Martin Taylor (990215.1612)--

> > Whether or not simulations could lead to the discovery of mechanisms
> 
> for
> 
> > "better" government, analytic PCT theory might do so. But first, the  
> > criterion for "better" has to be decided. ...  
> > One PCT-based answer might be that "best" is the minimization of
> 
> control
> 
> > error summed over all the controlled perceptions in the entire
> 
> population.
> 
> > If that is a reasonable criterion, then there is one apparent fact and  
> > two questions. The fact is (according to PCT), this criterion leads to  
> > the lowest overall rate of reorganization among the individuals in the  
> > population.
> > 
> > Question 1: Reorganization in individuals is always changing the
> 
> conflicts
> 
> > that occur among them, and therefore is always changing the overall  
> > error rate in the society. Is this a stable situation in the sense that  
> > the reorganization in individuals tends to restore the same situation  
> > after other reorganizations disturb it--is it like the bottom of a bowl  
> > being continually shaken, where the ball never sits but where it always  
> > tries to return?
> > 
> > Question 2: Is there one unique distribution of ability to control that  
> > is consistent with a stable situation, or do many such distributions  
> > exists--or are there none?
> 
> I'm actually uncomfortable with this whole line of reasoning; the  
> utilitarian approach of averaging over individuals feels contrary to the  
> approach of PCT.

I think again you fail to follow the nature of the argument. The argument  
is not based on any concept of utility. It is based on assuming that one  
of the basic components of the PCT hypothesis is correct: reorganization  
is more likely to happen within an individual if the individual is having  
difficulty control perceptions than if the individual's perceptions are  
well controlled. If individuals are likely to reorganize, the social  
structure is likely to change, too.

If on average the individuals in a society are well able to control their  
perceptions, then there will be few reorganizations in the individuals.  
The through-other-people (i.e. "social") environmental feedback functions  
for any one person will be more stable than in a society in which other  
people are likely to reorganize more often. This provides the "fact" that  
I stated. It's almost a tautology--the better on average the control of  
perceptions among the individuals, the lower the overall rate of  
reorganization.

The two questions ask whether the lowest reorganization rate is actually  
compatible with a stable distribution of ability to control ("power" in  
everyday language), and if it is, is there one unique stable distribution  
or many.

> Definition of a criterion of "good" or "better" may  
> pull us into ideologies as well.

The objective was to eliminate any question of ideology from the criterion  
(other than an ideology "belief in the essential correctness of PCT").

> I've appealed, explicitly at times I  
> think, to "minimization of violence" as the criterion; that was as close  
> as I could come, off the top of my head, to formulating the apparent  
> criterion by which Bill criticized punishment-based rule of law. But it  
> may be subject to the same objection; I wouldn't doubt that a better  
> (more PCT) one could be formulated.

I suspect that your criterion is close to one based on best overall average  
level of control (lowest error rate averaged over all the perceptions  
controlled by all the people). Why? Because conflict always implies  
failure of control on the part of one or both parties, and conflict  
often escalates to violence. Minimizing violence seems to be a side-effect  
of maximizing average levels of control.

What a stability analysis would show is whether there is a stable structure  
that leads to a "most contented" population, or whether we are likely  
always to be in dynamic transitions between periods of democracy, anarchy,  
and dictatorship.

Martin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/4bbf92/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory)\
**Post date:** [February 17, 1999, 9:17pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/32 "1999-02-17T21:17:30Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (990217.1612 EST)]

Martin Taylor 990217 15:00

> I suspect that your criterion is close to one based on best  
> overall average  
> level of control (lowest error rate averaged over all the perceptions  
> controlled by all the people). Why? Because conflict always implies  
> failure of control on the part of one or both parties, and conflict  
> often escalates to violence. Minimizing violence seems to be  
> a side-effect  
> of maximizing average levels of control.
> 
> What a stability analysis would show is whether there is a  
> stable structure  
> that leads to a "most contented" population, or whether we are likely  
> always to be in dynamic transitions between periods of  
> democracy, anarchy,  
> and dictatorship.

This reminds me of the current situation with the Kurds. It is  
conceivable that a configuration with a Kurdish homeland would lead to a  
"most contented" population, were it not for the fact that we would have  
to reach this configuration by passing through configurations where  
conflict was greatly exacerbated. The current situation may be a local  
conflict minimum that is much less desirable than the global conflict  
minimum.

Bruce Gregory

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/R_Marken)\
**Post date:** [February 17, 1999, 9:37pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/33 "1999-02-17T21:37:37Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (990217.1440)]

Mike Acree (990217.1102 PST)--

> Now it's your turn to point out that coercion will still  
> occur under anarchy, and we can go around again.

I have no idea why you think coercion will \_not\_ occur  
under anarchy. Do people stop being control systems under  
anarchy?

> How often does someone try to coerce someone stronger?

All the time. Look at the Kurds trying to coerce the Turks,  
the Palestinians trying to coerce the Israelis. Since the  
weaker party's attempts at coercion are unsuccessful we see  
them as being \_coerced\_ and their stronger opponent as the  
coercer.

> Your definition would imply that Hitler was not coercing  
> Allied countries when he invaded them, since they proved  
> stronger.

The ones he defeated were coerced; the one's who defeated  
him coerced him. Coercion just describes the winning side  
in a conflict over the state of a controlled variable.

Me:

> If I decide that it would be fun to let all the air out of  
> the tires of your Private Fire Dept. trucks I bet \_someone\_  
> would try to stop me if they got wind of my plans. If they  
> stop me then they have coerced me; they are foring me to do  
> something I don't want to do (leave the air \_in\_ the tires).

Mike:

> You're usage of \_coercion\_ here is one you criticized when  
> Tim and others used it that way a year ago.

Not at all. The usage of coercion that I criticized is the  
one that says "coercion is not happening when there is no  
resistance to the controlling efforts of the coercer". Here  
I am saying that coercion \_is\_ happening when someone  
successfully controls my "letting air out of the tires"  
behavior, whether I resist this control or not.

> If you succeeded in letting the air out, and refused to pay  
> restitution, I'd take it to arbitration.

Take it wherever you like; I'm still letting the air out  
of the tires and I'm not paying any restitution;-) Are you  
still going to refrain from coercing me?

Me:

> But my friends and I don't want to secede; we want to take  
> over. Now what do you do?... You keep avoiding answering  
> this question. The question is "how do you deal with people  
> who work against the rules of you anarchic paradise"?

Mike:

> I hadn't perceived myself as avoiding the question; I hadn't  
> perceived the question. It is still incomplete, lacking a  
> direct object: \_what\_ is it that you aspire to take over?  
> State Farm? Starbucks? The Boy Scouts? My house?

The whole enchilada.

> There isn't any government to be taken over.

I know. So I'm establishing a government! I'm unestablishing  
the non government (anarchy) you've established. I'm an anti-  
disestablishmentarianist (finally, I got to use it!). I'm not going to  
negotiate, restitute or play fair. You can negotiate  
and arbitrate all you want but I'm not listening. Just keep  
paying me taxes and you won't get hurt.

> Your reference to "the rules of you anarchic paradise" makes  
> it clear that you're still thinking of anarchy as just  
> another kind of government.

Yes. That's my point. If you have no rules then apparently  
there is no rule against me establishing a government and  
forcing you to work for it. If there is no such rule then  
you will not try to enforce such a rule. So when I establish  
my government I haven't broken any rule and you won't try  
to unestablish my government; you won't coerce me. In that  
case, your anarchy is history because my friends and I are  
now governing your one-time anarchy. Our government has rules  
and one of them is that you don't mess with the government;  
you certainly don't get to be an anarchist anymore; if you  
do, you're toast. If you \_do\_ keep me from establishing my  
government then you are coercing me -- giving the lie to  
your claim that there is no coercion in an anarchy.

"Anarchy" is just a state of a controlled perceptual variable.  
Unless everyone wants this perceptual variable in exactly the  
same state -- the state you call "anarchy", say -- then there  
will be conflict because people will be acting to bring this  
perception to the state \_they\_ prefer. If one or more people  
are strong enough to push this variable to the state they  
prefer -- overwhelming the efforts of others to get that  
variable to the state they prefer -- then these people  
have \_coerced\_ the variable into that state.

Once you have a preference for \_any\_ particular state of a  
perceptual variable that is also controlled by other people  
then you are likely to get into conflict with those other  
people. Since most people do seem to control a perception  
of how they are organized then there is bound to be conflict  
unless everyone maintains the same reference for this  
perception (everyone wants to control for "anarchy' or  
"monarchy" or whatever), which I consider highly unlikely.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net  
> [http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/a8b319/32.png) [@Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Acree_Mike)\
**Post date:** [February 18, 1999, 8:21pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/34 "1999-02-18T20:21:51Z")

</div>

[From Mike Acree (990218.1220 PST)]

Bruce Gregory (990217.1412 EST--]

Mike Acree (990217.1101 PST)

> > \>If anarchy is viable,  
> > \>where are the anarchic societies?
> > 
> > And if PCT is a viable theory, why isn't everyone using it?
> 
> If you perceive these statements to be comparable there is nothing I

can

> say at this point that would be helpful.

Could well be, though I'm mystified by the reason. I had gone on to say  
that what anarchy and PCT had in common was that they were both radical  
new theories (anarchy understood as a political theory applicable to  
industrial societies and not merely a tacit practice of precolonial  
tribes). I have no idea what part of that is so disturbing to you.

Mike

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/a8b319/32.png) [@Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Acree_Mike)\
**Post date:** [February 18, 1999, 8:22pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/35 "1999-02-18T20:22:17Z")

</div>

[From Mike Acree (990218.1221 PST)]

Martin Taylor 990217 15:00--

I know this isn't supposed to happen on the Net, but your clarifications  
were actually helpful, and I have no objection to anything you said. I  
don't see that it gets us, in itself, very far toward resolving the  
anarchy vs. government question, but at least maybe I can give up the  
idea that you're expecting me to reach such conclusions directly from  
what you've written.

Mike

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/a8b319/32.png) [@Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Acree_Mike)\
**Post date:** [February 18, 1999, 8:22pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/36 "1999-02-18T20:22:45Z")

</div>

[From Mike Acree (990218.1222 PST)]

Rick Marken (990217.1440)--

Me:

> > Now it's your turn to point out that coercion will still  
> > occur under anarchy, and we can go around again.
> 
> I have no idea why you think coercion will \_not\_ occur  
> under anarchy. Do people stop being control systems under  
> anarchy?

Unbelievably perfect. I had just said, in the paragraph you quote:

> I never said governments had a monopoly on coercion. I've denied it

about six times, including in the post you were

> responding to.

The time previous to that goes all the way back to 2/15:

> When I say that anarchy is unique in not \_building in\_ coercive

relationships, I am not saying--to repeat--that coercion \> cannot occur  
in an anarchic society. Nothing can guarantee that. Anybody can hold a  
club over your head at any

> time and demand your wallet. What I have said, and given reasons for

believing, is that anarchy can \_minimize\_ the \> coercion in a society.  
Rick also persists (e.g., 990210.1330) in equating anarchy with  
pacifism, despite my

> previously having argued that anarchy does not imply pacifism.

So there's your cue again for denying that anarchy can eliminate  
coercion.

Rick, you've based your opposition to anarchy throughout this thread on  
the equation of anarchy with pacifism. Then you think if you've shown  
that people will respond to violence with violence that you've refuted  
anarchy--when that claim was never in dispute. Pacifism is an  
interesting position, but it's not one that I've ever tried to defend.  
You cling to your straw man as though it were a teddy bear. I'm a  
thousand times more interested in your objections to the positions I'm  
actually articulating.

> > If you succeeded in letting the air out, and refused to pay  
> > restitution, I'd take it to arbitration.
> 
> Take it wherever you like; I'm still letting the air out  
> of the tires and I'm not paying any restitution;-) Are you  
> still going to refrain from coercing me?

You are free to let to air out of my tires (if you're not forcibly  
stopped by me or my agents), to refuse to pay restitution, and to refuse  
arbitration. But I explained before why I think you're unlikely to do  
this:

Me (990215.1304):

> what happens when someone refuses to abide by the decision of the

arbitration agency (and assuming the process of \> appeals to other  
agencies has been exhausted). I've already answered that question, too  
(990201.1100): Such a

> person makes himself thereby an "outlaw," placing himself outside the

realm of negotiation and contract. Nobody

> else will feel any obligation to honor contracts with him, and he will

have a tough time purchasing any insurance or

> protection services. Most importantly, he would not be due

restitution for harm done to him, which makes it more or \> less open  
season for anyone who has a grievance against him. That seems a pretty  
strong deterrent to flouting

> arbitration decisions.

You:

> > > But my friends and I don't want to secede; we want to take  
> > > over. Now what do you do?... You keep avoiding answering  
> > > this question. The question is "how do you deal with people  
> > > who work against the rules of you anarchic paradise"?

Me:

> > I hadn't perceived myself as avoiding the question; I hadn't  
> > perceived the question. It is still incomplete, lacking a  
> > direct object: \_what\_ is it that you aspire to take over?  
> > State Farm? Starbucks? The Boy Scouts? My house?

You:

> The whole enchilada.

Me:

> > There isn't any government to be taken over.

You:

> I know. So I'm establishing a government! I'm unestablishing  
> the non government (anarchy) you've established. I'm an anti-  
> disestablishmentarianist (finally, I got to use it!). I'm not going to  
> negotiate, restitute or play fair. You can negotiate  
> and arbitrate all you want but I'm not listening. Just keep  
> paying me taxes and you won't get hurt.

If you're talking about Somalia, or sub-Saharan Africa in general, or  
North America in precolonial times, then you're talking about not just a  
theoretical possibility but a whole lot of the history of the last 500  
years. But this observation doesn't take you anywhere unless you can  
show that these anarchic tribal societies were intrinsically more  
vulnerable to conquest than those with governments. It might be hard to  
argue that conclusively one way or the other, but the evidence in favor  
of government isn't overwhelming. The Incas had a highly hierarchical  
organization, and they succumbed with astonishing speed: Once Atahualpa  
was captured (by 150 men with horses and steel weapons, in a few days, I  
think, Pisarro had the entire civilization at his command. Compare that  
conflict with the Indians of North America, who had no single chief who  
could surrender for all of them. The conquest took centuries, and not,  
I believe, for lack of trying.

If you're talking about the modern U.S. when you refer to you and your  
friends taking over the whole enchilada, then you're talking about  
guerrilla warfare against 200,000,000 people (minus you and your  
friends). I don't know how many friends you have, but 100,000 isn't  
going to be nearly enough. All of Canada and Mexico teaming up together  
would have a tough time.

It's satisfying, by the way, to see a good usage of  
\_antidisestablishmentarianist\_! I've used it (in a similarly whimsical  
spirit) in the draft of my book on statistics (referring to conservative  
backlash against postmodern efforts to disestablish the Church of  
Reason), but this is the first I've seen anyone else make good use of  
it.

Mike

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/4bbf92/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory)\
**Post date:** [February 18, 1999, 8:36pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/37 "1999-02-18T20:36:37Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (990218.1534 EST)]

Mike Acree (990218.1220 PST)

> I had gone on to say that what anarchy and PCT had in common  
> was that they were both radical  
> new theories (anarchy understood as a political theory applicable to  
> industrial societies and not merely a tacit practice of precolonial  
> tribes). I have no idea what part of that is so disturbing to you.

Perhaps you can tell me what data the political theory of anarchy was  
designed to explain. I would then know what kind of data could be used  
to test the theory. This is the same approach I take to PCT. (The  
radicalness of either theory is largely irrelevant.)

Bruce Gregory

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/a8b319/32.png) [@Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Acree_Mike)\
**Post date:** [February 22, 1999, 10:17pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/38 "1999-02-22T22:17:40Z")

</div>

[From Mike Acree (990222.1417 PST)]

Rick Marken (990218.1510)--

> > What I have said, and given reasons for believing, is that  
> > anarchy can \_minimize\_ the coercion in a society.
> 
> How does anarchy do this? Is anarchy a control system that  
> monitors the level of coercion in a society and acts to  
> lower the level of coercion when it goes above a reference?
> 
> I think you have it backward. Anarchy doesn't do (control)  
> anything; rather, anarchy may be the state to which a  
> society moves when the individual "doers" (control systems)  
> that make up that society figure out how to minimize the  
> use of coercion as the means of controlling the variables  
> they want to control.

As for anarchy being a control system or purposive agent, it certainly  
is not. There isn't any overall monitoring or controlling agent. I'm  
satisfied with your formulation that

> anarchy may be the state to which a  
> society moves when the individual "doers" (control systems)  
> that make up that society figure out how to minimize the  
> use of coercion as the means of controlling the variables  
> they want to control.

My usage that you critique throughout this post is analogous to  
statements like "PCT avoids the problems of reinforcement theory." We  
all know, in a simple-minded way, that theories aren't control systems  
and can't avoid anything. Occasionally we fall into traps of  
personification, but I would generally have taken this sort of usage to  
be understood.

It's a separate issue, and one not necessarily relevant to the question  
of anarchy vs. government, whether governments or other organizations  
are control systems. Bill has written, I believe, as though they were,  
and that treatment made sense to me. I mention it only because it's  
similar to the interesting questions of whether societies are alive.  
Maturana and Varela proposed autopoiesis as the criterion of life, but  
then famously disagreed on the question of whether societies were  
living. Does anyone know what happened to that debate?

> I'm not for or against anarchy.

This is disingenuous. At various points you've stated your support for  
taxation, (forcible) redistribution of income, and minimum wage laws,  
all of which I think you (correctly) perceive as impossible under  
anarchy.

> "Anarchy" is just a state of a controlled perceptual variable.  
> Unless everyone wants this perceptual variable in exactly the  
> same state -- the state you call "anarchy", say -- then there  
> will be conflict because people will be acting to bring this  
> perception to the state \_they\_ prefer.

This sounds like an uninteresting tautology (there's nothing else but  
controlled variables), but, depending on what you meant, is either false  
or misleading. There is no single perceptual variable for the society  
which anarchists and government advocates are jointly trying to control.  
Anarchists want anarchy for themselves, which is only to say that they  
don't want to be forcibly controlled by others, and in particular they  
don't want to set up an agency for the purpose of doing just that. But,  
as far as anarchists are concerned, everybody else is free to choose  
whatever system they want. Anarchists, virtually by definition, are  
\_not\_ seeking to coerce others. Two-for-one special today, so I repeat:  
Anarchists are not trying to coerce others. Government, however, being  
a game that requires everybody to play, its advocates must coerce any  
unwilling persons who remain within the territory. And, as I've pointed  
out, they usually don't allow such people to escape: it's too obvious  
what kind of people would leave. (Within the U.S. movement is easy, and  
California taxes made it worthwhile for Tiger Woods to move to Florida.)  
The issue of territory, in fact, gives this much truth to your position:  
that if some residents in an anarchic society wanted to form a  
government, some migration would probably be necessary: given that  
governments are totally jealous gods, they could not tolerate anarchists  
in their midst.

But I think you want to claim much more than merely the possibility that  
some people would have to move in a transition between anarchy and  
government. When anarchists seek to avoid coercion by others, you see  
them (if I read you correctly) as coercing all those others who want to  
coerce them. In this sense you are coercing all the robbers who want to  
rip you off, and women are coercing all the men to whom they are denying  
access to their bodies. Logically, a social system could be set up to  
embody such a concept, granting equal consideration to your wish not to  
be raped and to all the men who think you're good-looking. It's obvious  
to whom such a system would appeal, and it looks like a pretty good  
recipe for \_maximizing\_ violence. Under anarchy, anybody who wanted to  
set up an arbitration or protection agency which favored rapists and  
muggers, or even just treated equally their wish to rob or rape and your  
wish not to be robbed or raped, would be free to do so. But, given that  
contracts and disputes have two parties, I don't think they'll get much  
business. Two years ago I spoke as though there were something wrong or  
illogical about such a concept, thinking that that claim would be  
uncontroversial; but there's perhaps no need to resort to such language,  
when your concept of coercion will be a vastly harder sell, for those of  
practically any political persuasion, than a concept which treats  
rapists and victims, robbers and homeowners, as asymmetrically coercive.  
I also don't see anything in PCT which entails symmetrical treatment of  
trying to control others and resisting such control. Tellingly, Chapter  
17 speaks of giving up the desire to control others but not of giving up  
the desire not to be controlled by others. We know the former isn't  
easy, but it may be easier than the latter.

Mike

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/a8b319/32.png) [@Acree\_Mike](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Acree_Mike)\
**Post date:** [February 22, 1999, 10:17pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/39 "1999-02-22T22:17:33Z")

</div>

[From Mike Acree (990222.1416 PST)]

Bruce Gregory (990218.1534 EST)--

> > I had gone on to say that what anarchy and PCT had in common  
> > was that they were both radical  
> > new theories (anarchy understood as a political theory applicable to  
> > industrial societies and not merely a tacit practice of precolonial  
> > tribes). I have no idea what part of that is so disturbing to you.
> 
> Perhaps you can tell me what data the political theory of anarchy was  
> designed to explain. I would then know what kind of data could be used  
> to test the theory. This is the same approach I take to PCT. (The  
> radicalness of either theory is largely irrelevant.)

I could say that PCT is a theory of how human beings work and anarchy is  
a theory of how societies work, but that may be dignifying the latter  
usage of the word \_theory\_ a bit too much. Differences between the two  
"theories" are what's irrelevant in any case. The only similarities I  
was claiming are newness and radicalness (understood in the sense of  
profoundly different from the prevailing theories), and both of these  
are relevant, I still contend, to the slowness of their acceptance.

Mike

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/4bbf92/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory)\
**Post date:** [February 23, 1999, 2:29pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/anarchy/1080/40 "1999-02-23T14:29:50Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (990223.0928 EST)]

Mike Acree (990222.1416 PST)

> I could say that PCT is a theory of how human beings work and  
> anarchy is  
> a theory of how societies work, but that may be dignifying the latter  
> usage of the word \_theory\_ a bit too much.

So anarchy is a theory of how societies work. I must admit I'm lost. Is  
the claim that societies are anarchic even though they do not appear to  
be? Or are you claiming something else? I thought anarchy was a proposed  
model of how a society \_might\_ work (much as communism is a model of how  
a society might work). What am I missing?

> Differences  
> between the two  
> "theories" are what's irrelevant in any case. The only similarities I  
> was claiming are newness and radicalness (understood in the sense of  
> profoundly different from the prevailing theories), and both of these  
> are relevant, I still contend, to the slowness of their acceptance.

I am not sure what is to be accepted. That an anarchic society is not  
impossible?

Bruce Gregory

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