[From Dick Robertson, 2009.06\5.07.1758CDT]
After I sent that last post it occurred to me that if any of you do get involved in the symposium and would want to add a third day for a mini-CSG annual conference I would be willing to research that convent where we met once before, or other cheap but decent places, for accomodations.
----- Original Message -----
From: Bill Powers powers_w@FRONTIER.NET
Date: Thursday, May 7, 2009 10:23 am
Subject: Re: To know and to believe
[From Bill Powers (2009.05.07.0904 MDT)]
Kenny Kitzke (2009.05.06.1915 EDT)]
KK: I think you missed my point. I was trying to propose that our knowledge and our beliefs (however we define or establish them) appear in HPCT as reference perceptions. You have a method for distinguishing which of your references you perceive as knowledge and which as belief. That’s fine. But, when it comes to your behavior according to PCT, it is the reference perception and not its origin that matters. I certainly believe that and think I know it. What do you observe?
I would say they are perceptions. The reference perception simply indicates how much of a perception I want to experience. The actual appearance of a perception is what I experience happening, regardless of what I would prefer that perception to be.
I think belief and knowledge are words I use to indicate how much weight I give to any perception at higher levels, whether it matches or differs from any reference value. The lowest weight is given to perceptions I am least sure about, the ones I say I “believe”. I would say I “believe” that the crossbar of a T is shorter than the vertical stroke even though I can see that it definitely looks shorter, because I know there is an illusion and I can’t remember which way it goes. After I measure the crossbar and the vertical stroke with a ruler, I can say I “know” they are equal in length as close as I can read the scale. When controlling things, I give the most importance – use the highest gain – to control things I am pretty sure about perceiving correctly (that is, in ways I can verify). If I only “believe” I am perceiving something, I don’t take apparent errors as seriously, nor do I rely on it even if it seems to be under control. These are all higher-level judgments about lower-level perceptions.