Are we finite state automata?

In B:CP, Powers spoke about changing our perspective from viewing ourselves as automatons to viewing ourselves as autonomous. In what manner did he distance us from viewing ourselves as automatons?

This is an important insight not only of Powers but of cybernetics more broadly IMO. If organisms are understood as autonomous control systems, then we look for teleological mechanisms, which is to say end-directed feedback mechanisms, and therefore expect organisms to be self-organizing in terms of such ends. The organisms-as-automata theory in contrast is apt to expect fixed modules that produce output to be fed as input to something else. Cognitive science was initially one of the biggest offenders in that regard, taking a computer engineering metaphor of organisms to an extreme, but as the decades have passed-- surprise: the most successful projects in cognitive science are repackaged cybernetics efforts such as connectionism, deep learning, behavior-based robotics, agent-based reinforcement learning, etc.

···

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:01 PM PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP, Powers spoke about changing our perspective from viewing ourselves as automatons to viewing ourselves as autonomous. In what manner did he distance us from viewing ourselves as automatons?

This dialog between Stafford Beer and Francisco Varela is interesting and relevant: https://bit.ly/2KfXeGR

They discuss Powers’ PCT later on in it. The above link is not to the full paper but the randomly censored Google Books version. I believe it is certainly ethical even if questionably legal in certain jurisdictions to download the whole book here to see the rest of the text: http://b-ok.xyz/book/2116784/469b02

···

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:39 PM Robert Levy r.p.levy@gmail.com wrote:

This is an important insight not only of Powers but of cybernetics more broadly IMO. If organisms are understood as autonomous control systems, then we look for teleological mechanisms, which is to say end-directed feedback mechanisms, and therefore expect organisms to be self-organizing in terms of such ends. The organisms-as-automata theory in contrast is apt to expect fixed modules that produce output to be fed as input to something else. Cognitive science was initially one of the biggest offenders in that regard, taking a computer engineering metaphor of organisms to an extreme, but as the decades have passed-- surprise: the most successful projects in cognitive science are repackaged cybernetics efforts such as connectionism, deep learning, behavior-based robotics, agent-based reinforcement learning, etc.

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:01 PM PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP, Powers spoke about changing our perspective from viewing ourselves as automatons to viewing ourselves as autonomous. In what manner did he distance us from viewing ourselves as automatons?

I think that the discussion about the difference between autonomy and autonomous in that section of book is not good. It says: in an autonomous system we find that its components are so strongly interrelated that it is this internal coherence and interrelatedness that is central, rather than the way inputs are specified. I call this operational closure.

I think the author is confused because the next topic relates the fact that antibodies bind to antibodies.

The author states three points, the second of which is this: mode of relationship - going from an instructive one to laying down a sense.

Powers is cited as pointing out that the gadgets made by engineers would do what the engineers instructed, hence they were called servomechanisms or slaves. I don’t think that this is a good place to begin discussing the nature of autonomy because it suggests that autonomy is the ability to choose what to do.

I think that autonomy is not properly described as a choice of instructions. Mathematics progresses whenever we choose the correct basis with which to represent space. Yet mathematics is a system of instructions. There is no autonomy in mathematics. Yet it is the crown achievement of our existence.

···

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 3:00 PM, Robert Levy r.p.levy@gmail.com wrote:

This dialog between Stafford Beer and Francisco Varela is interesting and relevant: https://bit.ly/2KfXeGR

They discuss Powers’ PCT later on in it. The above link is not to the full paper but the randomly censored Google Books version. I believe it is certainly ethical even if questionably legal in certain jurisdictions to download the whole book here to see the rest of the text: http://b-ok.xyz/book/2116784/469b02

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:39 PM Robert Levy r.p.levy@gmail.com wrote:

This is an important insight not only of Powers but of cybernetics more broadly IMO. If organisms are understood as autonomous control systems, then we look for teleological mechanisms, which is to say end-directed feedback mechanisms, and therefore expect organisms to be self-organizing in terms of such ends. The organisms-as-automata theory in contrast is apt to expect fixed modules that produce output to be fed as input to something else. Cognitive science was initially one of the biggest offenders in that regard, taking a computer engineering metaphor of organisms to an extreme, but as the decades have passed-- surprise: the most successful projects in cognitive science are repackaged cybernetics efforts such as connectionism, deep learning, behavior-based robotics, agent-based reinforcement learning, etc.

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:01 PM PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP, Powers spoke about changing our perspective from viewing ourselves as automatons to viewing ourselves as autonomous. In what manner did he distance us from viewing ourselves as automatons?

From the book:

It is well to remember that Jean Piaget, the most epistemologically
oriented of the modern psychologists of cognition, formulated the core of
a cybernetical theory of knowledge when he wrote more than a decade before
the official birth of cybernetics: “Intelligence organizes the world by
organizing itself” (Piaget, 1937, p.311). This clearly and uncompromisingly
created a new perspective on cognition and placed the emphasis on
two hitherto neglected aspects: self-regulation and the endogenous construction
of knowledge.

I can accept the endogenous construction of knowledge as an example of intelligence organizing itself. But I think its dumb to include self-regulation as an example of “organizing” something. I don’t think intelligence or the process of invention or discovery is the process of putting a perception into a state. Rather, it is like putting a perception into a location.

···

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 4:52 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:

I think that the discussion about the difference between autonomy and autonomous in that section of book is not good. It says: in an autonomous system we find that its components are so strongly interrelated that it is this internal coherence and interrelatedness that is central, rather than the way inputs are specified. I call this operational closure.

I think the author is confused because the next topic relates the fact that antibodies bind to antibodies.

The author states three points, the second of which is this: mode of relationship - going from an instructive one to laying down a sense.

Powers is cited as pointing out that the gadgets made by engineers would do what the engineers instructed, hence they were called servomechanisms or slaves. I don’t think that this is a good place to begin discussing the nature of autonomy because it suggests that autonomy is the ability to choose what to do.

I think that autonomy is not properly described as a choice of instructions. Mathematics progresses whenever we choose the correct basis with which to represent space. Yet mathematics is a system of instructions. There is no autonomy in mathematics. Yet it is the crown achievement of our existence.

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 3:00 PM, Robert Levy r.p.levy@gmail.com wrote:

This dialog between Stafford Beer and Francisco Varela is interesting and relevant: https://bit.ly/2KfXeGR

They discuss Powers’ PCT later on in it. The above link is not to the full paper but the randomly censored Google Books version. I believe it is certainly ethical even if questionably legal in certain jurisdictions to download the whole book here to see the rest of the text: http://b-ok.xyz/book/2116784/469b02

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:39 PM Robert Levy r.p.levy@gmail.com wrote:

This is an important insight not only of Powers but of cybernetics more broadly IMO. If organisms are understood as autonomous control systems, then we look for teleological mechanisms, which is to say end-directed feedback mechanisms, and therefore expect organisms to be self-organizing in terms of such ends. The organisms-as-automata theory in contrast is apt to expect fixed modules that produce output to be fed as input to something else. Cognitive science was initially one of the biggest offenders in that regard, taking a computer engineering metaphor of organisms to an extreme, but as the decades have passed-- surprise: the most successful projects in cognitive science are repackaged cybernetics efforts such as connectionism, deep learning, behavior-based robotics, agent-based reinforcement learning, etc.

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:01 PM PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP, Powers spoke about changing our perspective from viewing ourselves as automatons to viewing ourselves as autonomous. In what manner did he distance us from viewing ourselves as automatons?

[Rick Marken 2018-06-28_18:47:24]

···

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:00 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

PY: In B:CP, Powers spoke about changing our perspective from viewing ourselves as automatons to viewing ourselves as autonomous. In what manner did he distance us from viewing ourselves as automatons? Â

RM: By showing that the behavior of organisms is a process of control consisting of observable variations in the states of controlled variables – variations that are a result of autonomously varied reference specifications for the states of these variables. This behavior is autonomous in the sense that the variations in reference specifications can occur independent of any external influence, simply as the means of controlling higher level perceptions.

Best

Rick

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

If all perceptions are derived from external influence, then all
reference specifications for lower level perceptions are also
influenced by external events. All perceptions are subject to external
influence. Therefore, nothing you do is free from external influence
unless there exists a perception that is free from external influence.
What you have said is that people's intentions are not influenced by
the environment. However, this is not true. It is often emphasized on
this thread that the words "control" and "influence" should be
discriminated. It should be obvious that people's intentions are not
controlled by the environment. There is no theory which states that
people's intentions are controlled by the environment. Nevertheless,
what you have stated is not correct because you suggest that there
exists perception independent of external influence.

Down…

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 3:48 AM
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Are we finite state automata?

[Rick Marken 2018-06-28_18:47:24]

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:00 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

PY: In B:CP, Powers spoke about changing our perspective from viewing ourselves as automatons to viewing ourselves as autonomous. In what manner did he distance us from viewing ourselves as automatons?

RM: By showing that the behavior of organisms is a process of control consisting of observable variations in the states of controlled variables –

HB : Yes and how did he showed that ??? Where exactly did he show that "behavior of organisms is a process of control consisting of observable variations

Which variables….??? Are you talking about definition of control ???

RM : …variations that are a result of autonomously varied referencee specifications for the states of these variables.

HB : Which variables ??? You are avoiding straight answer like a cat walking arround hot milk.

RM : This behavior is autonomous in the sense that the variations in reference specifications can occur independent of any external influence, simply as the means of controlling higher level perceptions.

HB : So behavior is not control as you insinuated in first statement above ??? But is result “Control of perception” ???

RM : ….the behavior of organisms is a process of control consisting of observable variations in the states of controlled variables

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.29 19.15)]

Good points, Robert, about Cognitive Science!

Rupert

···

On 28/06/2018 22:39, Robert Levy
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

    This is an important insight not only of Powers but

of cybernetics more broadly IMO. If organisms are understood as
autonomous control systems, then we look for teleological
mechanisms, which is to say end-directed feedback mechanisms,
and therefore expect organisms to be self-organizing in terms of
such ends. The organisms-as-automata theory in contrast is apt
to expect fixed modules that produce output to be fed as input
to something else. Cognitive science was initially one of the
biggest offenders in that regard, taking a computer engineering
metaphor of organisms to an extreme, but as the decades have
passed-- surprise: the most successful projects in cognitive
science are repackaged cybernetics efforts such as
connectionism, deep learning, behavior-based robotics,
agent-based reinforcement learning, etc.

r.p.levy@gmail.com

[Rick Marken 2018-06-29_12:12:35]

PY: If all perceptions are derived from external influence, then all
reference specifications for lower level perceptions are also
influenced by external events. All perceptions are subject to external
influence. Therefore, nothing you do is free from external influence
unless there exists a perception that is free from external influence.

RM: This is precisely what PCT shows to be false. Perceptions -- or, rather, the environmental basis of perceptions -- are, indeed, subject to external influence. These external influences are called "disturbances". These disturbances have little or no effect on perceptions that are controlled. The autonomy of a control system is reflected in the fact that it is the control system itself, in the form of its reference specifications, that determines the state of a controlled perception, not the disturbances to the perception. Even the actions of the system that compensate for the would-be effects of disturbances on controlled perceptions are not caused by these by these disturbances. The appearance that actions are caused by disturbances is the behavioral illusion -- the illusion that the behavior of an autonomous system is determined by external influences (that it is not autonomous).

PY: What you have said is that people's intentions are not influenced by
the environment. However, this is not true.

RM: If I said that then I misspoke because it is, indeed, not true. But not for the reasons you give. People's intentions, in the form of reference specifications for lower level perceptions that are set by higher level systems, are often set at levels determined by the influence of disturbances to the perception controlled by the higher level system. The disturbances to the higher level perception influence, via the feedback connection to that perception, the variations in the setting of the lower level reference but (per the "behavioral illusion equations) they don't cause those variations. Autonomy prevails.
Best
Rick
Â

It is often emphasized on
this thread that the words "control" and "influence" should be
discriminated. It should be obvious that people's intentions are not
controlled by the environment. There is no theory which states that
people's intentions are controlled by the environment. Nevertheless,
what you have stated is not correct because you suggest that there
exists perception independent of external influence.

Â

···

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 10:09 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN <<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

The autonomy of a control system is NOT reflected in the fact that it is the control system that determines the state of a controlled variable. Conventional control theory describes this resistance to disturbance as well. Autonomy is not demonstrated by the fact that disturbances do not determine the state of the controlled variable. Nor does the behavioral illusion say anything about autonomy. Autonomy is demonstrated by consciousness alone.Â

···

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 12:12 PM, Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-29_12:12:35]

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 10:09 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

PY: If all perceptions are derived from external influence, then all

reference specifications for lower level perceptions are also

influenced by external events. All perceptions are subject to external

influence. Therefore, nothing you do is free from external influence

unless there exists a perception that is free from external influence.

RM: This is precisely what PCT shows to be false. Perceptions – or, rather, the environmental basis of perceptions – are, indeed, subject to external influence. These external influences are called “disturbances”. These disturbances have little or no effect on perceptions that are controlled. The autonomy of a control system is reflected in the fact that it is the control system itself, in the form of its reference specifications, that determines the state of a controlled perception, not the disturbances to the perception. Even the actions of the system that compensate for the would-be effects of disturbances on controlled perceptions are not caused by these by these disturbances. The appearance that actions are caused by disturbances is the behavioral illusion – the illusion that the behavior of an autonomous system is determined by external influences (that it is not autonomous).

PY: What you have said is that people’s intentions are not influenced by

the environment. However, this is not true.

RM: If I said that then I misspoke because it is, indeed, not true. But not for the reasons you give. People’s intentions, in the form of reference specifications for lower level perceptions that are set by higher level systems, are often set at levels determined by the influence of disturbances to the perception controlled by the higher level system. The disturbances to the higher level perception influence, via the feedback connection to that perception, the variations in the setting of the lower level reference but (per the "behavioral illusion equations) they don’t *cause *those variations. Autonomy prevails.

Best

Rick

Â

It is often emphasized on
this thread that the words “control” and “influence” should be

discriminated. It should be obvious that people’s intentions are not

controlled by the environment. There is no theory which states that

people’s intentions are controlled by the environment. Nevertheless,

what you have stated is not correct because you suggest that there

exists perception independent of external influence.
Â


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Robert Levy 2018-06-29 1:05 PM PST]

“Autonomy is demonstrated by consciousness alone.”

With all due resect, this statement seems impossible to be worked into a scientifically useful AKA philosophically naturalist account. Autonomy should be understood in terms of control, whereby agents are control systems. However, any theory of agent autonomy worth its salt should ultimately serve as a demonstration of how perception and action as empirically observed in real organisms works.

···

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 12:12 PM, Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-29_12:12:35]

On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 10:09 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

PY: If all perceptions are derived from external influence, then all

reference specifications for lower level perceptions are also

influenced by external events. All perceptions are subject to external

influence. Therefore, nothing you do is free from external influence

unless there exists a perception that is free from external influence.

RM: This is precisely what PCT shows to be false. Perceptions – or, rather, the environmental basis of perceptions – are, indeed, subject to external influence. These external influences are called “disturbances”. These disturbances have little or no effect on perceptions that are controlled. The autonomy of a control system is reflected in the fact that it is the control system itself, in the form of its reference specifications, that determines the state of a controlled perception, not the disturbances to the perception. Even the actions of the system that compensate for the would-be effects of disturbances on controlled perceptions are not caused by these by these disturbances. The appearance that actions are caused by disturbances is the behavioral illusion – the illusion that the behavior of an autonomous system is determined by external influences (that it is not autonomous).

PY: What you have said is that people’s intentions are not influenced by

the environment. However, this is not true.

RM: If I said that then I misspoke because it is, indeed, not true. But not for the reasons you give. People’s intentions, in the form of reference specifications for lower level perceptions that are set by higher level systems, are often set at levels determined by the influence of disturbances to the perception controlled by the higher level system. The disturbances to the higher level perception influence, via the feedback connection to that perception, the variations in the setting of the lower level reference but (per the "behavioral illusion equations) they don’t *cause *those variations. Autonomy prevails.

Best

Rick

Â

It is often emphasized on
this thread that the words “control” and “influence” should be

discriminated. It should be obvious that people’s intentions are not

controlled by the environment. There is no theory which states that

people’s intentions are controlled by the environment. Nevertheless,

what you have stated is not correct because you suggest that there

exists perception independent of external influence.
Â


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.29 21.50)]

Is a frog autonomous? How about a plankton?

Regards,
Rupert

···

On 29/06/2018 20:54, PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIAN ( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

      The

autonomy of a control system is NOT reflected in the fact that
it is the control system that determines the state of a
controlled variable. Conventional control theory describes
this resistance to disturbance as well. Autonomy is not
demonstrated by the fact that disturbances do not determine
the state of the controlled variable. Nor does the behavioral
illusion say anything about autonomy. Autonomy is demonstrated by
consciousness alone.

pyeranos@ucla.edu

It seems the DNA gives these organisms autonomy. A constitution gives a country autonomy. Autonomy does not mean goal oriented.

···

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 1:50 PM, Rupert Young csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.29 21.50)]

  On 29/06/2018 20:54, PHILIP JERAIR

YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

      The

autonomy of a control system is NOT reflected in the fact that
it is the control system that determines the state of a
controlled variable. Conventional control theory describes
this resistance to disturbance as well. Autonomy is not
demonstrated by the fact that disturbances do not determine
the state of the controlled variable. Nor does the behavioral
illusion say anything about autonomy. Autonomy is demonstrated by
consciousness alone.

Is a frog autonomous? How about a plankton?



Regards,

Rupert

[From Robert Levy 2018-06-29 3:40 PM PST]

DNA gives these organisms autonomy. A constitution gives a country autonomy

I think this is on the right track but it doesn’t address the question of what makes DNA or a constitution necessary and sufficient for autonomy. I will venture to define autonomy as a the property of a system persisting over time by self-regulating variables that bear upon its continued persistence. Because the system itself controls factors vital to health and survival, it is autonomous. Methods of achieving autonomous self-constitution may include DNA, habits, policies, stances, agreements, constitutions etc.

···

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 1:50 PM, Rupert Young csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.29 21.50)]

  On 29/06/2018 20:54, PHILIP JERAIR

YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

      The

autonomy of a control system is NOT reflected in the fact that
it is the control system that determines the state of a
controlled variable. Conventional control theory describes
this resistance to disturbance as well. Autonomy is not
demonstrated by the fact that disturbances do not determine
the state of the controlled variable. Nor does the behavioral
illusion say anything about autonomy. Autonomy is demonstrated by
consciousness alone.

Is a frog autonomous? How about a plankton?



Regards,

Rupert

The constitution allows a country to form a government.
The property of a system persisting over time is fitness.

DNA is not a method or action. It’s not something you do.

···

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 3:49 PM, Robert Levy csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Robert Levy 2018-06-29 3:40 PM PST]

DNA gives these organisms autonomy. A constitution gives a country autonomy

I think this is on the right track but it doesn’t address the question of what makes DNA or a constitution necessary and sufficient for autonomy. I will venture to define autonomy as a the property of a system persisting over time by self-regulating variables that bear upon its continued persistence. Because the system itself controls factors vital to health and survival, it is autonomous. Methods of achieving autonomous self-constitution may include DNA, habits, policies, stances, agreements, constitutions etc.

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 2:44 PM PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

It seems the DNA gives these organisms autonomy. A constitution gives a country autonomy. Autonomy does not mean goal oriented.

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 1:50 PM, Rupert Young csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.29 21.50)]

  On 29/06/2018 20:54, PHILIP JERAIR

YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

      The

autonomy of a control system is NOT reflected in the fact that
it is the control system that determines the state of a
controlled variable. Conventional control theory describes
this resistance to disturbance as well. Autonomy is not
demonstrated by the fact that disturbances do not determine
the state of the controlled variable. Nor does the behavioral
illusion say anything about autonomy. Autonomy is demonstrated by
consciousness alone.

Is a frog autonomous? How about a plankton?



Regards,

Rupert

[Martin Taylor 2018.06.29.23.28]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.29 21.50)]

  Is a frog autonomous? How about a plankton?
I presume that these questions are in reference to "demonstrated by

consciousness alone", since they have the obvious answer “Yes”.

But I think this question of autonomy is a bit more subtle than has

been expressed so far. It goes back to at least Laplace, who claimed
that if he knew where everything in the Universe was and how it was
moving at one instant, he could predict its entire future. He saw
the Universe and everything in it as one automaton. But that
requires a standpoint outside the Universe, since it presumes the
observer to include a complete replica of the entire Universe, which
would include itself if it was in the Universe. An infinite Universe
could do this, but then the computation would also be infinite and
could not be done in finite time. All this is to argue that whether
a part of the Universe such as a machine or an organism is
autonomous depends not only on its state and mechanism, but also on
its relationship to an observer. Here on CSGnet, we have been
discussing not organisms, but models of organisms, models perceived
only in our imaginations, not determined by sensory data.

The models we more or less agree on are of organisms that have

inherited certain characteristics from their ancestors and have
acquired some of their characteristics from interactions with the
rest of the Universe (including other organisms). If Laplace had
been correct, we could have said that knowing the state of
everything just before the first precursor of life came into being
that between then and now would influence any of one’s ancestors,
one could predict exactly what one would do throughout one’s life.
But since we have learned about chaotic systems, we know that all
these things would have had to be known with perfect precision, even
if our current understanding of quantum uncertainty is wrong. So the
characteristics of an organism cannot be predicted from the history
of its ancestry together with the history of its interactions with
its environment.

Looking from the other side, ignoring history and considering only

the models, our models presume a perceptual hierarchy that is finite
in extent. There is always a top level that is not provided with
reference values from yet higher levels. The reference values for
that level either are built-in by ancestry or are influenced by
things outside the perceptual control hierarchy. Those reference
values are not influenced by environmental disturbances, as the
reference values at lower levels are, changing as the higher level
controls counter disturbances to their controlled perceptions.

These top-level reference values may depend on the history of one's

ancestors back to the beginning of life, but so far as the
individual organism is concerned, they are one’s own, responsive to
nobody and nothing outside. The way one interacts with the
environment depends on these personal and private reference values,
the “wishes” and “wants” that are most important, and one acts
autonomously and continuously to bring one’s environment into a
state that provides perceptual values that best match these personal
top-level reference values.

In a machine (so far) the top-level reference values are supplied

from outside the machine. It is not autonomous. Organisms are.

Martin
···

On 29/06/2018 20:54, PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIAN (
via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

pyeranos@ucla.edu

        The

autonomy of a control system is NOT reflected in the fact
that it is the control system that determines the state of a
controlled variable. Conventional control theory describes
this resistance to disturbance as well. Autonomy is not
demonstrated by the fact that disturbances do not determine
the state of the controlled variable. Nor does the
behavioral illusion say anything about autonomy. Autonomy is demonstrated by
consciousness alone.

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.30 10.55)]

···

pyeranos@ucla.edu

It seems the DNA gives these organisms autonomy.

(Rupert Young (2018.06.29 21.50)]

           Is

a frog autonomous? How about a plankton?

How does DNA give the feedback architecture?

···

On Sat, Jun 30, 2018 at 2:51 AM, Rupert Young csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.30 10.55)]

On 29/06/2018 22:44, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN (pyeranos@ucla.edu via
csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

It seems the DNA gives these organisms autonomy.

Ok, but that's because DNA gives the feedback architecture.




Do you think then that these have consciousness?



Rupert

(Rupert Young (2018.06.29 21.50)]

           Is

a frog autonomous? How about a plankton?

[From Rupert Young (2018.07.01 14.05)]

No idea, I'm not a geneticist. How does DNA give autonomy?

But you didn’t respond to the most important question.
Rupert

···

On 30/06/2018 20:19, PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIAN ( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

pyeranos@ucla.edu

How does DNA give the feedback architecture?

                (Rupert Young (2018.06.29

21.50)]

                       Is

a frog autonomous? How about a plankton?

          Do you think then that these have consciousness?