Beliefs reconciled...model of imagination

[From Chris Cherpas (990110.1320 PT)]

Bill Powers (990110.0954 MST)--

the imagination connection
is a way to get information from memory or output
signals into the perceptual input channels, to become
a perception. A switch is required,
and I don 't know what operates the switch.

Bruce Gregory (990110.1350 EST)--

In my model, apparently no such switching is called for.
What experiment could we use to tell which, if either,
model is better?

BG: What's your model of imagination? I might have
deleted the post you presented it in by accident.
In any case, why do you say "apparently no such
switching is called for," instead of just "no such
switching is called for?" Is this a detail you
have yet to work out in your model of imagination?

Best regards,
cc

[From Bruce Gregory (990110.1730 EST)]

Chris Cherpas (990110.1320 PT)

BG: What's your model of imagination? I might have
deleted the post you presented it in by accident.
In any case, why do you say "apparently no such
switching is called for," instead of just "no such
switching is called for?" Is this a detail you
have yet to work out in your model of imagination?

I don't have a model of imagination. I don't think such a model is required
simply to know what your beliefs are. Apparently imagination plays a very
central role in PCT. I don't see why the output of a higher-level control
system besides establishing the reference level for a lower system can't
also serve as a perception for a system that is not controlling it.

Bruce Gregory

[From Rick Marken (990110.1700)]

Chris Cherpas (990110.1320 PT)

BG: What's your model of imagination?

Bruce Gregory (990110.1730 EST)]

I don't have a model of imagination.

Then what model were you [Bruce Gregory (990110.1350 EST)] talking
about when you said:

In my model, apparently no such switching is called for.

You go on to say:

I don't see why the output of a higher-level control system
besides establishing the reference level for a lower system
can't also serve as a perception for a system that is not
controlling it.

Look at Figure 15.3 (p. 221) in B:CP. I think what you are
proposing is a model in which the memory and perceptual
switches are permanently closed (so that they are not switches,
just direct connections). Then you want to add a tap line from
the (now connected) reference signal line and have it become the
perceptual input to another control system that is not shown in
the figure (one that is not controlling the perceptual signal
that is shown). If this is what you are suggesting, I leave
the explanation of what such a perceptual tap off the reference
signal would imply experientially as an exercise.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Rick Marken (990111.0730)]

Me:

I think what you are proposing is a model in which the memory
and perceptual switches are permanently closed...Then you want
to add a tap line from the (now connected) reference signal line
and have it become the perceptual input to another control system...

Bruce Gregory (990111.1005 EST)--

A very creative interpretation of what I said. I leave contrasting
it with my actual statements as an exercise.

My [Rick Marken (990110.1700)] description of what I took to be
the meaning of your words in terms of Figure 15.3 (p. 221) in B:CP
_is_ my interpretation of your "actual statements". So what I
said in [Rick Marken (990110.1700)] constitutes my "exercise" in
contrasting my understanding of your statements with what that
understanding should be. If my understanding is wrong all you have
to do is explain what is wrong with it. An explanation that includes
functional flow diagrams would help me a lot.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Bruce Gregory (990111.1005 EST)]

Rick Marken (990110.1700)

Look at Figure 15.3 (p. 221) in B:CP. I think what you are
proposing is a model in which the memory and perceptual
switches are permanently closed (so that they are not switches,
just direct connections). Then you want to add a tap line from
the (now connected) reference signal line and have it become the
perceptual input to another control system that is not shown in
the figure (one that is not controlling the perceptual signal
that is shown). If this is what you are suggesting, I leave
the explanation of what such a perceptual tap off the reference
signal would imply experientially as an exercise.

A very creative interpretation of what I said. I leave contrasting it
with my actual statements as an exercise.

Bruce Gregory

[From Bill Powers (990111.0805 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (990110.1730 EST)]

Chris Cherpas (990110.1320 PT)

BG: What's your model of imagination?

YOU:

I don't have a model of imagination. I don't think such a model is required
simply to know what your beliefs are.

When you "know what your beliefs are," what is doing the knowing and what
is the nature of that which it knows? Is this knowing a form of perception?
That is, is some subsystem receiving information from somewhere else, and
doing something with it? Is the information arising from sensory endings in
real time? If not, where is it coming from?

Apparently imagination plays a very
central role in PCT. I don't see why the output of a higher-level control
system besides establishing the reference level for a lower system can't
also serve as a perception for a system that is not controlling it.

Imagination plays the same role in PCT that it plays in real life, whatever
it is. Imagination is a phenomenon that requires explanation, which is the
reason it's included in the model. If we didn't have to explain imagining,
thinking, dreaming, and planning (etc), that part of the PCT model wouldn't
be needed. I think you've got the cart before the horse, if you can imagine
that.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (990111.0831 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (990111.1005 EST)]

"replying" to Rick Marken (990110.1700)

A very creative interpretation of what I said. I leave contrasting it
with my actual statements as an exercise.

It's fine to reject Rick's interpretation, but we really need to know what
you're offering in its place, if anything.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (990111.1342 EST)]

Bill Powers (990111.0831 MST)

Bruce Gregory (990111.1005 EST)]
>
"replying" to Rick Marken (990110.1700)
>A very creative interpretation of what I said. I leave contrasting it
>with my actual statements as an exercise.

It's fine to reject Rick's interpretation, but we really need
to know what
you're offering in its place, if anything.

See my two most recent posts.

Bruce Gregory

[From Bruce Gregory (990111.1345 EST)]

Rick Marken (990111.0730)

My [Rick Marken (990110.1700)] description of what I took to be
the meaning of your words in terms of Figure 15.3 (p. 221) in B:CP
_is_ my interpretation of your "actual statements". So what I
said in [Rick Marken (990110.1700)] constitutes my "exercise" in
contrasting my understanding of your statements with what that
understanding should be. If my understanding is wrong all you have
to do is explain what is wrong with it. An explanation that includes
functional flow diagrams would help me a lot.

I hope my posts to Bill add a little clarity. If not, I'll try an ASCII
flow diagram.

Bruce Gregory

[From Bruce Gregory (990111.1340 EST)]

Bill Powers (990111.0805 MST)

When you "know what your beliefs are," what is doing the
knowing

Awareness.

and what
is the nature of that which it knows?

A perceptual signal.

Is this knowing a form
of perception?

Yes.

That is, is some subsystem receiving information from
somewhere else, and
doing something with it? Is the information arising from
sensory endings in
real time? If not, where is it coming from?

A sensory signal copy of the output of a higher level control system.

Imagination plays the same role in PCT that it plays in real
life, whatever
it is. Imagination is a phenomenon that requires explanation,
which is the
reason it's included in the model. If we didn't have to
explain imagining,
thinking, dreaming, and planning (etc), that part of the PCT
model wouldn't
be needed. I think you've got the cart before the horse, if
you can imagine
that.

I'm not competing with PCT, simply suggesting an alternative mechanism
for knowing what our beliefs are.

Bruce Gregory