Best-Laid Plans

[Acree_Michael]

[From Mike Acree (2003.04.02.1645 PST)]

The following article has interesting observations about modeling aggregates of control systems, and about forgetting that control systems push back.

Some of the remarks about central planners remind me of what economist Joe Fuhrig said about Keynes: that he was never so surprised as on the first Easter after his death.

Mike

http://www.mises.org/fullstory.asp?control=1197

Best-Laid Plans

Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.

[Posted April 1, 2003]

Explaining why the opening blows in the War on Iraq did not go as planned,
General William Wallace offered this revealing, damning, and now-famous
comment: "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different from the one we had
war-gamed against."

The remark "ignited the ire of the White House," the Washington Post
reports. Why? Wallace broke the cardinal rule of all central planning: never
admit error. In the real world, the missteps of the war are not surprising.
It's not unusual that a government action did not go as planned, or as
"gamed," to use General Wallace's verb.

The game in question was called Millennium Challenge 2002, played over three
weeks during last July and August. At a cost of $250 million, the military
involved 13,500 personnel from all four services to wage a mock war (in nine
live settings and 17 simulations). In the game, everything was designed to
go right for the U.S.: weapons were accurate, soldiers were fast and agile,
and the command was all knowing. Enemies rolled over when faced with an
impressive military machine. The U.S. won the game.

But as General Paul Van Riper complained, the game was "almost entirely
scripted to ensure a U.S. win." In early runs of the game, Riper was asked
to play the enemy and attempt to elude the U.S. planners. When he succeeded
in doing so, the game was changed to diminish the role of human volition on
his side. Once the game became purely static, the planners won handily.

War gaming may be the newest term for the static trial runs that government
officials use as proxies for a real-world that always surprises them. If we
want to call war planning a "social science"-that's how the Pentagon thinks
of it-what we have here is a classic error: the belief that government
policy and its effects can be modeled in the same way as the physical
sciences.

But as Ludwig von Mises says, "in the field of purposive human action and
social relations no experiments can be made and no experiments have ever
been made." To the extent that models deal with real conditions, all data
used in the model are derived from history. The future is something else
entirely. Conditions change. Variables and change cannot be isolated from
other variables and changes.

In the games planners play, the model builder wins by outsmarting an
opponent programmed to react in predictable ways. The conclusion is decided
by the assumptions built into the system. The more variables in the game,
the harder it becomes to win. As for truly unpredictable and unknown
variables, the kind we associate with acts of human will, they cannot be
modeled. If this is true in peace, it is all the more true in war.

Nonetheless, the planners never give up. Whether attempted to impose a
national "energy plan" or engaging in large-scale war planning, they
authorities never seem to give up their models.

Indeed, the attempt to model the unmodelable dates way back.

The socialists in the 1930s dismissed Mises's claim that central planning
could not work because it does not generate prices necessary for economic
calculation. The answer, they said, is to assign prices to goods based on
all available information. Get the inputs right, they said, and the outputs
would be right too.

Mises's response was that the games of central planners have nothing to do
with the demands placed on the market in the real world. Entrepreneurs must
discover the values and priorities of consumers through a real-world process
of trial and error. Divvying up capital between competing ends requires
property titles, the ability to exchange, and the freedom to choose. The
fact of exchange generates market prices that permit profits and losses to
be calculated, and hence guide production.

Central planners who attempt to replicate this process within the structure
of an equation or a static game simulation are fooling themselves. They are
merely playing a game called "market," and not truly engaging the real
world.

Mises's critique of central planning applies in peacetime or wartime.
Central planners are apt to make calamitous mistakes whether the aim is to
produce wealth (in peacetime) or destroy it (in wartime). The game called
"war" is no better at preparing central planners for real life than the game
called "market."

What's especially interesting is how attempts at central planning display a
series of highly typical features. Whether we are talking about a
Breshnev-style economic plan, a New-Deal-style antidepression program, or
the current war against Iraq, government planners are inclined toward the
same failings:

Overutilization of resources. At the outset, the war planners anticipated
that a few strategically placed bombs, and a massive display of human will
combined with plenty of psychological operations, would be enough to achieve
victory. The same approach has been adopted by all central planners in all
times. Faced with the sudden reality that the first round of plans didn't
work, the response is wholly predictable: more of the same.

When one "stimulus plan" fails to revive an economy, the government's
approach is to spend ever more money or drive interest rates ever lower. In
war, the approach is to drop more bombs and send more troops. If something
goes wrong, it is because insufficient resources have been supplied. We are
familiar with this line of thinking from the proponents of the welfare
state. But the same is true for the warfare state. The rationale behind this
approach in war is to convey to the enemy-whether that enemy is a recession
or a foreign foe-that planners really mean business.

In a world of liberty and peace, the economy is always working to do more
with less. No entrepreneur has the luxury of just throwing more money and
labor at a problem. When the enterprise is not profitable, the capitalist
seeks to economize and reassess. The exact opposite impulse drives the
socialist planner or war planner. Instead of cutting, capital and labor are
overutilized, while the underlying plan remains unchanged, with the result
of increased squandering, destruction, and eventual collapse.

Not accounting for error. Central planners attempt to plan for contingencies
but rarely consider that they may have missed something fundamental. It is
well established that the war planners made two crucial assumptions in the
current war: that the Iraqi government would topple in days and that the
Americans would be welcomed by one and all.

Someone planning the war forgot to consider the reality that has dominated
the entire gulf region for ten years: the hatred engendered by deadly
sanctions. Hardly anyone in D.C. wants to consider these and their effects
on the political constellation in the Mid East. They have ruined the image
of America as a force for liberation. But the war planners turned a blind
eye to this, even after the September 11th terrorists specifically cited the
sanctions as an underlying source of their hate.

It is evidently the case that most Iraqis are more anxious to be liberated
from American sanctions followed by the American invasion than they are to
be liberated from Saddam, no matter how bad he is. In fact, the invasion has
made Saddam a folk hero throughout a region where has was previously
unpopular. This is the big picture that the war planners completely missed.
They failed to critically examine the possibility that the Iraqis will
resent the invaders even more than their own government.

Underestimating the will to resist. The great error of all central planners
is to assume that there will be no unanticipated consequences associated
with their policies. They believe that once people have the merits of the
plan explained to them, they will go along with it. The people are the clay
and the planners are the masters, so their hubristic minds believe.

But the truth is that people are not automatons and there are other forces
at work besides the will of the planning regime. People resist central
economic plans and they resist wartime plans too. The usual response of the
planner when faced with resistance is to liquidate those who dare not go
along. Once these meddlesome troublemakers are eliminated, they believe, the
results of the plan will begin to show. In the Ukraine in the 1930s, and
Cambodia in the 1970s, that was pretty much everyone.

The refusal to admit error. Wallace's open admission that something was
amiss was highly unusual. How many times in recent days have we received
assurance that military planners have "full confidence in the plan"? Why do
they persist in making such radically implausible claims? Do they really
expect us to accept the idea that they are infallible, to ignore all the
piles of evidence pouring in that events have belied every expectation? And
why do they believe that we are going to be comforted in the fact that they
are ignoring every bit of this evidence?

The public might actually be more supportive if the central planners were
willing to admit error. But that is not the way of the planners. They
believe that they must posture as gods on earth while insisting on total
deference. Even more frightening, they might actually believe they are gods
on earth and that anything that appears to contradict their plans is mere
illusion or must be, by definition, a small menace that is easily overcome.
The truth is that if Iraqis do not want the Americans there, we face a
choice: either make peace and get out, or administer the entire country as a
large-scale prison.

Assuming that the world is ours for the making. In the simple-minded view of
the central planners, society is infinitely malleable. It takes the form
imposed on it by bayonets and bombs. The planners are loath to admit that
there are forces beyond their control, forces like culture, economics, and
the inherent limits of power to accomplish its aims. The people who planned
the war on Iraq dismiss suggestions that perhaps not everyone in Iraq is
going to be overjoyed at the prospect of gaining freedom through bombing,
destruction, and martial law administered by a U.S. military dictatorship.
They dismiss the possibility that resources to impose the plan may
eventually run out.

Looking to the future, there are many people in Washington who have opinions
on how best to manage a post-war Iraq. They have probably "gamed" this
scenario too, and come up with the idea that Iraq needs a military
dictatorship for a time. But the advocates of dictatorship always assume
that they will be in a position to make all the decisions. They consider the
viability of their own plan and not the possibility that someone else's plan
will prevail.

Let's grant the unrealistic assumption that one plan will prevail in a
postwar Iraq. What is the big picture that the planners are overlooking in
this case? It is that every plan for dictatorship relies on a relentless
beating of the population into submission. Only those blinded by ideology
can dare call this liberation.

Persisting in ignorance. F.A. Hayek described the voluntary society as one
of continual learning. We might describe government planning as one in which
ignorance persists no matter what. The people who gave us Millennium
Challenge, in fact, have prepared another war game called Olympic Challenge
and Pinnacle Challenge-both are games that build "on what we learn from
MC02" particularly as it affects RDO.

And what is RDO? The very embodiment of the best-laid plan:

  A rapid decisive operation (RDO) will integrate knowledge, C2, and
operations to achieve the desired political/military effect. In preparing
for and conducting a rapid decisive operation, the military acts in concert
with and leverages the other instruments of national power to understand and
reduce the regional adversary's critical capabilities and coherence. The
U.S. and its allies asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions and
in dimensions against which he has no counter, dictating the terms and tempo
of the operation. The adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and
unable to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions that are against
U.S. interests or has his capabilities defeated.

The world would be a much safer place if the planners would stick to their
games and leave real life alone.

···

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----

Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. (Rockwell@mises.org) is president of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, and editor of LewRockwell.com.

------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~-->
Save Smiley. Help put Messenger back in the office.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/4PqtEC/anyFAA/i5gGAA/nJ9qlB/TM
---------------------------------------------------------------------~->

To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
libs4peace-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2003.04.24 21:10 EDT)]

Mike Acree (2003.04.02.1645 PST)--
At 08:43 PM 4/2/2003, Acree, Michael quoted Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. quoting Ludwig von Mises:

"in the field of purposive human action and
social relations no experiments can be made and no experiments have ever
been made."

I think we must take exception to this, although, admittedly, PCT work with "social relations" is still at a very primitive stage.

Rockwell went on to say

To the extent that models deal with real conditions, all data
used in the model are derived from history. The future is something else
entirely. Conditions change. Variables and change cannot be isolated from
other variables and changes.

This is the difference between a descriptive "model" and a generative model.

         /Bruce Nevin

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.04.24.1945)]

Bruce Nevin (2003.04.24 21:10 EDT) --

Mike Acree (2003.04.02.1645 PST) quoted Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
quoting Ludwig von Mises:

>"in the field of purposive human action and
>social relations no experiments can be made and no experiments have ever
>been made."

I think we must take exception to this

Not just _take_ exception but also _bring_ many examples of good experiments on
purposive human action and social relations to the table.

Good catch, Bruce.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[Acree_Michael]

[From Mike Acree (2003.04.29 10:20 PDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2003.04.24 21:10 EDT)--

At 08:43 PM 4/2/2003, Acree, Michael quoted Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
quoting Ludwig von Mises:

"in the field of purposive human action and
social relations no experiments can be made and no experiments have ever
been made."

I think we must take exception to this, although, admittedly, PCT work with
"social relations" is still at a very primitive stage.

Rockwell went on to say

To the extent that models deal with real conditions, all data
used in the model are derived from history. The future is something else
entirely. Conditions change. Variables and change cannot be isolated from
other variables and changes.

This is the difference between a descriptive "model" and a generative model.

Thanks, Bruce, for these good points.

Mises was referring here to experiments as the term has often been understood in the physical sciences, including (a) the isolation of a single factor as causal and (b) a _general_ causal statement as a result. He would argue that the "data" of human action and social relations are unique and historical, to be understood by interpretation. (He obviously accepted the familiar distinction between _Geisteswissenschaften_ and _Naturwissenschaften_ in late-19th-century German philosophy--though such exclusive categorizations tend to make any bisexual nervous.) If we observe that a 10% increase in the supply of potatoes is followed by an 8% decline in the price in Atlantis, in his example, we can't conclude anything about the relation in other times and places. As I've pointed out before, Mises and PCT share a methodological individualism, rejecting a statistical approach to economics and psychology, respectively. If Mises would decline to call the Test for the Controlled Var!
iable an experiment (and I am not at all sure that he would have), it would be on the basis (b), that only a singular event were being explained. But I suspect the idea simply never occurred to him. (As for PCT theory, he would probably see it as _Naturwissenschaftliche_.) In any case, I'm not particularly concerned to defend Mises; but neither do I see any of his work impugning PCT.

As for models, my sense, again, is that both Mises and PCT are more interested in generative models than in Clever Hans simulations.

Mike

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.04.29.1159 MDT)]

Mike Acree (2003.04.29 10:20 PDT)

>Mises was referring here to experiments as the term has often been
understood in the >physical sciences, including (a) the isolation of a
single factor as causal and (b) a >_general_ causal statement as a result.

But this is precisely what the physical sciences do NOT do. You're thinking
of imitations of the physical sciences as the behavioral, social, and
biological sciences have MISunderstood them.

Consider the formula for predicting the force of attraction between two masses:

f = G*m1*m2/r^2 (r^2 means r*r, r squared)

What is "the cause" of the force f? I count four quantities on the right
side. There is an infinity of different combinations of values on the right
that will "cause" the same force to appear. Changing any one of them with
the others constant will "cause" the force to change. However, for any
change in one of the values, there is an infinity of combinations of
changes in the other three values that will result in the force remaining
unchanged. The idea of causation in this situation is nonsense, as it is in
most phenomena studied under physics and chemistry.

>If we observe that a 10% increase in the supply of potatoes is followed
by an 8% >decline in the price in Atlantis, in his example, we can't
conclude anything about the >relation in other times and places.

On the other hand, if we understand _how_ the price of Atlantis depends on
the supply of potatoes, and verify this model by observing the variables in
many different circumstances, we are perfectly justified in accepting the
apparent relationship as real. Maybe that's what you mean by
Naturewissenschaft.

Here's a sample of Mises, which I saved for an occasion like this:

···

======================================================================================
  Human action is necessarily always rational. The term "rational action"
is therefore pleonastic and must be rejected as such. When applied to the
ultimate ends of action, the terms rational and irrational are
inappropriate and meaningless. The ultimate end of action is always the
satisfaction of some desires of the acting man. Since nobody is in a
position to substitute his own value judgments for those of the acting
individual, it is vain to pass judgment on other people's aims and
volitions. No man is qualified to declare what would make another man
happier or less discontented. The critic either tells us what he believes
he would aim at if he were in the place of his fellow; or, in dictatorial
arrogance blithely disposing of his fellow's will and aspirations, declares
what condition of this other man would better suit himself, the critic.

As usual, this Ayn Randish sort of pseudophilosophy considers only the
cases favorable to the idea being promoted. It is certainly NOT vain to
pass judgments on the values of other people. If someone on the street
decided he had a better use for the money in my wallet than I have, I would
form a very poor opinion of his values, and would do my best to thwart
them, either right then or as soon afterward as possible. When social
intelligence makes its appearance in our development, we realize that we
need to reach agreements with other people about many things. Those who
simply go their own way, treating others as obstacles instead of equals,
are dealt with as children, or as if they are insane.

I don't have much use for Mises.

Best,

Bill P.

[Bruce_Gregory4]

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.0429.1525)]

Bill Powers (2003.04.29.1159 MDT)

As usual, this Ayn Randish sort of pseudophilosophy considers only the
cases favorable to the idea being promoted.

I am very interested in the process by which we come to consider "only the
cases favorable to the idea being promoted." As far as I can tell, examples
unfavorable to the case being promoted are not simply ignored, they never even
emerge in awareness. It is as if the idea being promoted inhibits the
emergence of ideas that might conflict with it. What circumstances cause this
flip? Why does it seem to happen to some of us and not to others?

[Acree_Michael]

[From Mike Acree (2003.04.29.1254 PDT)]

Bill Powers (2003.04.29.1159 MDT)--

>Mises was referring here to experiments as the term has often been
understood in the >physical sciences, including (a) the isolation of a
single factor as causal and (b) a >_general_ causal statement as a result.

But this is precisely what the physical sciences do NOT do. You're thinking
of imitations of the physical sciences as the behavioral, social, and
biological sciences have MISunderstood them.

Consider the formula for predicting the force of attraction between two masses:

f = G*m1*m2/r^2 (r^2 means r*r, r squared)

What is "the cause" of the force f? I count four quantities on the right
side. There is an infinity of different combinations of values on the right
that will "cause" the same force to appear. Changing any one of them with
the others constant will "cause" the force to change. However, for any
change in one of the values, there is an infinity of combinations of
changes in the other three values that will result in the force remaining
unchanged. The idea of causation in this situation is nonsense, as it is in
most phenomena studied under physics and chemistry.

>If we observe that a 10% increase in the supply of potatoes is followed
by an 8% >decline in the price in Atlantis, in his example, we can't
conclude anything about the >relation in other times and places.

On the other hand, if we understand _how_ the price of Atlantis depends on
the supply of potatoes, and verify this model by observing the variables in
many different circumstances, we are perfectly justified in accepting the
apparent relationship as real.

I agree with all you've said here, including the point about causality in the physical sciences as perceived by social scientists. That's partly why I said "as the term [experiment] has often been understood."

Here's a sample of Mises, which I saved for an occasion like this:

======================================================================================
Human action is necessarily always rational. The term "rational action"
is therefore pleonastic and must be rejected as such. When applied to the
ultimate ends of action, the terms rational and irrational are
inappropriate and meaningless. The ultimate end of action is always the
satisfaction of some desires of the acting man. Since nobody is in a
position to substitute his own value judgments for those of the acting
individual, it is vain to pass judgment on other people's aims and
volitions. No man is qualified to declare what would make another man
happier or less discontented. The critic either tells us what he believes
he would aim at if he were in the place of his fellow; or, in dictatorial
arrogance blithely disposing of his fellow's will and aspirations, declares
what condition of this other man would better suit himself, the critic.

As usual, this Ayn Randish sort of pseudophilosophy considers only the
cases favorable to the idea being promoted. It is certainly NOT vain to
pass judgments on the values of other people. If someone on the street
decided he had a better use for the money in my wallet than I have, I would
form a very poor opinion of his values, and would do my best to thwart
them, either right then or as soon afterward as possible. When social
intelligence makes its appearance in our development, we realize that we
need to reach agreements with other people about many things. Those who
simply go their own way, treating others as obstacles instead of equals,
are dealt with as children, or as if they are insane.

I don't have much use for Mises.

An interesting passage you've picked here to criticize. Actually, Rand disavowed Mises' philosophy. I never heard her reasons, but I gather they were similar to mine; I see him, at least, as overdrawing various epistemological distinctions, like a priori/empirical and _Geisteswissenschafte_/_Naturwissenschafte_ (neither dichotomy was original with him, of course).

But the passage you quote is one I read as quite similar to passages in Chapter 17. Mises says: "No man is quaified to delcare what would make another man happier or less discontented"; you say (p. 269): "But one person cannot feel another's intrinsic errors" (original in italics). Mises says: "The critic either tells us what he believes
he would aim at if he were in the place of his fellow; or, in dictatorial arrogance blithely disposing of his fellow's will and aspirations, declares what condition of this other man would better suit himself, the critic." You say (p. 260): "People who want to control other people seldom admit that they _want_ to, that controlling people gives them any satisfaction, or that they in any way are to blame for their own behavior. Rather, they prefer to objectify the situation, saying that morality requires control, or logic requires it, or self-preservation requires it, or scientific experiment proves its necessity, or the good of society demands it (and who am I go to against society?). . . . Thus my argument here will not be against morality, or logic, or self-preservation, or science: to speak of justifications at all is to miss the point."

You and Mises and I would all do what we could to thwart a mugger, and we were all brought up to believe that protecting ourselves against such an attack (or retaliating afterward) entailed a (moral, or psychiatric, etc.) judgment of the attacker. But I would read Mises, and the Powers of Chapter 17, as saying that the judgment was indeed vain, and unnecessary: If we take steps to protect ourselves, the judgment is superfluous, a story we tell ourselves (and others) to make us feel better about our own actions.

I don't see why Mises would call all human behavior rational; as he himself immediately acknowledges, that act of labeling renders itself pointless and inappropriate.

Certainly Mises and I would agree with you on the importance of reaching "agreements with other people about many things."

Responding to criticisms of Mises unavoidably puts me in the position of appearing to defend Mises, which is not (as I've said) something I'm particularly controlling for. But I was intrigued in the present instance that you should see yourself so different from the Mises in this paragraph. I don't have a need, either, to see similarities between you where there aren't any, so perhaps you'll set me straight if I've misread you.

Mike

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.04.29.1904 MDT)]
Mike Acree (2003.04.29.1254 PDT)--

>But the passage you quote is one I read as quite similar to passages in
Chapter 17. >Mises says: "No man is quaified to delcare what would make
another man happier or less >discontented"; you say (p. 269): "But one
person cannot feel another's intrinsic >errors" (original in
italics). Mises says: "The critic either tells us what he >believes he
would aim at if he were in the place of his fellow; or, in
dictatorial >arrogance blithely disposing of his fellow's will and
aspirations, declares what >condition of this other man would better suit
himself, the critic." You say (p. 260): "People who want to control other
people seldom admit that they _want_ to, that >controlling people gives
them any satisfaction, or that they in any way are to blame >for their own
behavior. Rather, they prefer to objectify the situation, saying
that >morality requires control, or logic requires it, or self-preservation
requires it, or >scientific experiment proves its necessity, or the good of
society demands it (and who >am I go to against society?). . . . Thus my
argument here will not be against >morality, or logic, or
self-preservation, or science: to speak of justifications at >all is to
miss the point."

I had forgotten those words from my youth, written more than 30 years ago.
Thanks for reminding me. I see that I was much in the same frame of mind as
Mises seemed to be, and that I have read in Ayn Rand's works. My focus was
on the fact of individual autonomy and the essential separateness of
individuals. I clearly felt that the control of other people was an ignoble
goal, and even implied that it is not, in the long run, possible.

What I was overlooking was simply that our goals, at the higher levels, are
not focused on ourselves, but on the shape of the world in which we live,
and hope to live. From the systems standpoint, my position is no more
privileged than anyone else's. "Self-preservation" is far from the highest
consideration; indeed, the "self" is a relatively low-order phenomenon
(though quite real).

In the real world, people do not all seek the same ends, nor are the ends
they seek totally compatible. Furthermore, an individual's capacity for
control is limited; there are aspirations that can be achieved only with
the help of others (for example, building a skyscraper or exploring space).
So an essential part of human interaction is the trading of control: I put
myself at your service to help you with your goals, and you do the same for
me, or someone like me. If we reject all attempts by other people to
control us just as a matter of principle, we lose most of what it means to
be human beings in a universe with others of our kind. We become
fountainheads of aloneness, if Ayn would have permitted the appropriation
of her term.

My respect for and liking of the human race is at a low ebb right now. I've
said all that makes any sense to me today. Tomorrow can take care of itself.

Best,

Bill P.

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.04.29.1932 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0429.1525)--

I am very interested in the process by which we come to consider "only the
cases favorable to the idea being promoted." As far as I can tell, examples
unfavorable to the case being promoted are not simply ignored, they never even
emerge in awareness. It is as if the idea being promoted inhibits the
emergence of ideas that might conflict with it. What circumstances cause this
flip? Why does it seem to happen to some of us and not to others?

I think one has to realize the ultimate advantages of trying to deal with
all the evidence (as much as one can), when seeking truth about anything. I
learned it as an idealized concept of how a scientist works, and stuck with
it long enough to get some vague idea of what it means. There is obviously
a lot of prestige and immediate satisfaction to be found in proving that
you are right, so if careful selection of facts will accomplish that, why
not? I saw a letter from a science student somewhere recently in which the
student solemnly announced that what scientists do is form an hypothesis
and then prove that it's right. I remember stories from long ago in which
the heroic scientist insisted against all his colleagues that he was right,
and finally succeeded in proving that he was. I can recall being confused
about that -- how could he know he was right before he had even done any
experiments? What would have happened if he had found he was wrong?

Maybe it's simply experience that eventually convinces some people that the
best way to avoid being wrong so often is not to try so hard to be right.

Best,

Bill P.

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2003.0429 22:35 EDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0429.1525) –

I am very interested in the process by which
we come to consider "only the

cases favorable to the idea being promoted." As far as I can tell,
examples

unfavorable to the case being promoted are not simply ignored, they never
even emerge in awareness. It is as if the idea being promoted inhibits
the

emergence of ideas that might conflict with it. What circumstances cause
this

flip? Why does it seem to happen to some of us and not to
others?

This second question may be related to the distinction between dogmatism
and rigidity. Rigidity is resistance to change in a single belief (or
disbelief), and dogmatism (or closed-mindedness) is resistance to change
of a system of beliefs and disbeliefs. A person may hold certain ideas
rigidly while still being in general open minded, and a person may be
closed-minded (dogmatic) while not being rigid about certain ideas or
beliefs.
A closed-minded (dogmatic) person, compared with an open-minded
person

• Has more difficulty entertaining alternative ideas (systems,
  theories).
• Has more difficulty integrating a new idea into their belief-disbelief
  system.
• Takes longer to recall such ideas after an interval of time, having
  used them successfully to solve a problem or perform a task.
• Strongly rejects what they disbelieve, and is more likely to use
  opinionated language to do so (rejecting the person as well as the idea:
  “Only an idiot would think that blah blah blah”).
• Does not differentiate disbeliefs from one another.
• Most of the time perceives their world or their situation as
  threatening.
• Has difficulty evaluating information on its merits without reference
  to information about its source.
• Perceives authority as absolute and accepts or rejects people according
  to their agreement or disagreement with authority.
• Does not question or try to resolve inconsistencies in ideas perceived
  as emanating from authority
• Is more likely to adhere to beliefs and disbeliefs that are
  inconsistent with each other, being attending to them in isolation from
  one another.
  (Source: Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (Basic Books,
  1960).)

Why these differences? Surely we all are capable of being open-minded or
closed-minded, defending particular beliefs in a rigid way or
entertaining alternatives in a flexible way, being authoritarian or
assessing information on its merits, using opinionated language or
evaluating the message apart from the messenger, surely it is a matter of
emphasis or more or less strong preference on the continua suggested by
these polarities. Often “how” is a more fruitful question than
“why”. In part this is probably a family heirloom, cultural
inheritance. If you grow up in circumstances where adults are
closed-minded, dogmatic, opinionated, perceiving themselves as obligated
to exercise absolute authority over you, then even in rebelling against
them you are very apt (it appears) to do so in equally dogmatic,
opinionated, and authority-oriented ways. Is it a difference in the
experiences, then, during which or out of which control structures are
organized in the maturing child?

Is it remediable? If these are structures for controlling perceived
threats (whether they are really there or not - that is, whether the
perceived threatener actually intends a threat or not, so in the social
case perhaps we really can say “really”), if these are
reorganization outcomes as a result of which the perception of pervasive
hazard is successfully controlled, is the absence of conflict or threat
going to be the occasion for further reorganization? I think probably
internal conflict is a more likely occasion for reorganization - for
learning at this fairly deep level. Being right, or in the right, or
justified, or on the right side, etc., is often a Pyrrhic victory. Many
people have recounted a feeling of emptiness, meaninglessness, falseness,
inauthenticity, in the midst of seemingly great attainments, as a
precursor to fundamental, liberalizing changes in their lives. Perhaps
reorganization of this sort is what is going on.

    /Bruce

Nevin

···

At 03:26 PM 4/29/2003, Bruce Gregory wrote:

[Marc_Abrams1]

From [ Marc Abrams (2003.04.29.2316) ]

[From Bruce Nevin (2003.0429 22:35 EDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0429.1525) --

And Bill Powers.

First, C'mon Bill, snap out of it.

Why don't we try to keep this real simple.

_IT"S ALL PERCEPTION_ !!!!!

Let me explain. This came to me today in a series of private posts I had
with Bruce Gregory. Thanks Bruce.

When one communicates with another ( through _any_ medium, print or voice )
the person communicating has a some knowledge and some beliefs that he/she
would like the other person or persons to "_understand_" or perceive. But
in _all_ of the cases, _all_ of the time. The person doing the perceiving
does not interpret the communication in exactly the same way the
communicator intends it. Most of the time it just doesn't matter. We are
usually in the ballpark, and minor differences in interpretation does not
matter. Sometimes it matters a great deal. I don't believe we spend a great
deal of time trying to "reach" goals. I think most of our time is spent
correcting error and getting by. By this I mean, that very often whatever
it was that started us on a certain path, is often lost in the
entanglements of life. If you were to ask yourself. What is my goal in
life?, How many could give a reasonable answer? And if you could, how about
the follow up questions of , Exactly what do you do on a daily basis to
reach that goal? Very difficult questions.

Bruce N. What does it mean to be "open minded"?, or "closed minded". We are
all "one minded". You can start putting loads of labels on things but
ultimately we know that words will use other words to describe still other
words until we get to a word that can only be described by each of us
individually by the perceptions we walk around with.

It's _ALL PERCEPTION_.

Marc

···

At 10:36 PM 4/29/2003 -0400, you wrote:

At 03:26 PM 4/29/2003, Bruce Gregory wrote:

[Bill_Powers]

[From Bill Powers (2003.04.30.1031 MDT)]

Marc Abrams (2003.04.29.2316)--

> You can start putting loads of labels on things but

ultimately we know that words will use other words to describe still other
words until we get to a word that can only be described by each of us
individually by the perceptions we walk around with.

Memorably put.

Best,

Bill P.

[bnhpct]

From [Bruce Nevin (2003.04.30 13:30 EDT)]

Marc Abrams (2003.04.29.2316) --

What does it mean to be "open minded"?, or "closed minded". We are
all "one minded". You can start putting loads of labels on things but
ultimately we know that words will use other words to describe still other
words until we get to a word that can only be described by each of us
individually by the perceptions we walk around with.

Huh?

The question that I was addressing was

Bruce Gregory (2003.0429.1525) --

Why does it seem to happen to some of us and not to others?

In other words, human beings differ in this respect. Why? The "it" here was

[...] the process by which we come to consider "only the cases favorable to the idea being promoted." As far as I can tell, examples unfavorable to the case being promoted are not simply ignored, they never even emerge in awareness. It is as if the idea being promoted inhibits the emergence of ideas that might conflict with it.

Rokeach and colleagues did a lot of interesting research that seems to me to be related to this. The results are conventionally presented in population terms (percentages) of course, of the sort that (as Bateson said of anthropological research) at best says to us "there's something going on here that we should investigate further", but they are strong results and are consistent across many domains, indicating that there is something here about the way people are organized internally that effects control of many sorts of variables. By "strong" I mean e.g. (picking at random Table 19.6 on p. 361) 72% of those who scored "open minded" on the test instrument and 2% of those who scored "closed minded" gave general responses without reference to any particular individual or group when asked "what other people (relatives, guardians, friends, etc.) influenced your development [as a child]?"; and 8% of the open vs. 60% of the closed named a clergyman and/or boy scout leader. This is in the chapter on anxiety and childhood experience.

There was another question:

What circumstances cause this flip?

This may refer to circumstances of maturation, learning, reorganization over the lifetime thus far. An instance would be growing up with parents who were closed-minded, dogmatic, and authoritarian. It may refer to immediate circumstances, on the assumption that people become more closed-minded (less receptive to ideas not "favorable to the idea being promoted") under some circumstances. An instance would be circumstances in which the person feels increased anxiety. Saying circumstances cause some attributes of behavior or cognition may be excessive (it contradicts PCT expectations).

Now, what was it in what I said that conflicts with the slogan "it's all perception"?

         /Bruce Nevin

···

At 02:41 AM 4/30/2003, Marc Abrams wrote:

[Marc_Abrams1]

From [ Marc Abrams (2003.04.30.1355)]

From [Bruce Nevin (2003.04.30 13:30
EDT)]

Huh?

C’mon Bruce. Is that the best question you can come up with? From a
linguist no less. LOL

Your post was an excellent example of what is was I was trying to
convey.

Lets see if we can go over this together.

To begin with, I never said you said it was something other then
perception. I made the statement;

"Why don’t we try to keep this real simple.

IT"S ALL PERCEPTION !!!"

I then tried to explain why I said that. Nothing more, nothing less. What
made you think I thought otherwise? Do you think otherwise? My post in no
way criticized your points or your logic. I simply tried to summarize in
one sentence what you tried to “explain” in 2
paragraphs

I did comment on Bill’s point on “goals”, he
said; “…What I was overlooking was
simply that our goals, at the higher levels, are not focused on
ourselves, but on the shape of the world in which we
live,…”

I responded with;

“…I don’t believe we spend a great deal of time trying to
“reach” goals. I think most of our time is spent correcting
error and getting by. By this I mean, that very often whatever it was
that started us on a certain path, is often lost in the entanglements of
life. If you were to ask yourself. What is my goal in life?, How many
could give a reasonable answer? And if you could, how about the follow up
questions of , Exactly what do you do on a daily basis to reach that
goal? Very difficult questions…”

Maybe I was not clear about attributing my passage to Bills passage. Was
that the problem?. Is there a problem?

I don’t think so.

Lets take a further look at your post.

You said;

The question that I was addressing
was

Bruce Gregory (2003.0429.1525) –

Why does it seem to happen to some
of us and not to others?

In other words, human beings differ in this respect. Why? The
“it” here was

[…] the process by which we come
to consider "only the cases favorable

to the idea being promoted." As far as I can tell, examples
unfavorable to

the case being promoted are not simply ignored, they never even emerge
in

awareness. It is as if the idea being promoted inhibits the emergence
of

ideas that might conflict with it.

I’ll say it again. It’s all perception. This is not a slogan. It is
a FACT ( as far as I am concerned, and until proven otherwise ) It is
the way it is. You can come up with all the fancy categories and labels
you want, and compartmentalize perceptions until the cows come home, but
it’d still only perceptions. The “process” or “it”
Bruce G speaks of is all about how we perceive. How are perceptions are
“used” are in the HPCT model with memory. Exact details need to
be worked out ( I am busy trying to do that, not that I will, but I am
giving it a shot :-))

You would probably be interested in the work Chris Argyris and Donald
Schon ( who passed away a few years ago ) did for 30 years in Action
Science. A theory of “organizational” “reasoning”,
“learning”, and problem solving based on empirical case
studies. They know nothing of Control or PCT, but HPCT explains their
model. Something they could not do

Rokeach and colleagues did a lot of
interesting research that seems to me

to be related to this. The results are conventionally presented in

population terms (percentages) of course, of the sort that (as Bateson
said

of anthropological research) at best says to us "there’s something
going on

here that we should investigate further", but they are strong
results and

are consistent across many domains, indicating that there is something
here

about the way people are organized internally that effects control of
many

sorts of variables. By “strong” I mean e.g. (picking at random
Table 19.6

on p. 361) 72% of those who scored “open minded” on the test
instrument and

2% of those who scored “closed minded” gave general responses
without

reference to any particular individual or group when asked "what
other

people (relatives, guardians, friends, etc.) influenced your
development

[as a child]?"; and 8% of the open vs. 60% of the closed named a
clergyman

and/or boy scout leader. This is in the chapter on anxiety and
childhood

experience.

Again Bruce. A “theory” that explains 72% of what exactly? and
what explains the other 28%? You are trying to interpret what others
perceive. How do you even know if there definitions and descriptions of
things are the same as yours? What do you mean by “being open
minded”? I’ll bet you a thousand dollars it’s different then mine.
Not only is our “working” definitions different, we most
certainly have different referents for the “degree” of
“Open mindedness” that we think others have.

Figure out how our memory and the hierarchy work together to produce our
perceptions and you got your answer. It’s that simple. Unfortunately it’s
not easy.

There was another
question:

What circumstances cause this
flip?

This may refer to circumstances of maturation, learning,
reorganization

over the lifetime thus far. An instance would be growing up with
parents

who were closed-minded, dogmatic, and authoritarian. It may refer
to

immediate circumstances, on the assumption that people become more

closed-minded (less receptive to ideas not "favorable to the idea
being

promoted") under some circumstances. An instance would be
circumstances in

which the person feels increased anxiety. Saying circumstances cause
some

attributes of behavior or cognition may be excessive (it contradicts
PCT

expectations).

“close-minded”, “dogmatic”,
“authoritarian”. “less receptive” All loaded.( i.e.
ambiguous ) Give me a break. It’s all
perception You have an excellent working knowledge of HPCT.
How can you toss around those words that have very specific meanings to
each of us individually ( maybe? ) , and that we try to apply to others,
usually unsuccessfully.
Lets elaborate on this passage. What does “maturation” mean.
Well, according to the Oxford English Dictionary there are 13 meanings.
It seems #5 fits this the best. "The action or process of coming to
full growth or development; a. of man, his faculties, etc. In
Psychol., the physical growth which, together with learning, leads
to full development. Also transf. Knowing this, can you please explain to me how
“circumstances” of this, maturation ( whatever that means
) over a lifetime thus far ( exactly how long is that any way?
).

Do you think the parents thought they were closed minded or
authoritative?, Did anyone ask? What does it mean for a person to be
authoritative? What is anxiety?

What you say sounds wonderful. I’m not sure everyone that read it came
away perceiving it the same way others have.

Now, what was it in what I said
that conflicts with the slogan "it’s all

perception"?

I’m sorry you view it as a “slogan”. It happens to be the truth
as we currently understand it. As I said at the beginning of the post you
said nothing to conflict with the statement.

Marc

···

At 01:30 PM 4/30/2003 -0400, you wrote:

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.01.1130)

Marc Abrams (2003.04.30.1355)--

I did comment on Bill's point on "goals", he said; ".....What I was
overlooking was simply that our goals, at the higher levels, are not focused on
ourselves, but on the shape of the world in which we live,..."

I responded with;

"...I don't believe we spend a great deal of time trying to "reach" goals. I
think most of our time is spent correcting error and getting by..."

Then you are thinking in terms of something other than the perceptual control
model of humans. According to PCT people spend _all_ their time trying (usually
successfully) to get their perceptions to and to maintain them in goal states.
Error correction is _part of_ this process. In a properly designed closed loop
control system error corrects itself. That is, error causes the very actions that
eliminate error. If most of our time is spent correcting error then it is also
spent reaching goals because they are aspects of the same process: control of
perception.

The "process" or "it" Bruce G speaks of is all about how we perceive. How are
perceptions are "used" are in the HPCT model with memory. Exact details need to
be worked out ( I am busy trying to do that, not that I will, but I am giving it
a shot :-))

Actually, I'm working on a little paper now that tries to explain how, in closed
loop control, perceptions are not really "used"; they are _controlled_ (forced to
reach the specified reference -- goal -- state).

These may seem like nits but I believe that I didn't really have a good _feel_ for
how behavior worked, according to PCT, until I was able to to get my mind around
these apparently minor details.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Senior Behavioral Scientist
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[Acree_Michael]

[From Mike Acree (2003.05.01.1037 PDT)]

Bill Powers (2003.04.29.1904 MDT)--

>But the passage you quote is one I read as quite similar to passages in
Chapter 17. >Mises says: "No man is quaified to delcare what would make
another man happier or less >discontented"; you say (p. 269): "But one
person cannot feel another's intrinsic >errors" (original in
italics). Mises says: "The critic either tells us what he >believes he
would aim at if he were in the place of his fellow; or, in
dictatorial >arrogance blithely disposing of his fellow's will and
aspirations, declares what >condition of this other man would better suit
himself, the critic." You say (p. 260): "People who want to control other
people seldom admit that they _want_ to, that >controlling people gives
them any satisfaction, or that they in any way are to blame >for their own
behavior. Rather, they prefer to objectify the situation, saying
that >morality requires control, or logic requires it, or self-preservation
requires it, or >scientific experiment proves its necessity, or the good of
society demands it (and who >am I go to against society?). . . . Thus my
argument here will not be against >morality, or logic, or
self-preservation, or science: to speak of justifications at >all is to
miss the point."

I had forgotten those words from my youth, written more than 30 years ago. . . .
I clearly felt that the control of other people was an ignoble
goal, and even implied that it is not, in the long run, possible.

This is generally my reading of that Chapter, but with the very important proviso that you were explicitly talking there about _arbitrary_ control, which you defined as attempts at controlling another person's behavior without regard to the systems that were already controlling that behavior.

My focus was
on the fact of individual autonomy and the essential separateness of
individuals. . . .

What I was overlooking was simply that our goals, at the higher levels, are
not focused on ourselves, but on the shape of the world in which we live,
and hope to live. From the systems standpoint, my position is no more
privileged than anyone else's. "Self-preservation" is far from the highest
consideration; indeed, the "self" is a relatively low-order phenomenon
(though quite real).

In the real world, people do not all seek the same ends, nor are the ends
they seek totally compatible. Furthermore, an individual's capacity for
control is limited; there are aspirations that can be achieved only with
the help of others (for example, building a skyscraper or exploring space).
So an essential part of human interaction is the trading of control: I put
myself at your service to help you with your goals, and you do the same for
me, or someone like me. If we reject all attempts by other people to
control us just as a matter of principle, we lose most of what it means to
be human beings in a universe with others of our kind. We become
fountainheads of aloneness, if Ayn would have permitted the appropriation
of her term.

You are curiously hard on your(former)self in ways for which I see no support at all. The problems you described with attempts at _arbitrary_ control of others don't pertain at all to the voluntary trading of control you describe here. I cheerfully surrender control of my weekday activities in exchange for a check at the end of the month. (Within implicit, but largely irrelevant, limits. I've never been required to do anything I would have refused, though I did once leave a job in protest of how other employees were treated.) But I don't see any evidence in B:CP, or elsewhere in your work, of the sort of atomistic individualism you are (appropriately, in my view) rejecting here. The closest examples I can recall are (a) your uneasy confession, in "Control Theory, Constructivism, and Autopoiesis" (1987), of having incompletely escaped solipsism, and (b) your recent exchanges with Bruce Nevin on language and culture. But both of these seem to me considered philosophical!
  positions which say nothing necessarily about social cooperation, sociability, or our highest values.

All best,
Mike

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.01.1500)]

Marc Abrams (2003.05.1533)

>Rick Marken (2003.05.01.1130)--

> According to PCT people spend _all_ their time trying (usually
> successfully) to get their perceptions to and to maintain them in goal states.

> These may seem like nits but I believe that I didn't really have a good
>_feel_ for how behavior worked, according to PCT, until I was able to
> to get my mind around these apparently minor details.

I'm glad you realized at the end of your post, that what you presented was,
in fact, "nits".

I think if you read what I said more carefully you'll see that I don't think these
are nits at all. I said that they might _seem_ like nits, but, in fact, they are
fundamentally important to understanding PCT.

Why did you not ask me to clarify my statement if you
thought I did not "understand" PCT?

Feel free to clarify if you like. The statement that I found most problematic was:

"...I don't believe we spend a great deal of time trying to "reach" goals. I
think most of our time is spent correcting error and getting by..."

It sounds to me like you are saying that reaching goals and correcting error are
two separate things; that we spend most of our time doing one of these things
(correcting error) and little time doing the other (reaching goals). As far as I
know, correcting error and reaching goals are inseparable parts of the same
process: control. Control systems reach goals by bringing perceptual variables to
reference states (goal). The difference between perception and reference (error)
drives action that bring the perception toward the goal, thus "correcting"
(reducing) the error. Is what you said consistent with that understanding of how
control systems work?

What, does the "forcing"? [in control- RM]

I would say it is the operation of the control loop itself. A negative feedback
loop forces a controlled variable to the reference state, the actual physical
force being exerted via outputs that have physical effects on the controlled
variable.

I don't think your use of the word "force" is any better then the word
"used". What does the word "force" provide in a _working_ definition that
would make that a "clearer" and more accurate way of describing control?

I think "force" is a better way to talk about control because it gets across the
idea that the controlled variable is continuously being pushed (forced) via
control system output to the reference state. This "forcing" is quite palpable
when the controlled variable is also influenced by disturbances that oppose system
output. The word "used" is wrong because it implies that the perceived state of
the controlled variable is used by the controller as the basis of decisions
regarding actions to take to get the controlled variable to the goal state. This
is just a version of the stimulus-response or information processing view of
control, which PCT has shown to be wrong (see Bill's 1979 Psych Review paper).

Finally Rick, I say this without rancor, anger, or dislike. I really don't
think you "care" about what anyone else does or doesn't "know" about PCT.

Then why would I take the time to try to help people understand it correctly? I
care very much what others do and don't know about PCT.

If you "really" "understood" HPCT you would "know" that each
of us has a different perspective of the world.

What makes you think that I don't know that?

Knowing this, you must also realize that
_your_ understanding of _anything_ is unique to _you_.

To some extent, yes. But I do believe that I share some understandings with some
people. I am quite sure that my understanding of PCT, for example, overlaps to a
large extent with Bill's, and vice versa.

No one will ever "understand" PCT the way you do.

I don't think that's true. I think Bill does. I think there are some others who
understand PCT as I do. I agree that my understanding is not one for one with that
of others. But I think the overlap in human understanding can be substantial. It's
really easy to tell the extent to which people understand something (like PCT) in
the same way; just see how much of a disturbance is created for you by what they
say.

When I post to CSGnet I'd like to hear criticisms based on what
I _do and don't_ know, Not on what _you_ do know.

All I know about what you do or don't know is what you say. Perhaps you really do
know, for example, that reaching goals and correcting error are simultaneous
components of the same process: control. But when you say something like

"...I don't believe we spend a great deal of time trying to "reach" goals. I
think most of our time is spent correcting error and getting by..."

it sounds like you think they are two separate processes and that one can occur
without the other, which, of course, is not correct. So forgive me if I
misunderstood what you said. Maybe you could try to say whatever you meant n
another way to see if I would be able to understand better.

If we have little regard to what others perceive
we are in trouble. _DO NOT_ confuse this with the notion of _accepting_ and
encouraging talk about issues other the PCT/HPCT. People who have
criticisms about PCT _must_ be addressed. We will not satisfy everyone. As
Bill likes to say. "We are a couple of funerals away from acceptance"

I am less interested in acceptance of PCT than in understanding of PCT. People who
accept but don't understand PCT are not really going to be very helpful in terms
of making progress in the science (or application) of PCT. There are quite a few
people out there who have accepted PCT -- Carver/Scheier, etc -- without having
understood it. I think such people are more of an impediment to progress in PCT
than are people who don't accept PCT (whether the latter understand it or not).

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Senior Behavioral Scientist
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2003.05.01 15:12 EDT)]

[ Marc Abrams (2003.04.30.1355)]

My post in no way criticized your points or your logic. I simply tried to
summarize in one sentence what you tried to “explain” in 2
paragraphs
[…]
you said nothing to conflict with the
statement [“it’s all perception”]

Marc Abrams (2003.05.01.1005) –

In my last post it was not my intention to
“rip” apart [your me]ssage. I

was trying to show that you could literally do that with any

communication.

No distress, only confusion. I guess I’d have really been at sea
if you were disagreeing with me.

I agree that everything that is said and done is ambiguous. This is
Marken’s Maxim: you can’t tell what someone is doing by observing what
they’re doing.

Paraphrase is the best test of understanding. “In other words, blah
blah blah, right?” A few cycles back and forth in that manner and
you can get pretty close. But as you have demonstrated if you want to
show that misunderstanding is easy, well, that’s very easy.

    /Bruce

Nevin

···

At 11:18 PM 4/30/2003, Marc Abrams wrote:
At 03:14 PM 5/1/2003, Marc Abrams wrote:

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2003.05.01 16:34 EDT)]

[ Marc Abrams (2003.04.30.1355)]

···

At 11:18 PM 4/30/2003, Marc Abrams wrote:
My post in no way criticized your points or your logic. I simply tried to summarize in one sentence what you tried to "explain" in 2 paragraphs
[...]
you said nothing to conflict with the statement ["it's all perception"]

Marc Abrams (2003.05.01.1005) --
At 03:14 PM 5/1/2003, Marc Abrams wrote:
In my last post it was not my intention to "rip" apart [your me]ssage. I
was trying to show that you could literally do that with _any_
communication.

No distress, only confusion. I guess I'd have really been at sea if you were disagreeing with me.

I agree that everything that is said and done is ambiguous. This is Marken's Maxim: you can't tell what someone is doing by observing what they're doing. But there is a difference between ambiguity of what is said and willful substitution of your own words in place of what is said for the sake of making the point that misunderstanding is easy.

A "theory" ...

Not a theory, a statistical observation about a population. Most of the people who answered this set of these questions in these ways (which Rokeach labels "closed-minded") also answered this question about childhood influences in this way.

... that explains 72% of what exactly? and what explains the other 28%?

Exactly the questions that PCT might address, given more complete data.

More complete data would identify controlled variables for each individual. Rigidity, for example, might show up as persisting with control of a program or sequence in the face of persistent error and not trying alternatives that are available or that may be presented. Rokeach's "experimental cosmology" research teases dogmatism apart from rigidity.

Perhaps a question behind this is: why 78% instead of 100%? These are all verbal responses, both the answers to the questionnaires that identify the populations and the answers to the specific question about childhood influences. There's a lot of wiggle room in verbal responses. But I believe you were making that very point.

Rokeach does give explicit operational definitions of these terms. Indeed, the point of much of the work done by his group seems to be to clarify issues of prejudice and so on which have become so critically important for social policy and personal conduct since the Holocaust, the Civil Rights Movement, etc. Unfortunately for PCT researchers, they are operationalized in terms of psychological instruments and statistics about populations of (usually, and as usual) college sophomores.

You are trying to interpret what others perceive.

Actually, I'm quoting for the most part.

How do you even know if [their] definitions and descriptions of things are the same as yours? What do _you_ mean by "being open minded"? I'll bet you a thousand dollars it's different then mine. Not only is our "working" definitions different, we most certainly have different referents for the "degree" of "Open mindedness" that we _think_ others have.

Immaterial. I'm quoting.

Figure out how our memory and the hierarchy work together to produce our perceptions and you got your answer. It's that simple. Unfortunately it's not easy.

Perhaps. Not at all clear. You could take it as an article of faith if you want.

can you please explain to me how "circumstances" of this, maturation (whatever that means)

Experiences the person had from birth (or perhaps before) to their present age.

over a lifetime thus far (exactly how long is that any way?).

from birth to their present age.

Did you intend to complete that question with a verb?

Do you think the parents thought they were closed minded or authoritative?,

Immaterial. What matters is the child's experience with them. If the parents are available and willing they could answer the questions on the instruments (the California F Scale - F for Fascism - and the Gough-Sanford Rigidity Scale, to name the two provided in Rokeach's appendix B and C) for comparison with the others who did likewise. What they think about their own character would still be a distinct matter. If you asked everyone in the population for a self-assessment you could compare those results too. I'm not sure it would be useful. "Any idiot knows I'm not opinionated, you fool!" and so on.

Did anyone ask?

I don't know. But if you mean did anyone ask what they thought about their own character, that's immaterial. Al Capone thought he was a benefactor to humanity.

What does it mean for a person to be authoritative? What is anxiety?

Rokeach gives definitions. You are welcome to read them. Mine are probably not relevant to the quotations.

  /Bruce Nevin

[Marc_Abrams1]

From [ Marc Abrams (2003.05.1533) ]

[From Rick Marken (2003.05.01.1130)

Then you are thinking in terms of something other than the perceptual control
model of humans. According to PCT people spend _all_ their time trying
(usually
successfully) to get their perceptions to and to maintain them in goal states.

Actually, I'm working on a little paper now that tries to explain how, in
closed
loop control, perceptions are not really "used"; they are _controlled_
(forced to
reach the specified reference -- goal -- state).

These may seem like nits but I believe that I didn't really have a good
_feel_ for
how behavior worked, according to PCT, until I was able to to get my mind
around
these apparently minor details.

I'm glad you realized at the end of your post, that what you presented was,
in fact, "nits". Why did you not ask me to clarify my statement if you
thought I did not "understand" PCT? Do you really believe I don't "know"
that? Do you think I was talking about the model and not a human? Do you
really believe humans behave and control without memory? Your PCT model does.

Better be real careful in your paper to back up your claim. What, does the
"forcing"? Sounds like your giving the "process" itself a characteristic.I
don't think your use of the word "force" is any better then the word
"used". What does the word "force" provide in a _working_ definition that
would make that a "clearer" and more accurate way of describing control?

Finally Rick, I say this without rancor, anger, or dislike. I really don't
think you "care" about what anyone else does or doesn't "know" about PCT.
You yourself have very little understanding of how you actually operate.
For instance, If you "really" "understood" HPCT you would "know" that each
of us has a different perspective of the world. Made up of our different
perceptions of it. I would venture to say, that if we could take a mind
print of our individual collective perceptions, it would be as unique as
our fingerprints and DNA make up. Knowing this, you must also realize that
_your_ understanding of _anything_ is unique to _you_. Yes, at a certain
level you may have some common "understandings" about some things, but
not _everything_ about any one thing and/or something, about everything.
You and Bill ( and just about everyone else ) can agree on the mathematical
model proposed by Bill. I think we may start running into difficulties with
"defining" the primitives. But maybe not. You could simply believe that
whatever Bill thinks or says is right. So knowing this as well, when
someone comes on the net and states that he/she knows all there is to know
about control or PCT,`whay not ask some questions that might clarify, not
for _you_, but for him/her how much they do or don't know about
PCT/Control. Why not try to "understand" the "working" definitions people
walk around with? No one will ever "understand" PCT the way you do. No one
will ever understand it the way I do. Your post being a prime example,
thank you. If we are trying to "help" people we need to consider what
they perceive, and what their goals may be. Yet you come off spouting your
"understanding" of PCT and how wonderful you think that understanding is.
Who cares? When I post to CSGnet I'd like to hear criticisms based on what
I _do and don't_ know, Not on what _you_ do know.

So asking clarifying questions shows a concern for where someone else might
be coming from. Standing on a soap box shows you care only about where your
coming from.

I hope you take this post in the spirit it was intended. That is, give some
thought to what I said. I would like to see others "encouraged" to come on
this list and participate. If we have little regard to what others perceive
we are in trouble. _DO NOT_ confuse this with the notion of _accepting_ and
encouraging talk about issues other the PCT/HPCT. People who have
criticisms about PCT _must_ be addressed. We will not satisfy everyone. As
Bill likes to say. "We are a couple of funerals away from acceptance"

Marc

···

At 11:35 AM 5/1/2003 -0400, you wrote: