Beyond the Fringe (was An Opportunity for PCT PR)

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.05.21.1257 EDT)]

[From Rick Marken (2010.05.20.0800)]

“In the section on controlled quantities in my article [the 1973
Science paper, RM] there appears an approximation, g(d) = - h(o),
which says that the cause-effect relationships that can be observed
between stimulus events and consequences of nervous system outputs –
responses – are expressible wholly in terms of the physics of the
local environment, containing almost no information about the behaving
system at all. I see no way in which behaviorism [or cognitive
psychology, which is based on the same open-loop model, RM] can
survive a full understanding of the derivation and significance of
this harmless expression.”

Apply this analysis to the thermostatically-controlled furnace. It is indeed true that we can learn nothing about the mechanism of either the thermostat or the furnace by altering the external temperature. It is also true that the behavior of the thermostatically-controlled furnace is expressible wholly in terms of the physics of the local environment. Does this imply that the experiment tells us nothing worth knowing?

Bruce

[From Bill Powers (2010.05.21.1010 MDT)]
Thanks for taking the time to do this derivation. This will eventually
get us on the right track. Neither you nor Rick has yet brought out why
there is a behavioral illusion, or why it is an illusion, but we will get
there, and we may all learn something.
First, there is definitely a way to tell an open-loop system from a
closed-loop system, even if you happen to overlook the controlled
quantity and think that d is the direct input which makes the system
produce qo.
Disturb qo. An equivalent strategy, where it’s possible to arrange, is to
alter the gain of the output function, which will alter qo. Most real
systems have some compliance in their output functions, so a direct
disturbance of qo (say by pushing on the arm the person is using to hold
the mouse) will change it.
If this is an SR system, qo will not be restored to its undisturbed
state. The system will not know that the effective output has changed. If
it is a control system, the small change in qo will cause qi to change
which will change the error signal and cause an output that prevents qo
from changing more than a little.
This doesn’t show up in the equations because we don’t include any
details such as the compliance of the output function, so neither you nor
Rick has made any mistake under the stated rules of the game. As stated,
qo is a function of the error signal, which means the compliance is zero.
But if you think of a real system behind the abstract mathematics, the
compliance is never zero in any physical system, so the output function
should always, in principle if not practicality, include a term
indicating the partial derivative of qo with respect to an arbitrary
external variable. There is always a way to distinguish a real S-R
system from a control system with the same d and qo.

OK, to the math. I haven’t read Richard Kennaway’s post yet so I’m
operating with a handicap here.

MMT: Equations

qi = E(qo) + d

qo = G(e)

e = r - p

p = P(qi)

which gives the loop equation

qo = G(r - P(E(qo) + d))

in which the “loop gain function” is G(P(E(
)))

If r is constant, we can ignore
it in the functional form, since we can write G’(x) == G(r -
x)

BP: This also requires assuming that d is constant, for the same reasons
you’re assuming r is constant: the functions may be nonlinear. If they
are, then the loop gain will depend on both r and d.

MMT: I^-1(qo) = E(qo) + d,

which is straightforward, since I^-1(qo) (backtracking through the
internal part of the loop) is just qi. We didn’t need to go through all
the rigmarole to come back to qi = E(qo) + d, but in the above form there
are only two variables, qo and d, both of which are observable by an
experimenter.

This last equation can be rewritten

d = I^-1(qo) - E(qo),

This is an unfortunate step because it makes it seem as if altering the
output quantity will alter the disturbance. I try to avoid algebraic
manipulations that put independent variables on the left, because algebra
is incapable of detecting directionality in functions. The real
interpretation of the above statement is “If qo is observed to have
value x, then d must have had the value as computed here.” If one
doesn’t realize that d is an independent variable, great confusion can
result – as in the following:

MMT: making d a function only of
qo (or, if that function is invertible, qo is a function of d, which we
can write qo = D(d)). Well, we know that this is obviously true if r is
constant, since d is the only other input into the loop, but having the
equations to show that it is true can be psychologically more satisfying
than just pointing it out.

BP: Saying “d is a function of qo” is of course wrong; the
dependent variable qo is a function of the independent variable d, but it
doesn’t work the other way around. Algebra doesn’t know anything about
sequence or causality.

Here is where the real problem starts:

MMT:Now the question becomes one
of what the function qo = D(d) might tell the experimenter.

Rick has emphasised the behavioural illusion. Using the notation above,
the behavioural illusion is due to the fact that both I( ) and E( ) come
into the relationship between d and qo.

BP: This is not the correct explanation. The correct explanation is much
easier to see if we just use a linear system with explicit gain
factors.

(1) qi = Kf*qo + d

(2) qo = Ko*e

(3) e = r - p

(4) p = Ki*qi

We can solve this set of equations directly for qo, using successive
substitutions:

qo = Ko*[r - Ki*(Kf*qo + d)]

= Kor - KoKiKfqo + KoKid

  Ko*(r - Ki*d)

qo = ---------------

  1 + Ko*Ki*Kf

Now let’s investigate the behavioral illusion.

Let Ki = 1, Kf = 1, and Ko = 1. We find that

qo = -0.5*d

According to the behavioral illusion, the output should be the inverse
feedback function of the disturbance. The feedback function is a
multiplier of 1, making the inverse also 1. The behavioral illusion
predicts that the output with r = 0 should be

qo = -d.

What’s wrong? The output is negative but it’s only half as large as it
should be. Half of the effect of the disturbance will be uncorrected.

The answer lies in the loop gain. Let’s just change Kf to 1000. Now we
get

   1*(r - d)

qo = ------------------

    1 + 1009

With r = 0, we now have

qo = -0.00099*d

The inverse of the feedback function with sign (Kf = 1000) is -0.001. the
actual factor connecting qo and d is -0.00099, within 1% of the value
predicted by the behavior illusion.

So clearly the behavioral illusion can’t be deduced from the abstract
form of the equations. It’s necessary to know the values of the
constants. For some values there will be a behavioral illusion; for
others there won’t, or the predictions of the behavioral illusion idea
will be quantitatively wrong.

Now we have the nub of the
issue. Let’s suppose that there was an experiment in which the
experimenter believed that the setup precluded qo having any influence on
qi, but was wrong, and the subject could control (perhaps poorly). Could
an experimenter who understands PCT discover from the experimental data,
without examining the experimental setup, that the S-R (IV-DV) analysis
was wrong? I think the equations above suggest that the data do not allow
it. The discrimination between S-R and perceptual control must be made on
other grounds.

Technically you’re right because the stated conditions included only a
disturbance of the controlled variable, which is d. But if we generalize
a little to allow disturbances elsewhere, it’s easy to tell when there is
no feedback from output back to the (supposed) controlled variable. The
fact that we predict that qo will be some constant times the disturbance
is enough to show that the general form will be the same for control
theory or S-R theory. But that does not mean there isn’t any way to know
when feedback exists. Often you can see that it exists just by
looking.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers ()2010.05.21.1230 MDT)]

Richard Kennaway (2010.05.21.1150 BST) --

MMT: This raises an interesting point. If two theories are mathematically identical, how is it possible to make sense of a claim that one is "wrong" and the other is "right"?

JRK: That is a good question. The reason is that the theories here omit some essential details which are the reason that one works and the other does not.

As a simpler example, consider the equation dx/dt = x. One solution of this is x=0 for all t. But if this equation is a description of a real physical system, then there will always be other effects going on, perhaps very small ones, but they will be there. And if you add to that equation an extra terms to represent all the stuff that was left out: dx/dt = x + epsilon, where epsilon is some small random variable, then you will find that x=0 is not even an approximately correct solution. Instead, x will fly off to plus or minus infinity.

BP: How do you always manage to get the answer in two steps while I am still halfway around Robin Hood's Barn?

Actually, I think I used the same test you used: stability. Only I did it by inserting a perturbation that the system opposed, showing it is stable and that there is negative feedback, while you showed that a perturbation could reveal the presence of positive feedback.

All of this just supports what an engineering physics math teacher told us a lot of years ago: be very careful when you use approximations, and always know what the exact solution is and what it means.

He also told us freshmen that when you manipulate equations purporting to describe a physical system, you should be able to explain what each intermediate step says about the physical system. Each step says that something is equal to something else. So what is it saying is equal to what? Sometimes that turns out to be more interesting than the solution you were trying to get.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2010.05.21.1245 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.05.21.1257 EDT) –

BP, quoted by Marken: "In
the section on controlled quantities in my article [the 1973 Science
paper, RM] there appears an approximation, g(d) = - h(o),

which says that the cause-effect relationships that can be observed

between stimulus events and consequences of nervous system outputs

responses – are expressible wholly in terms of the physics of the

local environment, containing almost no information about the
behaving

system at all. I see no way in which behaviorism [or cognitive

psychology, which is based on the same open-loop model, RM] can

survive a full understanding of the derivation and significance of

this harmless
expression."

Apply this analysis to the thermostatically-controlled furnace. It is
indeed true that we can learn nothing about the mechanism of either the
thermostat or the furnace by altering the external temperature. It is
also true that the behavior of the thermostatically-controlled furnace is
expressible wholly in terms of the physics of the local environment. Does
this imply that the experiment tells us nothing worth
knowing?

That depends on what you want to know. If you want to understand how a
change in outside temperature causes a furnace to turn on even though the
inside temperature remains constant within a degree or two, then whatever
understanding you get is likely to be wrong. If you look more closely and
realize that it is the change of inside temperature that matters, you
will learn that there are many possible causes of the furnace turning on
and off, and that the purpose of those changes in furnace output is to
keep the room temperature as constant as possible, given the limits of
the regulator. Knowing that the furnace can only turn on and off, you can
predict that the duty cycle will depend on thermal inputs to and losses
from the room, and you can even predict what duty cycle will result from
a given outside temperature and inside set-point for temperature. That
can be calculated strictly from the physical properties of the furnace,
the fuel, the air, and the room – and understanding how feedback control
works.

All that is worth knowing.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2010.05.21.1615)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.05.21.1257 EDT)--

Rick Marken (2010.05.20.0800)--

"In the section on controlled quantities in my article [the 1973
Science paper, RM] �there appears an approximation, g(d) = - h(o),
which says that the cause-effect relationships that can be observed
between stimulus events and consequences of nervous system outputs --
responses -- are expressible wholly in terms of the physics of the
local environment, containing almost no information about the behaving
system at all. I see no way in which behaviorism [or cognitive
psychology, which is based on the same open-loop model, RM] can
survive a full understanding of the derivation and significance of
this harmless expression."

Apply this analysis to the thermostatically-controlled furnace.

It's actually the temperature that is controlled, not the furnace.
Control systems control their inputs, not their outputs.

It is indeed
true that we can learn nothing about the mechanism of either the thermostat
or the furnace by altering the external temperature.

What do you think you would learn from observing a relationship
between changes in the external temperature (d) and furnace output
(qo)?

I think what you would learn from such an experiment depends on what
you already know about the system. If you know nothing at all about
the system, then this experiment won't tell you much. It will tell you
that the system seems to respond (qo) to temperature variations (d),
but not much more. It certainly won't tell you whether the system is
open or closed loop. But you might be able to tell by inspection that
the system is closed loop (you can see that both the heat produced as
a disturbance and the heat produced by the furnace affects the
sensor). In that case, the observed relationship between d and qo
suggests that the system is controlling a perception related to
temperature but you don't know exactly what the system is controlling
(it might be controlling humidity or pressure, variables that would be
disturbed by changes in temperature). So even if you knew that the
system is a control system, the observed relationship between d and qo
wouldn't tell you much about what variable(s) the system is
controlling or how it controls it (them).

But your question implies that you know that you are dealing with a
thermostat: a closed loop system that is controlling sensed
temperature. In that case the observed relationship between d and qo
still tells you nothing about characteristics of the control system
(eg. the gain of the thermostat). But it does give you information
that would be useful to a user of the system. Specifically, it tells
how much output the furnace will produce for different settings of the
disturbance (outside temperature) when the system is used in an
environment that is the same as the one in which it was tested (same
elevation, humidity, etc), all other things being equal. This is
something that is worth knowing , particularly by the user of the
system, who might want to estimate what the furnace fuel bill will be.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.05.21.2258 EDT)]

[From Rick Marken (2010.05.21.1615)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.05.21.1257 EDT)--

Rick Marken (2010.05.20.0800)--

"In the section on controlled quantities in my article [the 1973
Science paper, RM] there appears an approximation, g(d) = - h(o),
which says that the cause-effect relationships that can be observed
between stimulus events and consequences of nervous system outputs --
responses -- are expressible wholly in terms of the physics of the
local environment, containing almost no information about the behaving
system at all. I see no way in which behaviorism [or cognitive
psychology, which is based on the same open-loop model, RM] can
survive a full understanding of the derivation and significance of
this harmless expression."

Apply this analysis to the thermostatically-controlled furnace.

It's actually the temperature that is controlled, not the furnace.
Control systems control their inputs, not their outputs.

Sorry. A thermostatically-regulated furnace.

Bruce

[Martin Taylor 2010.05.21.23.17]

[From Rick Marken (2010.05.19.2300)]

Martin Taylor
(2010.05.20.14:30)–

This last equation can be rewritten

d = I^-1(qo) - E(qo),

making d a function only of qo (or, if that function is invertible, qo
is a function of d, which we can write qo = D(d)).

What an experimenter can see is d (“stimulus”) and qo (“response”). The
question is whether the form of the last equation can be distinguished
from the S-R formulation, qo = F(d).

Your derivation produces results that are quite different than mine
(using a linear approximation) and Bill’s (using functional
notation).In the derivations with which I am familiar, d is not a
function of I^-1(qo) (the organism function) in a control loop.

By definition, qi = E(qo) + d, or qi - E(qo) = d

but I(qi) = qo, so I^-1(qo) = qi

I^-1(qo) - E(qo) = d

(I hope that makes Bill happier, since I put d on th right-hand side
this time. It makes no difference to me whether I write a = b or b = a,
but since it matters to Bill, I am playing nice)

Bill’s derivations are on pp. 145-146 of LCS I; for the
closed-loop case he gets (using your notation):

qo = 1/E (r - d)

This makes no sense, since in most analyses that are shown on CSGnet,
E() is the identity function, which would give

qo = 1/(r-d)

no matter what the loop gain. I think you misread the pages in
question (you have to go back to page 139, anyway.

Your version of the open loop equation is the same as Bill’s:

qo = F(d)

The
question, it seems to me, is not whether the form of closed-loop
equation can be distinguished
from the S-R (open loop) formulation. The equations can be
distinguished quite easily.

Really? I thought I had demonstrated that they are identical.

The question is whether one who observesan S-R relationship (the
relationship between d and qo) will conclude that this relationship
reflects F(), the organism function, or 1/E(), the inverse of the
feedback function. Obviously, conventional researchers take an observed
relationship between d and qo to be a reflection of F().

So far, I’m with you. This is indeed the question.

But if the system under study is closed loop, the the observed
relationship between d and qo actually reflects 1/E(). That’s the
behavioral illusion.

This would be true if control were perfect. Let’s do the simple
analysis with all the functions being the identity function excepot for
the output gain G.

qi = qo + d

qo = Ge = G(r-p) = G(r -qi) = G(r - qo - d)

qo/G = r - d - qo

qo(1+G)/G = r - d

qo = G(r-d)/(1+G)

The factor G/(1+G) is the sensitivity of qo to changes in d, or the
“compliance” of the system. That compliance, when E() is the identity
function, is purely a property of I(), since in this case I() == G().

When E() is not the identity function, we can make an almost identical
derivation

qi = Eqo + d

qo = Ge = G(r-p) = G(r-qi) = G(r - Eqo - d)

qo/G = r - Eqo -d

qo(1+EG)/G = r -d

qo = G(r-d)/(1+EG)

Now system is “stiffer” (assuming E > 1), but the relation still
depends strongly on I().

Rick has emphasised the
behavioural illusion. Using the notation above,
the behavioural illusion is due to the fact that both I( ) and E( )
come into the relationship between d and qo.

I don’t think I( ) comes into it.

The behavioral illusion comes about for the reasons I described
above; it comes from thinking that the system under study is open loop
when it is actually closed loop.

True. I think I understand that.

The cyclist may well be more
responsive and pay more
careful attention to the road when it is wet and slippery than when it
is dry and clear.

Actually, the equations say that the d - qo relationship for a closed
loop system depends only on E() and r. I’ll have to check this out in
simulation. It does seem like a change in control parameters should
affect it too.

The point really is the degree to which chnages in control parameters
(I()) matter. If control is essentially perfect, they don’t matter, and
all your arguments have implicitly assumed that “control” means “almost
perfect control”. So long as this remains true, you are correct that
one can’t deduce much about I() from observations of d and qo, and
deviations between them are due almost entirely to E(). But when
control is less perfect, then changes in I() do matter, as in the case
of your cyclist, who probably will slow down in slippery conditions to
compensate for changes in E().

Now let’s consider another
experimental situation, in which qo has no
influence on qi, so that qo = I(d). This is the typical psychophysical
experiment, in which qo is a report after a trial as to whether a tone
was in the first or the second interval of the trial.

A person doesn’t become open loop when they are in a psychophysical
experiment.

True. A person doesn’t become open loop in a psychophysical
experiment. But the relation betwenn the presentation on trial N and
the response choice on trial N is most definitely open-loop. We
thrashed all this out a year or more ago.

My “Power Law” paper (http://www.mindreadings.com/BehavioralIllusion.pdf)
shows how the closed loop might work in a magnitude estimation
experiment.

Yes, I’ve referenced this before, several times. But even there, there
is no way that the subject’s saying “27” can affect the loudness of the
tone to which the subject has assigned that number. The (several) loops
are closed elsewhere.

And I am currently working with Bill on a demonstration of the
closed-loop nature of behavior in a choice reaction time experiment.

Good, but unless your experiment is set up so that the subject’s choice
influences the physical presentation that leads to the choice, that
critical element is open loop.

Now we have the nub of the
issue. Let’s suppose that there was an
experiment in which the experimenter believed that the setup precluded
qo having any influence on qi, but was wrong, and the subject could
control (perhaps poorly). Could an experimenter who understands PCT
discover from the experimental data, without examining the experimental
setup, that the S-R (IV-DV) analysis was wrong? I think the equations
above suggest that the data do not allow it. The discrimination between
S-R and perceptual control must be made on other grounds.

It must always be made on other grounds, those being tests to determine
that a variable is under control.

Yes, and that is the essence of Bill’s comment, and it is a simple
answer to Bruce’s original query.

So why was it necessary to go through all those derivations to get to
this point on which we seem to have agreed beforehand?

Martin

···

On 2010/05/21 2:01 AM, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2010.05.22.0835 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.05.21.2258 EDT) –

BG: Sorry. A
thermostatically-regulated furnace.

BP: The thermostat regulates the sensed air temperature, not the furnace.
It turns the furnace on and off in any way required to keep the
temperature of its own sensor matching the reference value set by the
lever on the box. Normally, the sensor’s temperature reflects the
temperature of the room air (with a lag of few minutes). However, if you
put something hot, like a lighted candle, too close to the unit in which
the sensor is, the room will soon be too cold. That’s how we know that
the thermostat is really regulating the temperature of its own
sensor.
Wiki editors: perhaps the above should be in the wiki article.
After 150 years, the behavioral sciences have managed to persuade the
public to get cause and effect reversed almost everywhere. Rewards cause
behavior. Behavior is controlled by its consequences. Pain conditions
escape responses. Changes in air temperature cause thermostats to
regulate furnaces. It’s almost impossible to grasp just how wrong the
scientific understanding of behavior has been, and for how long, exactly
as in the case of phlogiston. No wonder PCT meets with resistance even
when presented in the nicest and most patient way. Losing patience, of
course, just makes the resistance stiffer.
It’s interesting, by the way, how PCT-correct the dictionary definition
of “regulate” is, at least in my old Webster’s Collegiate (1945
– it used to be my NEW Webster’s Collegiate). How about “4.
To fix the amount, degree, or rate of, by adjusting, rectifying, etc., as
to regulate speed.” Maybe the behavioral scientists should
have become dictionary editors instead, so the dictionary editors could
try their hands at behavioral science.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2010.05.22.-0920 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.05.21.23.17 –

Rick Marken: Your derivation
produces results that are quite different than mine (using a linear
approximation) and Bill’s (using functional notation).In the derivations
with which I am familiar, d is not a function of I^-1(qo) (the organism
function) in a control loop.

MMT: By definition, qi = E(qo) + d, or qi - E(qo) = d

but I(qi) = qo, so I^-1(qo) = qi

I^-1(qo) - E(qo) = d

(I hope that makes Bill happier, since I put d on th right-hand side this
time. It makes no difference to me whether I write a = b or b = a, but
since it matters to Bill, I am playing nice)

If you don’t see why I don’t like solving for independent variables, I
guess I can’t persuade you that it’s misleading. In algebra, of course,
there is no such thing as dependent or independent variables; all
equalities work both ways. And if you want to deduce what the value of an
independent variable must have been (in the immediate past – there’s no
way to predict the future state), then it’s meaningful to solve an
equation for it.

I would interpret your equation above (boldfaced) to mean that given the
value of d, you know the value that [I^-1(qo) - E(qo)] must have. The
problem here is that d has an arbitrary value, not dependent on any other
variable in the equations. So basically, you’re solving for all cases
with a constant disturbance. You may or may not be able to deduce the
permissible values of qo from that condition.

Consider the equation

P= QA

This can also be written

Q = P/A.

So by varying either P or A, the equation seems to say, you can alter
Q. If you’re thinking only of the abstract mathematical
manipulations, this will not bother you. But if you’re also aware of the
physical situation being represented by the equations, you may know that
Q stands for “Quantity of matter, or mass,” P stands for
“Pushing force”, and A stands for Acceleration. In that case
you won’t won’t consider varying “either” P or A, since
Quantity of matter (Mass) determines the ratio of Force to Acceleration.
If you vary P, A will automatically vary at the same time, just enough to
keep M constant. That connection is not shown in the equation.

This is the sort of thing my old instructor meant when he said it’s
important to keep the equations tied to the physical situation when you
represent real systems mathematically.

In your equation, you might assume that you can vary I^-1(qo) (by
changing some of the parameters of I) while leaving E(qo) alone, and thus
change d. There is nothing in the equation to say you can’t do that. The
reason you can’t do it is hidden in the physical relationships being
described by the equation.

RM: Bill’s derivations are on
pp. 145-146 of LCS I; for the closed-loop case he gets (using your
notation):

qo = 1/E (r - d)

MMT: This makes no sense, since in most analyses that are shown on
CSGnet, E() is the identity function, which would give

qo = 1/(r-d)

BP: No, it would give qo = r - d. The notation E^-1 applies to the
function, not the variables in it. If the function were qo = SQRT(r - d),
the inverse of the square root function would give qo = (r - d)^2, not
1/SQRT(r-d). The notation is perfectly arbitrary, of course: it couLd
also be written “inv E(r-d)”. To be less misleading, it should
probably be written (E^-1)(r-d) or (inv E)(r-d). You first do the
operation in the first parenthesis, and find the function that is the
inverse of E. Then you apply that function to (r - d). Sin^-1(x) means
“the angle whose sine is x,” not 1/sin(x). You would write
the

-1

latter expression as sin(x)^-1, that is, sin(x )
. Only the identity function is its own
inverse.

The equation Rick cites from LCS1 is a little embarrassing because it
needs a better explanation than I gave it. It starts with making the
approximation of infinite loop gain in equation 7, then manipulates the
result, which is always very risky. The starred values were supposed to
indicate the ideal case, but I see this wasn’t explained clearly.

RM (I think): The question is
whether one who observesan S-R relationship (the relationship between d
and qo) will conclude that this relationship reflects F(), the organism
function, or 1/E(), the inverse of the feedback function. Obviously,
conventional researchers take an observed relationship between d and qo
to be a reflection of F().

MMT: So far, I’m with you. This is indeed the question.

BP: I see Martin didn’t notice, or has been seduced into making the same
mistake. E^-1(x) is not 1/E(x). That reciprocal would be written
[E(x)]^-1, to be perfectly clear.

RM: But if the system under
study is closed loop, the the observed relationship between d and qo
actually reflects 1/E(). That’s the behavioral illusion.

MMT: This would be true if control were perfect.

Yes, and that is why the loop gain must be high to use the approximations
Rick is using. Organisms have high loop gain in most circumstances. But
not all – the iris reflex, I seem to recall, has a loop gain of around
7.

MMT: But when control is less
perfect, then changes in I() do matter, as in the case of your cyclist,
who probably will slow down in slippery conditions to compensate for
changes in E().

BP: Yes, I was going to say that I hope Rick’s response to sensing an
incipient skid is not to put the brakes on harder. To avoid skidding, the
cyclist must reduce the braking force.This says that a higher-order
skid-control system (r = 0) must be reducing the reference level for
deceleration, because the deceleration control system, given the same
reference deceleration as for dry pavement, would try to achieve the
higher deceleration by braking harder when the tires began to
slip.

MMT: Now let’s consider another
experimental situation, in which qo has no influence on qi, so that qo =
I(d). This is the typical psychophysical experiment, in which qo is a
report after a trial as to whether a tone was in the first or the second
interval of the trial.

RM: A person doesn’t become open loop when they are in a psychophysical
experiment.

MMT: True. A person doesn’t become open loop in a psychophysical
experiment. But the relation betwenn the presentation on trial N and the
response choice on trial N is most definitely open-loop. We thrashed all
this out a year or more ago.

No, you declared yourself satisfied with your own arguments. As far as I
know, nobody else was satisfied with them. You may have a point of some
kind, but so far you haven’t made it. I disagreed with your basic
analysis of the situation, not with your algebra. Rick’s arguments, I
thought, weren’t pertinent; there’s no reason the person can’t control
one variable while not controlling another. Rick’s objections had to do
with controlling for following the instructions, which we assume in any
case. I came up with a model showing what the possible controlled
variable might be, but evidently I was the only one who understood
it.

RM: My “Power Law”
paper
(
http://www.mindreadings.com/BehavioralIllusion.pdf
) shows how the
closed loop might work in a magnitude estimation experiment.

MMT: Yes, I’ve referenced this before, several times. But even there,
there is no way that the subject’s saying “27” can affect the
loudness of the tone to which the subject has assigned that number. The
(several) loops are closed elsewhere.

You’re right, of course. It can’t affect the pitch or the time of
occurrance, either. However, it can affect the relationship between the
tone and the utterance, and that may be what the subject is
controlling.

Here is an abstract that has more than a little relevance to this subject
(copied from a PDF file using Foxit reader):

···

===========================================================================

American Psychologist, 43(3), 151-160

Pavlovian Conditioning

It’s Not What You Think It Is

Robert A. Rescorla

University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: Current thinking about Pavlovian conditioning differs
substantially from that of 20 years ago. Yet the changes that have taken
place remain poorly

appreciated by psychologists generally. Traditional descriptions of
conditioning as the acquired ability of one stimulus to evoke the
original response to another because of their pairing are shown to be
inadequate. They fail to characterize adequately the circumstances
producing learning, the content of that learning, or the manner in which
that learning influences performance. Instead, conditioning is now
described as the learning of relations among events so as to allow the
organism to represent its environment. Within this framework, the
study of Pavlovian conditioning continues to be an intellectually active
area, full of new discoveries and information relevant to other areas of
psychology.

============================================================================

Instead of just observing and describing relationships, as you do in your
analysis, Rescorla came (in 1988) to recognize them as controlled
variables in their own right – but without the concept of controlled
variables. I tried to show how the phenomena you described could come
about through control of relationships, but you didn’t object on that
ground; you objected because one of the elements of the relationship
couldn’t be affected by the subject’s response.

RM: And I am currently working
with Bill on a demonstration of the closed-loop nature of behavior in a
choice reaction time experiment.

MMT: Good, but unless your experiment is set up so that the subject’s
choice influences the physical presentation that leads to the choice,
that critical element is open loop.

Are you saying that if the driver of the car turns left when coming to a
T-junction, that choice is open-loop? Surely turning left doesn’t affect
the presentation that led to that choice, so by your reasoning if there
is an invisible force (a strong wind) affecting the left turn, the driver
will simply steer off the road.

A two-element relationship can be controlled when either element can be
disturbed, even if only one of its elements can be affected by the
controller. I think you’re focusing only on the triggering event and the
element that can’t be affected. However, if that element is changed, the
relationship with the other element is disturbed, and the controller can
react to that disturbance at the relationship level.

In some tracking experiments we combine pursuit tracking (target
disturbed) with compensatory tracking (cursor disturbed). The pertinent
relationship between cursor and target is called the distance between
them. Here we have a person reacting to two disturbances, but able to
affect only one of the elements, the cursor position. If we assume
distance, a function of the positions of both target and cursor, to be
the controlled variable, the model fits the performance within 5% or
better RMS, which is roughly a 20-sigma fit.

I think you are too fixed on the element of the relationship that can’t
be affected by the subject, and are thereby missing the relationship that
the subject might be controlling and that is disturbed by the change in
the presentation. Of course the element that can’t be affected by the
behavior (the brightness of the light bulb) is not controlled, but the
relationship that is disturbed is under control (if the proposed
identification of the controlled variable is correct). I’d be more
specific but I’ve forgotten some of the details.

MMT: Now we have the nub of the
issue. Let’s suppose that there was an experiment in which the
experimenter believed that the setup precluded qo having any influence on
qi, but was wrong, and the subject could control (perhaps poorly). Could
an experimenter who understands PCT discover from the experimental data,
without examining the experimental setup, that the S-R (IV-DV) analysis
was wrong? I think the equations above suggest that the data do not allow
it. The discrimination between S-R and perceptual control must be made on
other grounds.

You can always tell the difference if you can directly disturb qo or some
variable in series with it before the controlled variable is reached.
Maybe that is one of the “other grounds” you mention. If the
system is open-loop, the output and variables immediately depending on it
do not affect the input, so disturbances of the output will not change
the behavior of the system at all. If the loop is closed, the input will
be disturbed and the action of the control system will change.

Of course since the feedback connection is in the environment and is
easily observed, it’s much simpler just to see if there’s a connection
between the action and the input variables. You have to identify the
controlled variable first, of course – and that alone settles the
question. As, indeed, both Rick and you agree:

RM: It must always be made on
other grounds, those being tests to determine that a variable is under
control.
MMT: Yes, and that is the essence of Bill’s comment,
and it is a simple answer to Bruce’s original query.

So why was it necessary to go through all those derivations to get to
this point on which we seem to have agreed beforehand?

Because along the way, a lot of other disagreements were exposed to
view.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory 92010.05.22.1600 EDT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.05.22.0835 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.05.21.2258 EDT) --

BG: Sorry. A thermostatically-regulated furnace.

BP: The thermostat regulates the sensed air temperature, not the furnace. It turns the furnace on and off in any way required to keep the temperature of its own sensor matching the reference value set by the lever on the box. Normally, the sensor's temperature reflects the temperature of the room air (with a lag of few minutes). However, if you put something hot, like a lighted candle, too close to the unit in which the sensor is, the room will soon be too cold. That's how we know that the thermostat is really regulating the temperature of its own sensor.

BG: Will you accept a thermostat that can turn a furnace on and off? Or have I been so befuddled by 150 years of behavioral science that I should just shut up?

Bruce

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.05.221621 EDT)]

[From Bill Powers (2010.05.22.0835 MDT)]

After 150 years, the behavioral sciences have managed to persuade the
public to get cause and effect reversed almost everywhere. Rewards cause
behavior. Behavior is controlled by its consequences. Pain conditions
escape responses. Changes in air temperature cause thermostats to
regulate furnaces. It’s almost impossible to grasp just how wrong the
scientific understanding of behavior has been, and for how long, exactly
as in the case of phlogiston. No wonder PCT meets with resistance even
when presented in the nicest and most patient way. Losing patience, of
course, just makes the resistance stiffer.

BG: How fortunate we are to have found the very few who have seen the light and are willing to lead us from the darkness. Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of behavioral science I will fear no evil, for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff they comfort me. Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of my enemies; thou anointest my head with oil; my cup runneth over. Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life: and I will dwell in the house of PCT for ever.

Amen,

Bruce

[Fraom Bill Powers (2010.05.22.1425 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory 92010.05.22.1600 EDT)]

BG: Will you accept a thermostat that can turn a furnace on and off? Or have I been so befuddled by 150 years of behavioral science that I should just shut up?

BP: Sure, a thermostat can turn a furnace on and off, but that's the means, not the end. If someone lights a fire in the fireplace, the thermostat may not have to produce any output at all. A thermostat is not a device with the purpose of turning a furnace on and off.

We all started out befuddled by 150 years of behavioral science, though in my case it was more like 100. If that didn't make me shut up, why should you?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2010.05.22.1430 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2010.05.221621 EDT) –

BG: How fortunate we are to have
found the very few who have seen the light and are willing to lead us
from the darkness. Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of
behavioral science I will fear no evil, for thou art with me; thy rod and
thy staff they comfort me. Thou preparest a table before me in the
presence of my enemies; thou anointest my head with oil; my cup runneth
over. Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life:
and I will dwell in the house of PCT for
ever.
I certainly hope so. Unfortunately, unlike the guy you’re addressing
I don’t know how to wave a wand, yell SHAZAM, and make it happen. But I
will be very pleased if PCT can provide you with some of the better
things in life. And don’t look for sarcasm there because there isn’t
any.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce gregory (2010.05.22.1650 EDT)]

[Fraom Bill Powers (2010.05.22.1425 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory 92010.05.22.1600 EDT)]

BG: Will you accept a thermostat that can turn a furnace on and off? Or have I been so befuddled by 150 years of behavioral science that I should just shut up?

BP: Sure, a thermostat can turn a furnace on and off, but that’s the means, not the end. If someone lights a fire in the fireplace, the thermostat may not have to produce any output at all. A thermostat is not a device with the purpose of turning a furnace on and off.

BG: An excellent point. Needless to say, the same is true of control. We do not live to control our perceptions (with the possible exception of Rick) but rather control our perceptions to achieve our goals. Or is this an heretical view? If so forgive me. My ignorance is boundless (ask Rick).

Bruce

[From Fred Nickols (2005.05.22.1453 PDT)]

I’m going to run the following test item by some people on
various groups and see what kind of response I get.

A thermostat acts to control:

a.
Actual room
temperature

b.
Furnace or A/C
operation (on/off)

c.
The temperature it
senses

d.
The temperature that
has been set

I’ll fill you in later.

Regards,

Fred Nickols

www.nickols.us

fred@nickols.us

···

From: Control Systems
Group Network (CSGnet) [mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Bruce
Gregory
Sent: Saturday, May 22, 2010 1:51 PM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: Beyond the Fringe (was An Opportunity for PCT PR)

[From Bruce gregory (2010.05.22.1650 EDT)]

[Fraom Bill Powers (2010.05.22.1425 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory 92010.05.22.1600 EDT)]

BG: Will you accept a thermostat that can turn a furnace on
and off? Or have I been so befuddled by 150 years of behavioral science that I
should just shut up?

BP: Sure, a thermostat can turn a furnace on and off, but that’s the means, not
the end. If someone lights a fire in the fireplace, the thermostat may not have
to produce any output at all. A thermostat is not a device with the purpose of
turning a furnace on and off.

BG: An excellent point. Needless to say, the same is true of
control. We do not live to control our perceptions (with the possible exception
of Rick) but rather control our perceptions to achieve our goals. Or is this an
heretical view? If so forgive me. My ignorance is boundless (ask Rick).

Bruce

[Martin Taylor 2010.05.23.12.23]

[From Bill Powers (2010.05.22.-0920 MDT)]

I think you are getting into one of your unattractive “peevish” moods.
I wasn’t going to reply, but I decided to make a couple of comments
anyway, at the risk of escalation.

Martin Taylor 2010.05.21.23.17 –

Rick Marken: Your
derivation
produces results that are quite different than mine (using a linear
approximation) and Bill’s (using functional notation).In the
derivations
with which I am familiar, d is not a function of I^-1(qo) (the organism
function) in a control loop.

MMT: By definition, qi = E(qo) + d, or qi - E(qo) = d

but I(qi) = qo, so I^-1(qo) = qi

I^-1(qo) - E(qo) = d

(I hope that makes Bill happier, since I put d on th right-hand side
this
time. It makes no difference to me whether I write a = b or b = a, but
since it matters to Bill, I am playing nice)

If you don’t see why I don’t like solving for independent variables, I
guess I can’t persuade you that it’s misleading.

Following the mantra “If you don’t understand, it’s my fault, not
yours”, I admit that it is misleading. But I don’t know why, unless it
is that you are so familiar with the programming convention that "x = a

  • b" means “make x take on the value that was true of a + b” that you
    carry it through into algebra. However that may be, I’ll try to
    remember to keep you happy when there are obvious physical dependencies
    implicit in an equation.

RM: Bill’s derivations
are on
pp. 145-146 of LCS I; for the closed-loop case he gets (using your
notation):

qo = 1/E (r - d)

MMT: This makes no sense, since in most analyses that are shown on
CSGnet, E() is the identity function, which would give

qo = 1/(r-d)

BP: No, it would give qo = r - d.

No it wouldn’t. The correct form would give qo = r-d, but Rick said “qo
= 1/E(r-d)”, which I pointed out had to be wrong because if it were
true and E were the identity function, that would make qo = 1/(r-d),
not qo = r-d. I suggested it was a typo, but Rick said it was an error
of intention.

MMT: Now let’s consider another
experimental situation, in which qo has no influence on qi, so that qo

I(d). This is the typical psychophysical experiment, in which qo is a
report after a trial as to whether a tone was in the first or the
second
interval of the trial.

RM: A person doesn’t become open loop when they are in a psychophysical
experiment.

MMT: True. A person doesn’t become open loop in a psychophysical
experiment. But the relation betwenn the presentation on trial N and
the
response choice on trial N is most definitely open-loop. We thrashed
all
this out a year or more ago.

No, you declared yourself satisfied with your own arguments.

If you remember, the “arguments” in question were not about whether the
perception generated from the sensory input was controlled, but about
the detailed configuration of the controlled perceptions leading to the
response given to the experimenter. Here are our two versions in my
posting from very early in the discussion (Feb 16, 2009).

ButtonPresentationMatch1.jpg

I proposed initially one configuration, you suggested another, and
after a lot of back-and-forthing about the viability of these different
configurations, I concluded that there really wasn’t any way to support
one or another configuration other than our respective individual
intuitions, so I stopped worrying about it. But if you are now saying
that the perception being judged by the subject is controlled, in the
sense that something the subject does can influence it, you are
introducing time-travel into PCT, and that’s a whole new concept.

You’re right, of course. It can’t affect the pitch or the time of
occurrance, either. However, it can affect the relationship between the
tone and the utterance, and that may be what the subject is
controlling.

I think we all agreed on that as being almost certainly true, and have
done from very early in last year’s discussion.

RM: And I am currently
working
with Bill on a demonstration of the closed-loop nature of behavior in a
choice reaction time experiment.

MMT: Good, but unless your experiment is set up so that the subject’s
choice influences the physical presentation that leads to the choice,
that critical element is open loop.

Are you saying that if the driver of the car turns left when coming to
a
T-junction, that choice is open-loop? Surely turning left doesn’t
affect
the presentation that led to that choice, so by your reasoning if there
is an invisible force (a strong wind) affecting the left turn, the
driver
will simply steer off the road.

No, that’s a false analogy. A better analogy in this circumstance is to
imagine that there is fog. The driver is controlling for perceiving
himself going to Anytown, but cannot perceive how far away the turn
possibility is or which way to turn. When close enough, the driver sees
some change in the shapes seen through the fog and begins to hazard a
guess “we approach the junction”. A little further on, that perception
is clear, and the driver can choose whether to turn right or left as
soon as the sign “Anytown -->” can be read through the fog. Then,
when the perception of the sign is clear enough to allow a secure
choice. the driver can make use of the now perceptible environmental
affordance of a road to the left and a road to the right to control his
perception of taking the road to Anytown.

A two-element relationship can be controlled when either element can be
disturbed, even if only one of its elements can be affected by the
controller.

Yes, we all agreed on that. In fact, I think it may have been I who
pointed that out first in the earlier discussion. At any rate, we
agreed on it immediately it was mentioned by one of us.

I think you’re focusing only on the triggering event and
the
element that can’t be affected.

No I’m not. I’m asking you not to forget that the object of study is
the path – the perceptual function – between the “triggering event”
and “the element that can’t be affected”. Only if there is some problem
with control of the relationship does it matter how that control is
structured. I focus on the “triggering event and the element that can’t
be affected” because you and Rick focus exclusively on the part on
which we all agree, the control of the relationship between the
perception of the triggering event and the possible responses that
might be given to the experimenter.

One of us is certainly rewriting history. I don’t think it matters who
that is, but in case it matters to anyone else, I guess the archives
for February and March 2009 might provide an authoritative answer. I
have only looked at my diagrams starting Feb 14, when I laid out the
control loops through the experimenter and subject, which concerns a
general multi-choice experiment, and continuing Feb 16 when I clarified
what I had meant at the relationship level, which had been just a tiny
part of the whole complex structure that I had proposed on Feb 14. The
next six weeks has many variants on these, but always dealing with
control at the relationship level (and sometimes at lower levels on the
output side). Little or none of the discussion over that period dealt
with the object of the psychophysicist’s study – only with how the
subject generated responses.

Martin

[From Bruce Gregory (2010.05.23.1654 EDT)]

[Martin Taylor 2010.05.23.12.23]

MT to BP: I proposed initially one configuration, you suggested another, and
after a lot of back-and-forthing about the viability of these different
configurations, I concluded that there really wasn’t any way to support
one or another configuration other than our respective individual
intuitions, so I stopped worrying about it. But if you are now saying
that the perception being judged by the subject is controlled, in the
sense that something the subject does can influence it, you are
introducing time-travel into PCT, and that’s a whole new concept.

BG: This might be a way to engender wider interest in PCT. Time travel is always popular and it should not be left only to physicists. A convincing demonstration could readily lead to Nobel Prize, I would think. (I am not sure that Rick would agree, however, since he champions the view that the perception being judged by the subject is a disturbance.)

Bruce