[from Gary Cziko 930905.1300 UTC]
Bill Powers and Bruce Nevin:
If you'd like to read an interesting perspective on Gibson, I highly recommend:
Bickhard, M. H., & Richie, D. Ml. (1983). ON THE NATURE OF REPRESENTATION:
A CASE STUDY OF JAMES GIBSON'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION. New York: Praeger.
Bickhard and Richie contend that Gibson was moving in the right direction,
away from a mediated, "encodingist" view of perception to an interactive
one but didn't go far enough in that direction.
017.2 "Gibson's basic insight was that it is possible to derive information
about an environment from interactions with that environment without
encoding anything from that environment."
I found this book of particular interest in that it shows that PCT avoids
not just one but the TWO fatal mistakes of mainstream psychology. We all
know the first (that perception controls behavior). The second is that
perception involves an internal encoding of aspects of the environment.
Here are some other quotes from the book to give some of its flavor
(preceding numbers are page.paragraph).--Gary
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011.1 Gibson quote: ""[It is] tempting to believe that the image on the
retina falls on a kind of screen and is itself something intended to be
looked at, that is, a picture. It leads to one of the most seductive
fallacies in the history of psychology--that the retinal image is something
to be seen. I call this the "little man in the brain" theory of the
retinal image (1966, p. 226), which conceives the eye as a camera at the
end of a nerve cable that transmits the image to the brain. Then there has
to be a little man, a homunculus, seated in the brain who looks at the
physiological image. The little man would have to have an eye to see it
with, of course, a little eye with a little retinal image connected to
a little brain, and so we have explained nothing by this theory. We are,
in fact worse off than before, since we are confronted with the paradox of
an infinite regress of little men, each within the other and each looking
at the brain of the next bigger man.""
016.4 "Suppose instead that the most direct focus of perception is the
functional nature of that which is perceived. Suppose that what are most
directly perceived are functional potentialities, potential usefulness.
The patterns of interactions that detect ambient light patterns, after all,
are not in any sense copies of those light patterns nor of the physical
surfaces and edges that yield them; they, rather, are simply interacting
outcomes that may indicate potentialities for further actions and
interactions. They are simply functional indicators.^2"
031.2 "Direct perception, then, in the sense of not involving mediating
encodings, is a valid metatheoretical position consistent with Gibson's
theory. Direct perception in the sense of direct encoding is an invalid
metatheoretical position inconsistent with Gibson's theory. The ease with
which the former is interpreted as the latter, both within and without the
Gibsonian camp, has obscured and retarded the basic task of understanding
perception."
051.3 "In both cases examined, Ullman (1980) and Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981),
the arguments are directed against a direct encoding interpretation of
Gibson from a mediated encoding perspective on perception. In both cases,
the general arguments are valid against a direct encoding interpretation,
through not against an interactive interpretation. Furthermore, in both
cases, the mediated encoding alternatives proposed are fatally vulnerable
to criticisms directed at their encoding foundations. In the Fodor and
Pylyshyn article, that mediated encoding alternative position is
particularly well elaborated; its vulnerabilities are thus exposed in
corresponding detail. In spite of Gibsons's own metatheory, then, a direct
encoding interpretation of Gibson is untenable. So also is the mediated
encoding alternative to Gibson. This leaves the interactive interpretation
of Gibson and the interactive approach in general."
057.4 "Encodings can only be explicated in terms of interactive
interpreters, yet such intentional interactive systems have been presumed
to be definable only in terms of (operations on) encodings. Strict
encoding, then, are circularly incoherent: They presuppose themselves."
058.1 "The incoherence of strict encodings, then, derives from their
presuming to be the grounds for explicating that which must in fact be the
grounds for their own explication. The impoverishment, insufficiency, and
lack of necessity of encodings all derive from encodings being
specializations of a broader representational function: the impoverishment
and insufficiency because that specialization does not capture all of the
broader interactive representational power, and the lack of necessity
because such specialization, however efficient it might be, is itself not
necessary."
058.2 "The claim that a level of interactive systems exists in this manner
between the material and the representational encoding levels actually has
four parts: 1) that such a nonmaterial, not necessarily representatinal,
level exists, 2) that representation can be explicated in terms of this
level, 3) that representation must be explicated in terms of this level,
and 4) that encodings can and must be explicated in terms of such
interactive representations. That such a level exists is easily
established: It is the domain of such areas as automata theory, control
structure theory, cybernetics, and so on. All of these areas study
processes, potentially interactive processes, in terms of their abstract
pattern of organization--that is, without essential reference to the
particulars of their material level instantiations--and without
presupposing or (necessarily) instantiating any representational
phenemena."
059.4 "it can be argued . . . that skills and values can be understood
interactively, but not in terms of encodings. The representation by
indicator differentiation of a simple feedback system also provides an
example. An internal outcome indicator can be used to differentiate and
select ensuing courses of interaction, but it contains essentially no
information about what in the environment yielded that outcome; it contains
or constitutes no information about what it might be taken to encode and,
thus, no information that would allow it to be an encoding. We, as
observers of the system, might claim that it encodes such-and-such a
physical state of affairs that yielded that outcome, but the system itself
has no necessary knowledge of that sort, and it certainly need not infer
its next course of interaction on the basis of such encodings: Does a
thermostat infer its actions on the basis of encodings of temperature, or
does it simply discriminately respond to internal indicators? We confuse
our perspective as observers with the perspective of the system being
[060.1] observed when we take such indicators as encodings. In effect,
encodings presuppose and require too much knowledge to be able to explicate
such simple differentiating indicators."
083.2 "James Gibson's theory of perception, both internally and with
respect to the controversy surrounding it, exemplifies the conflict between
two fundamental approaches to the nature of representation: the encoding
approach and the interactive approach. We have argued that the encoding
approach forms an impoverished, asymptotically limiting case of the
interactive approach and that it is insufficient, unnecessary, and
incoherent when taken as a logically independent approach to the nature of
representation. The issues have been examined primarily with respect to
perception and with a primary focus on Gibson's theory, but those issues
are fundamental to all of psychology. It is hoped and expected that the
exploration of those issue will prove interesting and productive throughout
their domain."