[from Jeff Vancouver 990824.0815 EST]
Last night I got to chapter 3 in Carver & Scheier. That is the chapter on
the self-awareness, self-focus, self-hocus, pocus stuff. In other words,
bizarro. Just like the first time I read this stuff in their '81 book, I
cannot understand what their research tells us. Unlike Rick and Phil, I
still have some faith in the between-subjects experiment. The aggregation of
the data is worrisome, but I think explainable (i.e., not random). Whether
the correct explanation is the one C&S give I do not know. But I find that
the evidence they present is too far from the point they are trying to make.
From Phil Runkel on 23 Aug 99:
Since Carver & Scheier wrote their first book on this subject, I've never
been asked to review any papers in their field.
I deplore that fact, but I can't say I am surprised.
I was somewhat surprised to here this too, but then I thought about it some
more. Bill P. has not been publishing in the journals in which these
articles were written, or even in related social-personality journals. The
closest was the '78 Psych Review, which probably should have gotten him on
at least one review list, but I do not think it merits a condemnation of the
editorial establishment.
A psychologist who
borrows a theory or a part of a theory from an originator almost always
takes the stand that he or she is improving on the original. (And usually
takes the stand that the originator should be honored to receive the
Borrower's attention.) Suppose the Editor asks the Originator whether the
Borrower has it right. Suppose the Originator says no. And the Borrower
says, "Of course I am not doing it the way the Originator did it. I am
improving on it." What is the editor to do? The tradition in mainstream
psychology, like the tradition in many other academic fields, is that
everyone is entitled to his or her opinion. So who can say that the
Originator is right?
Phil, had Bill reviewed some of this work he would not have simply said x
was an incorrect interpretation of his model but why x does not make sense.
In other words, an editor would not rely on the word of the originator, but
on the power of his or her arguments. From what I have seen, Bill's are
extremely powerful.
If you say yes, but can he build a working model,
that conception is simply not, I think, in the imagination of any editor
except MM Taylor and RS Marken. And to stick his neck out and CHOOSE the
criterion of a working model would get the Editor run out of the
discipline on a rail.
With all do respect Phil, horse hockey. Much of cognitive psychology loves
working models (of course cognitive psychology is a small minority in the
psychological community). In this case it is, if I may generalize a bit,
social-personality that would not know what to do with a working model. But
I believe that if you sell it correctly (i.e., know your audience), even
social-personality journals might be persuaded. It would depend on who the
reviewers and editors were of course. In general, there is a devision
between the modeling schools (e.g., MIT, Carnegie-Melon) and the verbal
schools (e.g., Yale).
From Rick Marken (990823.1320)]
C&S's version of PCT is not the whole field called self-regulation.
I know. But they are the one's who seem to be the most explicit
in their use of Powers' model. They refer to Powers a lot and they
even use PCT terminology: reference, perception, action, etc.
Agreed.
You may have noticed that C&S give MG&P primary credit for introducing
the negative feedback model to psychology, which is probably fair
Miller, Galanter and Pribrum (MG&P) published "PLans and the Structure
of Behavior" in about 1965; Powers' first publication on PCT was in
1960 (in either _Psychological Reports_ or _Perceptual and Motor
Skills_).
I suspect that the earliest introduction of the negative feedback model
to psychology was by a British psychologist named Craik during WW II.
Plans was published in 1960. Same year as Bill and gang (it was P&MS). We
explicited noted this in the goal construct paper (but C&S apparently did
not notice). Before Craik was Cannon, and before Cannon was some guy Cziko
likes to talk about (whose name I cannot remember). But again, having just
finished chapter 3, I see that it is the Wicklund & Duval research that
partially accounts for the bizarreness of C&S. In other words, it appears
they were trying to give a different explanation to a very specific finding
having to do with a mirror. It seems (from what I have read so far), that
where they get bizarre is in trying to shoe horn PCT into the "self-focus"
effect.
Their [Carver and Scheier's] interest is in the higher levels in
Power's hierarchy, but their take on how that might work is infused with
their own ideas and the ideas of others. This is merely the age-old
issue
of the student (trying) to go beyond the master.
It would have been nice if the students had gotten to where the master
was before trying to go beyond him. From what I've seen, C&S's model
of the "higher levels" is just a bunch of cause-effect gobbledygook.
Are C&S going beyond the "master" when they present evidence that
"self focus" engages a comparator that causes people to be more
willing to take certain actions?
I would emphasize the _trying_ here. Your job, should you choose to accept
it, is to explain why they found what they found and why your interpretation
is consistent with a different model of negative feedback loops (although
obviously a speculative alternative explanation since it was not what was
tested). This is what you did with your behavioral illusion demo. I think
that is powerful stuff. The irony here is that C&S's explanation is
presumably negative feedback. So far, I have only gotten to the point where
it seems very problematic to interpret their findings as they did (I do not
understand how a manipulation which presumably focuses attention on the self
improves the comparison process for a specific control unit relevant to some
specific task, see p. 34). So, although I can have problems with their
interpretations, I cannot offer an alternative that is actually
PCT-compatible (which I interpret as my shortcoming, not PCTs). But given
the social-personality audience, you cannot simple ignore their findings
(e.g., calling it gobbledygook) and simply having problems with their
interpretation only undermines control theory in the short run. It might be
reasonable to settle for that last state, but I would rather provide a true
PCT-consistent explanation, and some data to back it up. Until I (or
someone) can do that, I am leaving the self-focus stuff alone.
I anticipate, given other stuff I have read by C&S, that I will have great
misgivings about the "executive" control they suggest, and the narrowness of
the affect stuff. What I will look for is whether they attribute those
"ideas" to PCT (see below).
You cannot begrudge the attempt (unless they mis-represent the master
I can and they do.
You cannot begrudge the attempt. You can certainly begrudge the result!
In terms of mis-representation. I would be interested in your (or anyone
elses) opinions about that. So far, I have found 2 possible incidents, but
they are arguably not a misrepresentation.
1) In the figure on page 32, they call the reference signal a "standard for
behavior." This is inconsistent with their own description of control of
perception and their label for the results of the input function
("perception of effects of your behavior"). This problem with switching
behavior and perception also shows up in the title. But rather than arguing
that this is a mis-representation of PCT, I would argue that this is an
inconsistency within C&S's explanation, an inconsistency that PCT does not
suffer from.
2) On p. 76 (I skipped ahead a little bit) they claim that Powers claims
that the hierarchy takes on a digital quality at the program level. My read
of PCT is that a unit _can_ be digital (no matter where it is), but that we
are more likely to see that at higher levels like the program level.
However, I think that if I were Miller et al., I would be more upset. In
that same section they claim that "the sense of this [Miller et al's]
discussion is very similar to the arguments that Powers made about the
hierarchy he proposed" (p. 77). This sounds like something I would have
said a few years ago. Where is the science in "sense of this discussion."
If I find more I will post them. If anyone finds more, I would appreciate
knowing.
Finally, and probably what you do not want to hear, is that some
of the differences might be reasonable.
I judge the quality of a control model by how well it explains
control, not by how reasonable it seems. As far as I can tell,
C&S have never tested their model (such as it is) in terms of
its ability to explain control; so I have no idea whether the
C&S model is better or worse than the good ol' PCT model.
I judge the quality of a psychological model by how well it explains human
behavior. Judging on the quality to which a model is a control model does
not play well to psychological audiences. In other words, I use the term
reasonable in relation to the perceptions I am trying to control. Sorry for
the confusion.
Later
Jeff
···
On Mon, 23 Aug 1999, Bill Powers wrote: