# Blobs 'n' Stuff

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/blobs-n-stuff/1858>\
**Category:** CSG1997\
**Created:** [September 12, 1997, 1:15am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/blobs-n-stuff/1858 "1997-09-12T01:15:53Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 2\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![Fred\_Nickols3](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/f/9de053/32.png) [@Fred\_Nickols3](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Fred_Nickols3)\
**Post date:** [September 12, 1997, 1:15am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/blobs-n-stuff/1858/1 "1997-09-12T01:15:53Z")

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[Fred Nickols (970911.2240 EST)]

> Rick Marken (970910.0800)]
> 
> Fred Nickols (970909.2015 EST) --
> 
> > I have a sense of what BruceA is trying to do and I am  
> > sympathetic (BillP seems similarly inclined and RickM does not).
> 
> I guess you hadn't read Bill Powers (970909.1748 MDT) and  
> (970910.0138 MDT) when you wrote this. In particular, take a  
> look at Bill Powers (970910.0138 MDT):
> 
> > What I am saying here, Bruce, is that the behaviorist account,  
> > which you present as a simple factual description of observations,  
> > is nothing of the sort. It is a biased account slanted toward  
> > encouraging the listener to conclude that the environment is  
> > controlling behavior -- that behavior is controlled by its  
> > consequences, which is exactly the opposite of the truth.
> 
> This doesn't sound like sympathy toward Bruce A's position to me.  
> It sounds more like it took Bill one day longer than it took me  
> to lose patience entirely. And you certainly don't have to take  
> Bill or my word for it; use the demos to see that the behaviorist  
> account is wrong and the PCT account is right.

My reference was to earlier posts of Bill's when it seemed to me  
that he was sympathetic toward BruceA's effort to figure out how  
to connect the two. Since I can't recall which specific posts and  
because I have no intention of trying to dig them up, I'll retract  
the assertion as unfounded. As for me trying to see that "the  
behaviorist account is wrong," I'll pass on that invitation. I  
wouldn't know whether to use your definition of the behaviorist  
account, Skinner's, Fred Keller's, BruceA's, or any one of half a  
dozen different accounts of that perspective.

> > it also seems to me that the perceived consequences of our  
> > behavior have an effect on the reference structures against  
> > which we attempt to control our perceptions.
> 
> This is a poor way of describing it. In a hierarchical  
> control model, when a higher level system is not getting the  
> perceptual consequences it wants it will change the reference  
> for a lower level control system; this is the normal disturbance  
> resistance process of control. The way you stated it here it  
> sounds like perceived consequences can have an effect on the  
> very reference against which thery are compared; as though  
> food pellet input rate can have an effect on the reference for  
> what this rate should be. If this were true, there would be no  
> control. Since organisms do control, your statement of the model  
> must be wrong.

All that sounds like a nice theoretical explanation and I'll  
certainly not take issue with it, but I will, as I do with all  
theoretical explanations, take it with a grain of salt.

You also provide an example illustrating my remark that the  
consequences of behavior affect the reference structures against  
which we attempt to control our perceptions--and then denounce  
it as untrue. Specifically, you said the notion that "food pellet  
input rate can have an effect on the reference for what this rate  
should be" cannot be true, I plainly disagree. In my experience,  
actual conditions often lead to a revision of expectations and  
standards. We lower and raise our sights, so to speak. So I  
don't think your argument holds water.

> > Personally, I think that the behaviorists' view and the B:CP view  
> > fit better than RickM will ever admit
> 
> I don't understand why people want to believe this. What's to  
> fit? If PCT is right then (as Powers said in his Science article  
> in 1973) the behavioral sciences have been laboring under an  
> illusion for the last 100 years. The basic conclusion of  
> behaviorism is that behavior is output controlled by the  
> environment; the basic conclusion of PCT is that behavior is  
> input controlled by the organism. I can't see how these two  
> points of view can be made to "fit" together. And why try?

I'm a one-time behaviorist and I never--not once--viewed behavior  
as output. I've known people who did, and I always thought their  
thinking processes were impaired. To me, behavior was and is a  
shorthand label for "the activity of the organism." Urine and  
fecal matter are outputs, as are the sounds we make, and the heat  
and perspiration we emit. But I don't view behavior as an output  
and never did. If, as you say, "the basic conclusion of PCT is  
that behavior is input controlled by the organism," I think that's  
as wrong-headed a view as saying that behavior is output. To me,  
behavior is neither input TO nor output FROM the organism; it is  
the activity OF the organism. If I understand your statement, you  
would have me separate myself from my behavior. No thanks.

> > I'll remind myself from time to time that we're dealing with  
> > competing explanations of behavior and let it go at that
> 
> I think that it is a \_very\_ big mistake to look at it this way.  
> PCT and behaviorism are \_not\_ really competing explanations of  
> behavior. They are, first and foremost, competing explanations  
> of what behavior \_is\_. Behaviorism views behavior as a dependent  
> variable that is caused by independent variables inside or outside  
> of the organism. Behaviorism doesn't recognize the fact that some  
> of these variables are neither independent nor dependent variables  
> but are, rather, controlled variables.

I wouldn't know a dependent variable from an independent variable  
if one of each walked up and bit me. I can't decode the paragraph  
above and I'm not about to try--except for the part about what  
behavior is. Presumably, you refer to your earlier comment that  
EAB sees behavior as output and PCT sees it as input. I think  
both those views are wrong, so, if EAB and PCT are competing on  
that basis, it is to me a competition that I will ignore.

> Behaviorism doesn't try to explain the behavior of controlled  
> variables because it doesn't even know they exist. PCT, on the  
> other hand, was developed specifically to explain the behavior of  
> controlled variables. A side benefit is that the PCT model also  
> explains why behaviorists have been able to see behavior (control),  
> incorrectly, as a cause-effect process for all these years.

In the last sentence above lies a clue, I think, as to why I think  
the fit between EAB and PCT might be a little closer than some in  
the PCT camp might find comfortable. It seems to me that if PCT  
can explain what is wrong with EAB, there has to be a sufficient  
commonality of terms and referents for those terms to communicate  
the argument. If not, it's all harangue and hyperbole. If the  
correspondence in terms does exist, or can be brought to light, it  
ought to be possible to take the reverse angle of attack. Hence,  
I believe, BruceA's notion of the possibility of a bridge between  
the two.

> Most people come to PCT thinking it is an alternative explanation  
> of behavior, where the "behavior" they want to explain is the kind  
> seen by behaviorists. These people will not "get" PCT until they  
> are willing to revise their notion of what behavior \_is\_. PCT was  
> developed, not as an alternative to behaviorism, but as an  
> explanation of a phenomenon that behaviorism never noticed (or  
> tried to imagine away): the phenomenon of purposeful behavior,  
> also known as control.

The assertions above might be true of some but they are not true of  
me--if you mean "behavior" to mean output (or input, for that matter).  
In that vein, help me out...If I substitute "input" for behavior in  
the last sentence above, it reads "the phenomenon of purposeful input,  
also known as control." Is that consistent with PCT?

Regards,

Fred Nickols  
nickols@worldnet.att.net

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**Author:** ![R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/R_Marken)\
**Post date:** [September 12, 1997, 5:52am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/blobs-n-stuff/1858/2 "1997-09-12T05:52:58Z")

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[From Rick Marken (970911.2250)]

Fred Nickols (970911.2240 EST)

> As for me trying to see that "the behaviorist account is  
> wrong," I'll pass on that invitation.

No problem. Nobody has to look through the telescope unless  
they want to.

> I will, as I do with all theoretical explanations, take it  
> with a grain of salt.

I usually take the opportunity to test them. To each his own.

> you said the notion that "food pellet input rate can have  
> an effect on the reference for what this rate should be"  
> cannot be true, I plainly disagree.

This is where modeling helps. You can disagree all you like  
with what I say but if a model built according to your claims  
doesn't control (as it doesn't) then its not a model of human  
behavior -- whether one likes it or not. Science has the  
pesky habit of rejecting our theories no matter how much we  
like them. Of course, people don't just give up on theories  
just because they are rejected by the evidence. People control  
their perceptions -- even scientist people.

> I'm a one-time behaviorist and I never--not once--viewed  
> behavior as output... To me, behavior was and is a shorthand  
> label for "the activity of the organism."

Same thing. The visible activity of an organism is what we  
call its "output". In PCT, the activity of the organism is  
a side-effect of the process of perceptual control.

> I wouldn't know a dependent variable from an independent  
> variable if one of each walked up and bit me. I can't  
> decode the paragraph above and I'm not about to try

Sorry. I was using terms that I thought would be familiar to  
people in the behavioral sciences. All I can say is that, if  
you do try to decode what I said, I think you will find much  
of value. But there's sure no way to prove that;-)

> It seems to me that if PCT can explain what is wrong with EAB,  
> there has to be a sufficient commonality of terms and referents  
> for those terms to communicate the argument.

I think there is, indeed, sufficient commonality of terms and  
referents between PCT and EAB to communicate in argument. I  
think I understand EAB and PCT just fine. PCT and EAB proponents  
can certainly talk to each other; I think the problem is that  
the EAB people don't like what they hear so they respond by saying  
that PCT people 1) don't understand what the EAB people are  
\_really\_ saying and 2) that the PCT people don't really mean what  
they are saying.

What we're seeing is just good old disturbance resistance; PCT  
is a disturbance to EAB so EAB people do whatever they can to  
protect their baby. The only way to prevent this resistance  
is to say things like "PCT is consistent with EAB"; that  
statement will get no resistance at all from EABers but it  
will get resistance from PCTers because it is a disturbance  
to the perception of PCT that some of us are controlling for.

> If I substitute "input" for behavior in the last sentence above,  
> it reads "the phenomenon of purposeful input, also known as  
> control." Is that consistent with PCT?

I think so. Actually, one of the papers I wrote was called  
"The hierarchical behavior of perception". From the perspective  
of the behaving system, "behavior" is the behavior of one's  
own perceptions (inputs).

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --
> 
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net  
> [http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/)
