# Bruce's selection model

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/bruces-selection-model/1996>\
**Category:** CSG1994\
**Created:** [December 26, 1994, 5:36pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/bruces-selection-model/1996 "1994-12-26T17:36:02Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/w/c67d28/32.png) [@William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/William_T_Powers2)\
**Post date:** [December 26, 1994, 5:36pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/bruces-selection-model/1996/1 "1994-12-26T17:36:02Z")

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[From Bill Powers (941226.0900 MST)]

Bruce Abbott (941220.1400 EST)--

Don't know what happened with that program I sent you -- maybe I had the  
wrong format in effect for creating ascii files from my word processor.

Your new "selection" program is very neatly constructed and works just  
as you say. I looked it over fairly carefully, however, and couldn't  
find the part of the code that is doing the selecting. Maybe I just  
didn't recognize it. Can you point it out to me?

I see you got around my problem with using reorganization at the second  
level. In order to keep the organism from dying, I found I had to make  
the reorganizing process very slow -- but that allowed the organism to  
get into regions where the gradient was so low that everything slowed to  
a stop. I didn't keep on with the project, so don't know if I could have  
found a solution.

Yours is simply to start E. coli over again each time it "dies," with a  
new set of parameters and a new supply of stored nutrient. I notice that  
the new organism is also set back onto the playing field if its ancestor  
had gone off it. So basically your model keeps restarting with new  
parameters but from similar initial conditions until a set of parameters  
is found that results in a control system.

A problem with realism is that each new E. coli is given a new store of  
nutrients, which would not be the case in the real E. coli. Nor,  
considering the method of reproduction, would the mutated offspring be  
relocated into the region of normal concentrations.

Your evolutionary model could be made into a reorganization model if you  
didn't require E. coli to die. By setting a nonzero lower level of  
stored nutrient as the trigger, and randomly shuffling the parameters  
each time, you might be able to make E. coli survive, while still  
reorganizing. You'd need to use rate of change of stored nutrient, too,  
so that if the level of stored nutrient started to rise while the  
absolute level was still too low, you wouldn't get another  
reorganization right way.

You could make the model even more interesting if you allowed E. coli to  
reproduce instead of "bursting" at a nutrient level of 200.

> **···**
>
> ---------------------------------------  
> I still don't see any selection by consequences, except in a sort of  
> roundabout metaphorical sense. The consequence of dying doesn't really  
> select anything, does it? As far as I can see, when an organism dies  
> that is the end of it. Its death doesn't affect anything else. Of course  
> in your program the routine for creating a new organism is triggered by  
> the death of an old one, and doesn't execute unless an organism dies. So  
> we could say that creating a new organism is "selected" by the death of  
> an old one. But inside that routine, I can't see any selection process  
> -- you just get random new parameters, plus a refill on the stored  
> nutrient and a boost back to a reasonable place in the gradient. The  
> chances are probably appreciable that the new organism "selected" in  
> this way will die, too (although the number of deaths seems remarkably  
> small). This continues until no more deaths occur.
> 
> The problem with using a word like selection, and saying that the  
> consequence is doing it, is that I would expect to see some selection  
> mechanism at work in the thing that is said to do the selecting. I can  
> see that the overall effect is AS IF the consequence could select a  
> behavior that produces it, but I always assume that we're speaking  
> literally, particularly when proposing models. In a control-system  
> model, the way the system behaves when the reference signal is constant  
> suggests that the disturbance directly causes the output of the system  
> that opposes the disturbance. But that is an appearance only, and not  
> the literal truth. Likewise, it seems that the reference signal directly  
> sets the value of the input quantity, but again that is only an  
> appearance. When we understand how the control mechanism actually works,  
> we can see how these appearances are created, but we no longer believe  
> that the appearances are telling the true story.
> 
> In the crowd program, when you see an active individual wend its way  
> through a maze of obstacles to reach a goal-circle, it really looks as  
> if the goal-circle is selecting behaviors by the individual that will  
> eventually bring it inside the circle. Someone who didn't know about the  
> model behind the Crowd program, and who was unfettered by prejudices  
> against magic, might actually propose some such model, saying that the  
> goal-circle was an attractor of some sort, pulling on the individual and  
> making it move toward the source of attraction. Heck, look at Kurt  
> Lewin's "field theory" of the 1930s, which actually proposed that  
> objects in the environment attracted and repelled organisms in their  
> vicinity. I don't know if even Lewin took that theory literally, but he  
> seemed to talk as if it were literally true.
> 
> I think that metaphorical descriptions of behavior create more confusion  
> than understanding. "Goal-seeking" behavior is often talked about as if  
> the goal somehow exists in the environment, so that even if it doesn't  
> actually exist, it is still sought by the organism. At the time I say  
> that my goal is to be at the gas station at the foot of Farmington Hill,  
> my actual position is my front driveway. I am NOT at the gas station. So  
> how can my being at the gas station, a condition that does not exist,  
> result in my being at the gas station? Without the PCT model, this  
> problem just becomes a big muddle, and the whole muddle is caused by  
> using a metaphor that implies a nonsensical mechanism. In fact,  
> organisms do not "seek goals" if by "goal" you mean some condition in  
> the environment that does not actually exist. What they seek is to make  
> perceptions of the actual environment match internal reference signals,  
> which DO have physical existence. When you understand that, and adjust  
> your language (or at least your meanings) accordingly, the muddle  
> disappears.
> 
> So while I can understand "selection by consequences" in a metaphorical  
> sense, I can't accept it as a literal description. The mechanisms behind  
> this process that we get out of PCT don't contain any selection devices  
> or procedures; there is something else entirely going on. We may  
> describe the appearances created by these mechanisms, poetically, as  
> "selection," but anyone taking that description literally would be hard  
> put to point to the selector -- and the means by which it selects.  
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Best,
> 
> Bill P.