[Bulk] ENA's [experiencing naming acts]

CSGnet Archive CSG2006
1

Re: [Bulk] ENA’s [experiencing naming
acts]
[Martin Taylor 2006.04.11.15.03]

[Jim Dundon
2006.04.12.12:33EDST]
In living control
systems, on page 2, Bill Powers says:

“a percept is the
basic unit of experience.”.
Does PCT see the
production of words as acts?

Yes. An act is the output of a control system. The production of
a word is the output of a fairly high-level control system. That
output alters reference values for control systems at successively
lower levels, which output “acts”. Eventually, there are
acts that are manifest in the outer world, such as muscular movements
of the jaw and tongue, or of the fingures if the word is written. But
the “act” of outputting the word is also manifest in the
outer world, as is the act that produced the reference value that
induced the word-level control system to gneerate its output (e.g. a
control system with a reference to perceive some effect on a dialogue
partner).

Does PCT see the
naming of percepts as acts?

I think that depends on what you mean by “naming”. If
you are talking about a taxonomist producing outputs that are names of
percepts, then for sure the namings are acts. If you are talking about
your perception of the name “red” when you see a red object,
that’s a perception, not an act. However, the perceptual “naming”
process could conceivably be the object of a control process – in
fact such a control process is sometimes observable externally, when
someone says “I’m trying to think of the name.”

Does PCT see the
naming of units of experiences as acts?

Same answer.

Does PCT see
“experiencing namings” as acts?

No, not if you are talking about the second case above.

Does PCT see the use
of symbols in communication as naming acts?

Now you’ve added a third usage of “naming”, as an
adjective applying to “act”. Symbols are outputs, and the
outputting of each symbol is an act. If the choice of symbol included
somewhere in the control pathway the perception of the name “X”
associated with a perception, and that led to the output of X, would
you then call the output act a “naming act”? If so, the
“naming” would be perceptual, the symbol output, an
act.

In what I call
the Cisena worldview all symbols of communication are products of
naming acts of humans.

Never heard of that worldview. Have you come across my Layered
Protocol Theory of communication? It was that that led me to PCT, when
I discovered that it could be treated as a particular case of PCT
applied to dialogue.

This includes even the
spaces between words and sentences as named perceptions, basic
units of experiencings because, they dictate to the reader a certain
perception to experience.

PCT wouldn’t require that they be named in order that they should
have the desired effects. A dialogue analyst might name them, but I
think it extremely dubious as to whether a listener in ordinary
dialogue names them.

If the answer to any
of the above is yes, at what level is this likely to take
place?

That’s a contentious issue that has been argued here in the past.
My take on it is that the “naming” perceptions occur at all
levels of the hierarchy, but that the control systems that use them
are controls of perceptions of the intended recipient(s) of the
message. Those control system are at very different levels from the
levels at which the perceptions of names occur.

More “classic” PCT puts names at the “category
level”, a level with which I am not at all happy.

Martin

2

Re: [Bulk] ENA’s [experiencing naming acts]

···

----- Original Message -----

From:
Martin Taylor

To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.UIUC.EDU

Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 4:20 PM

Subject: Re: [Bulk] ENA’s [experiencing naming acts]

[Martin Taylor 2006.04.11.15.03]

[Jim Dundon 2006.04.12.12:33EDST]
In living control systems, on page 2, Bill Powers says:
"a percept is the basic unit of experience.".
Does PCT see the production of words as acts?

Yes. An act is the output of a control system. The production of a word is the output of a fairly high-level control system. That output alters reference values for control systems at successively lower levels, which output “acts”. Eventually, there are acts that are manifest in the outer world, such as muscular movements of the jaw and tongue, or of the fingures if the word is written. But the “act” of outputting the word is also manifest in the outer world, as is the act that produced the reference value that induced the word-level control system to gneerate its output (e.g. a control system with a reference to perceive some effect on a dialogue partner).

Does PCT see the naming of percepts as acts?

I think that depends on what you mean by “naming”. If you are talking about a taxonomist producing outputs that are names of percepts, then for sure the namings are acts.

      I Am.

If you are talking about your perception of the name “red” when you see a red object, that’s a perception, not an act. However, the perceptual “naming” process could conceivably be the object of a control process – in fact such a control process is sometimes observable externally, when someone says “I’m trying to think of the name.”

Does PCT see the naming of units of experiences as acts?

Same answer.

Does PCT see "experiencing namings" as acts?

No, not if you are talking about the second case above.

         As in 2, I am speaking of the taxonimist producing outputs

Does PCT see the use of symbols in communication as naming acts?

Now you’ve added a third usage of “naming”, as an adjective applying to “act”. Symbols are outputs, and the outputting of each symbol is an act. If the choice of symbol included somewhere in the control pathway the perception of the name “X” associated with a perception, and that led to the output of X, would you then call the output act a “naming act”? If so, the “naming” would be perceptual, the symbol output, an act.

         I am speaking of the symbol output

In what I call the Cisena worldview all symbols of communication are products of naming acts of humans.

Never heard of that worldview.

         Cisena is my Acronym for "created/concepted, imagined/incorporated, spontaneous experiencing naming act".  the intent is to leave nothing out. That is to include all words, spoken and written symbols used by humans, to represent to oneself or others, a percept. It may be that the acronym is not adequate but the intent is to include all spoken and symbols expressions. so if you understand that, that is all that is neccessary for now.  To simplify more, we can use just ENA "experiencing naming acts" It is the name of my website,"Cisenaproject.com"

Have you come across my Layered Protocol Theory of communication?

          Where can I find it?

It was that that led me to PCT, when I discovered that it could be treated as a particular case of PCT applied to dialogue.

This includes even the spaces between words and sentences as named perceptions, basic units of experiencings because, they dictate to the reader a certain perception to experience.

PCT wouldn’t require that they be named in order that they should have the desired effects. A dialogue analyst might name them, but I think it extremely dubious as to whether a listener in ordinary dialogue names them.

         Of course they are not named in the course of dialogue,  but they are named as things to do when writing. They are then subitized actions. They are named as spaces and utilized to communicate to the writer and reader to pause, or to separate the previous "naming assemblings" from the next "naming assemblings" in order to facilitate the best expression, communication, comprehension, etc. I use the verbing form of words to indicate and emphasize the fact that, as namings of experiencings, they are anthropomorphicaly sourced. That is, they are acts of humans. This leads to my conclusion that religions, philosophies, all ologies theories etc are creations of humans. They serve, among other things, as political power structures. If we were to use a block or a scribed square in the place of the space it would be called a symbol. the absence of the square or block in the interest of efficiency does not remove the effect which is to communicate an experiencing, it is therefore, in the Cisena view a symbol. It an "unpoken understood",  maybe a Zen moment.The Cisena view has no problem accepting experiencing namings which have been used in the history of any science and subsequently discarded. Words like phlogiston and ether, reinforcement, etc are considered part of the experiencing history, if they were all or in part imaginatings, they are to be so named. Ther is tremendous power in naming.  Even Zenning requires a dergree of naming to be understood as a process whereby we escape the trappings of words. Words are essential to life.

If the answer to any of the above is yes, at what level is this likely to take place?

That’s a contentious issue that has been argued here in the past. My take on it is that the “naming” perceptions occur at all levels of the hierarchy, but that the control systems that use them are controls of perceptions of the intended recipient(s) of the message.

           The writer must be the first recipient. He must play both roles in imagination.

Those control system are at very different levels from the levels at which the perceptions of names occur.

More “classic” PCT puts names at the “category level”, a level with which I am not at all happy.

     If they are only in or at the catagory level does it not force a boolean or set theory structure, which I believe to be inadquate for some purposes, not only inadequate but problematic at times.

Martin