[Bulk] Re: Tickling and PCT

[Bulk] Re: Tickling and PCT
[Martin Taylor 2006.03.09.14.33]

[From Rick Marken
(2006.03.08.0930)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2006.03.08,13:30
EUST)

How shall we explain it [tickling] in a PCT way? I
think we talk about control at different levels, but that may be
wrong.

OK. I’ll give it a go. I think the PCT
interpretation would go something like this:

What we feel when tickled is an emotional
experience. …

We can’t tickle ourselves, I think,
because the “tickled” emotion depends on the existence of
error and on the cognitive interpretation of the cause of that error
as being funny.

No theory, but an observation: It is possible (maybe normal) to
be able to produce an effect like that of tickling without there being
any physical contact between the tickler and the ticklee. I do to my
grandchildren what my mother used to do to me nearly 70 years ago – I
wiggle my fingers above the child who is lying down. My hand
approaches the region were I would tickle, and the child goes into
hysterical laughter, just as he would if I actually tickled him.

There’s something here about predicted perception, as Bjørn
say, I think.

I’m pretty sure that if a stranger did that to the child, the
reaction would be more fearful than laughing. And as Rick said, if it
were an adult being “threatened” with tickling, the reaction
might be “growl” (or worse).

As I said, no theory.

Martin

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2006.03.09,21:50 EUST)]

[Martin Taylor 2006.03.09.14.33]

No theory, but an observation: It is
possible (maybe normal)

to be able to produce an effect like that of tickling without

there being any physical contact between the tickler and the

ticklee. I do to my grandchildren what my mother used to do

to me nearly 70 years ago – I wiggle my fingers above the

child who is lying down. My hand approaches the region

were I would tickle, and the child goes into hysterical

laughter, just as he would if I actually tickled him.

If someone tickled your grandchildren
earlier, your grandchildren perceived the fingers around the body, but they
also saw the fingers coming toward their body.

Is that the reason they felt a kind of tickling
when you wiggled your fingers above them.

Is a perception through the eyes as good as a
perception through bodily contact?

There’s something here about predicted
perception, as Bjørn say, I think.

I am sorry I wrote “predicted perceptions”.
If I had referred correct I should have written “predicted episodes”.

For me “predicted perceptions” are just
references.

bjorn

···

[From Rick Marken (2006.03.09.1540)]

Martin Taylor (2006.03.09.14.33)--

No theory, but an observation: It is possible (maybe normal) to be able to produce an effect like that of tickling without there being any physical contact between the tickler and the ticklee.

I know the experience quite well! I loved it when my grandpa did it to me and my kids loved it when I did it to them. Just approach in a "tickling" way and the reaction is just like the person was tickled.

I think that what you're seeing is control of an imagined perception (the imagined feel of the tickle) resulting in the same physiological experience (because there is the same error) as you get when actually tickled. And, again, the experienced emotion is "funny" if the cognitive component interprets the physiological experience as the result of playfulness rather than hostility.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Bulk] Re: Tickling and PCT
[Martin Taylor 2006.03.09.21.02]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2006.03.09,21:50
EUST)]
[Martin Taylor 2006.03.09.14.33]

There’s something here about predicted perception,
as Bjørn say, I think.

I am sorry I wrote “predicted perceptions”. If I
had referred correct I should have written “predicted
episodes”.
For me “predicted perceptions” are just
references.

I don’t
understand that. In PCT, what is an “episode”. What do you
perceive, if not perceptions? And if the prediciton is not of a
perception, how is its accuracy determined when the event does or does
not happen? At some time, you have a percetion, but at an earlier time
you predicted an episode. What is the relationship between the
two?

Predicted
perception makes sense to me. Predicted episode does not, unless you
are using “episode” as a synonym for the perception
associated with one of Bill’s levels (such as sequence,
perhaps?).

How can a predicted perception be a reference? I may have
predicted G.W.B’s election as US President, but I sure didn’t have a
reference to perceive it, and even had I had such a reference, I had
no control system that would have allowed me to influence that
perception, not being a US citizen. A reference is a desired state
that is compared with an existing state. The difference is the
“error”, and the error affects the output that, if control
exists, influences the perception so as to reduce the error.

I see no connection between a reference and a predicted
perception, unless one is predicting that one’s control actions will
bring the controlled perception to its reference. More specifically,
if one were to predict that, without one’s own action, a particular
perception would match its reference value, one would be advised not
to act (or rather not to change one’s current action).

Martin

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2006.03.10,09:10 EUST)]

Martin Taylor 2006.03.09.21.02

I don’t understand that. In PCT, what is an
“episode”.

that do you perceive, if not perceptions? And if
the

prediction is not of a perception, how is its
accuracy

determined when the event does or does not happen?

At some time, you have a perception, but at an
earlier

time you predicted an episode. What is the
relationship

between the two?

Here must be a misunderstanding.

In my first mail I gave an account of Randy Flanagan’s explanation why we don’t laugh when we tickle ourselves,
and why we laugh when we are tickled of other people. Randy Flanagan is from
Queen’s University in Ontario, Canada.

I reported “One explanation from Randy Flanagan is
that all perceptions are predictable if we tickle ourselves and because of
that, our sensory capabilities are weakened”.

When I looked back, he didn’t say what I
wrote. He said “

One explanation from Randy Flanagan is that
all episodes are predictable if
we tickle ourselves and because of that, our sensory capabilities are weakened”.

I don’t think he knows PCT and I translated
his word episodes as actions. I don’t think we can predict actions (episodes),
I think we predict perceptions. Therefore I asked my question “How shall we
explain it in a PCT way?”

I hope I was able to explain a possible
misunderstanding.

As you see, neither I think “episode” is a
PCT concept. And of course I absolutely agree when you say that we predict our
perceptions.

Predicted perception makes sense to me. Predicted
episode does not, …

Same to me.

How can a predicted perception be a
reference?

I may have predicted G.W.B’s election as US

President, but I sure didn’t have a reference to

perceive it, and even had I had such a reference,

I had no control system that would have allowed

me to influence that perception, not being a US

citizen. A reference is a desired state that is

compared with an existing state. The difference

is the “error”, and the error affects the output that,

if control exists, influences the perception so as

to reduce the error.

I will answer viewed in the light of an
earlier comment from you (a year or two).

We don’t control all our perceptions. We don’t
control the angle horizon_me_moon. I neither think you can control the election
of G.W.B, as you said yourself.

When I said a predicted perception is a
reference, I meant that a predicted perception is something I wish. And if I
wish something I am aware of the reference that helps me to perceive what I
predicted, what I wished. Of course I am able to predict perceptions I don’t
wish to perceive, but then I perceive in the imagination mode.

I see no connection between a reference
and a predicted

perception, unless one is predicting that one’s control

actions will bring the controlled
perception to its reference.

Yes, I agree.

More specifically, if one were to predict
that, without

one’s own action, a particular perception
would match

its reference value, one would be advised
not to act

(or rather not to change one’s current
action).

Said with other words. If we predict a
perception without one’s own actions, we are in the imagination mode. Am I
wrong?

I am still looking at your World Model (now
and then) and soon I will send you a World Model mail. At the moment I also
spend some time trying to understand the connection between our interior state
and our brain hierarchy. Maybe you will hear from me about that.

bjorn