[From Bill Powers (920615.0900)]
Mark Olson (920614.1700) --
1) Outcomes are influenced by the environment and reference signals.
Outcomes are determined by reference signals.
Actions are influenced by the environment and reference signals.
Actions are determined by the environment.
Actions control outcomes.2) The cause of an outcome is the reference signal with the
environment as the enabling condition.
The cause of an action is the environment, with the reference
signal as the enabling condition.
Actions control outcomes.
This kind of summing-up is a good idea, I think. Let me throw in some more
considerations for you to sort through.
I think "the environment" is perhaps too general, because properties of the
environment enter differently from independent variables in the
environment. A lever has the property that pushing down on one end makes
the other end go up. So it determines that IF you want the far end to go
up, THEN you push down on the near end. Skinner used the term "contingency"
for this: movement of the far end is contingent on movement of the near
end. Not a bad term.
But the lever neither causes nor influences anything by just sitting there.
The variable position of its far end, given the lever's properties, is
influenced in a particular way by the action of moving the near end. It is
also influenced by independent forces acting anywhere along the lever. The
lever doesn't determine whether any such actions or forces will occur.
Maybe this could be summed up by saying that the KIND of outcome of an
action is determined by properties of the environment, while the STATE of
the outcome is influenced by action and independent variables: this comes
down to JOINT DETERMINATION of the state of the outcome by action and
disturbance, given the properties of the feedback connection.
Of course this doesn't bring purpose into it yet. There are always joint
outcomes of action and disturbance, but INTENDED outcomes are a subset:
those maintained near a given state by variations in action.
Shoot, now I'm getting into details that seem to go on forever. For
example, what is an "outcome?" Isn't it defined by perception? When you act
on an environment you cause a never-ending series of shifts in
relationships among thousands of detailed variables. It's perception that
puts order into these variables, represents them as abstract things like
"objects." Outcomes are defined in terms of things we perceive. While
perception doesn't CAUSE the physical variables to be in certain states, it
SELECTS certain functions of those variables as significant aspects of the
world, and intended outcomes are among those aspects.
Oh, blah, blah, blah. Suddenly I'm wondering if there really is any way to
reduce the relationships to a sequence of simple statements of influence,
determination, or causation. Those concepts are all really two-element
ideas: the influence or determiner or causer, and the influenced,
determined, or caused. Maybe all this boils down to trying to express
circular causation in terms of lineal causation. I'm beginning to see why
Aristotle ended up with four kinds of causes.
I guess the problem with your summing-up is that it makes perfect sense if
you already understand the principles of control, but that each statement
requires endless explanation for someone who doesn't. In a real control
system, there are all kinds of determinations and causations and influences
going on at the same time. Perception defines what amounts to an outcome.
The environment, given that definition, determines what actions would be
needed to affect that outcome in any given direction, and also determines
how any remote independent variables that may exist can affect that same
outcome. Reference signals specify which state of a perceived outcome is to
be maintained; disturbances that cause errors relative to that reference
state then determine what amount and direction of action, applied through
properties of the environment, will occur.
I feel the same way you do: there has to be a way to express all this as a
series of easily-understood statements. But after all the above, I'm
beginning to wonder whether ordinary language doesn't contain too much SR
theory for this to be done using existing words. Just talking about causes
and effects is a problem, and influences and determinations really don't
help that much. Maybe in a subtle way we're trying to make control theory
palatable to people who still think in straight lines.
After all that, I guess I just should have said "Very interesting." But
what you're trying to do deserves more than that.
Best,
Bill P.