Choice and deceit

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.01.13.1856 EST)]

Bill Powers (2000.01.11.0212 MDT)

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.10.1850 EST)--

What I imagine is a situation where, by test, you know that the person is
controlling a choice between x and y, and (as yet another test) you assert
that you see that they are controlling x. Is this what you had in mind?

Roughly, yes.

Or, in your words:

I have this bit of evidence about what you were
controlling, but to establish evidence about what you were _choosing_ would
be more difficult. To find that evidence, I would first have to see you
controlling x, and then controlling y, and then see you in a situation
where you couldn't do both at once and had to make a choice as to which one
to control (with no other alternatives being possible).

(You went on from here about another question, finding out how a person
makes choices.)

I'm not sure how telling the person what he or she is controlling would
constitute yet another Test. What controlled variable would be disturbed by
my telling the person what is being controlled?

Saying "I see that you have chosen to do x" is not simply telling them that
they are controlling x, it is also saying that they are constrained to do x
or y, that they must do one, not both, and that there are no other
alternatives. We haven't identified what variable might be disturbed by
this, but we certainly have imagined some pretty strong ways of resisting
the disturbance, whatever it is.

Of course there can be more than two elements, but by your assumptions
above the choice set is small, predetermined, and invariant. Given some
prior social context, it is also public, rather like the choice whether a
particular sound sequence is the word "pall" or the word "ball".

I like Rick's answer the best: it's easy to perform a simple test by
putting some obstacle in the way of achieving the guessed-at goal. If the
person makes the necessary adjustments and succeeds in controlling x
anyway, at least the proposal as to what the person is controlling is not
refuted.

If control of x is disturbed, that changes the balance of the conflict
between x and y. There is now an external conflict with their control of x
in addition to the disturbance to x due to their control of y. It seems to
me quite natural that the process of choosing (resolving the conflict)
would be re-opened, very possibly with a different outcome. That proves
nothing about whether they had previously chosen to do x, that is, resolved
the conflict by abandoning control of y.

It does not seem to me a simple matter to disturb control of a choice
(rather than disturbing the chosen variable). Indeed, "choosing" seems not
to be a simple variable that is controlled. It seems to be

* A limitation as to what can be controlled (the choice set)
* A conflict between controlling the variables in the choice set.
* A requirement to control one of them.
* Resolution of the conflict by abandoning all but one of them.

Truthfully and validly to say "I see that you have chosen to do x" one
would need to know each of these. If the first three are public in a
community (as for example, the contrast between p and b in English) then
the task of Testing for the fourth (which way they resolved the conflict)
is greatly simplified.

(A person who is told that they have chosen x could deny this in respect to
any one or more of these four points. Such denial indicates that their
control of some variable was disturbed, but it isn't at all clear just what
variable, so I must agree that it is not a very successful Test. That is
all that I had in mind by saying, parenthetically, that the assertion
amounted to another Test.)

Because "choice" is not simple control of a variable that can be disturbed
in a Test, all of this so far is problematic, but I hope not controversial.
The controversy about RTP arises perhaps from the nature of the choice set:
either control disturbance to others' control or go to the place where
skill in that kind of control is taught. If it can be shown empirically
that the constraint to this choice set is publically accepted among the
students in an RTP school, then the rest follows, and the resolution of
that conflict becomes a publically observable choice by any individual
student. If it can be empirically shown that the constraint is not public
and established, but instead is unilaterally imposed by the teacher at the
time of sending the student to the RTC, then the choice by the student is
not a resolution of the x vs. y conflict, but rather of a teacher-student
conflict. This cannot be determined from here by any of us.

        Bruce Nevin

···

At 03:15 AM 01/11/2000 -0700, Bill Powers wrote:

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.14.0810)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.13.1856 EST)--

If it can be shown empirically that the constraint to this choice
set is publically accepted among the students in an RTP school, then
the rest follows, and the resolution of that conflict becomes a
publically observable choice by any individual student. If it can
be empirically shown that the constraint is not public and established,
but instead is unilaterally imposed by the teacher at the time of
sending the student to the RTC, then the choice by the student is
not a resolution of the x vs. y conflict, but rather of a teacher-student
conflict. This cannot be determined from here by any of us.

So if a student says publicly "I accept that if I disturb the class
I must go to the RTC" then when the student disturbs the class he
has "chosen" to go to the RTC; and an RTP teacher can truthfully and
validly say "I see you have chosen to go to the RTC". If the student
does not say this oath publicly then when the student disturbs the
class he has not chosen to go to the RTC.

So there is no test for controlled variables needed to be able to
say, truthfully and validly, that a student has chosen to go to the
RTC. The only "test" needed is an observation of overt behavior; looking
to see whether the student has uttered the oath stated above. If the
student has uttered the oath, then the teacher can truthfully and
validly say " I see you have chosen to go to the RTC"; if the student
has _not_ uttered the oath, then the teacher _cannot_ truthfully and
validly say this.

This means, of course, that determination of the truthfulness and
validly of saying "I see you have chosen to go to the RTC" has nothing
to do with PCT. It's simply a judgement based on observation of overt
behavior; and taking that behavior at face value. There is no effort to
determine the perceptions the kid might be controlling when he is seen
saying the oath or when he disturbs.

Basing evaluation of the truthfulness and validly of saying "I see you
have chosen to go to the RTC" on overt behavior is a completely
behavioristic approach to dealing with people. From this behavioristic
perspective a teacher is being completely truthful and honest when she
says "I see you have chosen to go to the RTC" if she has also seen the
student say the oath. The only people who are not being truthful and
honest are the people saying that the RTP program is based on PCT.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.01.14.1157 EST)]

Rick Marken (2000.01.14.0810)]

···

At 08:15 AM 01/14/2000 -0800, Richard Marken wrote:

If the student does not say this oath publicly

Is that how you test for controlled variables? I didn't know.

        Bruce Nevin

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.14.1030)]

Me:

If the student does not say this oath publicly

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.14.1157 EST)

Is that how you test for controlled variables? I didn't know.

No. The way to test for controlled variables is explained in
many places in the PCT literature (one pretty good, and recent,
reference is R. Marken (1997) The dancer and the dance,
_Psychological Methods_, December issue).

Looking at a public oath to determine what a student has done
(chosen) is an example of _not_ testing for controlled variables.
Indeed, it's an example of being completely ignorant of the
possible existence of controlled variables. That is, it is an
example of a completely behavioristic method of determining
what a person had done.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.01.14.1726 EST)]

Rick Marken (2000.01.14.1030)--

···

At 10:31 AM 01/14/2000 -0800, Richard Marken wrote:

Looking at a public oath to determine what a student has done
(chosen) is an example of _not_ testing for controlled variables.
Indeed, it's an example of being completely ignorant of the
possible existence of controlled variables. That is, it is an
example of a completely behavioristic method of determining
what a person had done.

Then why did you bring it up?

        Bruce Nevin

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.14.1820)]

Me:

Looking at a public oath to determine what a student has done
(chosen) is an example of _not_ testing for controlled variables.
Indeed, it's an example of being completely ignorant of the
possible existence of controlled variables. That is, it is an
example of a completely behavioristic method of determining
what a person had done.

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.14.1726 EST)--

Then why did you bring it up?

I [Rick Marken (2000.01.14.0810)] brought it up in reply to the
following from you [Bruce Nevin (2000.01.13.1856 EST)]

Because "choice" is not simple control of a variable that can be
disturbed in a Test, all of this so far is problematic, but I hope
not controversial. The controversy about RTP arises perhaps from
the nature of the choice set: either control disturbance to others'
control or go to the place where skill in that kind of control is
taught. If it can be shown empirically that the constraint to this
choice set is publically accepted among the students in an RTP
school, then the rest follows, and the resolution of that conflict
becomes a publically observable choice by any individual student.
If it can be empirically shown that the constraint is not public
and established, but instead is unilaterally imposed by the teacher
at the time of sending the student to the RTC, then the choice
by the student is not a resolution of the x vs. y conflict, but
rather of a teacher-student conflict. This cannot be determined
from here by any of us.

As best as I could tell (and I admit that I'm not sure what you
were saying here) it seemed like you were saying that, "if it can
be shown empirically that the constraint to this choice set is
publically accepted" (which I took to mean "if we can see that
the student publicly accepts the rule that a disturbance leads to
the RTC room") then "resolution of that conflict" (I admit I had
a pretty hard time deciphering that one; I took it to mean
"resolving the conflict between disturbing and going to the RTC
room") becomes a "publically observable choice".

So my translation of what I _thought_ you were saying here was
"If the student publicly accepts the rule 'disturbance leads
to RTC room' then when the student creates a disturbance he has
publicly chosen to go to the RTC room". If this is not a correct
interpretation of what you said, feel free to explain what you
did mean.

I took your final comment to mean that we can only see whether
teacher's are correctly and honestly telling students that
"they have chosen to go to the RTC" when the students create
a disturbance if we go to the schools and see whether those
students have publicly agreed to the rule. Is this right?

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.01.18.0958 EST)]

Take 2.

Bill Powers (2000.01.11.0212 MDT)

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.10.1850 EST)--

What I imagine is a situation where, by test, you know that the person is
controlling a choice between x and y, and (as yet another test) you assert
that you see that they are controlling x. Is this what you had in mind?

Roughly, yes.

Or, in your words:

I have this bit of evidence about what you were
controlling, but to establish evidence about what you were _choosing_ would
be more difficult. To find that evidence, I would first have to see you
controlling x, and then controlling y, and then see you in a situation
where you couldn't do both at once and had to make a choice as to which one
to control (with no other alternatives being possible).

Making this more explicit:

1. A person is controlling both x and y at time t.

2. They can successfully control either, but they cannot
   successfully control both because they conflict.

3. They must control one. (Giving up on both is not an
   option for resolving the conflict.)

4. They successfully control x at time t+i; they abandon
   control of y.

If (4) is a result of a control process, one can test whether (4) is the
person's choice by disturbing the controlled variable. What is the
controlled variable, such that (4) is an effect of controlling it?

I like Rick's answer the best: it's easy to perform a simple test by
putting some obstacle in the way of achieving the guessed-at goal. If the
person makes the necessary adjustments and succeeds in controlling x
anyway, at least the proposal as to what the person is controlling is not
refuted.

Disturbance to their control of x is not a test of whether or not it is
their choice.

If "choosing" is not a control process, then there is no way to determine
whether control of x is their choice or not by disturbing some controlled
variable. The prima facie evidence is their control of x rather than y.
What other evidence is there?

        Bruce Nevin

···

At 03:15 AM 01/11/2000 -0700, Bill Powers wrote:

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.18.0847 MDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.18.0958 EST)--

Making this more explicit:

1. A person is controlling both x and y at time t.

2. They can successfully control either, but they cannot
  successfully control both because they conflict.

3. They must control one. (Giving up on both is not an
  option for resolving the conflict.)

4. They successfully control x at time t+i; they abandon
  control of y.

Actually, giving up control of both _is_ an option in the general case
(achieving the higher goal by doing z instead of either x or y), and is a
legitimate resolution of the conflict, in that the conflict and its bad
effects cease to exist. So you're dealing with a special case in which, for
some reason, the person is _required_ to control either x or y. This
implies that x and y are the only available means of controlling some
higher variable in the person, or that some external agency is somehow both
forcing a choice between x and y and forbidding the rejection of both
alternatives (which naturally leads us to ask how and by whom the choices
are successfully forced or forbidden).

If (4) is a result of a control process, one can test whether (4) is the
person's choice by disturbing the controlled variable. What is the
controlled variable, such that (4) is an effect of controlling it?

I don't know that there's a general answer to this question; if there were,
resolving conflicts would be fairly simple. I think the answer lies at a
higher level, in that the person has changed something about a higher-level
goal (or perception or output function) so that sending a reference signal
to one set of lower systems to accomplish it does not cause an error in a
different set of control systems.

Changing a reference signal at a given level always implies a change in the
output of a higher system, according to the hierarchical model. If there is
a conflict, it is being caused by a higher system that is sending two
reference signals to two lower systems that cannot achieve both reference
conditions at the same time. Assuming that the goal of the higher system is
not abandoned (which would just push the analysis up one level), the only
way I can see for the same higher error to be corrected without conflict is
for the output function to be reorganized so the reference signals it sends
to lower systems no longer create conflict.

We can see resolution of a conflict, therefore, as the process that
restores control of some higher variable which had been lost due to the
conflict. The actual process of resolution must involve reorganization; if
a systematic way of resolving the conflict already existed, there would be
no conflict (at least not for a significant length of time).

Having said that, I realize that people _do_ have systematic ways of
resolving some conflicts, so that the conflicts are only transient. This
implies that the person has learned to perceive when a conflict exists, has
a reference level for zero conflict, and an output method for resolving the
conflict. You could therefore observe the process and show that it is a
systematic way of controlling the perception of conflict, using the Test.
For example, you might find that a person resolves certain
incompatibilities by determining to accept the result of a coin toss: heads
I turn left, tails I turn right. This procedure removes any need to make a
decision between two alternatives. If you disturb the procedure, the person
will counteract the disturbance.

I like Rick's answer the best: it's easy to perform a simple test by
putting some obstacle in the way of achieving the guessed-at goal. If the
person makes the necessary adjustments and succeeds in controlling x
anyway, at least the proposal as to what the person is controlling is not
refuted.

Disturbance to their control of x is not a test of whether or not it is
their choice.

No, but disturbance of their ability to make a choice is a test of
choice-making. This works, of course, only if the person has a systematic
way of making the choice. If, after the coin toss at the Superbowl, the
captain of one team put his foot on the coin before everyone saw it,
somebody would probably ask him to remove his foot. Any disturbance that
prevented the coin-toss from resolving the questions of who receives the
ball and who defends which goal will be counteracted somehow, if making the
decision is truly a controlled variable on someone's part. It would
probably be the referee, who is in charge of rules. If the two captains
approached him before the coin toss and explained that they were in
agreement about who was to receive and which goal the other team was to
defend, I'm pretty sure the referee would have to refuse, and make the
decision by tossing the coin anyway. That is the mandated way of starting
the game, and can't be bypassed.

If "choosing" is not a control process, then there is no way to determine
whether control of x is their choice or not by disturbing some controlled
variable. The prima facie evidence is their control of x rather than y.
What other evidence is there?

If the choosing is accomplished through reorganization (a control process
of a particular kind), it's not likely that the particular intrinsic error
driving the reorganizing process would be easily visible to an outside
observer. Given that reorganization is _defined_ in PCT as a process of
random variation and selective retention, it would be hard to see the
actions of the reorganizing system except as a noise level in behavior, or
to produce disturbances that would systematically affect the controlled
variable.

If there were a systematic method for resolving (transient) conflicts, then
there might be some hope of discovering it and using the Test.

However, merely observing that one variable rather than another is being
controlled has no bearing on choice. It shows only that a reference signal
was set to control x, or to control y. You might say that there is a
reasonable inference that a conflict has been resolved (which is what
making a choice implies), but that is not scientific proof, since it would
not always or necessarily be true. It is not necessary that a conflict
exist for either x or y to be set as a reference condition. The fact that x
is controlled does not imply a choice between controlling x and controlling
any other variable. For example, if I turn left at a street corner, this
does not imply that I chose between turning left and committing suicide
(although these would certainly be incompatible goals at the moment just
before either action). The mere fact that you _could have_ done something
different does not imply that you made any choice.

Best,

Bill P.

[Martin_Taylor]

[Martin Taylor 2000.01.18 17:23]

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.18.0847 MDT)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.18.0958 EST)--

>Making this more explicit:
>
>1. A person is controlling both x and y at time t.
>
>2. They can successfully control either, but they cannot
> successfully control both because they conflict.
>
>3. They must control one. (Giving up on both is not an
> option for resolving the conflict.)
>
>4. They successfully control x at time t+i; they abandon
> control of y.

Actually, giving up control of both _is_ an option in the general case
(achieving the higher goal by doing z instead of either x or y), and is a
legitimate resolution of the conflict, in that the conflict and its bad
effects cease to exist. So you're dealing with a special case in which, for
some reason, the person is _required_ to control either x or y.

I don't think you addressed what I read as Bruce's question (though I'm
sure he will say so himself if I'm wrong; but it's my question, too).
I read his question as having to do with what is being controlled _in
the making of the choice_ and how to Test whether "that" is what is
being controlled. The behaviour (output acts of the "choosing" control
system) is that x is observably being controlled and y is not. The
question is: To what does one apply The Test for the controlled
variable of the "chooser" control system?

You seem to say the appropriate Test is to inhibit the mechanism the
chooser uses to make the choice. But usually that mechanism is not
visible to an outside observer (as a coin-toss is visible). So the
question remains. There is a behaviour that is "choosing." All behaviour
is the control of perception. What perception is being controlled, and
how can one test that it is? I don't myself have an answer, but I don't
think your answer addresses the question.

Bringing in "z" is a red herring, in that all it does is make the
choice three-way rather than two-way. And so, I think (but am not sure),
is bringing in the notion of a single higher-level system that can
use either x-control or y-control as methods for its own control.

···

On the other hand, if x-control serves one higher-level control (X') while y-control serves a different one (Y'), all we have done is push the conflict "chooser" up a level so that it becomes a conflict between X' and Y' -- as you said.

I don't think "reorganization" fills the bill, because often what we are
talking about is time-division multiplexing. The conflicted hierarchy
"chooses" x-control for a period, and then y-control, and then x-control
again, and so forth. Reorganization tends to be less directed and more
permanent. If the higher system is reorganized so as to be satisfied with
x-control, eliminating the conflict, it tends to stay with x-control.

I may have read you carelessly, but the tenor of your response seemed
to imply that there is no "chooser" control system to be tested. It
seems to me that there must be, and going a bit further, that "choosing"
is likely to be a component specifically of "program-level" control.

I don't think Bruce's situation is a special case. Do I control for
seeing myself on a bike or in a car as an element of controlling for
seeing myself at work? Do I eat the ice-cream or not, anticipating that
my dinner will be tastier if I don't? Do I listen to Brahms or Billy
Holliday--or nothing?

All of these situations appear to involve choice but not reorganisation,
and to exemplify situations we encounter almost every waking minute of
every day.

Martin

PS. Bill--Berg is on his way thorugh the Canada Post system.

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.19.0617 MST)]

Martin Taylor 2000.01.18 17:23--

I don't think you addressed what I read as Bruce's question (though I'm
sure he will say so himself if I'm wrong; but it's my question, too).
I read his question as having to do with what is being controlled _in
the making of the choice_ and how to Test whether "that" is what is
being controlled. The behaviour (output acts of the "choosing" control
system) is that x is observably being controlled and y is not. The
question is: To what does one apply The Test for the controlled
variable of the "chooser" control system?

I am rejecting "choosing" as a specific control process; the phenomenon we
classify as choosing is explained completely in terms of conflicting
control systems with resolution of the conflict by reorganization (or
learned systematic ways of resolving conflict, such as temporal ordering of
goals). I don't think we need any more than that to explain the process we
call choosing.

You seem to say the appropriate Test is to inhibit the mechanism the
chooser uses to make the choice.

Not to "inhibit" it in the absolute sense; merely to make it slightly more
difficult, or delay it a bit, so we can see whether the person counteracts
our disturbance. We don't want to destroy the very control process we're
trying to identify.

But remember, I don't see choice processes as some special process
different from what the higher systems do all the time.

But usually that mechanism is not
visible to an outside observer (as a coin-toss is visible). So the
question remains.

If it remains invisible to the outside observer, then we must remain in
ignorance about it, save for introspection.

There is a behaviour that is "choosing." All behaviour
is the control of perception. What perception is being controlled, and
how can one test that it is? I don't myself have an answer, but I don't
think your answer addresses the question.

I'm denying the truth of your initial premise: There is a behavior that is
"choosing." Thus it does not follow that there is any perception
representing an objective choosing process, or any control of that
perception. I claim that "choosing" is merely a name we give to a
collection of experiences which themselves have nothing to do with any
unique process of choosing.

"Choice", I say, starts with the simultaneous selection of incompatible
reference signals, followed quickly by the realization that control has
been lost (or if this is done in imagination, _would be_ lost). That is
what _necessitates_ the "choice". If there were no conflict, both reference
conditions would be achieved at the same time and no choice would be needed.

If a systematic method for eliminating the conflict already exists at a
higher level, it is brought into play and the conflict is removed. If there
is no systematic method available, the conflict will persist until
reorganization (at the level causing the conflict, not at the level where
the conflict is expressed) solves the problem. Or until the organism dies.

I don't think that account leaves out anything of importance that we
include in the idea of choice. If you can find something it leaves out, of
course, I will try to address it.

Best,

Bill P.

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.19.0950)]

It seems to me that this thread has become unnecessarily
arcane.

I believe Bruce Nevin started things off by asking if there
were any situation in which a person could truthfully say
"I see you have chosen...". I mentioned one: My "mind reading"
demo at :

http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/ControlDemo/ThreeTrack.html

In that demo the subject is asked to move one of the three
squares (small, medium and large) in an arbitrary pattern.
When the computer detects the controlled square (by filling
it in) the subject is to "change his mind" and chose to move
one of the other two squares.

The idea of the demo was to show how The Test lets you see
another person's changing intentions (or "choices") regarding
which square to move. An observer who understands what is going
on in this demo can watch a skilled subject perform this task
and truthfully say (as one square after another is filled in)
"I see you have chosen to control the (large, medium or small)
square" depending on which square has just been filled in.

Each time a new square is filled, which happens regularly if
the subject is following instructions and choosing to move a
different square each time the currently controlled square is
successfully detected (filled in), the observer can truthfully
tell the subject "I see you have now chosen to control the
(large, medium or small) square" depending on which square is
now filled.

I don't recall hearing any comments about the appropriateness
of this simple demo as an example of a situation where a person
could truthfully say "I see you have chosen...". Doesn't this
answer your question, Bruce?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.01.19.1617 EST)]

Bill Powers (2000.01.19.0617 MST)

···

At 06:39 AM 01/19/2000 -0700, Bill Powers wrote:

I am rejecting "choosing" as a specific control process; the phenomenon we
classify as choosing is explained completely in terms of conflicting
control systems with resolution of the conflict by reorganization (or
learned systematic ways of resolving conflict, such as temporal ordering of
goals). I don't think we need any more than that to explain the process we
call choosing.

Then the only evidence available that going to the RTC is the student's
choice is the fact that they do go there despite disturbances already
present in the environment.

        Bruce Nevin

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.19.1400)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.19.1617 EST)--

Then the only evidence available that going to the RTC is the
student's choice is the fact that they do go there despite
disturbances already present in the environment.

Actually, I'd say you don't even need to see disturbance
resistance; all you have to see is the kid going to the RTC.

You don't need PCT in order to be able to see that the RTP
teacher is lying when s/he says "I see you have chosen to go
to the RTC". All you need is an elementary grasp of the English
language. If the teacher sees a kid disturbing the class and
says to the kid "I see you have chosen to go to the RTC" then
any native speaker of English (at least, one without an agenda)
would conclude that the teacher is either lying or hallucinating.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.19.1700 MST)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.19.1617 EST)--

Bill:

I am rejecting "choosing" as a specific control process; the phenomenon we
classify as choosing is explained completely in terms of conflicting
control systems with resolution of the conflict by reorganization (or
learned systematic ways of resolving conflict, such as temporal ordering of
goals). I don't think we need any more than that to explain the process we
call choosing.

Bruce:

Then the only evidence available that going to the RTC is the student's
choice is the fact that they do go there despite disturbances already
present in the environment.

I don't see any evidence of that. I think you and I may have different
ideas of what constitutes evidence.

Best,

Bill P.

[Erling_O_Jorgensen]

RECAPITULATION: / EXTENSION:
[I'm a little confused by Hank's proposal, but my intention
here is either to recapitulate a previous point that's gotten
lost, or to extend the discussion in a new direction.]

[From Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.21.1620 CST)]

I have been traveling a lot since before the new year (on
interviews for internship, to start in the Fall), so I'm
not exactly sure of the current state of the discussion.
But from what I've skimmed of the ongoing thread, there is
an aspect that I don't think is being addressed.

It seems to me the teacher's statement, "I see you have
chosen to go to the RTP room," is an intentional *disturbance*
to what the disrupting student is controlling. No, of course
he/she hasn't chosen to go to that room. He/She is too busy
trying to get a rise out of other students (or whatever) by
acting up. But from a deeper perspective, [same as "higher"
to my way of thinking, just inverting the metaphor], that's
the only choice consistent with what the student has previously
agreed, including principles such as: Classtime is for learning,
and Students have a right to learn free from undue disruptions.

The "I see you have chosen..." exchange -- just like the prior
"What are you doing?" series of questions -- is an invitation
(and expectation) for the student to "go up a level" and attend
to that broader context. The teacher is controlling for seeing
an up-a-level experience by the student. In that sense it is
a deliberate attempt to _teach_ what Ed Ford has chosen to call
Responsible Thinking (and responsible action to correspond
with it.)

We can argue whether either series of questions/statements does
it well or does it badly, but I believe that is the intention
of the teacher at that point in the RTP process. And perhaps
it should be examined in light of how well it achieves that
intention or not.

BTW, if the student _does_ go up a level, then new references/
choices of perception and action become possible, including
going to the RTP room as a way of affirming previously agreed
principles. In terms of the so-called truth or honesty of the
teacher's "I see you have chosen..." statement, at worst its
veracity is *premature*.

To recapitulate, I believe the unspoken dynamic behind the
Responsible Thinking Program is, in effect, "To be responsible
(or to learn how) you have to go-up-a-level, and here's a way
for teachers to encourage that in their students."

All the best,

        Erling

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.21.1520)]

Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.21.1620 CST)--

The "I see you have chosen..." exchange -- just like the
prior "What are you doing?" series of questions -- is an
invitation (and expectation) for the student to "go up a
level" and attend to that broader context.

Why wouldn't saying "I see you have chosen to disturb the
class" (rather than "I see you have chosen to go to the
RTC") work just as well?

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[Erling_O_Jorgensen]

CLARIFICATION: / RESPONSE TO QUERY:
[From Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.22.1200 CST)]

Rick Marken (2000.01.21.1520)

Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.21.1620 CST)--

The "I see you have chosen..." exchange -- just like the
prior "What are you doing?" series of questions -- is an
invitation (and expectation) for the student to "go up a
level" and attend to that broader context.

Why wouldn't saying "I see you have chosen to disturb the
class" (rather than "I see you have chosen to go to the
RTC") work just as well?

My sense is that the exchange would go in a very different
direction. I think the reason may be that your suggestion
is _not_ necessarily a disturbance to what the student is
doing. It's stating the obvious -- (Student: "Well, duh!") --
and in that sense it *stays* at the level the student is
currently controlling for.

It is also somewhat adversarial in that it calls attention
to the _breaking_ of the agreed-upon rule, with a possible
defensive exchange from the student as a result. What I
think the other question achieves is drawing attention to
a way for the student to _keep_ various prior commitments,
and in that sense succeed at a higher level.

It invites the student to regain control of the various
principles everyone agreed to (or at least acknowledged) as
a good way for a classroom to run. And it subsumes the
disruption within that framework, without necessarily labeling
it as bad. In effect -- "Yes, you can disrupt twice; you
just need to visit the RTC and develop a plan, as a way to
reaffirm that you still believe in these principles for letting
other students learn."

It is _moving up_ to that broader context that is key. And I
think that is the intention of Ed's RTP program, even if he
doesn't use that image or phraseology.

I am wondering if you agree that some kind of up-a-level
phenomenon is involved here; (and not just the phenomenon
of whether the teacher is modeling honesty and the perceptual
limitations of an outside control system).

I am also wondering how introducing a _disturbance_ (by means
of the teacher's "...chosen..." statement) could have such
an effect. That is not usually how we think of the Method of
Levels (even in miniature, such as in a quick classroom exchange)
as proceeding. Generally, it seems to be questions -- including
the other RTP suggestion, "What are you doing?" -- that allow
moving up a level to happen.

I'll admit that I may not have a good enough experiential feel
for the Method of Levels, to apply it appropriately to this
case. But it certainly _seems_ that a) going up a level is key,
and b) a disturbance starts it all off.

Perhaps it is only an *apparent* disturbance, since by moving up
a level the seeming dilemma is resolved, [namely, the dilemma
that you believe other students should be free to learn, and yet
here you are disrupting them.] At that higher level, the student
can simply sequence his/her choices -- disruption first, then
visit to RTC -- and all his/her control systems, both Principle
and Program, end up getting what they want!

The broader question in my mind (especially as a therapist) is,
do we want to consider certain kinds of disturbances as useful
in fostering this up-a-level phenomenon? I think Ed and his
associates have hit upon a relatively successful practical
program, that incorporates some kind of mini-MOL as its operative
dynamic, and I'd like us to examine why and how it works (according
to the known or to-be-further-elaborated structure of PCT).

All the best,

        Erling

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.01.23.1207 EST)

Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.22.1200 CST)--

···

At 01:10 PM 01/22/2000 -0600, Erling O Jorgensen wrote:

CLARIFICATION: / RESPONSE TO QUERY:

But it certainly _seems_ that a) going up a level is key,
and b) a disturbance starts it all off.

A reminder that has the effect of nudging the student to go up to the level
at which the prior agreement was made, which happens to be "up a level"
from the conflict between "control disruptions" and the disruptive side
effects of whatever the student was doing. It may also be a disturbance,
but that is irrelevant.

        Bruce Nevin

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.24.0440 MST)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.23.1207 EST)--

A reminder that has the effect of nudging the student to go up to the level
at which the prior agreement was made --

I can't find any discussion by Ed Ford concerning "prior agreements." In
discussing this with him, when he was still talking to me, he said that
children "know right from wrong" and know what the rules are without the
need for any discussions of them. It was LeEdna Custer who instituted
negotiations with children concerning rules, but I don't think Ed thought
that was necessary. Maybe it's different now. On the basis of what I have
seen and heard of Ed's thoughts, it seems to me that he thinks children
simply have to learn to get along under whatever rules the adults around
them have established.

It's not always clear to me whether you are describing what Ed Ford has
said about his program's design, what others in RTP have contributed out of
their own experiences, or your concepts of an RTP program that you believe
would work. As far as I know, Ed himself does not think that working out
rules in cooperation with children is particularly important, although he
has deferred to a few of his people in allowing that it would be
permissible under RTP. I'm not up to date on his current thinking, though,
so I could be wrong.

Best,

Bill P.

[Erling_O_Jorgensen]

[From Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.24.0925 CST)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.23.1207 EST)

Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.22.1200 CST)--

But it certainly _seems_ that a) going up a level is key,
and b) a disturbance starts it all off.

A reminder that has the effect of nudging the student to go up to the
level
at which the prior agreement was made, which happens to be "up a level"
from the conflict between "control disruptions" and the disruptive side
effects of whatever the student was doing. It may also be a disturbance,
but that is irrelevant.

Yes, but what is a "reminder", from a PCT understanding?

It seems we only have "disturbances", and that is a functional term
and conflated into the receiver's perception. How does "reminding"
work?

All the best,

        Erling