Choice

[Martin Taylor 2000.01.20 11:42]

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.19.0617 MST)]

I am rejecting "choosing" as a specific control process; the phenomenon we
classify as choosing is explained completely in terms of conflicting
control systems with resolution of the conflict by reorganization (or
learned systematic ways of resolving conflict, such as temporal ordering of
goals). I don't think we need any more than that to explain the process we
call choosing.

Your message is more subtle than appears on the surface. It deals with a
very important part of the actions of the control hierarchy, and demands
careful attention.

Two things seem to follow from your exposition that what we see as
"choice" is really something else:

(1) A "choosing" perception is a perception by an outside observer,
whether that observer be a different person or another part of the
hierarchy within the person doing the "choosing."

(2) "Choosing" is in interaction in a highly non-linear part of the
hierarchy, where mutual inhibition can occur. If we go along with the
conventional segregation of the hierarchy into "analogue" and "logical"
regions, choosing can occur _only_ in the logical region.

Under point (1) the outside observer must see the possibility that the
"chooser" may act in one of a set of _discretely_ different ways, and
having observed that one of those acts occurred, perceives the "chooser"
as having "chosen" that action. Hence, it is legitimate for the
observer to say "I see you have chosen" even though to the chooser
there was no choice. The action may have been the only one permitted
by the "method" that pre-existed in the "chooser's" hierarchy. But an
observer in a different body imagines that the chooser had more than
one possibility, and therefore perceives that a choice had been made.
(I hope I'm correctly re-interpreting what you are saying, so far).

Continuing point (1), if the outside observer is a separate part of the
"chooser's" hierarchy, the possibilities of different actions are perceived
in imagination:

"Choice", I say, starts with the simultaneous selection of incompatible
reference signals, followed quickly by the realization that control has
been lost (or if this is done in imagination, _would be_ lost).

(Lost because of conflict, as other parts of your message attest, not
lost because of problems with the environmental feedback functions of
the individual possibilities).

Here, as with the outside observer in a separate body, the imagining
observer perceives the possibilities of discretely different actions
that are incompatible. One or other possibility must be inhibited.
The question is how--by intervention on the part of the imagining
observer, by intrinsic properties of the interconnections among the
reference signals sent to the different next-lower level control units,
or by some other means. Maybe different kinds of choices involve
different methods of resolution.

If a systematic method for eliminating the conflict already exists at a
higher level, it is brought into play and the conflict is removed. If there
is no systematic method available, the conflict will persist until
reorganization (at the level causing the conflict, not at the level where
the conflict is expressed) solves the problem. Or until the organism dies.

I don't think we can start to suggest we understand "choosing" until we
understand what methods are (a) possible, (b) plausible, and (c) supported
by some kind of evidence. At the moment, I see only the two I mentioned
above: intervention by a "choosing" control system--which you dismiss--
and cross-linked inhibition of mutually incompatible control units.
I'd like to think that there are other methods that haven't occurred
to me.

Reorganization that results in one of the possible actions being
permanently suppressed in favour of the other seems a most unlikely
answer for most cases of "choice," in which a situation arises once,
a choice is made, and the future history depends on which choice was
made (e.g. "Do I leave school and go to work, or continue my education?").
I would assume that the "method" for making the choice had been built
by reorganization very early in life, and that it rarely applies to
choices that occur in mature organisms.

I apologise for the somewhat incoherent nature of this message. As I said,
your comments are subtle, and my appreciation of them may change with
time--and with further discussion of the issues.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.20.1510)]

Martin Taylor (2000.01.20 11:42) --

Under point (1) the outside observer must see the possibility that the
"chooser" may act in one of a set of _discretely_ different ways, and
having observed that one of those acts occurred, perceives the "chooser"
as having "chosen" that action. Hence, it is legitimate for the
observer to say "I see you have chosen" even though to the chooser
there was no choice.

I agree. I think it's possible that the RTP teacher learns to perceive
disruption as part of a program level perception of the child's
behavior. Programs involve choice points like: if (2 disturbances)
then (goto RTC) else (stay). So the teacher could sees a disruption
as a choice point in a program level perception of the child's
behavior. Thus, the teacher who says "I see you have chosen to go to
the RTC" may be truthfully describing his or her program level
perception
of the child's overt behavior; seeing 2 disturbances is like seeing
the point at which the program does the choice point "if" test. So, from
a completely behavioral point of view, the teacher can honestly say "I
see you have chosen to go to the RTC"; the teacher is accurately
describing a program level perception of the child's behavior.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.20.1536 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2000.01.20 11:42--

Two things seem to follow from your exposition that what we see as
"choice" is really something else:

Hence, it is legitimate for the
observer to say "I see you have chosen" even though to the chooser
there was no choice.

"Legitimate" in the sense that the observer is honestly reporting a
subjective interpretation, yes. He is not saying "x", but "I see x,"
meaning that he is reporting an experience, not claiming to know that x
really exists.

The action may have been the only one permitted
by the "method" that pre-existed in the "chooser's" hierarchy. But an
observer in a different body imagines that the chooser had more than
one possibility, and therefore perceives that a choice had been made.
(I hope I'm correctly re-interpreting what you are saying, so far).

That's the main idea. It's just like any other mode of perception; when you
filter everything through a "choosing" input function, everything people do
looks like choosing -- no matter what you mean by that term. If _you_ can
see alternatives, you assume that the other person sees them, too, and if
both are attractive or useful to you, you assume they are attractive or
useful to the other. If one is chosen, you believe it follows that another
one was rejected -- considered and rejected.

I can't speak for anyone else, but I don't think I spend as much as one
percent of my time considering alternatives and feeling that I must choose
between them. And I try to avoid being put in that position as much as I can.

I don't think we can start to suggest we understand "choosing" until we
understand what methods are (a) possible, (b) plausible, and (c) supported
by some kind of evidence. At the moment, I see only the two I mentioned
above: intervention by a "choosing" control system--which you dismiss--

Suppose there is a control system which emits two reference signals to two
lower systems, which prove to be mutually exclusive. How would another
"intervention" system resolve the conflict unless it could operate _on_ the
control system that caused the conflict? If it merely overrode the two
reference signals, it would be in conflict with the first system. If it
altered the first system's organization, it would be a higher system
(systematic) or the reorganizing system (trial and error).

No "choosing" control system is necessary, because if one existed it would
merely be the control system of higher level that caused the conflict in
the first place. It simply has to undo what it did to produce the conflict.

and cross-linked inhibition of mutually incompatible control units.
I'd like to think that there are other methods that haven't occurred
to me.

Yes, but the principle I follow is to look for the simplest explanation
that covers all the cases, rather than inventing more complicated ones in
which we have no current reason to believe.

Reorganization that results in one of the possible actions being
permanently suppressed in favour of the other seems a most unlikely
answer for most cases of "choice," in which a situation arises once,
a choice is made, and the future history depends on which choice was
made (e.g. "Do I leave school and go to work, or continue my education?").
I would assume that the "method" for making the choice had been built
by reorganization very early in life, and that it rarely applies to
choices that occur in mature organisms.

There are very few choices that are made once and for all. The one you
mention, for example, is made and reversed many times as we go through the
educational process. A bad semester makes quitting school look pretty
desirable; a successful one reminds us that learning is a noble and
exciting phenomenon. By the time we might be said to have chosen, school is
over.

I don't think that "suppressing" possible actions works. This implies that
there is one system trying (via reference signals) to cause the action to
be carried out, and another stronger one opposing it to prevent that action
from occurring. This leaves the other side of the original conflict -- the
non-suppressed side -- free to act, but at the cost of establishing a new
conflict. This may look like a choice to an outside observer, but it does
nothing to _resolve_ a conflict -- in fact, it sets up another conflict.

To me the simplest view is that the higher system simply ceases to send
reference signals to the troublesome set of lower systems, and sends them
to some other set, perhaps overlapping the first. When conflict is actually
resolved, there is nothing to suppress. If I quit school in an unconflicted
way, there is no remaining desire to continue it.

I've now spend 45 minutes in this intellectual opium den. Enough.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.01.21.1637 EST)]

Rick Marken (2000.01.20.1510)

···

At 03:11 PM 01/20/2000 -0800, Richard Marken wrote:

the teacher is accurately
describing a program level perception of the child's behavior.

In an RTP school, this is a program-level perception that the teachers have
been teaching and that the children (and their parents) have been
discussing, seeing exemplified, and learning. Has a given child learned it,
and is that child controlling it? TBD. But I am glad that you can see that
it is possible.

        Bruce Nevin

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.21.1500)]

Me:

the teacher is accurately describing a program level
perception of the child's behavior.

Bruce Nevin (2000.01.21.1637 EST)--

In an RTP school, this is a program-level perception that
the teachers have been teaching and that the children... Has a
given child learned it, and is that child controlling it? TBD.
But I am glad that you can see that it is possible.

I always thought it was _possible_ that the kids are controlling
this program perception. I just thought the teacher is being
required to be somewhat less than candid when s/he is asked to
say, essentially, "I see you are controlling for this program"
when s/he has no idea whether this is true of not. But what I
finally realized is that it's possible to hear the teacher's
words ("I see you have chosen...") as a description of the way
the kid's overt behavior looks _to the teacher herself_. The
teacher is not necessarily saying (mendaciously) "I know that
you are controlling for this program". The teacher could be
saying (truthfully) "It looks to me like you are carrying out
this program". I'm not sure why the teacher should be required
to share her unsolicited impressions of the student's behavior
with the student; they will just be a disturbance if the kid
doesn't want to appear to be carrying out the program. But I
am convinced that a teacher who says "I see you have chosen..."
is not necessarily lying.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[Martin Taylor 20000122 09:33]

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.20.1536 MDT)]

I'm still somwhat short of understanding your notions about choosing and
not choosing. You say that there is no need to assume the existnce of
a choosing mechanism, and then seem to assert the existence of just such
a mechanism. Perhaps a pair of quotes from your most recent (2-days ago)
message may illustrate my problem.

>Martin Taylor 2000.01.20 11:42--
>I don't think we can start to suggest we understand "choosing" until we
>understand what methods are (a) possible, (b) plausible, and (c) supported
>by some kind of evidence. At the moment, I see only the two I mentioned
>above: intervention by a "choosing" control system--which you dismiss--

Suppose there is a control system which emits two reference signals to two
lower systems, which prove to be mutually exclusive. How would another
"intervention" system resolve the conflict unless it could operate _on_ the
control system that caused the conflict? If it merely overrode the two
reference signals, it would be in conflict with the first system. If it
altered the first system's organization, it would be a higher system
(systematic) or the reorganizing system (trial and error).

No "choosing" control system is necessary, because if one existed it would
merely be the control system of higher level that caused the conflict in
the first place. It simply has to undo what it did to produce the conflict.

...

To me the simplest view is that the higher system simply ceases to send
reference signals to the troublesome set of lower systems, and sends them
to some other set, perhaps overlapping the first.

I can see that these two quotes are consistent, in that there is no
_external_ choosing system, but it sounds as though you are nevertheless
saying that there is a choosing _mechanism_ which is a part of the
higher system's mode of operation. This higher system then sounds as if
it contains a separate "chooser." But you have denied the need for a
"chooser."

A "chooser", no matter whether it is an outside mechanism or a mechanism
within the higher system that is trying to control a perception, seems to
me to be necessarily defined the way you have defined it--something that
causes the higher system to cease to send reference signals to one set of
lower systems and sends them to another. In other words, it operates on
switches that connect the higher system to the lower sets of systems.

The higher control system, if it is configured in the conventional way,
operates normally, when there is no lower-level conflict, by increasing
or decreasing its output. You are arguing that a "choosing" system is not
configured in the conventional way, in that when it finds itself unable
to control by increasing or decreasing its output, it then shifts to a
different mode of control that causes it to change where its output goes.
This implies that the system must contain a novel additional output
function that operates on the connections to the lower systems rather
than on the reference values for those lower systems.

I find it hard to distinguish this conceptually from an external "chooser"
mechanism that perceives the control error of the higher system and acts
on the connections from the higher to the lower systems. And I find it
hard also to see wherein such an external system would be in conflict
with any of the systems involved in the conflict, as you suggest it would
be.

Do you see the problem I have with interpreting the two quotes from your
recent message? I must have failed to interpret them as you intended, but
I've spent a couple of days trying to figure out how, without succsess.

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.22.1234 MST)]
(note that I'm back on standard time -- thanks for the comment, whoever did
it)

I'm still somewhat short of understanding your notions about choosing and
not choosing. You say that there is no need to assume the existnce of
a choosing mechanism, and then seem to assert the existence of just such
a mechanism.

I don't see "choosing" as requiring special treatment as a specific mode of
behavior. We can do the things that are commonly called choosing without
any special-purpose choosing mechanism. It's just the same set of
mechanisms we use for everything else. I can paint a house, but I don't
need any special house-painting functions to do that. I use the same grip
on the brush and the same motions I use (sometimes) for ping-pong. I dunk
the paintbrush in the can the same way I dunk a doughnut in a coffee cup,
and so on.

If we named every process that a person could do with the kinds of systems
I imagine to exist around the logic level, there would be an endless list.
It would be like trying to characterize a computer by naming the programs
that can run on it. Is a computer a spreadsheet-operating device? A word
processor? A compiler? A game player? A drawing aid? A decision-maker? It
can, of course, act like all these things, but that's just an accidental
matter of programming. The computer itself does not have any particular
inclination to do any of these things; what it does is more fundamental
than any of them.

That's basically how I see "choosing" in the meaning of considering
alternatives and somehow selecting among them. That's not, as I see it, a
basic property of the brain, but just something any programmable device
could do -- or not do. Some people consider making choices and decisions
very important, and spend a lot of time doing such things. Others don't,
and they get by about as well. Certainly, one can argue that considering
different alternatives before acting has many advantages, but the mere fact
that you have to try to persuade someone to behave sensibly in this way
shows that it's not a basic aspect of behavioral organization that you're
recommending. It's a learnable strategy, not a basic brain function.

If you want to say that choosing is important and everyone ought to do it,
I wouldn't try to dissuade you of that, unless you meant _I_ had to be as
concerned with it as you are. Most people don't have a very clear idea of
what they mean by choosing. In many cases, the meaning is simply that you
did something on purpose (chose to create a result) rather than causing it
accidentally, with no particular mention of alternatives. In other cases,
the alternatives are the important factor, with an unspoken assumption that
you can't have them all at the same time. A CT analysis of these two
meanings would show that they are operationally completely different,
involving different processes. And I wouldn't be surprised if there are
others.

In the RTP case, I like Erling Jorgensen's interpretation as a kind of
warning or reminder. The meaning is not actually "choosing" -- it's more
like reminding the student that under the rules that everyone is supposed
to be aware of, disrupting for the second time always results in a trip to
the RTC, so it's _AS IF_ the student had made a conscious decision to go to
the RTC (even though it's unlikely that any such decision was actually
made). In fact, with a skillful teacher, there could well be an
understanding that "I see you have chosen ..." is metaphorical and
cautionary, and not to be taken literally. So this makes it into a tool of
rhetoric, a way of helping the student grasp what it means to agree to a
social rule -- at least in _that_ teacher's classroom.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Dick Robertson,000123.0649CST]

Bill Powers wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.22.1234 MST)]
(note that I'm back on standard time -- thanks for the comment, whoever did
it)

In the RTP case, I like Erling Jorgensen's interpretation as a kind of
warning or reminder. The meaning is not actually "choosing" -- it's more
like reminding the student that under the rules that everyone is supposed
to be aware of, disrupting for the second time always results in a trip to
the RTC, so it's _AS IF_ the student had made a conscious decision to go to
the RTC (even though it's unlikely that any such decision was actually
made). In fact, with a skillful teacher, there could well be an
understanding that "I see you have chosen ..." is metaphorical and
cautionary, and not to be taken literally. So this makes it into a tool of
rhetoric, a way of helping the student grasp what it means to agree to a
social rule -- at least in _that_ teacher's classroom.

I like Erling's interpretation too. And your final paragraph here seems to me
the best construction of this whole sad debate.

···

Best, Dick R.

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.23.1015)]

Bill Powers (2000.01.22.1234 MST) --

In the RTP case, I like Erling Jorgensen's interpretation as a
kind of warning or reminder...

Dick Robertson (000123.0649CST) --

I like Erling's interpretation too. And your final paragraph
here seems to me the best construction of this whole sad debate.

I agree. And it helps me understand why the debate was so sad
and why I've lost it so profoundly. For me, the discussion
(I don't think I really understood until now why it became
a "debate") was ultimately about how to apply PCT in practical
situations such as those dealt with by RTP. Apparently, my
"opponents" thought the discussion was about how to justify
existing practices in terms of PCT. Ergo, there was a "debate";
my attempts to critically examine RTP practices in terms of PCT
were seen as attacks on RTP and the people associated with it.
This was, indeed, a "sad debate" rather than a sublime interaction
between dispassionate scientists.

I had been laboring under the assumption that CSGNet was a
forum for critically evaluating and, perhaps, suggesting
better approaches to dealing with practical problems (such
as school discipline problems) based on an understanding
of humans as input control systems. I finally see (from
Bill's comments on Erling's ingenious interpretation of
the "I see you have chosen..." statement) that CSGNet is
actually meant to be a forum for developing plausible sounding
PCT-based justifications for current practices. In other
words, when it comes to applications, CSGNet is a political,
not a scientific, forum.

The proof of this is that justifications for current
practices are only required if those practices are carried
out by people who are strong advocates of PCT. We are still
able to critically evaluate the practices of non-PCT advocates
(such as behavior modifiers) with impunity, even if those
practices are identical to those carried out by PCT advocates.

But I will bow to prevailing political realities; no more
critical evaluation of practical applications, whether or not
those applications have a PCT pedigree. I'll leave the PCT -
based justifications of PCT pedigreed practices to those whose
hearts are in it. I'm getting back to where I belong: impractical,
irrelevant models of control phenomena.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[Chuck Tucker 2000.01.24.07:32 EST]

In a message dated 1/23/00 7:54:37 AM Eastern Standard Time,
R-Robertson@NEIU.EDU writes:

<< [From Dick Robertson,000123.0649CST]

Bill Powers wrote:

> [From Bill Powers (2000.01.22.1234 MST)]
> (note that I'm back on standard time -- thanks for the comment, whoever did
> it)
>
> In the RTP case, I like Erling Jorgensen's interpretation as a kind of
> warning or reminder. The meaning is not actually "choosing" -- it's more
> like reminding the student that under the rules that everyone is supposed
> to be aware of, disrupting for the second time always results in a trip to
> the RTC, so it's _AS IF_ the student had made a conscious decision to go to
> the RTC (even though it's unlikely that any such decision was actually
> made). In fact, with a skillful teacher, there could well be an
> understanding that "I see you have chosen ..." is metaphorical and
> cautionary, and not to be taken literally. So this makes it into a tool of
> rhetoric, a way of helping the student grasp what it means to agree to a
> social rule -- at least in _that_ teacher's classroom.

I like Erling's interpretation too. And your final paragraph here seems to
me
the best construction of this whole sad debate.

> Best, Dick R. >>

I too agree with Erling's interpretation and I thought that I, Bruce N. and
Bruce A. said the same in our posts written during the last century.

Regards,
                    Chuck

[From Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.24.1115 CST)]

Chuck Tucker 2000.01.24.07:32 EST

I too agree with Erling's interpretation and I thought that I, Bruce
N. and
Bruce A. said the same in our posts written during the last century.

Agreed. This is why I used the term recapitulation. It seemed to me
the up-a-level character of what (hopefully) goes on in the RTP
classroom was getting lost.

All the best,

        Erling

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.24.2115 PST)]

Bill Powers (2000.01.22.1234 MST)--

In the RTP case, I like Erling Jorgensen's interpretation
as a kind of warning or reminder. The meaning is not actually
"choosing" -- it's more like reminding the student that under
the rules that everyone is supposed to be aware of, disrupting
for the second time always results in a trip to the RTC, so
it's _AS IF_ the student had made a conscious decision to go to
the RTC (even though it's unlikely that any such decision was
actually made).

Chuck Tucker (2000.01.24.07:32 EST) --

I too agree with Erling's interpretation and I thought that I,
Bruce N. and Bruce A. said the same in our posts written during
the last century.

Martin Taylor (2000.01.24 09:26) --

And to Chuck Tucker's list of Bruces, I think the name of
Bruce G. might well be added

You can add my name to the list as well. This is what I, too, was
trying to say during the last century: "I see you have chosen..."
is not a description of the child's behavior or state of mind; it's
a warning (or reminder) of what lies in store if the child doesn't
go to the RTC voluntarily.

I'm sorry I'm so dense Bill. I'm afraid that some of your disciples
aren't much brighter than the ones Jesus got.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.25.0706 MST)]

Rick Marken (2000.01.24.2115 PST)--

You can add my name to the list as well. This is what I, too, was
trying to say during the last century: "I see you have chosen..."
is not a description of the child's behavior or state of mind; it's
a warning (or reminder) of what lies in store if the child doesn't
go to the RTC voluntarily.

I'm sorry I'm so dense Bill.

The problem isn't being dense, it's trying (as I also was trying) to make a
literal technical discussion of "choosing" out of a discussion that was
really based on indirect, metaphorical, and poetic meanings. Once you
understand that the others weren't interpreting "choosing" in any technical
sense, the basis for the disagreements goes away. Of course the discussion
also gets a lot less interesting as it pertains to PCT.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Fred Nickols (2000.01.25.1705 EST)] --

Rick Marken (2000.01.23.1015)

I had been laboring under the assumption that CSGNet was a
forum for critically evaluating and, perhaps, suggesting
better approaches to dealing with practical problems (such
as school discipline problems) based on an understanding
of humans as input control systems.

Me, too. Oh, darn, don't tell me I'm mistaken !

I finally see (from
Bill's comments on Erling's ingenious interpretation of
the "I see you have chosen..." statement) that CSGNet is
actually meant to be a forum for developing plausible sounding
PCT-based justifications for current practices. In other
words, when it comes to applications, CSGNet is a political,
not a scientific, forum.

All forums are political, Rickus. What's new?

The proof of this is that justifications for current
practices are only required if those practices are carried
out by people who are strong advocates of PCT. We are still
able to critically evaluate the practices of non-PCT advocates
(such as behavior modifiers) with impunity, even if those
practices are identical to those carried out by PCT advocates.

Sounds like the old "in crowd" vs "out crowd" game to me. A distinctly
political game. Again, what's new?

But I will bow to prevailing political realities; no more
critical evaluation of practical applications, whether or not
those applications have a PCT pedigree. I'll leave the PCT -
based justifications of PCT pedigreed practices to those whose
hearts are in it. I'm getting back to where I belong: impractical,
irrelevant models of control phenomena.

Chuckle, chuckle, chuckle, chuckle, chuckle. Yeah, right, and I've got
some ocean front property in Arizona. See ya 'round the next time things
get interesting, Rick. Even if strapped to a chair, blindfolded and
gagged, you couldn't sit out a really good, substantive debate that was
only tangentially related to PCT.

What were you controlling for in this post?

···

--

Fred Nickols
The Distance Consulting Company
"Assistance at A Distance"
http://home.att.net/~nickols/distance.htm
nickols@worldnet.att.net
(609) 490-0095

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.25.1530)]

Me:

I'll leave the PCT - based justifications of PCT pedigreed
practices to those whose hearts are in it. I'm getting back
to where I belong: impractical, irrelevant models of control
phenomena.

Fred Nickols (2000.01.25.1705 EST) --

Chuckle, chuckle, chuckle, chuckle, chuckle. Yeah, right,
and I've got some ocean front property in Arizona. See ya
'round the next time things get interesting, Rick.

You're on to me;-)

What were you controlling for in this post?

I was pouting because I thought Bill had joined those
rationalizing current practice with PCT lingo when he
wrote [Bill Powers (2000.01.22.1234 MST)]:

In the RTP case, I like Erling Jorgensen's interpretation
as a kind of warning or reminder. The meaning is not actually
"choosing" -- it's more like reminding the student that under
the rules that everyone is supposed to be aware of, disrupting
for the second time always results in a trip to the RTC, so
it's _AS IF_ the student had made a conscious decision to go to
the RTC (even though it's unlikely that any such decision was
actually made).

But then I read it more carefully and saw that he wasn't doing
that at all.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.29.2000 CST)]

Because of internship interview commitments, I have not been
able to interact in a more timely fashion with some of this.
But from the look of even more recent posts, it _still_ seems
to be drifting away from the "up a level" character of what
I think is going on. And I can't tell if others think
going-up-a-level is a valid focus for inquiry in the RTP
situation.

Bill Powers (2000.01.25.0706 MST) [replying to Rick]

The problem isn't being dense, it's trying (as I also was
trying) to make a literal technical discussion of "choosing"
out of a discussion that was really based on indirect,
metaphorical, and poetic meanings. Once you understand
that the others weren't interpreting "choosing" in any
technical sense, the basis for the disagreements goes away.
Of course the discussion also gets a lot less interesting
as it pertains to PCT.

Granted, I wasn't interpreting "chosen" (in the teacher's
statement) in any technical sense. But I _am_ trying to
understand "going up a level" in a technical sense.

To put it simplistically, how are inputs and outputs moving
along a hierarchical PCT diagram when someone, quote, goes
up a level? I find that very pertinent and appropriate
as it pertains to PCT. In my role as counselor, I try to
understand it in a clinical sense. But the scientist in me
also wants to know what is going on in a technical sense.

Bill Powers (2000.01.26.1520 MST)

Martin Taylor 2000 01 26 14:40

And didn't you accept that the
teacher's purpose in making the observation might be an
attempt to get the student to go up a level?

None of that has anything to do with the logical statement
"If A then X else Y." If that is ALL you intend to mean by
choosing, then what does going up a level, reminding, warning,
and so on -- none of which has any agreed-on or consistent
technical meaning -- have to do with that logical form?

I agree that we need much more than the logical format
of what we might call Program-level decision-nodes
to give technical meaning to going up a level. I also
agree with your interpretation of "choice" (articulated
elsewhere) as best reserved for some kind of conflict
between one's control systems, rather than the normal
operation of the program level that Martin advocates.

On another front, I don't yet understand the phenomenon
of "reminding," although Bruce N. seems to think it will
be a simple offshoot of a more technical description
of "memory" in PCT. On this listserv I use understand
in the sense of having a PCT schema to map onto the
flow of such a conversation. I think we can use terms
such as reminding and warning to narrow the focus of
what we're _trying_ to understand. But we cannot use
them as part of the technical explanation, because as
you note there is as yet no "agreed-on or consistent
technical meaning" for them.

This remains true of "going up a level" as well, even
though there is a bit more of a PCT-informed intuitive
sense of that phenomenon. This up-a-level stuff is
my main focus, of what I want to understand or establish
in a technical sense, mostly because I think it might
make some therapeutic difference in my chosen field.

Bill continues --

...the meaning of what I took Erling to be saying
is NOT "choosing" -- it's a lot of other stuff that has
nothing to do with choosing. I was taking Erling's
meaning to refer to a metaphor, not a rigorous logical
statement.

Yes, it is not choosing. I suppose we could call it
a metaphor, but that doesn't tell me very much. That's
why I tried to apply the more strictly defined notion
of "disturbance".

Because the teacher's statement is _not_ strictly logical,
it doesn't quite fit as a response to the student. And
in that sense it functions as a disturbance forcing the
student to do something to make it fit. From the teacher's
standpoint it fits a broader context (and is only under-
standable within that context); and so, the hope is that
the student will step back and try to find that context.

It is a transaction something like this that I am trying
to understand without invoking or creating a lot of new
and undefined concepts, (including "reminding").

Bill Powers (2000.01.22.1234 MST)

In fact, with a skillful teacher, there could well be an
understanding that "I see you have chosen ..." is metaphorical
and cautionary, and not to be taken literally. So this makes
it into a tool of rhetoric, a way of helping the student grasp
what it means to agree to a social rule -- at least in _that_
teacher's classroom.

Yes, exactly. It is a tool of rhetoric. And my nose tells
me it has something to do with what we have been calling
(but as yet without definition) "going up a level." The
RTP situation is useful because it involves a variety of
components _at_ various levels.

There are "social rules". There may be (implied or explicit)
"prior agreements", [although, granted, some of us may be
reading that in, from hearing LeEdna Custer rather than Ed
Ford's prescriptions.] There is a current classroom situation,
which one party (the teacher) interprets as "disrupting", and
another (the student) interprets as "having fun". There are
the perceived or ignored "rights" of other students, including
an explicit agenda of having each student learn how to
construct and perceive such things as rights and control for
them appropriately. There may be a moral pedagogy of teaching
students how to "make and keep commitments" (whatever they may
be). All of this gives a fruitful real-world situation for
trying to understand and derive a more technical definition
of the "up-a-level" interactive process.

Rick Marken (2000.01.25.1530)

Fred Nickols (2000.01.25.1705 EST) --

[referring to Rick's post of (2000.01.23.1015)]

What were you controlling for in this post?

I was pouting because I thought Bill had joined those
rationalizing current practice with PCT lingo when he
wrote [Bill Powers (2000.01.22.1234 MST)]:
...[snip the quote]...

But then I read it more carefully and saw that he wasn't
doing that at all.

I don't see myself as "rationalizing current practice with
PCT lingo", (and it kind of stings to think that you view
me that way). I'm trying to stay within the framework
of the defined PCT terms (like "disturbance"), and see
what light they can shed on the ill-defined PCT phenomena
(like "going up a level").

RTP is simply a case scenario that may capture some of
the relevant dynamics, as phenomena to be _understood_
in a more technical way. I think such understanding must
precede the attempt to _improve_ whatever practices we
are talking about.

I have not seen your reply to a previous question I asked
of you, and am wondering if you are willing to provide
one. It would help me know if there is a shared basis
for conversation in this area.

The question was --
"I am wondering if you agree that some kind of up-a-level
phenomenon is involved here; (and not just the phenomenon
of whether the teacher is modeling honesty and the perceptual
limitations of an outside control system)."

All the best,

        Erling

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.30.0630 MST)]

Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.29.2000 CST)--

To put it simplistically, how are inputs and outputs moving
along a hierarchical PCT diagram when someone, quote, goes
up a level? I find that very pertinent and appropriate
as it pertains to PCT. In my role as counselor, I try to
understand it in a clinical sense. But the scientist in me
also wants to know what is going on in a technical sense.

My view of going up a level is that it's a phenomenon of awareness. We can
experience the phenomenon and see strong evidence that it happens in others
as well as ourselves, but we have no mechanistic model of it yet. I suspect
that before we can produce a mechanistic model of awareness, we will have
to expand considerably our notion of what "mechanistic" means. For now, all
we can do is make some guesses.

Let me lay out my mental model of this phenomenon, as far as I have gone
with it. None of this is Gospel, of course: it's a (rather complex) opinion
to be taken under consideration.

I. Think of the hierarchy as a complex neural device. As a neural device,
it works according to whatever laws of signal propagation and synaptic
transmission may be in operation. We can reproduce as computer models some
of its functions at the lower levels of organization, and speculate about
how they might work at higher levels. When a model of a neural control
system is running in a computer, the model does not take on any special
properties we might call awareness or consciousness. If we added another
layer of computation, that would not add awareness or consciousness,
either, and so adding _any number_ of layers of computation and signal
processing would not add awareness or consciousness. We would just have
more and more signals that are functions of other signals. To add the
missing quality to the model, we would have to add something more than
neural computations and signals. I don't know what it is we would have to
add, but whatever it is, I don't know how to program or build it, either.

II: Awareness seems to _receive information_ from the hierarchy, and this
information is almost exclusively perceptual. That is, if we have any
awareness of other (non-perceptual) signals in the hierarchy, it is nowhere
near as detailed as the perceptual information. I do not consciously
experience, for instance, any signals that go from my brain into my spinal
cord, or from my spinal cord into my muscles. I may experience their
effects, but I don't experience the signals. Awareness, therefore,
_observes_ rather than _acts_, and what it observes are primarly perceptual
signals in the hierarchy.

Consciousness, or at least one meaning of consciousness that seems
consistent with this mental model, refers to both the aware observer and
that which is being observed. That which is being observed consists
primarily of a set of perceptual signals existing at one level or more in
the hierarchy, but existence of the signals does not by itself imply
conscious awareness. Neither does the existence of the aware observer imply
any particular signals being observed, or any at all. Anaesthesia can
remove the signals without removing the awareness. Consciousness requires
both the aware observer and a set of perceptual signals that is the object
of observation.

The neural hierarchy can work, at all levels, without being observed by
awareness. Thus, at least given the experimental methods and data we have
to date, it would seem very difficult for an external observer to tell
whether a given control process is being carried out consciously or
unconsciously. This is particularly hard at the higher levels, where the
processes are complex, symbolic, and abstract, and always give the
impression of conscious execution. Yet it is quite possible, in fact
common, for higher processes to operate without consciousness, like a
computer running in an empty room.

III: The character of the world of which we are aware depends on the level
in the hierarchy and the particular systems from which signals are being
received by awareness. If the signals come exclusively from the
relationship-perceiving level, the world will be experienced consciously as
consisting entirely of relationships. If the signals also come from the
configuration level, the world will consist of objects in relationship to
each other. If some signals come from the logic level, the world of
relationships among objects will appear to have logical properties and
implications.

The particular characteristics of the conscious world are determined by the
perceptual functions of the systems from which the signals are being
observed. Awareness itself is no different when experiencing a gouty toe
from what it is when experiencing the proof of a theorem. It simply
observes. The difference is entirely a matter of the perceptual input
functions involved -- where they get their input signals, and what
operations they perform on them. And those functions are a matter of neural
systems receiving signals, operating on them, and producing new signals
that are some function of the input signals. Once the hierarchy has become
organized in a particular way, the production of perceptual signals and
control of them are independent of awareness.

Evidently, the level or levels from which perceptual signals are being
received by awareness can change. If you drop a book on your toe while
you're in the middle of consciously trying to prove a theorem, you (as the
aware observer) will quite likely cease receiving signals from the
theorem-proving circuits and begin receiving them from your poor toe and
all the other systems that have been alarmed by the pain. You might even
take your poor toe to a doctor for X-rays and tender care, focusing on it
to the exclusion of all else until you're sure it's not broken and is going
to be OK (and all those other thoughts that having an injured toe awakens
in the hierarchy).

When you finally get back to trying consciously to prove the theorem, you
may well find that it has been proven. The theorem-proving circuits went
right on working on the problem in the absence of the observer, and the
results are ready when anyone is ready to observe them.

IV: At any given moment, there is, I believe, some particular level or mix
of levels from which a given person's awareness habitually receives
signals. There are control systems in operation outside this range of
awareness, at the same level, lower levels, and higher levels. The higher
levels operating without awareness supply the reference signals that
determine what the levels in awareness are trying to accomplish by their
actions -- what perceptions they are trying to keep in what states. The
lower levels operating without awareness are the means of control being
used by the awared systems. There is normally a limit to our awareness of
both _how_ we are controlling our awared experiences, and _why_ we are
controlling them as we are. And of course we are unaware of all processes
at the same level that are going on outside the range of awareness.

However, it is possible to change the content of awareness -- to receive
perceptual information from systems outside the normal range, as happens
when you drop a book on your toe. Dropping a book on your toe appears to
replace high-level connections to awareness with low-level connections: you
go down a level (or lots of levels). That means simply that awareness
switches from receiving _these_ signals to receiving _those_ signals. It
doesn't really (in my mental model) move, but awareness is now associated
with a different set of perceptual signals and their control systems, so
the _content of consciousness_ has changed to a lower level.

V. Any unusual or markedly disturbing event -- one that calls for some
unusual readjustment of a control process -- appears to call for awareness
to focus on it, at least momentarily. For example, if I ask you right now
if your right ear is itching, that will interrupt the flow of what we're
doing here, and you'll probably have to "look" and see if your ear is
itching in order to answer me, and it will take some time for all the
activities in extraneous systems to die down so you can get back on the
main track. Another person can evidently create quite a disturbance just by
asking the right question, and one result of this disturbance is that the
connections between your hierarchical perceptions and your awareness may
change for a while. If the question concerns a system that is not currently
in awareness, your awareness may momentarily switch so it's receiving
perceptual information from that system. Your consciousness may change so
that now it contains, as an object of awareness, the perceptions which that
system has been controlling (and goes on controlling).

One of the things that apparently happens when awareness is receiving
information from particular control systems is that reorganization of those
systems is enabled. I don't think that awareness _causes_ reorganization,
but if anything is going on that calls for reorganization to start,
awareness provides a focus for it, directs it to particular subsystems.
Some "Maxwell's demon" like this is clearly needed if reorganization of the
complex systems in the brain is not to be more disruptive than helpful.

So it follows that an external participant can, by providing disturbances
of systems outside awareness, both call attention to them and help direct
reorganization to them if there is some reason for reorganization to be
happening.

And clearly, when there is conflict the most useful place for attention to
be directed and for reorganization to take place is not at the level where
the conflict is expressed and felt, but at a higher level that is in a
position to change the reference signals that are the efficient cause of
the conflict (since that level set those reference signals in the first
place). So it's probably useful for awareness to move its connections up a
level, occasionally or even permanently.

VI: Remarks. I'm sure there are quite a few wrong statements in the above
exposition. If I knew which ones they were, I would change them, but I
don't. Further investigation, no doubt, will lead to the corrections that
are needed. For me, this mental model has enough form and substance to be a
useful guide to action -- in particular, to help apply the Method of Levels
to oneself and others -- whether it is "true" or not.

Of course there is a lot left out. Like most omissions, they will not
become evident until there is a need for the omitted concepts and our
groping encounters only the empty air.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.30.1250 PST)]

Erling Jorgensen (2000.01.29.2000 CST)--

I don't see myself as "rationalizing current practice with
PCT lingo", (and it kind of stings to think that you view
me that way).

I'm sorry you feel stung. If it's any help, I think this whole
process of "rationalizing current practice with PCT lingo" really
got it's initial (unintended) push from Bill Powers himself (see
my answer to your question below). I don't think there's anything
wrong with doing this; it's just a problem for those (like me)
who are interested in seeing how one might go about developing a
PCT-based application from first principles.

I have not seen your reply to a previous question I asked
of you, and am wondering if you are willing to provide
one. It would help me know if there is a shared basis
for conversation in this area.

The question was -- "I am wondering if you agree that some
kind of up-a-level phenomenon is involved here [in RTP]

I'm not sure what you mean by "here". If you mean the "what
are you doing?" question then, yes; this may, sometimes, get
a kid to go up a level. I remember the CSG meeting when Bill
Powers first suggested this "up a level" interpretation of the
question. I thought it was a very clever way of looking at an
aspect of the RTP process that was not developed with PCT
(or "going up a level") in mind. In order to answer the question
"what are you doing" the kid has to change his conscious point
of view from "am I getting X done?" to "what am I trying to get
done here -- X, Y or Z?" This is an "up a level" phenomenon (when
it happens -- the kid could just ignore the question) and it
can be useful because it can "bring a kid up short" when he is
doing something (like fighting with another kid) that the observer
would like to see stopped.

I now think that Bill's well-intentioned attempt to put a PCT
spin ("up a level") on _one_ existing RTP practice ("asking the
questions") has spun out of control. We now see almost everything
an RTP teacher does being interpreted as an implementation of
the "method of levels". For example, I think you, Erling, are
saying that the phrase "I see you have chosen to go to the RTC"
functions as a means of getting a kid to go "up a level". I
think it's a real stretch to suggest that saying this to a kid
has anything to do with getting a kid to go up a level (in the PCT
sense). A teacher who says this is not doing the method of levels;
she is (as you say) either reminding the kid of what's going to
happen to him if he doesn't go to the RTC or (as I say) trying to
make it seem like the kid is responsible for what the teacher is
forcing him to do.

I think the effort to view RTP practices as examples of the
method of levels in action (following Bill's well-intentioned
effort to view the RTP "questions" as an attempt to get a kid
to go "up a level") has gone way over the top. RTP procedures
were not developed on the basis of an understanding of the method
of levels and they really have nothing to do with this method. The
main difference between RTP practice and the "method of levels" is
that RTP is mandatory and the "method of levels" is not. The method
of levels is used with people who _want_ help; RTP is used with kids
who (probably) don't (they certainly haven't expressed a desire for
therapy, anyway). In the method of levels, the attitude of the
therapist is that of a _guide_; in RTP the attitude of the teacher
is that of a controller. A method of levels therapist doesn't care
whether or not a person goes up a level or what the person discovers
when they get there. The RTP teacher wants children to go up a level
and expects them to discover "the rules and the importance of
following them" when they get there.

I think Bill's original conception of the "What are you doing?"
question in terms of going up a level was perfectly consistent with
the "going up a level" phenomenon in PCT. The idea was that _if_
the kid _wanted_ to answer the question he would have to go up a
level, not in order to see that what he was doing was wrong or
against the rules, but simply to make it more difficult for him
to continue doing what he is doing _while_ he is trying to describe
what he is doing. Bill saw the "up a level" aspect of the "what are
you doing?" question as a nice way for an outsider to stop behavior
(at least momentarily) without having to use physical force.

I think some people have misunderstood Bill's "up a level"
explanation of the "what are you doing?" question. I don't
believe Bill ever saw this question as a way of _prodding_
a child into going up a level. And I don't believe that Bill thought
the child was "improved" in some way if he did go up a level. But
this is now the sense I get from the "up a level" interpretations
of the "I see you have chosen" statement. People are trying to
justify this statement by suggesting that it prods a kid "up a
level" where he will find "the ability to think responsibility,
taking into account the effect of his actions on others". But not
only is it unlikely that one can prod (stimulate) a person to go up a
level by saying something (unless, perhaps, what is said is a large
disturbance to some variable the person happens to be controlling),
the concept of going "up a level" has nothing to do with finding
the higher moral ground. Even if saying "I see you have choosen..."
gets a kid to go up a level, there is no telling what the kid
will find there.

I see that Bill Powers (2000.01.30.0630 MST) has posted a
detailed explanation of his take on "going up a level". I
suggest that those who are interested in applying this notion
in the real world start with these ideas as first principles
and work out the practical applications from there. The process
of going backwards, from existing practices to what these
practices _might_ mean in terms of going up a level is just
a source of never ending conflict.

Those who like RTP and don't want to change it should just do
RTP and not worry about what it has to do with PCT. The people
who are running it are decent, kind people who respect the kids.
The program apparently works just find -- usually. The fact
that the program (as described) has nothing to do with PCT is
obviously of no importance at all. So let the program be.

If we are going to talk about applications on CSGNet I think we
should based these discussions on first principles. If the
practices derived from those principles happen to resemble those
in existing programs that work then that will be nice.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bill Powers (2000.01.31.0014)]

Rick Marken (2000.01.30.1250 PST)--

I think this whole
process of "rationalizing current practice with PCT lingo" really
got it's initial (unintended) push from Bill Powers himself (see
my answer to your question below). I don't think there's anything
wrong with doing this; it's just a problem for those (like me)
who are interested in seeing how one might go about developing a
PCT-based application from first principles.

I have to agree with you. What keeps PCT taxiing around runways instead of
taking off is probably too much concern with remaining intelligible to
people who don't want to give up older approaches to understanding human
organization.

But don't sell Ed Ford quite so short. Remember that he has been with our
group since before that cybernetics meeting in Palo Alto where we first got
used to being ignored by cyberneticists (1983 if I remember right). Ed has
been trying to absorb PCT ideas for at least that long, so if he's failed
to grasp any of them we must be pretty lousy teachers. I think that there
are grounds for giving the benefit of the doubt when we're not sure what
interpretation to put on his words and deeds.

The only _real_ way to settle such questions is to observe RTP schools in
action, and neither of us has done that. We interpret the words in Ed's
books on the basis of what we _imagine_ really goes on. That's not very
fair. The appropriate thing for us to do is keep mum until we know what
we're talking about (and that applies to everyone in this sorry debate).

Best,

Bill P.

···

I have not seen your reply to a previous question I asked
of you, and am wondering if you are willing to provide
one. It would help me know if there is a shared basis
for conversation in this area.

The question was -- "I am wondering if you agree that some
kind of up-a-level phenomenon is involved here [in RTP]

I'm not sure what you mean by "here". If you mean the "what
are you doing?" question then, yes; this may, sometimes, get
a kid to go up a level. I remember the CSG meeting when Bill
Powers first suggested this "up a level" interpretation of the
question. I thought it was a very clever way of looking at an
aspect of the RTP process that was not developed with PCT
(or "going up a level") in mind. In order to answer the question
"what are you doing" the kid has to change his conscious point
of view from "am I getting X done?" to "what am I trying to get
done here -- X, Y or Z?" This is an "up a level" phenomenon (when
it happens -- the kid could just ignore the question) and it
can be useful because it can "bring a kid up short" when he is
doing something (like fighting with another kid) that the observer
would like to see stopped.

I now think that Bill's well-intentioned attempt to put a PCT
spin ("up a level") on _one_ existing RTP practice ("asking the
questions") has spun out of control. We now see almost everything
an RTP teacher does being interpreted as an implementation of
the "method of levels". For example, I think you, Erling, are
saying that the phrase "I see you have chosen to go to the RTC"
functions as a means of getting a kid to go "up a level". I
think it's a real stretch to suggest that saying this to a kid
has anything to do with getting a kid to go up a level (in the PCT
sense). A teacher who says this is not doing the method of levels;
she is (as you say) either reminding the kid of what's going to
happen to him if he doesn't go to the RTC or (as I say) trying to
make it seem like the kid is responsible for what the teacher is
forcing him to do.

I think the effort to view RTP practices as examples of the
method of levels in action (following Bill's well-intentioned
effort to view the RTP "questions" as an attempt to get a kid
to go "up a level") has gone way over the top. RTP procedures
were not developed on the basis of an understanding of the method
of levels and they really have nothing to do with this method. The
main difference between RTP practice and the "method of levels" is
that RTP is mandatory and the "method of levels" is not. The method
of levels is used with people who _want_ help; RTP is used with kids
who (probably) don't (they certainly haven't expressed a desire for
therapy, anyway). In the method of levels, the attitude of the
therapist is that of a _guide_; in RTP the attitude of the teacher
is that of a controller. A method of levels therapist doesn't care
whether or not a person goes up a level or what the person discovers
when they get there. The RTP teacher wants children to go up a level
and expects them to discover "the rules and the importance of
following them" when they get there.

I think Bill's original conception of the "What are you doing?"
question in terms of going up a level was perfectly consistent with
the "going up a level" phenomenon in PCT. The idea was that _if_
the kid _wanted_ to answer the question he would have to go up a
level, not in order to see that what he was doing was wrong or
against the rules, but simply to make it more difficult for him
to continue doing what he is doing _while_ he is trying to describe
what he is doing. Bill saw the "up a level" aspect of the "what are
you doing?" question as a nice way for an outsider to stop behavior
(at least momentarily) without having to use physical force.

I think some people have misunderstood Bill's "up a level"
explanation of the "what are you doing?" question. I don't
believe Bill ever saw this question as a way of _prodding_
a child into going up a level. And I don't believe that Bill thought
the child was "improved" in some way if he did go up a level. But
this is now the sense I get from the "up a level" interpretations
of the "I see you have chosen" statement. People are trying to
justify this statement by suggesting that it prods a kid "up a
level" where he will find "the ability to think responsibility,
taking into account the effect of his actions on others". But not
only is it unlikely that one can prod (stimulate) a person to go up a
level by saying something (unless, perhaps, what is said is a large
disturbance to some variable the person happens to be controlling),
the concept of going "up a level" has nothing to do with finding
the higher moral ground. Even if saying "I see you have choosen..."
gets a kid to go up a level, there is no telling what the kid
will find there.

I see that Bill Powers (2000.01.30.0630 MST) has posted a
detailed explanation of his take on "going up a level". I
suggest that those who are interested in applying this notion
in the real world start with these ideas as first principles
and work out the practical applications from there. The process
of going backwards, from existing practices to what these
practices _might_ mean in terms of going up a level is just
a source of never ending conflict.

Those who like RTP and don't want to change it should just do
RTP and not worry about what it has to do with PCT. The people
who are running it are decent, kind people who respect the kids.
The program apparently works just find -- usually. The fact
that the program (as described) has nothing to do with PCT is
obviously of no importance at all. So let the program be.

If we are going to talk about applications on CSGNet I think we
should based these discussions on first principles. If the
practices derived from those principles happen to resemble those
in existing programs that work then that will be nice.

Best

Rick
---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Rick Marken (2000.01.31.0810)]

Bill Powers (2000.01.31.0014)--

I have to agree with you.

Thanks.

But don't sell Ed Ford quite so short.

I'm not. But I am unloading my RTP portfolio at market rates;-)

The only _real_ way to settle such questions is to observe
RTP schools in action, and neither of us has done that.

See my reply to Bruce Nevin [Rick Marken (2000.01.29.0840)].
What might we see that would change our interpretation of
the description of the RTP process?

The appropriate thing for us to do is keep mum until we
know what we're talking about (and that applies to everyone in
this sorry debate).

I have to disagree with you.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken