Collective Control and Environmental Stabilities

[Martin Taylor 2010.11.11.14.53]

[From Rick Marken (2010.11.11.1140)]

Martin Taylor (2010.11.11.12.43) --
Cooperation can happen by chance as well as by design.

Of course. That's what Kent's modeling shows. It can also appear to
be occurring when two control systems act to control two different
variables in a coordinated way, as in my models of coordinated
movement (a good example is at
Bimanual Coordination). These are examples of
what I would call "apparent" rather than "controlled " cooperation.

Sure. Call it what you will. Not all perceptions are controlled, either.

Any time the control actions of one control system stabilize the value of
some variable in the environment, that variable has the potential to be part
of an environmental feedback path (an environmental affordance) for a whole
raft of perceptions being controlled by other control systems. As Stuart
Kauffman showed (in "At Home in the Universe" and probably elsewhere), if
there are enough such potentially interacting systems, it is almost certain
that loops will occur. We would call such loops "homeostatic". They are
self-sustaining because eventually the actions of each member of the loop
assist that member in controlling its own perceptions.

Sure. That's would be an example of apparent rather than controlled
coordination.

Yes. The point is the it becomes statistically almost certain to occur when there are enough interacting control systems in a complex environment. That means that regardless of what the individual control systems are controlling, and whether they engage in controlled cooperation, reorganization will tend toward the development of a network of such homeostatic loops.

In other words, chance cooperation in which the control behaviour of one
person controlling one perceptual variable stabilizes a variable used in the
environmental feedback path of another person's control of a quite different
perceptual variable is likely to be the dominant effect in the construction
of societies, whether it be of cells, co-evolving flora and fauna, or
people.

I don't think you're going to get a successful antelope hunt together
using chance cooperation.

Probably not, but then it is not the case that most human activity consists of organized cooperative projects.

  So, no, when it comes to human societies I
think what makes them work is mainly controlled cooperation. I would
guess that people succeeded as a species because their brains
developed the perceptual capabilities that allowed them to perceive
and thus control for cooperation.

That's true of a lot of other species, as well. I think the only place where we have a disagreement, and I think it is an insignificant disagreement, is in the use of "mainly". You want to associate "mainly" with controlled cooperation, whereas I suspect it is better associated with reorganization that creates homeostatic loops. To me, it's a bit like "does the fish perceive the water"? Probably the fish perceives other swimmers more than the water that supports it. I think the same is true of what you call "apparent" cooperation. It is so much the milieu in which we have always swum (in any specific culture) that we don't notice that it exists (until we try to live in a different culture).

Since there's no evidence either way that I can think of, the disagreement is a matter of faith, like the disagreements between various religions about the true nature of God.

I agree that some pretty complex societies, like bee hives, work on
the basis of apparent cooperation; the kind of cooperation seen in
that between movements of the two hands in the bimanual control model
(Bimanual Coordination). But I think the kind
of cooperation in bees can produce nothing compared to what can be
produced by the purposeful cooperation that we see in humans, which is
the kind of cooperation required to produce successful hunts as well
as computers, airplanes, air traffic control systems, cars, roads,
etc.

All of which I agree with. Did you read my "Helping" web page before you sent this reply?

Martin

(Gavin Ritz 2010.11.12.10.16)

Well there a great
mixture of logical connectives (If- and-only-if) with Imperative Logic
(commands).

If and only if is a
connective between two declarative statements in a bi-conditional manner.

So A controls B. is the Imperative
logical command.

This statement makes it
clear that PCT can clearly be circumscribed by an Imperative Calculus.

Bill wrote:

"A controls B if and only if for every
disturbance of B, A ALTERS its

effect on B to try to counteract the disturbance and
keep B from

changing."

The minor edit below reflects how I interact
chaotically with my

surrounding environment, including people, the
totality of which I view

as a complete signifier.

"A controls B if and only if for every
disturbance of B, A ALTERS its

effect on B to try to counteract the disturbance and
keep B from [NOT]

changing."

These two forces presented in a dynamic equilibrium
should help humanity

to avoid its own self-destruction, in the grand scheme
of things.

BTW, as we continue this discussion I suspect that
HPCT will be

dissolved eventually into something a bit more
sophisticated than its

original configuration. So what’s the harm in doing
that? :slight_smile:

Chad

Chad T. Green, PMP

Program Analyst

Loudoun County Public Schools

21000 Education Court

Ashburn, VA 20148

Voice: 571-252-1486

Fax: 571-252-1633

Web:
http://cmsweb1.loudoun.k12.va.us/50910052783559/site/default.asp

There are no great organizations, just great
workgroups.

– Results from a study of 80,000 managers by The
Gallup Organization

Bill Powers 11/11/10 9:40 AM >>>

[From Bill Powers (2010.11.11.0720
MDT)]

To Boris Hartman

BH:

Kent to Fred Nichols :

*The environmental stabilization that channels
lots of people’s

behavior

into trying to control similar perceptions*.

Bill P :

(1988) THE ASYMMETRY OF CONTROL

The circular relationship between organisms and
environment is well

known :

behavior affects the environment and the
environment affects behavior.

On

superficial consideration it may seem that we have
a choice : the

organism

controls it’s environment, or equally well
the environment controls the

organism. That’s not true*//* Organisms
control enviroemnt but not vice

versa (W.T.Powers, Living Control Systems, page
251).

Boris :

Are these statements comparable ? Are they having
the same meaning that

environment can’t control (channel) lots of
people’s behavior ?

The nonliving environment controls nothing.

Affect, influence, even determine, yes –

control, no. Control has a specific technical

meaning in PCT. A controls B if and only if for

every disturbance of B, A ALTERS its effect on B

to try to counteract the disturbance and keep B

from changing. If a car goes off the road, the

road does nothing to put it back on the road. So

the road does not control where the car goes. The

rate of a chemical reaction increases when the

temperature rises, so the temperature affects or

influences the rate of the reaction, but does not

control it. If a mixture is stirred, the overall

reaction rate will increase, but the temperature

will not then change in an attempt to restore the
previous reaction

rate.

If you don’t want to use the technical terms of

PCT correctly, that’s your priviledge. But if you

use them incorrectly, what you say will have

nothing to do with PCT. “Channeling” is not
a PCT

term so you can use it any way you like. Some

people use it to mean communication with the

dead. It’s not interchangeable with
“controlling.”

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2010.11.11.1700)]

Martin Taylor (2010.11.11.14.53)--

Rick Marken (2010.11.11.1140)--

Martin Taylor (2010.11.11.12.43) --
Cooperation can happen by chance as well as by design.

RM: Of course. That's what Kent's modeling shows. �It can also appear to
be occurring when two control systems act to control two different
variables in a coordinated way, as in my models of coordinated
movement (a good example is at
Bimanual Coordination). These are examples of
what I would call "apparent" rather than "controlled " cooperation.

Sure. Call it what you will. Not all perceptions are controlled, either.

That's no quite my point. The apparent coordination of outputs in that
demo are not even perceived by the agent moving the flags. What I
call apparent coordination is a perception only in the observer of the
behavior. It's like the ring formed around the guru in the CROWD demo;
it looks like the agents are cooperating by coordinating their actions
to produce the circle but, in fact, that circle is not perceived by
any of the agents involved, just by the observer. I think some
results, like a computer, require that the agents involved in its
production actually control for a perception of cooperation. The
computer won't get built if people don't cooperate.

MT: Yes. The point is the it [stability of an environmental variable] becomes
statistically almost certain to occur when there are enough interacting control
systems in a complex environment. That means that regardless of what the
individual control systems are controlling, and whether they engage in
controlled cooperation, reorganization will tend toward the development
of a network of such homeostatic loops.

I would like to see a demonstration of this. But even assuming it is
true -- that some kind of stable result will always occur when many
systems are controlling in the same environment -- there is no telling
what that stable result will be. I think cooperation is needed when a
particular result of group activity is desired -- like a killed
antelope or a laptop computer.

RM: I don't think you're going to get a successful antelope hunt together
using chance cooperation.

MT:Probably not, but then it is not the case that most human activity consists
of organized cooperative projects.

Agreed. All I'm saying is that there is a uniquely human kind of
organized activity that I would call purposeful cooperation. In order
to carry out this purpose people must be able to perceive cooperation
so that they can control for it.

RM: So, no, when it comes to human societies I
think what makes them work is mainly controlled cooperation. I would
guess that people succeeded as a species because their brains
developed the perceptual capabilities that allowed them to perceive
and thus control for cooperation.

MT: That's true of a lot of other species, as well.

Yes, I believe that our (not Kenny's;-) primate ancestors could
possibly be able to perceive and thus control for cooperation. I'm not
sure it's possible in other animals; cooperation is a pretty high
level perception; I'd say its a program type variable.

I think the only place where
we have a disagreement, and I think it is an insignificant disagreement, is
in the use of "mainly".

OK, I'll accept that. My main point is simply that when we see
coordinated action it may be the result of independent control of the
same or different variables (as in Kent's models and the Crowd demo)
or it may be the result of the agents controlling for being
cooperative (which we have no demo of). Of course, this is just a
guess, based on my own experience, but it should be possible to
develop tests to see whether control of cooperation is happening or
not. I seem to remember Tom Bourbon having a nice tracking demo where
it was possible for the two agents involved to produce the intended
result only if they controlled for cooperating with each other. If
anyone here still talks to Tom they might ask him about it.

RM: I agree that some pretty complex societies, like bee hives, work on
the basis of apparent cooperation; the kind of cooperation seen in
that between movements of the two hands in the bimanual control model
(Bimanual Coordination). But I think the kind
of cooperation in bees can produce nothing compared to what can be
produced by the purposeful cooperation that we see in humans, which is
the kind of cooperation required to produce successful hunts as well
as computers, airplanes, air traffic control systems, cars, roads,
etc.

MT: All of which I agree with. Did you read my "Helping" web page before you
sent this reply?

Give me the reference again and I'll take a look.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[Martin Taylor 2010.11.11.23.11]

[From Rick Marken (2010.11.11.1700)]

Martin Taylor (2010.11.11.14.53)--

Rick Marken (2010.11.11.1140)--

Martin Taylor (2010.11.11.12.43) --
Cooperation can happen by chance as well as by design.

RM: Of course. That's what Kent's modeling shows. It can also appear to
be occurring when two control systems act to control two different
variables in a coordinated way, as in my models of coordinated
movement (a good example is at
Bimanual Coordination). These are examples of
what I would call "apparent" rather than "controlled " cooperation.

Sure. Call it what you will. Not all perceptions are controlled, either.

That's no quite my point.

I guess I missed the point, then. In the demo you linked, two independent control systems act as parallel parts of the environmental feedback path of a higher-level system, a frequent structure in HPCT. In all the situations I have been considering, and that I thought you were considering, the "apparently cooperating" systems are independent in that they don't support a common higher-level control system.

  The apparent coordination of outputs in that
demo are not even perceived by the agent moving the flags. What I
call apparent coordination is a perception only in the observer of the
behavior. It's like the ring formed around the guru in the CROWD demo;
it looks like the agents are cooperating by coordinating their actions
to produce the circle but, in fact, that circle is not perceived by
any of the agents involved, just by the observer.

I still don't get the point. My riff on Kent's stabilization of the second kind (the stabilization of something in the environment provides an environmental affordance for some quite other perceptual control) goes even further than that. When that happens, it could be deliberate and the performer is controlling a perception of helping the other (e.g. holding the base of a ladder), but more often than not, the performer has no idea that the helped control system exists, or perhaps even that the helped person exists.

  I think some
results, like a computer, require that the agents involved in its
production actually control for a perception of cooperation. The
computer won't get built if people don't cooperate.

MT: Yes. The point is the it [stability of an environmental variable] becomes
statistically almost certain to occur when there are enough interacting control
systems in a complex environment. That means that regardless of what the
  individual control systems are controlling, and whether they engage in
controlled cooperation, reorganization will tend toward the development
of a network of such homeostatic loops.

I would like to see a demonstration of this. But even assuming it is
true -- that some kind of stable result will always occur when many
systems are controlling in the same environment -- there is no telling
what that stable result will be.

Quite so. In the world there are many cultures with wildly different customs and behaviours they may well take to be "human nature". Those interlinked patterns of behaviour we call "culture" are the stable or nearly stable results, which can indeed have many different forms.

  I think cooperation is needed when a
particular result of group activity is desired -- like a killed
antelope or a laptop computer.

Yes. I agreed with that, I thought. Though in the case of the computer, many of the components have other possible uses, and the component manufacturer might well not know that the computer assembler exists. The computer assembler might just buy off-the-shelf components (the stable result of control by the component manufacturer) and put them together, as do many computer hobbyists. If the component manufacturer were not stabilizing the environment by producing consistently replicable components, the computer assembler would not be able to control the perceptions involved in assembling the computer.

RM: I don't think you're going to get a successful antelope hunt together
using chance cooperation.

MT:Probably not, but then it is not the case that most human activity consists
of organized cooperative projects.

Agreed. All I'm saying is that there is a uniquely human kind of
organized activity that I would call purposeful cooperation. In order
to carry out this purpose people must be able to perceive cooperation
so that they can control for it.

RM: So, no, when it comes to human societies I
think what makes them work is mainly controlled cooperation. I would
guess that people succeeded as a species because their brains
developed the perceptual capabilities that allowed them to perceive
and thus control for cooperation.

MT: That's true of a lot of other species, as well.

Yes, I believe that our (not Kenny's;-) primate ancestors could
possibly be able to perceive and thus control for cooperation. I'm not
sure it's possible in other animals; cooperation is a pretty high
level perception; I'd say its a program type variable.

I was thinking not of primates, but of pack hunting such as by lions, wolves or dolphins, or guarding and alerting by sentinel marmots while the others are doing their thing on the surface, or crow-mobbing by sparrows, and such-like cooperative behaviour. The dolphin bubble-fences for fishing are a pretty spectacular example. It takes quite a few dolphins coordinating their positions and their timings to set up the fences that force the target fish into a dense mass through which individual dolphins can charge to get a meal. Lots of species do it in one form or another. I don't think any of those examples qualify as analogues of the Crowd demos in the way flocking in birds or schooling in fish would do.

I think the only place where
we have a disagreement, and I think it is an insignificant disagreement, is
in the use of "mainly".

OK, I'll accept that. My main point is simply that when we see
coordinated action it may be the result of independent control of the
same or different variables (as in Kent's models and the Crowd demo)
or it may be the result of the agents controlling for being
cooperative (which we have no demo of). Of course, this is just a
guess, based on my own experience, but it should be possible to
develop tests to see whether control of cooperation is happening or
not.

Well, you can see when someone is being uncooperative, can't you! "Would you mind opening the window, please?" "No way, not for you, you bastard!" vs. "Sure, no problem." "Come help me shovel the driveway" (not in L.A., I guess) "No, I'm comfortable here" vs. "OK, I'm with you".

MT: Did you read my "Helping" web page before you
sent this reply?

Give me the reference again and I'll take a look.

From [Martin Taylor 2010.11.11.12.43] "Sure, control of the perception of being cooperative is important (see my old analysis of "Helping" <http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/Helping/helping.html&gt;&quot;

Martin

···

On 2010/11/11 7:59 PM, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2010.11.12.-830 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.11.11.23.11 --

In all the situations I have been considering, and that I thought you were considering, the "apparently cooperating" systems are independent in that they don't support a common higher-level control system.

I agree with that idea, and think it's a good reason for not objectifying the concept of "affordance". Any condition in the environment can be used by a control system, under the right circumstances, as part of a means of controlling almost any variable; what is an affordance for one person, however, is probably not the same for another person. That is the weakness in Gibson's concept. Gibson was trying to retain the idea that organisms can know what is actually happening in the environment rather than just what they perceive of it. This idea got enthusiastic support from all those who really wanted to think they, as scientists trained to make objective determinations without personal bias, simply observe and report what is really there.

My favorite example of an affordance is one I actually experienced, when I used a laptop computer in its carrying bag to prop a door open while I moved something else through the doorway. This was certainly a case in which someone else's action (building the laptop) shaped part of my environment to make it convenient for me to control something I wanted to control, much in the way the building of the interstate system of expressways provides a convenient place to have drag races and to land airplanes with conked-out engines and to commit suicide by colliding with a bridge abutment. Affordances are in the eye of the controller.

If one affordance doesn't exist, most people will find another that makes reaching the same end possible. And one person's affordance is another person's disturbance, as would probably have been the case if I had used someone else's precious laptop to prop the door open.

I think that "accidental" cooperation is much like the correlation between two variables that is actually the result of a third variable affecting them both: an illusion. You can distinguish intentional from accidental cooperation by watching what happens when various disturbances affect whatever it is that both parties seem to be cooperating in accomplishing. When you start seeing one person reacting against some disturbances and the other person not reacting, you will know that the cooperation is accidental and therefore illusory.

Best,

Bill P.

[Martin Taylor 2010.11.12.16.27]

[From Bill Powers (2010.11.12.-830 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.11.11.23.11 --

In all the situations I have been considering, and that I thought you were considering, the "apparently cooperating" systems are independent in that they don't support a common higher-level control system.

I agree with that idea, and think it's a good reason for not objectifying the concept of "affordance". Any condition in the environment can be used by a control system, under the right circumstances, as part of a means of controlling almost any variable; what is an affordance for one person, however, is probably not the same for another person.

Yes. An environmental affordance has the same status as any other perception. Maybe there is some pattern in the environment to which it corresponds, in which case control using it as an element of an environmental feedback path will work. Maybe there isn't, and the perception is what we sometimes call "illusory", and then using it as part of an environmental feedback path won't work. If I'm in the desert and thirsty, and see a lake a little way ahead, I can control the thirst perception if it's a real lake, but not if it is a mirage.

You say "what is an affordance for one person, however, is probably not the same for another person". I would amend that by replacing "person" with "control system" in both places.

If one affordance doesn't exist, most people will find another that makes reaching the same end possible.

If they can, and if controlling for finding or making an affordance (of course, for a different controlled perception) does not create undue conflict, etc. etc. Sometimes it just isn't worthwhile to go to the effort of building a bridge over that stream. You just stay this side.

A point worth considering is that an affordance is a perception, controllable like any other. But of what is it a perception? It is a perception that certain behaviour could serve as the environmental feedback path in controlling some other perception, whether that perception is being controlled or not. A rock-climber might look at a cliff and decide that this crack would permit a climber to reach the top. The crack is an affordance for controlling a perception of reaching the top by climbing, whether or not the climber actually wants to make the climb. If the rock surface were smooth, the climber might decide that at his skill level no affordance existed for making the climb. (Note that the controlled perception for which the crack is an affordance is notthe location of teh climber, with reference value "at the top", but the perception of himself climbing and reaching the top. It's control of an imagined perception of behaviour).

I have the impression that you don't like using the word "environmental affordance" as a short form for "feature of the environment that can form part of an environmental feedback path" because Gibson used the word. I don't think that's a sensible reason, any more than it would be sensible to complain about using "perception" as a short form for "variable that changes as certain factors of the environment change" on the grounds that most people take "perception" to mean something of which one is conscious.

I think that if something affords an opportunity, the right word for it is an affordance. Thick ice on a lake surface is an affordance for snowmobilers, fishers, skaters, ice-yachters... The use of an affordance for one purpose in no way detracts from its use for another purpose unless resource limitations come into play.

And one person's affordance is another person's disturbance, as would probably have been the case if I had used someone else's precious laptop to prop the door open.

The environmental affordance itself would not be a disturbance, at least not as I think of disturbances. It's a state of the perceived environment. That state may not correspond to the reference value of someone else's controlled perception. But if all perceived states of the world that don't match our reference values are called disturbances, what do you call the changes of state that would in the absence of control move a perception away from it reference value? I tend to use "disturbance" to refer to the changes rather than to the static states. After all, very little of our world matches our ideal world.

Anyway, that's not really the point of Kent's work, which is that a network of controllers tend to generate an environment of greater stability than would any one controller acting alone. If a network of control systems tend to rigidly stabilize some features of the environment through a mixture of conflict and (deliberate) cooperation, then those features can be stable environmental affordances for control of quite independent perceptions. Their stability allows control system structures to reorganize to use them. Linguistic and cultural patterns have this characteristic.

I tend to think of the rigidity of networking as somewhat analogous to Buckminster Fuller's tensegrity structures (of which I saw a marvellous example at the Science Centre at Baltimore Harbour a couple of weeks ago). They hold themselves up because of the entire structure. If you remove some cable or rod, the rest might or might not remain stable, but you can be sure that no hitchup of a couple of rods or cables by themselves would do so.

I think that "accidental" cooperation is much like the correlation between two variables that is actually the result of a third variable affecting them both: an illusion. You can distinguish intentional from accidental cooperation by watching what happens when various disturbances affect whatever it is that both parties seem to be cooperating in accomplishing. When you start seeing one person reacting against some disturbances and the other person not reacting, you will know that the cooperation is accidental and therefore illusory.

True, but how is that comment relevant?

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2010.11.13.0815 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.11.12.16.27 --

MMT: I have the impression that you don't like using the word "environmental affordance" as a short form for "feature of the environment that can form part of an environmental feedback path" because Gibson used the word.

BP: It's true that I don't much like Gibson's work, but that's not the reason I don't like "affordance" I think that nonliving things in the environment have physical properties, but no psychological properties. To speak of affordance as a property of something in the environment is to endow it with characteristics that are not in it (not in my model of the environment), but that exist only in the viewer. It leads to objectification of things that are subjective, like attributing "value" to objects in economics.

MMT: I don't think that's a sensible reason, any more than it would be sensible to complain about using "perception" as a short form for "variable that changes as certain factors of the environment change" on the grounds that most people take "perception" to mean something of which one is conscious.

BP: I agree, my dislike of Gibson's writings wouldn't be a sensible reason for rejecting affordance as a property of the environment -- if that were my reason, which it isn't. In fact, it's the other way around: I dislike Gibson's writings because they attribute nonexistent properties to environmental objects. And that is quite aside from the fact that "it's all perception." I just think that a transitive verb like afford is a simple mistake in a model of the non-living world

MMT: I think that if something affords an opportunity, the right word for it is an affordance.

BP: It would be, if things in the environment could do such a thing. I don't think they can; the term is a metaphor. It's as if the object were telling us what it could be used for -- which of course is precisely what Gibson claims.

The stones someone placed for crossing a small creek do not do anything but be where they are and be flat on top. I could use them for crossing the creek, or for placing my fishing gear on while I wade beside them, or to start building a dam, or as foundations for a bridge, or to provide a point of interest in a painting or a photograph, or to study flow patterns, or to give evidence that another person has been there, or to pry up and use to build a fire pit on the shore, or to tie my boat to -- pretty smart stones, to be able to afford all those uses, as well as many others I was too insensitive to notice. Think of the incredible variety of affordances that are obtained when iron, copper, or aluminum ore is mined; we may never discover all of them. One would think that chemists would have detected them by now.

MMT: Thick ice on a lake surface is an affordance for snowmobilers, fishers, skaters, ice-yachters... The use of an affordance for one purpose in no way detracts from its use for another purpose unless resource limitations come into play.

BP: The metaphor can be carried as far as you wish, and that's fine for poetry or simply colorful communication or entertainment. But I don't think it has a role in any scientific discussion of how things work. Nonliving objects do not have a property of affordance, nor can they actively afford uses to people. As soon as you start trying to explain how affordance works, you have to begin talking about human goals and actions, and physical properties of feedback functions. A serious model doesn't contain a variable or function called affordance.

BP earlier: And one person's affordance is another person's disturbance, as would probably have been the case if I had used someone else's precious laptop to prop the door open.

MMT:" The environmental affordance itself would not be a disturbance, at least not as I think of disturbances.

BP: Of course it would. I'm using someone else's laptop for a purpose of my own in a way that might damage it, and that is definitely something that would cause an error signal in most owners of laptops -- if only in their imaginations, but perhaps also in present time perception. "Look at that, you've scratched the case!"

MMT: It's a state of the perceived environment. That state may not correspond to the reference value of someone else's controlled perception. But if all perceived states of the world that don't match our reference values are called disturbances, what do you call the changes of state that would in the absence of control move a perception away from it reference value? I tend to use "disturbance" to refer to the changes rather than to the static states. After all, very little of our world matches our ideal world.

BP: Put the straw man away, Martin. A disturbance is something that affects the state of a controlled variable in a way that causes an error signal in someone's control system. The resulting state does "not correspond to the reference value of someone else's controlled perception." What did you think I meant by "disturbance?" Isn't that what you mean? If someone sees me pick up his laptop, set it down on the floor, and push it with my foot against the bottom of the door to keep it open, is that not a "dynamic" enough disturbance for you? You're playing tricks with connotations that shift in the middle of a paragraph: starting with disturbance (formally: something that changes the state of a controlled perception independently of a control system's action), then shifting to something that is just different from a reference value for any reason, and ending with things that would change a variable "in the absence of control." I wasn't talking about the absence of control, but of its presence in the person who objects to my using his laptop in a particular way, even though it obviously (to me) "affords" that use. It's not my fault that it obviously affords that use, is it? That convenient excuse is one of the reasons people like to objectify their private preferences.

MMT: Anyway, that's not really the point of Kent's work, which is that a network of controllers tend to generate an environment of greater stability than would any one controller acting alone.

BP: I don't think "stability" is the word you want in control-system context. When people construct things that will last for a long time, those things can be used for any purpose a person might invent to use them for. But simply because they are semi-permanent, they also present problems for other people whose controlled variables are disturbed by those constructions, like the wall the Israelis built between the Palestinians and the fields they farmed, or the highway some politician finagled across what most local residents wanted to be open space.

MMT: If a network of control systems tend to rigidly stabilize some features of the environment through a mixture of conflict and (deliberate) cooperation, then those features can be stable environmental affordances for control of quite independent perceptions. Their stability allows control system structures to reorganize to use them. Linguistic and cultural patterns have this characteristic.

BP: I have no argument with that. Now you're just talking about the physical properties of whatever was created. Sometimes people try to use those properties as means of control and discover that they are wrong for the job; quite often they are good enough to allow a reasonable degree of control. The physical properties of the feedback function create multiple relationships between the action and the local variables in which the controlled variable is perceived. But the number of higher-order purposes for which those variables might be used is probably uncountable.

MMT: I tend to think of the rigidity of networking as somewhat analogous to Buckminster Fuller's tensegrity structures (of which I saw a marvellous example at the Science Centre at Baltimore Harbour a couple of weeks ago). They hold themselves up because of the entire structure. If you remove some cable or rod, the rest might or might not remain stable, but you can be sure that no hitchup of a couple of rods or cables by themselves would do so.

BP: All true, and I'd be happy to see the subject discussed in that way without attributing any active role in those structures for determining what purposes a person might use them for.

BP earlier: I think that "accidental" cooperation is much like the correlation between two variables that is actually the result of a third variable affecting them both: an illusion. You can distinguish intentional from accidental cooperation by watching what happens when various disturbances affect whatever it is that both parties seem to be cooperating in accomplishing. When you start seeing one person reacting against some disturbances and the other person not reacting, you will know that the cooperation is accidental and therefore illusory.

MMT: True, but how is that comment relevant?

Don't you remember? You and Rick were also discussing cooperation. I should have labeled the change of subject.

Best,

Bill P.
'

[Martin Taylor 2010.11.14.10.50]

[From Bill Powers (2010.11.13.0815 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.11.12.16.27 --

MMT: I have the impression that you don't like using the word "environmental affordance" as a short form for "feature of the environment that can form part of an environmental feedback path" because Gibson used the word.

BP: It's true that I don't much like Gibson's work, but that's not the reason I don't like "affordance" I think that nonliving things in the environment have physical properties, but no psychological properties. To speak of affordance as a property of something in the environment is to endow it with characteristics that are not in it (not in my model of the environment), but that exist only in the viewer. It leads to objectification of things that are subjective, like attributing "value" to objects in economics.

Kent McClelland seems to have a similar view when he says [From Kent McClelland (2010.11.14.0930 CST)]:

KM: In the exchange between Bill Powers and Martin Taylor about affordances, I agree with Bill about the difficulties of using the term "affordance". The problem with the term, as I see it, is that it attributes to an object or condition a property that is really the property of a relationship between that object and the organism making use of the object. An object has as many "affordances" as there are potential users of the object and potential uses that they might put the object to. So talking about "an environmental affordance" as if it were the property of the object alone is misleading.

We seem to have different connotations for both words. Kent even attributes to the word itself the very animate property to which he objects in its usage. I wouldn't do that, nor would I imagine that an affordance of an object is a property of the object alone. It's a property of an object or a perceived structure of the environment as related to possible control of a particular perception.

To me, both "affordance" and "value" are perceptions, not of concrete, tangible properties of the environment, but on a par with perceptions such as "stable" or "rickety" or "democracy" or "honour". And as Kent says, "an object has as many "affordances" as there are potential users of the object and potential uses that they might put the object to." Exactly so, but I would extend that by substituting for "object" the phrase "a perceived structure of the physical or social environment".

What I don't understand is why both Bill and Kent seem to think that because an object has one affordance for the control of one perception, to use the word carries the connotation that the object cannot have another affordance for the control of another perception.

MMT: I think that if something affords an opportunity, the right word for it is an affordance.

BP: It would be, if things in the environment could do such a thing. I don't think they can; the term is a metaphor.

As are almost all words we use regularly. That's an observation, not a criticism. An open door affords access to a room. A well frozen lake affords the opportunity to go skating. Does that make anyone think that the openness of the door is an active, willing entity like a bowing footman, or that the lake extends invitations to potential skaters? I think not. But the word is commonly used in similar situations. Why not use it in a closely related technical sense within PCT, just as "perception" is used in a technical sense in PCT rather more different from its sense in everyday speech?

I don't really care what word you use as a substitute for "feature of the environment that could form part of an environmental feedback path for some perception", but I don't want to keep using that long phrase whenever I talk about the possibilities the environment affords for control. If you come up with a word I think easier to remember, that has better connotations for you, I'll try to use it. Until then, I'll stick with talking about the controllable perception of "environmental affordance".

MMT:" The environmental affordance itself would not be a disturbance, at least not as I think of disturbances.

BP earlier: And one person's affordance is another person's disturbance, as would probably have been the case if I had used someone else's precious laptop to prop the door open.

BP: Of course it would. I'm using someone else's laptop for a purpose of my own in a way that might damage it, and that is definitely something that would cause an error signal in most owners of laptops -- if only in their imaginations, but perhaps also in present time perception. "Look at that, you've scratched the case!"

MMT: It's a state of the perceived environment. That state may not correspond to the reference value of someone else's controlled perception. But if all perceived states of the world that don't match our reference values are called disturbances, what do you call the changes of state that would in the absence of control move a perception away from it reference value? I tend to use "disturbance" to refer to the changes rather than to the static states. After all, very little of our world matches our ideal world.

BP: Put the straw man away, Martin. A disturbance is something that affects the state of a controlled variable in a way that causes an error signal in someone's control system.

Yes, that's what I mean by "disturbance", The key word is "affects", which you (in my view correctly) used here in place of the "is" to which I would have objected. No straw man here, just a recognition that you do, in fact, use "disturbance" as I had thought previously, to represent an influence that would change the environment in the absence of control. You didn't seem to use it that way when you originally presented your example, but you do in your expansion of the example.

MMT: Anyway, that's not really the point of Kent's work, which is that a network of controllers tend to generate an environment of greater stability than would any one controller acting alone.

BP: I don't think "stability" is the word you want in control-system context.

Why not? Isn't creating stability just what control systems do? A single control system with a single scalar perceptual variable makes the value of that perception more stable than it would otherwise be, doesn't it? And Kent has shown that under the conditions of his studies, networks of controllers create more stability than the individual controllers would if they acted alone. What word do you want, if not "stability" to represent a condition that is more stable than it otherwise would be?

When people construct things that will last for a long time, those things can be used for any purpose a person might invent to use them for. But simply because they are semi-permanent, they also present problems for other people whose controlled variables are disturbed by those constructions, like the wall the Israelis built between the Palestinians and the fields they farmed, or the highway some politician finagled across what most local residents wanted to be open space.

Yes. That is indeed what the discussion involving Kent concluded. The intuition that Kent had, with which I agreed, was that overall, the creation of the environmental stabilities created more different environmental pathways for control than they eliminated, not that there were no reductions of control possibilities for the less fortunate. I don't think there's any rigorous evidence for that, but on the surface, it does seem correct to me.

MMT: If a network of control systems tend to rigidly stabilize some features of the environment through a mixture of conflict and (deliberate) cooperation, then those features can be stable environmental affordances for control of quite independent perceptions. Their stability allows control system structures to reorganize to use them. Linguistic and cultural patterns have this characteristic.

BP: I have no argument with that. Now you're just talking about the physical properties of whatever was created. Sometimes people try to use those properties as means of control and discover that they are wrong for the job; quite often they are good enough to allow a reasonable degree of control. The physical properties of the feedback function create multiple relationships between the action and the local variables in which the controlled variable is perceived. But the number of higher-order purposes for which those variables might be used is probably uncountable.

Yes.

Now I want to pick a nit, just as a quid pro quo for your nit-picking. You are talking about "physical properties" as though they exist in the real world. Do the structures of language and culture? Are they not imagined perceptions of what is likely to happen if we talk or behave in certain ways? What can I point to or touch that is a physical property of a language, or to be more concrete, of a bank (other than the bricks and mortar, which are properties of the building but not of the bank itself)? The perception of an affordance is an imagined perception of what may happen if we act in a certain way, whether the feedback path involves an "object" or any other perceived environmental structure.

BP earlier: I think that "accidental" cooperation is much like the correlation between two variables that is actually the result of a third variable affecting them both: an illusion. You can distinguish intentional from accidental cooperation by watching what happens when various disturbances affect whatever it is that both parties seem to be cooperating in accomplishing. When you start seeing one person reacting against some disturbances and the other person not reacting, you will know that the cooperation is accidental and therefore illusory.

MMT: True, but how is that comment relevant?

Don't you remember? You and Rick were also discussing cooperation. I should have labeled the change of subject.

I still don't see how that comment is relevant either to the recent messages or to the earlier discussion. Some time ago we had already discussed and agreed with the content of your comment, but subsequently I had pointed out that the stabilization of environmental affordances for control system P by the control actions of a totally independent control system Q was another form of "accidental" cooperation. Q knows nothing of P, there is no higher-level systems providing references to both, nor is there any environmental common disturbance to both, but Q's actions nevertheless assist P. That form is not addressed by your comment, but it is a substantial element of the stabilization network that Kent's work (insofar as he reported it here) suggests exists in real societies.

Martin

[From Bill Powers
(2010.11.14.1600 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.11.14.10.50 –

MMT: We seem to have different
connotations for both words. Kent even attributes to the word itself the
very animate property to which he objects in its usage. I wouldn’t do
that, nor would I imagine that an affordance of an object is a property
of the object alone. It’s a property of an object or a perceived
structure of the environment as related to possible control of a
particular perception.

BP: I would say it’s not a property of the object at all. or of a
perceived structure. If you can’t determine it by examining the object,
it’s not a property of the object.

MMT: What I don’t understand is
why both Bill and Kent seem to think that because an object has one
affordance for the control of one perception, to use the word carries the
connotation that the object cannot have another affordance for the
control of another perception.

BP: I don’t think that objects “have” affordances any more than
words “have” meanings.

MMT: I think that if something
affords an opportunity, the right word for it is an affordance.

BP earlier: It would be, if things in the environment could do such a
thing. I don’t think they can; the term is a metaphor.

MMT: As are almost all words we use regularly. That’s an observation, not
a criticism. An open door affords access to a
room.

BP: How does it do that?

MMT: A well frozen lake affords
the opportunity to go skating.

BP: How does it do that? Understand that I’m trying to discuss this on a
technical, denotative level of discourse. You say that a door can do
something, a lake can do something, something called
“affording.” Of course I understand the informal colloquial
intent in this way of speaking, and that the customary meaning of a
transitive verb is not really what you intend, but that’s of no use in a
scientific discussion. In a scientific discussion, I want the words to
refer to reliable, agreed-upon, unambiguous, literal meanings. If you
want to say in a technical discussion that a lake can afford something,
you should be prepared to discuss the mechanisms by which it can do that,
and what determines the things it can afford. If your intent is not to
have a technical discussion that’s to be taken seriously, you should say
so. It’s OK with me but I like to know the context in which I
speak.

MMT: Does that make anyone think
that the openness of the door is an active, willing entity like a bowing
footman, or that the lake extends invitations to potential skaters? I
think not.

BP: I think so. I remember my mother saying that the water in a swimming
pool was very tempting but she had to resist until an hour after lunch.
People speak that way all the time without thinking about what they
really mean by those words, which is one reason communication is so poor
between people. It took me a while to realize she was speaking AS
IF the water were beckoning her in. She didn’t mean what the words, taken
literally, seemed to mean. Or I assumed she didn’t. Say what you will
about Asperger’s Syndrome, that’s the way I am.
In science, I think we are supposed to take words literally, and if there
isn’t a word with the literal meaning we want, we make one up, and then
have to explain it to everyone. The word you’re looking for in place of
affordance is property. The properties of an environmental
feedback function determine how acting through it will affect other
variables. Pushing with a given force will cause masses to accelerate in
a given way, or to compress, or to deform. The effects on other variables
are the raw material from which we can make controlled variables, and the
only thing determining what variables those might be are whatever limits
there are on our ability to form perceptual input functions. You can’t
know what the EFF “affords” until after you know what the
organism is going to do with the result. There’s no way to determine it
by examining the environment.

MMT: But the word is commonly
used in similar situations. Why not use it in a closely related technical
sense within PCT, just as “perception” is used in a technical
sense in PCT rather more different from its sense in everyday
speech?

BP: We’ve had this argument over and over for years. Why be fussy about
what is meant by “control?” Why be fussy about whether
“disturbance” refers to the cause or the effect? Why be fussy
about words at all? My answer has always been “For clarity of
communication; to eliminate ambiguity; to reason consistently.” When
we get too sloppy about words, we pay the price in pointless arguments
resting on nothing more important than differences in usage. And sloppy
usage means we can start talking about one thing and by the end of the
sentence be using the same word to talk about something else without even
knowing we have changed the subject.

I don’t really care what word
you use as a substitute for “feature of the environment that could
form part of an environmental feedback path for some perception”,
but I don’t want to keep using that long phrase whenever I talk about the
possibilities the environment affords for control. If you come up with a
word I think easier to remember, that has better connotations for you,
I’ll try to use it. Until then, I’ll stick with talking about the
controllable perception of “environmental
affordance”.

BP: Fine. The word I want to use is “property.”

MMT: Anyway, that’s not really
the point of Kent’s work, which is that a network of controllers tend to
generate an environment of greater stability than would any one
controller acting alone.

BP: I don’t think “stability” is the word you want in [a]
control-system context.

MMT: Why not? Isn’t creating stability just what control systems do? A
single control system with a single scalar perceptual variable makes the
value of that perception more stable than it would otherwise be, doesn’t
it? And Kent has shown that under the conditions of his studies, networks
of controllers create more stability than the individual controllers
would if they acted alone. What word do you want, if not
“stability” to represent a condition that is more stable than
it otherwise would be.

BP: I thought I had answered this and now can’t find it, so…

In control theory, “stable” does not mean
“unchanging” or “resistant to change” or
“reliable.” If a control system is stable, it does not
spontaneously break into oscillation or run away. Stability is the
condition of returning to a reference condition after a perturbation
without excessive oscillation, preferably (for maximum stability) in a
single smooth negative exponential curve without overshoot or at most a
single overshoot (minumum-time error correction).

This is another case of usage: the usage Kent was employing is the
common-language use, which is all right if we all understand that we’re
speaking loosely and imprecisely. But if we’re talking about PCT, that’s
not how we need to talk if we’re not to be tripped up by someone who can
remember what we said before. The only way to maintain consistency is to
follow the policy of one word, one meaning. It’s the same in programming
a computer: when you define a word, that and no other is to be its
meaning for the duration of the program. If you don’t follow that
policy in programming, your program will have a bug at worst, or at best
simply won’t compile. If you don’t follow that policy in science, you
can’t do science.

MMT: Now I want to pick a nit,
just as a quid pro quo for your nit-picking. You are talking about
“physical properties” as though they exist in the real world.
Do the structures of language and culture? Are they not imagined
perceptions of what is likely to happen if we talk or behave in certain
ways?

Yes. I referred to my “model of the world,” but perhaps should
have made a bigger point of that. When I speak of properties I’m
referring mainly to the physics model and the way we represent observed
relationships with mathematical functions.

What can I point to or
touch that is a physical property of a language, or to be more concrete,
of a bank (other than the bricks and mortar, which are properties of the
building but not of the bank itself)?

I assume that the meanings of words are simply our own remembered
perceptions that are evoked when we hear a familiar word. You can’t
necessarily point to it or touch it (can anyone point to or touch the
meaning of “above”?). Or am I missing your point?

The perception of an
affordance is an imagined perception of what may happen if we act in a
certain way, whether the feedback path involves an “object” or
any other perceived environmental
structure.

I think property covers that meaning pretty well, though it takes the
process only as far as the input boundary where input quantities are. But
that’s reasonable because we don’t know at that point what input
functions are going to receive the input variables or what functions of
them will be constructed.

We can talk about cooperation elsewhere. We’ve probably already bitten
off more than we want to chew.

Best,

Bill P.

[Martin Taylor 2010.11.15.23.06[

    [From Bill Powers

(2010.11.14.1600 MDT)]

    Martin Taylor 2010.11.14.10.50 --

    An open door affords access to a

room.

  BP: How does it do that?
By being perceived as affording that possibility, by someone who

might at some point want to enter the room.

      MMT: A well frozen

lake affords
the opportunity to go skating.

  BP: How does it do that?
By being perceived by someone as affording that opportunity.
  Understand that I'm trying to discuss this on a

technical, denotative level of discourse. You say that a door can
do
something, a lake can do something, something called
“affording.”

What I don't understand is why you have this notion in your head (as

does Kent and Kenny) that there is something active about
“affording”, while I don’t and never have had that notion. Have you
ever heard someone say “I afford you this gift” or even “I afford
you this way to do X”. I don’t think so – at least I never have.
One uses the word only when the grammatical subject is a
pragmatically passive object or pattern (like “open”) that can be
used. It would be interesting to know whether this is a difference
between US and UK or Canadian language. It seems extraordinarily
strange to me that you think of affording as “doing something”. But
you do say you think of it that way, so there’s a problem with the
word.

I'm going to quote here from a message I wrote off-line to another

CSGnet reader who couldn’t find “affordance” in a dictionary and
wanted an explanation (I have slightly edited the message for form,
not for content).

--------quote-------

>Can you help me understand word affordance in relation to for

ex. “stabilization of environmental variable”.

Affordance is a word invented by J.J.Gibson, I suppose in the

1950’s. I’m not surprised you couldn’t find it in your dictionaries.
It isn’t in my big Oxford English Dictionary, though it should be. I
thought it was a good word to use to refer to a situation or
structure that “affords” a possibility for action.

You may be able to find the word "afford". It has a lot of different

meanings, but the meaning from which I derive “affordance” is based
on the meaning that you can get from understanding “The open door
affords entrance to the room” and “the bridge affords a way of
crossing the river”. The fact that the door is open allows you to
enter the room. The fact that the bridge is there allows you to
cross the river.

Gibson used the term "affordance" in the sense that a particular

sensory pattern “affords” a particular perception; to Gibson the
perception is the “affordance” of that pattern. The problem for Bill
and Kent is that the implication of Gibson’s usage is that a
particular sensory pattern allows only one possible perception. I
don’t know whether they are right, but it’s not true when you use
“affordance” as a noun meaning “something that allows one to perform
a particular action”. The fact that the bridge affords a way of
crossing the river doesn’t mean that this is the only thing it
allows: “Sur le Pont d’Avignon, l’on y danser” (or something like
that – my French is very rusty, and the bridge at Avignon doesn’t
actually afford you a way of crossing the river because it is
broken).

You ask about the relation of "affordance" to "stabilization of

environmental variable". If an environmental affordance permits a
way of doing something, PCT says that a “way of doing something” is
behaviour that is control of a perceptual variable. Control means
stabilization (even though what is stabilized may be a rate of
change or an acceleration). The affordance allows a particular way
of acting to control that perceptual variable. So an affordance
forms at least part of an environmental feedback pathway that could
be used in controlling a perceptual variable. Controlling a
perceptual variable usually implies that some environmental variable
is also stabilized, so you could say that an affordance is a means
that could be used to stabilize an environmental variable.

There's another sense in which "affordance" is related to

stabilization of environmental variables, and that is the inverse of
the sense I just described. Suppose you are trying to control some
perceptual variable, but are unable to do so. You reorganize until
you find an affordance that allows you to act to control that
variable. If the environment is stable, the resulting organization
will probably stick around, but if the environment is not stable,
quite probably the next time you try that action in controlling that
variable, it won’t work, and you will have to reorganize some more.
So, if someone else is stabilizing something you use as an
affordance, you can rely on your actions continuing to work.

What Kent showed is that if a lot of people are stabilizing a number

of variables, those variables will probably be more stable than they
would be if only one person was stabilizing them. This implies that
what I call “network stabilized” variables can become part of
various environmental feedback pathways that continue to work, even
if one or more of the people who were controlling them stop their
control behaviour. The further implication is that the control loops
that use these network stabilized affordances can become parts of
more elaborate control structures within an individual. To put it in
everyday language, if you behave in a way appropriate to your
culture, you are likely to get along pretty well.

  So can you explain to me what's the difference if I say that with

collective control process we “stabilize” some environmental
variable (bridge, road, swimming-pool) as Kent said or what does
it mean that with collective control we “make” an affordance
(bridge, road) ?

Both are correct, I think. Which way you look at it depends on your

point of view. If you are wanting to cross the river, you are making
the affordance. If you are wanting to construct something, you are
stabilizing your perceptions of your environment.

  Did I

understood right the meanning of affordance as “something that
people can control in environment” ? Maybe something like
posibility for perceptual control ? Or does both have some other
meanning ?

I rely on the idea "it's all perception". There may or may not be

real structures in the environment corresponding to any particular
perception. If I’m in the desert and want a drink, I may see a lake
in front of me. That’s a real perception, but it may not correspond
to a lake from which I could get water. It might be a mirage. It’s a
perceived affordance for controlling the perception of thirst, but
when you come to use that perceived affordance, it doesn’t work.
Basically, that’s how one tests the reality of one’s perceptions.

An affordance is a perception, controllable like any other. If I

want to see a way of crossing a stream without getting wet, and do
not see any way of doing so, I have an error in a controlled
perception. I don’t perceive an affordance when I have a reference
to perceive one. Now I see a strong plank lying by the stream bank
and lay it across the stream, and when it has been placed, I do
perceive an affordance for crossing the stream. I have effectively
removed the error in the perception, by controlling the perception
of the affordance. I had a reference value “affordance exists” and a
perceived state “does not exist”, which I have changed by my
actions.

So yes, "affordance" implies "possibility for perceptual control",

and it is a “perception that people can control by acting in the
environment.”

---------end quote---------

Back to commenting on BP.
  Of course I understand the informal colloquial

intent in this way of speaking, and that the customary meaning of
a
transitive verb is not really what you intend, but that’s of no
use in a
scientific discussion. In a scientific discussion, I want the
words to
refer to reliable, agreed-upon, unambiguous, literal meanings.

Yes, as do I. I think I have explained "affordance" in a reliable,

could-be-agreed-upon, unambiguous way.

But I do not accept that there exist words with "literal meanings".

Instead, I agree with what you said, both about “affordances” and
about “meanings”: “BP: I don’t think that objects “have” affordances
any more than
words “have” meanings.” No, objects don’t have affordances. People
perceive affordances. Words don’t have meanings (as this thread
shows most clearly). People perceive meanings in the words (both
when writing them and when reading them).

  If you

want to say in a technical discussion that a lake can afford
something,
you should be prepared to discuss the mechanisms by which it can
do that,
and what determines the things it can afford.

Sure. If a person perceives that the frozen lake affords something,

and tries to control some perception using that affordance, either
the feedback path will influence the controlled perception
appropriately or it won’t. If it won’t, the perceived affordance may
well have been illusory. The ice may not have been thick enough to
skate on. What determines the things the frozen lake can afford is
the set of all perceptions that any person might control using the
frozen lake. I would hate to try to enumerate that set!

  If your intent is not to

have a technical discussion that’s to be taken seriously, you
should say
so. It’s OK with me but I like to know the context in which I
speak.

I hope your intent is not to dismiss as not to be taken seriously my

efforts in that direction. I need to use the concept of “affordance”
in technical discussion, especially (now) in the context of Kent’s
work. Your comments are unhelpful in this.

  In science, I think we are supposed to take words

literally, and if there
isn’t a word with the literal meaning we want, we make one up, and
then
have to explain it to everyone.

I have tried to do that with "affordance". Although I didn't

actually make it up, it is not in my biggest dictionary and has no
everyday meaning, which is more than I can say for most of the words
used technically in PCT in senses related to but different from
their everyday meanings. I have followed your instructions above,
but you refuse my explanations and definition of “affordance”. Where
does that leave us?

  The word you're looking for in place of

affordance is property.

"Property" would have to be redefined if it were to be used in the

restricted sense of affordance. It is true that all properties are
perceptions, as are all affordances. It may be true that there
exists some perceptual variable for the control of which any
perceived property could become an affordance. But until a
perception is specified for which the environmental feedback path
could use the value of that property, the property is not an
affordance.

   The properties of an environmental

feedback function determine how acting through it will affect
other
variables.

This is true. Those properties determine the set of perceptions for

whose control they could become affordances.

      MMT: But the word

is commonly
used in similar situations. Why not use it in a closely
related technical
sense within PCT, just as “perception” is used in a technical
sense in PCT rather more different from its sense in everyday
speech?

  BP: We've had this argument over and over for years. Why be fussy

about
what is meant by “control?” Why be fussy about whether
“disturbance” refers to the cause or the effect?

Interesting. You take my side and yet you seem to be trying to argue

against me. I am being fussy about what is meant by “affordance”,
and I take the technical use of the everyday word “perception” to
illustrate the need sometimes to use a familiar word in a precise,
technical sense. What is to argue about in respect of the (not
everyday) word “affordance”, except that you don’t want to use
“affordance” in a technical sense because you have some personal
connotation for its root word “afford”. Why be fussy, indeed!
Because I must be fussy if I want to argue technically.

  Why be fussy

about words at all? My answer has always been “For clarity of
communication; to eliminate ambiguity; to reason consistently.”

Yes. Accept it.
      I don't really care

what word
you use as a substitute for “feature of the environment that
could
form part of an environmental feedback path for some
perception”,
but I don’t want to keep using that long phrase whenever I
talk about the
possibilities the environment affords for control. If you come
up with a
word I think easier to remember, that has better connotations
for you,
I’ll try to use it. Until then, I’ll stick with talking about
the
controllable perception of “environmental
affordance”.

  BP: Fine. The word I want to use is "property."
Fine, but if you want to use the word "property" to refer only to

what I have been calling “affordance”, we would then have to be
fussy about using “property”, and say that when we perceive
something to be “red” we would not necessarily be talking about
perceiving a “property” of the object. And you would have to explain
to everyone who uses it in its current sense why you were now using
“property” in this specialized sense. I think that would cause more
confusion than introducing to PCT a word that is not even in the big
Oxford Dictionary (compact edition).

I'd be quite happy to have a different neologism, if it really pains

you so badly to use the obvious word in its defined technical sense.
How about “viamode”, “transperty”, “possiway”, (if I knew Greek I
might think of better suggestions, but I don’t). The only thing I
insist on is that I don’t want to keep using a complex line of text
to refer to the simple concept that I like to call “affordance”.

Martin

From Bill Powers (2010.11.16.0845 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.11.15.23.06 –

SO: affordance is the perception (whether veridical or not) that
something is a means by which control can be exerted. If everyone adopted
that meaning as a noun, and if we avoided verbifying it or otherwise
attributing it to an object as a property, there would be no problem.
Unfortunately, Gibson quite literally treated it as a property of an
object, saying that objects tell us the uses to which they could be put
(“It’s in the light!”), so the people who adopted his views
will be using affordance with a different meaning. That is one reason I
don’t plan to use it. I don’t want to be mistaken for a Gibson
fan.

Another reason is that we do not have to perceive the environmental
feedback function through which we control any given perception, and in
fact I think we seldom do. Mostly we set reference levels for perceived
actions (often involving objects like a hammer, but not their properties)
which we have learned will have the effect of controlling another
perception, with no perception at all of exactly (or even approximately)
how varying one perception in a certain way causes another one to vary.
In fact the idea that we have to know the properties of “the
plant” in order to control its perceived states is the mistaken
thesis of Modern Control Theory. One can control that way, but doing so
is slow and inexact in comparison with feedback control, which can
quickly reduce errors to the limit of measurement.

There is a sense in which the term affordance can be used that is
probably not objectionable (I trust that you understand I know that terms
are not objectionable in themselves). When I walk through a hardware
store, I keep an eye out for objects that look as if they might be useful
for some purpose of mine, especially if I’m in the middle of designing or
planning some project. It’s not that I perceive the environmental
feedback function in all its kinematic and dynamic detail; I just imagine
using the thingie to accomplish something, and have an impression that it
would or wouldn’t work. I find it easy to say all that without using the
terms affordance or afford, but perhaps you don’t, or perhaps you see
something that is left out in my way of speaking. I do have drawer full
of things I thought I would be useful but weren’t, but that’s
life.

Understand, if you say that stepping-stones afford a way of crossing a
brook, I will know that you don’t mean that the stones are actually doing
the affording, even though you’re using the same sentence structure
people use when saying things like “Ferris wheels scare me” or
“That music is thrilling.” I can recognize when you’re speaking
metaphorically, or since you say all language is metaphorical, more
metaphorically than usual. In nontechnical settings I speak
metaphorically, too. But this translation has disadvantages aside from
being an extra step in communication; I can assume you’re speaking
metaphorically when you’re not, and vice versa. If I say you’re giving me
a pain, I may mean you’re standing on my foot. Or if you take me
literally, you may miss the metaphorical message.

I think we can call a truce; you use affordance as you see fit, and I
will translate as required. But I still think that “affordance”
is, like “usefulness,” a metaphor that is in many circumstances
not very useful.

Best,

Bill P.

···

At 12:28 AM 11/16/2010 -0500, Martin Taylor wrote:

[Martin Taylor
2010.11.15.23.06[

[From Bill Powers
(2010.11.14.1600 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.11.14.10.50 –

An open door affords access to a room.

BP: How does it do that?

By being perceived as affording that possibility, by someone who might at
some point want to enter the room.

MMT: A well frozen lake affords
the opportunity to go skating.

BP: How does it do that?

By being perceived by someone as affording that opportunity.

Understand that I’m trying to
discuss this on a technical, denotative level of discourse. You say that
a door can do something, a lake can do something, something called
“affording.”

What I don’t understand is why you have this notion in your head (as does
Kent and Kenny) that there is something active about
“affording”, while I don’t and never have had that notion. Have
you ever heard someone say “I afford you this gift” or even
“I afford you this way to do X”. I don’t think so – at least I
never have. One uses the word only when the grammatical subject is a
pragmatically passive object or pattern (like “open”) that can
be used. It would be interesting to know whether this is a difference
between US and UK or Canadian language. It seems extraordinarily strange
to me that you think of affording as “doing something”. But you
do say you think of it that way, so there’s a problem with the
word.

I’m going to quote here from a message I wrote off-line to another CSGnet
reader who couldn’t find “affordance” in a dictionary and
wanted an explanation (I have slightly edited the message for form, not
for content).

--------quote-------

Can you help me understand word affordance in relation to for ex.
“stabilization of environmental variable”.

Affordance is a word invented by J.J.Gibson, I suppose in the 1950’s. I’m
not surprised you couldn’t find it in your dictionaries. It isn’t in my
big Oxford English Dictionary, though it should be. I thought it was a
good word to use to refer to a situation or structure that
“affords” a possibility for action.

You may be able to find the word “afford”. It has a lot of
different meanings, but the meaning from which I derive
“affordance” is based on the meaning that you can get from
understanding “The open door affords entrance to the room” and
“the bridge affords a way of crossing the river”. The fact that
the door is open allows you to enter the room. The fact that the bridge
is there allows you to cross the river.

Gibson used the term “affordance” in the sense that a
particular sensory pattern “affords” a particular perception;
to Gibson the perception is the “affordance” of that pattern.
The problem for Bill and Kent is that the implication of Gibson’s usage
is that a particular sensory pattern allows only one possible perception.
I don’t know whether they are right, but it’s not true when you use
“affordance” as a noun meaning “something that allows one
to perform a particular action”. The fact that the bridge affords a
way of crossing the river doesn’t mean that this is the only thing it
allows: “Sur le Pont d’Avignon, l’on y danser” (or something
like that – my French is very rusty, and the bridge at Avignon doesn’t
actually afford you a way of crossing the river because it is broken).

You ask about the relation of “affordance” to
“stabilization of environmental variable”. If an environmental
affordance permits a way of doing something, PCT says that a “way of
doing something” is behaviour that is control of a perceptual
variable. Control means stabilization (even though what is stabilized may
be a rate of change or an acceleration). The affordance allows a
particular way of acting to control that perceptual variable. So an
affordance forms at least part of an environmental feedback pathway that
could be used in controlling a perceptual variable. Controlling a
perceptual variable usually implies that some environmental variable is
also stabilized, so you could say that an affordance is a means that
could be used to stabilize an environmental variable.

There’s another sense in which “affordance” is related to
stabilization of environmental variables, and that is the inverse of the
sense I just described. Suppose you are trying to control some perceptual
variable, but are unable to do so. You reorganize until you find an
affordance that allows you to act to control that variable. If the
environment is stable, the resulting organization will probably stick
around, but if the environment is not stable, quite probably the next
time you try that action in controlling that variable, it won’t work, and
you will have to reorganize some more. So, if someone else is stabilizing
something you use as an affordance, you can rely on your actions
continuing to work.

What Kent showed is that if a lot of people are stabilizing a number of
variables, those variables will probably be more stable than they would
be if only one person was stabilizing them. This implies that what I call
“network stabilized” variables can become part of various
environmental feedback pathways that continue to work, even if one or
more of the people who were controlling them stop their control
behaviour. The further implication is that the control loops that use
these network stabilized affordances can become parts of more elaborate
control structures within an individual. To put it in everyday language,
if you behave in a way appropriate to your culture, you are likely to get
along pretty well.

So can you explain to me what’s the difference if I say that with
collective control process we “stabilize” some environmental
variable (bridge, road, swimming-pool) as Kent said or what does it mean
that with collective control we “make” an affordance (bridge,
road) ?

Both are correct, I think. Which way you look at it depends on your point
of view. If you are wanting to cross the river, you are making the
affordance. If you are wanting to construct something, you are
stabilizing your perceptions of your environment.

Did I understood right the
meanning of affordance as “something that people can control in
environment” ? Maybe something like posibility for perceptual
control ? Or does both have some other meanning ?

I rely on the idea “it’s all perception”. There
may or may not be real structures in the environment corresponding to any
particular perception. If I’m in the desert and want a drink, I may see a
lake in front of me. That’s a real perception, but it may not correspond
to a lake from which I could get water. It might be a mirage. It’s a
perceived affordance for controlling the perception of thirst, but when
you come to use that perceived affordance, it doesn’t work. Basically,
that’s how one tests the reality of one’s perceptions.

An affordance is a perception, controllable like any other. If I want to
see a way of crossing a stream without getting wet, and do not see any
way of doing so, I have an error in a controlled perception. I don’t
perceive an affordance when I have a reference to perceive one. Now I see
a strong plank lying by the stream bank and lay it across the stream, and
when it has been placed, I do perceive an affordance for crossing the
stream. I have effectively removed the error in the perception, by
controlling the perception of the affordance. I had a reference value
“affordance exists” and a perceived state “does not
exist”, which I have changed by my actions.

So yes, “affordance” implies “possibility for perceptual
control”, and it is a “perception that people can control by
acting in the environment.”

---------end quote---------

Back to commenting on BP.

Of course I understand the
informal colloquial intent in this way of speaking, and that the
customary meaning of a transitive verb is not really what you intend, but
that’s of no use in a scientific discussion. In a scientific discussion,
I want the words to refer to reliable, agreed-upon, unambiguous, literal
meanings.

Yes, as do I. I think I have explained “affordance” in a
reliable, could-be-agreed-upon, unambiguous way.

But I do not accept that there exist words with “literal
meanings”. Instead, I agree with what you said, both about
“affordances” and about “meanings”: “BP: I don’t
think that objects “have” affordances any more than words
“have” meanings.” No, objects don’t have affordances.
People perceive affordances. Words don’t have meanings (as this thread
shows most clearly). People perceive meanings in the words (both when
writing them and when reading them).

If you want to say in a
technical discussion that a lake can afford something, you should be
prepared to discuss the mechanisms by which it can do that, and what
determines the things it can afford.

Sure. If a person perceives that the frozen lake affords something, and
tries to control some perception using that affordance, either the
feedback path will influence the controlled perception appropriately or
it won’t. If it won’t, the perceived affordance may well have been
illusory. The ice may not have been thick enough to skate on. What
determines the things the frozen lake can afford is the set of all
perceptions that any person might control using the frozen lake. I would
hate to try to enumerate that set!

If your intent is not to have a
technical discussion that’s to be taken seriously, you should say so.
It’s OK with me but I like to know the context in which I
speak.

I hope your intent is not to dismiss as not to be taken seriously my
efforts in that direction. I need to use the concept of
“affordance” in technical discussion, especially (now) in the
context of Kent’s work. Your comments are unhelpful in this.

In science, I think we are
supposed to take words literally, and if there isn’t a word with the
literal meaning we want, we make one up, and then have to explain it to
everyone.

I have tried to do that with “affordance”. Although I didn’t
actually make it up, it is not in my biggest dictionary and has no
everyday meaning, which is more than I can say for most of the words used
technically in PCT in senses related to but different from their everyday
meanings. I have followed your instructions above, but you refuse my
explanations and definition of “affordance”. Where does that
leave us?

The word you’re looking for in
place of affordance is property.

“Property” would have to be redefined if it were to be used in
the restricted sense of affordance. It is true that all properties are
perceptions, as are all affordances. It may be true that there exists
some perceptual variable for the control of which any perceived property
could become an affordance. But until a perception is specified for which
the environmental feedback path could use the value of that property, the
property is not an affordance.

The properties of an
environmental feedback function determine how acting through it will
affect other variables.

This is true. Those properties determine the set of perceptions for whose
control they could become affordances.

MMT: But the word is commonly
used in similar situations. Why not use it in a closely related technical
sense within PCT, just as “perception” is used in a technical
sense in PCT rather more different from its sense in everyday
speech?

BP: We’ve had this argument over and over for years. Why be fussy about
what is meant by “control?” Why be fussy about whether
“disturbance” refers to the cause or the effect?

Interesting. You take my side and yet you seem to be trying to argue
against me. I am being fussy about what is meant by
“affordance”, and I take the technical use of the everyday word
“perception” to illustrate the need sometimes to use a familiar
word in a precise, technical sense. What is to argue about in respect of
the (not everyday) word “affordance”, except that you don’t
want to use “affordance” in a technical sense because you have
some personal connotation for its root word “afford”. Why be
fussy, indeed! Because I must be fussy if I want to argue
technically.

Why be fussy about words at all?
My answer has always been “For clarity of communication; to
eliminate ambiguity; to reason consistently.”

Yes. Accept it.

I don’t really care what word
you use as a substitute for “feature of the environment that could
form part of an environmental feedback path for some perception”,
but I don’t want to keep using that long phrase whenever I talk about the
possibilities the environment affords for control. If you come up with a
word I think easier to remember, that has better connotations for you,
I’ll try to use it. Until then, I’ll stick with talking about the
controllable perception of “environmental
affordance”.

BP: Fine. The word I want to use is
“property.”

Fine, but if you want to use the word “property” to refer only
to what I have been calling “affordance”, we would then have to
be fussy about using “property”, and say that when we perceive
something to be “red” we would not necessarily be talking about
perceiving a “property” of the object. And you would have to
explain to everyone who uses it in its current sense why you were now
using “property” in this specialized sense. I think that would
cause more confusion than introducing to PCT a word that is not even in
the big Oxford Dictionary (compact edition).

I’d be quite happy to have a different neologism, if it really pains you
so badly to use the obvious word in its defined technical sense. How
about “viamode”, “transperty”, “possiway”,
(if I knew Greek I might think of better suggestions, but I don’t). The
only thing I insist on is that I don’t want to keep using a complex line
of text to refer to the simple concept that I like to call
“affordance”.

Martin