# Collective Control:

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644>\
**Category:** CSG2018\
**Created:** [November 13, 2018, 3:44pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644 "2018-11-13T15:44:36Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 14\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ee7513/32.png) [@MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/MartinT)\
**Post date:** [November 13, 2018, 3:44pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/1 "2018-11-13T15:44:36Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.09.54]

> [Rick Marken 2018-11-12\_17:38:41]

> 

> …

> 

> ```
> RM: What these
> 
> ```
> 
> different examples of “collective control” have in common  
> is that they refer to controlling that involves two or  
> more organisms (controllers) controlling in a way such  
> that the controlling done by each  
> organisms may influence the  
> controlling done by the others. I think that’s all that  
> “collective control” should mean. All the different ways  
> such collective control can happen must be studied  
> individually.

> 

> …

```
That's certainly a novel interpretation of "collective control",

```

different from any I have heard before. Hitherto, I have understood  
“collective control” to occur when the actions of more than one  
control unit have an effect on an environmental variable, and on  
each other only through their separate perceptions of the  
environmental variable that is under collective control. The word  
“collective” in that interpretation comes from the fact that more  
than one control unit is involved, while the word “control” comes  
from the fact that an observer of (or an experimenter using the TCV  
on) the environment variable cannot distinguish between that  
variable being influenced by one control unit or by the combined  
effects of many.

```
Remembering that the Powers "neural current" is an arbitrary

```

conceptual combination of the firings of many individual neurons,  
and that more than one muscle is involved any time we act on the  
external environment, it is clear that ALL control is collective  
control, whether the collective is contained within one body or  
many.

```
Elsewhere in his message, Rick asks for examples of collective

```

control other than a simulated conflict. Here’s one that does not  
involve conflict. Henry and Joan want to set up a pole. They have a  
common reference to perceive the pole standing erect with its base  
stuck into the ground. Henry says to Joan “You hold the pole and I  
will pound it in with the mallet.” Each of them perceives the pole  
position to come to its reference state, without conflict. Neither  
would have been able to achieve the desired result without the  
other.

```
This example satisfies Rick's definition as well as the standard

```

definition of “collective control”, I suppose, because Joan would  
not have held the pole if she did not perceive that Henry would hit  
it, and Henry would not have picked up the mallet unless Joan held  
the pole. They did directly influence each other’s controlling, but  
not during the actual process of erecting the pole.

```
Another example of collective control without conflict occurs when a

```

committee unanimously agrees on some course of action to achieve a  
goal all have as a reference value.

```
I don't think there's much reason to belabour the point further,

```

because the issue seems to be not whether this kind of effect occurs  
when many control systems act on the same environmental degrees of  
freedom, but whether “collective control” means something quite  
different, the influence one controller has on another. These  
cross-influences can and do happen, creating all sorts of feedback  
loops both positive and negative. The question, as so often is the  
case on CSGnet, is how best to use the term “collective control”,  
one or the other exclusively (and which?) or both, with the  
distinction being context dependent. My preference is to use it  
exclusively for the influence of many control systems that makes it  
look to an observer or experimenter as though the variable is under  
the influence of a single control unit.

```
Martin

```

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [November 13, 2018, 8:28pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/2 "2018-11-13T20:28:02Z")

</div>

[Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_12:27:56]

> [Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.09.54]

> > ```
> > RM: What these
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > different examples of “collective control” have in common  
> > is that they refer to controlling that involves two or  
> > more organisms (controllers) controlling in a way such  
> > that the controlling done by each  
> > organisms may influence the  
> > controlling done by the others. I think that’s all that  
> > “collective control” should mean. All the different ways  
> > such collective control can happen must be studied  
> > individually. Â

> ```
> MT: That's certainly a novel interpretation of "collective control",
> 
> ```
> 
> different from any I have heard before.

RM: I think of it as a possible definition rather than an interpretation.Â

Â

> ```
> MT: Hitherto, I have understood
> 
> ```
> 
> “collective control” to occur when the actions of more than one  
> control unit have an effect on an environmental variable, and on  
> each other only through their separate perceptions of the  
> environmental variable that is under collective control.

RM: I don’t care for this definition for several reasons but 'twil serve.

Â

> ```
> MT: Remembering that the Powers "neural current" is an arbitrary
> 
> ```
> 
> conceptual combination of the firings of many individual neurons,  
> and that more than one muscle is involved any time we act on the  
> external environment, it is clear that ALL control is collective  
> control, whether the collective is contained within one body or  
> many.

RM: I think it’s better to reserve the term “collective” to refer to the controlling done by control systems that exist in independent organisms. Otherwise behavior like that in Marken,  
R. S. (1986) Perceptual Organization of Behavior: A Hierarchical Control Model of Coordinated Action. _Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human  
Perception & Performance,_ 12, 67 - 76, where one person controls two variables simultaneously to achieve a higher level goal, would qualify as a study of “collective control” as much as would Tom Bourbon’s versions of this study where two separate people cooperatively control the two variables to achieve the higher level goal.Â

> ```
> MT: Elsewhere in his message, Rick asks for examples of collective
> 
> ```
> 
> control other than a simulated conflict.

RM: I think you misunderstood what I was asking for. I can think of plenty of examples of “collective control” that don’t involve conflict. What I want is an example of collective control of the type demonstrated in Kent’s simulations, where two or more separate controllers control the same variable relative to different references, keeping it n a virtual reference state, protected from disturbance.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

> **···**
>
> > ```
> > I don't think there's much reason to belabour the point further,
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > because the issue seems to be not whether this kind of effect occurs  
> > when many control systems act on the same environmental degrees of  
> > freedom, but whether “collective control” means something quite  
> > different, the influence one controller has on another. These  
> > cross-influences can and do happen, creating all sorts of feedback  
> > loops both positive and negative. The question, as so often is the  
> > case on CSGnet, is how best to use the term “collective control”,  
> > one or the other exclusively (and which?) or both, with the  
> > distinction being context dependent. My preference is to use it  
> > exclusively for the influence of many control systems that makes it  
> > look to an observer or experimenter as though the variable is under  
> > the influence of a single control unit.
> > 
> > ```
> > Martin
> > 
> > ```
> 
> –  
> Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> "Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you  
> have nothing left to take away.�  
> Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ee7513/32.png) [@MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/MartinT)\
**Post date:** [November 13, 2018, 10:42pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/3 "2018-11-13T22:42:51Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.17.32]

> [Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_12:27:56]

> > [Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.09.54]

> > …

> > ```
> > MT: Elsewhere in his
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > message, Rick asks for examples of collective control  
> > other than a simulated conflict.

> 

> ```
> RM: I think you misunderstood what I was asking for. I
> 
> ```
> 
> can think of plenty of examples of “collective control” that  
> don’t involve conflict. What I want is an example of  
> collective control of the type demonstrated in Kent’s  
> simulations, where two or more separate controllers control  
> the same variable relative to different references, keeping  
> it n a virtual reference state, protected from disturbance.

```
Sorry, and yes, I did misunderstand. And for a real-world example of

```

that, I think you could use a pretty good proportion of unresolved  
political conflicts (I exclude ones like the Israeli-Palestinian  
conflict over who has the right to live in a certain land area,  
where one side has overwhelming force. I might also think of an  
internal conflict such as trying to control one’s perception of a  
piece of one’s garden as being both a patch of roses and a bed of  
cabbages, while it continues to be a simple stretch of lawn…

```
By the way, I don't think there is a good rationale for saying that

```

conflict between independent controllers in a single body is in  
principle any different between a conflict between control units in  
separate bodies. In each case there is a single degree of freedom at  
issue, and you can get the virtual control situation described by  
Kent (and Professor Higgins in “My Fair Lady”, who, if I remember  
rightly, had the line “and rather than do either, we do something  
that neither wants at all.”)

```
Martin

```

> **···**
>
> > 
> 
> > BestÂ
> 
> > 
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > Â
> 
> > > ```
> > > I don't think there's
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > much reason to belabour the point further, because the  
> > > issue seems to be not whether this kind of effect occurs  
> > > when many control systems act on the same environmental  
> > > degrees of freedom, but whether “collective control” means  
> > > something quite different, the influence one controller  
> > > has on another. These cross-influences can and do happen,  
> > > creating all sorts of feedback loops both positive and  
> > > negative. The question, as so often is the case on CSGnet,  
> > > is how best to use the term “collective control”, one or  
> > > the other exclusively (and which?) or both, with the  
> > > distinction being context dependent. My preference is to  
> > > use it exclusively for the influence of many control  
> > > systems that makes it look to an observer or experimenter  
> > > as though the variable is under the influence of a single  
> > > control unit.
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > Martin
> > > 
> > > ```
> 
> > 
> 
> > –  
> > Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> > ```
> > "Perfection
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > is achieved not when you have  
> > nothing more to add, but when you  
> > have  
> > nothing left to take away.�  
> > Â Â Â Â  
> > Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â --Antoine de  
> > Saint-Exupery

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [November 14, 2018, 3:17am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/4 "2018-11-14T03:17:15Z")

</div>

[Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_19:15:51]

> [Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.17.32]

> > ```
> > RM:...What I want is an example of
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > collective control of the type demonstrated in Kent’s  
> > simulations, where two or more separate controllers control  
> > the same variable relative to different references, keeping  
> > it n a virtual reference state, protected from disturbance.

> ```
> MT: ...And for a real-world example of
> 
> ```
> 
> that, I think you could use a pretty good proportion of unresolved  
> political conflicts

 RM: Please be more specific. Say who the different controllers are and what the variable is that is being maintained in a virtual reference state. But these conflicts don’t seem to be good examples of social stability; they are always on the cusp of violence.

> ```
> MT: (I exclude ones like the Israeli-Palestinian
> 
> ```
> 
> conflict over who has the right to live in a certain land area,  
> where one side has overwhelming force.

RM: I agree that Kent’s model doesn’t work for that one for the reason you give: the land is not being kept in a virtual reference state (which I suppose would be a state where all the land was equally occupied by both Israeli and Palestinian forces) but, rather, in the reference state desired by the Israelis – completely occupied (under the control of) Israel.Â

Â

> ```
> MT: By the way, I don't think there is a good rationale for saying that
> 
> ```
> 
> conflict between independent controllers in a single body is in  
> principle any different between a conflict between control units in  
> separate bodies.

RM: The conflicts are not different “in principle”, the principle being that both conflicts are a result of two (or more) systems having different references for the same (or a similar) perceptual variable. But I think there is a good rational for saying that there is an important difference between conflict (or cooperation) in these two cases. When the systems are in the same body, the references creating the conflict (or cooperation) are presumably determined by other systems within that body; but when the systems are in different bodies, the references creating the conflict (or cooperation) are in two separate bodies. I think this makes the “separate bodies” case quite different than the “same body” case. And I think the study of “collective control” is, indeed, a special instance of multiple control systems and deserves to be treated as a special application of perceptual control. I think “collective control” is a good name for that application of PCT, but as a description of the general phenomenon to be explained – controlling accomplished by control systems in separate individuals – rather than as an explanation itself.Â

BestÂ

Rick

> **···**
>
> > ```
> > In each case there is a single degree of freedom at
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > issue, and you can get the virtual control situation described by  
> > Kent (and Professor Higgins in “My Fair Lady”, who, if I remember  
> > rightly, had the line “and rather than do either, we do something  
> > that neither wants at all.”)
> 
> > ```
> > Martin
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > >
> 
> > > BestÂ
> 
> > >
> 
> > > Rick
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > > > ```
> > > > I don't think there's
> > > > 
> > > > ```
> > > > 
> > > > much reason to belabour the point further, because the  
> > > > issue seems to be not whether this kind of effect occurs  
> > > > when many control systems act on the same environmental  
> > > > degrees of freedom, but whether “collective control” means  
> > > > something quite different, the influence one controller  
> > > > has on another. These cross-influences can and do happen,  
> > > > creating all sorts of feedback loops both positive and  
> > > > negative. The question, as so often is the case on CSGnet,  
> > > > is how best to use the term “collective control”, one or  
> > > > the other exclusively (and which?) or both, with the  
> > > > distinction being context dependent. My preference is to  
> > > > use it exclusively for the influence of many control  
> > > > systems that makes it look to an observer or experimenter  
> > > > as though the variable is under the influence of a single  
> > > > control unit.
> > > > 
> > > > ```
> > > > Martin
> > > > 
> > > > ```
> 
> > >
> 
> > > –  
> > > Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> > > ```
> > > "Perfection
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > is achieved not when you have  
> > > nothing more to add, but when you  
> > > have  
> > > nothing left to take away.�  
> > > Â Â Â Â  
> > > Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â --Antoine de  
> > > Saint-Exupery
> 
> > 
> 
> –  
> Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> "Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you  
> have nothing left to take away.�  
> Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [November 17, 2018, 9:18am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/5 "2018-11-17T09:18:39Z")

</div>

Rick

![image002109.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/d0c828c0981f50f8c54499d8d0ea0a9eee2b36dc.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> **From:** Richard Marken ([rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com) via csgnet Mailing List) [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu)  
> **Sent:** Wednesday, November 14, 2018 4:17 AM  
> **To:** csgnet [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu)  
> **Subject:** Re: Collective Control:
> 
> [Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_19:15:51]
> 
> > [Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.17.32]
> 
> > > RM:…What I want is an example of collective control of the type demonstrated in Kent’s simulations, where two or more separate controllers control the same variable relative to different references, keeping it n a virtual reference state, protected from disturbance.
> 
> > MT: …And for a real-world example of that, I think you could use a pretty good proportion of unresolved political conflicts
> 
> RM: Please be more specific. Say who the different controllers are and what the variable is that is being maintained in a virtual reference state. But these conflicts don’t seem to be good examples of social stability; they are always on the cusp of violence.
> 
> > MT: (I exclude ones like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over who has the right to live in a certain land area, where one side has overwhelming force.
> 
> RM: I agree that Kent’s model doesn’t work for that one for the reason you give: the land is not being kept in a virtual reference state (which I suppose would be a state where all the land was equally occupied by both Israeli and Palestinian forces) but, rather, in the reference state desired by the Israelis – completely occupied (under the control of) Israel.
> 
> > MT: By the way, I don’t think there is a good rationale for saying that conflict between independent controllers in a single body is in principle any different between a conflict between control units in separate bodies.
> 
> RM: The conflicts are not different “in principle”, the principle being that both conflicts are a result of two (or more) systems having different references for the same (or a similar) perceptual variable. But I think there is a good rational for saying that there is an important difference between conflict (or cooperation) in these two cases. When the systems are in the same body, the references creating the conflict (or cooperation) are presumably determined by other systems within that body;
> 
> HB : So it’s general principle of how organisms function.
> 
> RM : …but when the systems are in different bodies, the references creating the conflict (or cooperation) are in two separate bodies. I think this makes the “separate bodies” case quite different than the “same body” case.
> 
> HB : I agree, that they seems to be different, but stil is “collective control”, because individual LCS (with their nervous system) are doing control in shared environment. So definition of “social collective control” is about how separate organisms control in common environment and how influences all involved. It’s about “intersection of control loops”. Intersection of control loops means in Kents definition, intersection of “effects of output on input”. It’s PCT definition. That’s what “gossamer thread” is about. Effects of control in organisms are done through external environment and “collective effects” of individual control can be considered as “collective control”.
> 
> Kent M :
> 
> …according to the mathematics of the control-system equations that Powers presents (1973a: 84-85), the variable actually stabilized in a control loop is the perceptual signal, which, when the control system is operating normally, is kept nearly equal to the reference signal.
> 
> Powers emphasizes that human organisms can only control their perceptions.
> 
> To understand the sociological implications of this model of human agency as control of perceptions, we need to take a fresh look the relationship between human actors and their environments.
> 
> HB : I understand It says how individual perception is controlled and that sociaological implication means that you have to turn two PCT diagrams (for ex. LCS III) against each other (human agency as control of perception).
> 
> ![cid:image001.jpg@01D37ABE.36063DF0]()
> 
> KM : Suppose feedback loops were visible, like gossamer threads stretching from an individual’s body through objects in the environment and back to the individual’s sense organs.
> 
> HB : Kent is clear that he is using PCT. As I understand what Kent is talking about I see that basic understanding of “gossamer threads” is part of “Control of perception” (see diagram) in the form of simple “feedback function”.
> 
> Bill P (B:CP) :
> 
> FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.
> 
> HB : It’s clear at least to me that Kent is using “actions” and “individual sense organs” to describe how “gossamer thread” works. And it’s in accordance to Bills definition of “feedback function”.
> 
> KM : Each perception that the individual is controlling at a given moment, that is, anything in the individual’s current perceptual world that would prove disturbing if arbitrarily changed or anything the individual is currently using to perform an action, would be the target of a feedback loop
> 
> HB : I understand that “feed-back” loop which is actually representing “control of perception”, and disturbances to that control and performance of action is what “feedback loop” is counteracting.
> 
> KM : Observing an individual in action, we would see an intricate ever-changing web of many thousands of feedback loops, some passing through objects near at hand, like a chair on which the individual sits or computer screen at which the individual gazes.
> 
> HB : I see no problem in Kents view about what control units are controllng and how “intersection” of control loops function. It’s PCT. LCS are controlling inside (perceptual control) and causing effects to environment, where they are “mixing” and are perceived by actors (sense organs) in shared environment and of course controlled as “control of perception”.
> 
> RM : And I think the study of “collective control” is, indeed, a special instance of multiple control systems and deserves to be treated as a special application of perceptual control.
> 
> HB : And how would you treat it differently ? Multiple control system controlling external environment with “Control of behavior” ? “Social collective control” follows the same rules of “perceptual control” in individuals with affecting environment with action and perceiving and thus follows Bills diagrams (LCS III).
> 
> RM : I think “collective control” is a good name for that application of PCT,
> 
> HB : All in all I’m glad Rick that you changed your mind about term “collective control” and that you’ll not demolish your home anymore.
> 
> RM earlier : Feel free to try again if you like but if you do please avoid using the term “collective control” since it elicits in me a strong urge to throw things at the computer screen;-)
> 
> RM : ….but as a description of the general phenomenon to be explained – controlling accomplished by control systems in separate individuals – rather than as an explanation itself.
> 
> HB : It’s interesting that you changed your mind just in right moment and you are not arguing that “people can control each other all the time”. I’m glad for this change. My oppinion is that you are right.
> 
> But as I see it this is the same as Kent is talking about. “Social collective control” is the result of “Perceptual control” in separate organisms and effects to common environment researched.
> 
> KM : To understand the sociological implications of this model of human agency as control of perceptions, we need to take a fresh look the relationship between human actors and their environments.
> 
> HB : Here are some examples from Kents PCT legacy about “relationship between human actors” :
> 
> Kent McClleand (1994) :
> 
> **A PCT Definition of Force**
> 
> In colloquial usage, force refers to physical violence. One person directly interferes with the bodily movements of another in order to prevent the other from acting. Hitting or grabbing another person is usually regarded as an act of force, as isthe use of a weapon to injure the other’s body. From a PCT viewpoint, force has been applied when the other person encounters a disturbance so great as to make him lose control of his own actions. Putting it more generally in PCT terms, and in terms of an interaction between individuals _A_ and _B_, we get this definition:
> 
> _A_ uses force on _B_ when _A_ acts with the intent of creating a disturbance for _B_ which is serious enough to cause _B_ to lose control of one or more of the perceptual variables _B_ is currently controlling.
> 
> **A PCT Definition of Coercion**
> 
> Coercion refers to the threat of force. One person dissuades another from doing something by somehow reminding him of the possibility that force may be used. For example, one might warn off an intruder by assuming a fighting posture or displaying a weapon. Putting it in PCT terms,
> 
> _A_ coerces _B_ by acting to produce a disturbance which _A_ intends _B_ to perceive as initiating a sequence in which _A_’s actions will force _B_ to lose perceptual control of one or more of _B_’s currently operative goals.
> 
> **A PCT Definition of Influence**
> 
> All of three of these strategies are more effective when combined with influence. We say one person has influenced another when the first has been able to tell the second what to think or do. We also describe it as influence when the second person imitates the behavior of the first. A single PCT definition for influence covers both those events.
> 
> _A_ influences _B_ by acting to create a disturbance from which _B_ constructs a reference level for perceptual control of _B_’s own actions.
> 
> Boris
> 
> Best
> 
> Rick
> 
> > In each case there is a single degree of freedom at issue, and you can get the virtual control situation described by Kent (and Professor Higgins in “My Fair Lady”, who, if I remember rightly, had the line “and rather than do either, we do something that neither wants at all.”)
> 
> > Martin
> 
> > > Best
> 
> > > Rick
> 
> > > > I don’t think there’s much reason to belabour the point further, because the issue seems to be not whether this kind of effect occurs when many control systems act on the same environmental degrees of freedom, but whether “collective control” means something quite different, the influence one controller has on another. These cross-influences can and do happen, creating all sorts of feedback loops both positive and negative. The question, as so often is the case on CSGnet, is how best to use the term “collective control”, one or the other exclusively (and which?) or both, with the distinction being context dependent. My preference is to use it exclusively for the influence of many control systems that makes it look to an observer or experimenter as though the variable is under the influence of a single control unit.
> > > > 
> > > > Martin
> 
> > >
> 
> > > –
> 
> > > Richard S. Marken
> 
> > > "Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you  
> > > have nothing left to take away.”  
> > > –Antoine de Saint-Exupery
> 
> –
> 
> Richard S. Marken
> 
> "Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you  
> have nothing left to take away.”  
> –Antoine de Saint-Exupery

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [November 17, 2018, 9:19am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/6 "2018-11-17T09:19:52Z")

</div>

Rick,

why can’t you stick to 99% sure PCT terminology. Why using RCT terminology ? You are deviating again and you done it so good in previous post to Nicholas.

RM: I think you misunderstood what I was asking for. I can think of plenty of examples of “collective control” that don’t involve conflict. What I want is an example of collective control of the type demonstrated in Kent’s simulations, where two or more separate controllers control the same variable relative to different references, keeping it n a virtual reference state, protected from disturbance.

HB : Where do you see in Kents literature that he used “protected from disturbance” ? Anyway I warned you many times not to use something that is almost never used in Bills’ literature.

Boris

> **···**
>
> **From:** Richard Marken ([rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com) via csgnet Mailing List) [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu)  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, November 13, 2018 9:28 PM  
> **To:** csgnet [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu)  
> **Subject:** Re: Collective Control:
> 
> [Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_12:27:56]
> 
> > [Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.09.54]
> 
> > > RM: What these different examples of “collective control” have in common is that they refer to controlling that involves two or more organisms (controllers) controlling in a way such that the controlling done by each organisms may influence the controlling done by the others. I think that’s all that “collective control” should mean. All the different ways such collective control can happen must be studied individually.
> 
> > MT: That’s certainly a novel interpretation of “collective control”, different from any I have heard before.
> 
> RM: I think of it as a possible definition rather than an interpretation.
> 
> > MT: Hitherto, I have understood “collective control” to occur when the actions of more than one control unit have an effect on an environmental variable, and on each other only through their separate perceptions of the environmental variable that is under collective control.
> 
> RM: I don’t care for this definition for several reasons but 'twil serve.
> 
> > MT: Remembering that the Powers “neural current” is an arbitrary conceptual combination of the firings of many individual neurons, and that more than one muscle is involved any time we act on the external environment, it is clear that ALL control is collective control, whether the collective is contained within one body or many.
> 
> RM: I think it’s better to reserve the term “collective” to refer to the controlling done by control systems that exist in independent organisms. Otherwise behavior like that in Marken, R. S. (1986) Perceptual Organization of Behavior: A Hierarchical Control Model of Coordinated Action. _Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance,_ 12, 67 - 76, where one person controls two variables simultaneously to achieve a higher level goal, would qualify as a study of “collective control” as much as would Tom Bourbon’s versions of this study where two separate people cooperatively control the two variables to achieve the higher level goal.
> 
> > MT: Elsewhere in his message, Rick asks for examples of collective control other than a simulated conflict.
> 
> RM: I think you misunderstood what I was asking for. I can think of plenty of examples of “collective control” that don’t involve conflict. What I want is an example of collective control of the type demonstrated in Kent’s simulations, where two or more separate controllers control the same variable relative to different references, keeping it n a virtual reference state, protected from disturbance.
> 
> Best
> 
> Rick
> 
> > I don’t think there’s much reason to belabour the point further, because the issue seems to be not whether this kind of effect occurs when many control systems act on the same environmental degrees of freedom, but whether “collective control” means something quite different, the influence one controller has on another. These cross-influences can and do happen, creating all sorts of feedback loops both positive and negative. The question, as so often is the case on CSGnet, is how best to use the term “collective control”, one or the other exclusively (and which?) or both, with the distinction being context dependent. My preference is to use it exclusively for the influence of many control systems that makes it look to an observer or experimenter as though the variable is under the influence of a single control unit.
> > 
> > Martin
> 
> –
> 
> Richard S. Marken
> 
> "Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you  
> have nothing left to take away.”  
> –Antoine de Saint-Exupery

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [November 17, 2018, 9:47am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/7 "2018-11-17T09:47:47Z")

</div>

Martin

> **···**
>
> **From:** Martin Taylor ([mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net](mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net) via csgnet Mailing List) [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu)  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, November 13, 2018 4:45 PM  
> **To:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** Re: Collective Control:
> 
> [Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.09.54]
> 
> > [Rick Marken 2018-11-12\_17:38:41]
> 
> > …
> 
> > RM: What these different examples of “collective control” have in common is that they refer to controlling that involves two or more organisms (controllers) controlling in a way such that the controlling done by each organisms may influence the controlling done by the others. I think that’s all that “collective control” should mean. All the different ways such collective control can happen must be studied individually.
> 
> > 
> 
> > …
> 
> That’s certainly a novel interpretation of “collective control”, different from any I have heard before. Hitherto, I have understood “collective control” to occur when the actions of more than one control unit have an effect on an environmental variable, and on each other only through their separate perceptions of the environmental variable that is under collective control. The word “collective” in that interpretation comes from the fact that more than one control unit is involved, while the word “control” comes from the fact that an observer of (or an experimenter using the TCV on) the environment variable cannot distinguish between that variable being influenced by one control unit or by the combined effects of many.
> 
> Remembering that the Powers “neural current” is an arbitrary conceptual combination of the firings of many individual neurons, and that more than one muscle is involved any time we act on the external environment, it is clear that ALL control is collective control, whether the collective is contained within one body or many.
> 
> HB : Interesting Martin. I assume this is your original physiological interpretation of collective control. I never thought of it like that as processes in “nerv net” being “collective control”. But it’s more than logical and it can be proved any time with physiological means.
> 
> But we can probably also use Ricks findings, if I understood him right…
> 
> RM : I think “collective control” is a good name for that application of PCT, but as a description of the general phenomenon to be explained – controlling accomplished by control systems…
> 
> HB : I think that we could understand :
> 
> 1. that “control units” function in inner and outer environment “simultaneoulsy”. So it seems to me that Martins statement is a little bit too narrow : “…conceptual combination of the firings of many individual neurons, and that more than one muscle is involved any time we act on the external environment…”.
> 
> 2. And if LCS control inside they can’t be controlled from outside. At least homeostasis (the level of genetic references). So ALL control can’t be collective in the sense that LCS could control other LCS. One thing is control and other thing is “consequences” or “effects” of control.
> 
> 3. “Collective control” in social sense has some other meaning not exactly the same as in the case of “collective control” in nerv net, because it’s describing “collective efects” of control in organisms. But stil the basis is individuals’ inside control as Rick emphasized so by my oppinion it can be termed as “collective control” although we know that “effects of control” are researched.
> 
> So Rick is by my oppinion right about general use of “collective control” : “controlling accomplished by control systems”, and consequenly “collective control effects” among controlling systems are just result of internal control. what at least to me means that we have to consider the whole control of LCS and consequences of that control on environment. Even blind hen happens to find grain.
> 
> But anyway I’ll probably use Martin’s physiological interpretation of basic “collective control” in organism in my writings : “collective control” is an arbitrary conceptual combination of the firings of many individual neurons". No matter which effectors are used. It’s general. So I think that term “collective control” can be used for researching of control in organisms and general characteristics of nervous system also through effects on environment, what I think suits Bills definition of TCV and definition of control :
> 
> Bill P (B:CP) :
> 
> The TCV is method for identifying control organization of nervous system….
> 
> Bill P (B:CP):
> 
> CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.
> 
> Research in PCT is directed to identify “control organization of nervous system”. And the term “collective control” for neurons helps. Shall I put you Martin as an author ? I didn’t find anything similar in Bills literature. I could miss something. But as far as I can see, Bill mostly supported events in nerv net from neurophysiological view and terminology. As I did from physiological.
> 
> Boris
> 
> Elsewhere in his message, Rick asks for examples of collective control other than a simulated conflict. Here’s one that does not involve conflict. Henry and Joan want to set up a pole. They have a common reference to perceive the pole standing erect with its base stuck into the ground. Henry says to Joan “You hold the pole and I will pound it in with the mallet.” Each of them perceives the pole position to come to its reference state, without conflict. Neither would have been able to achieve the desired result without the other.
> 
> This example satisfies Rick’s definition as well as the standard definition of “collective control”, I suppose, because Joan would not have held the pole if she did not perceive that Henry would hit it, and Henry would not have picked up the mallet unless Joan held the pole. They did directly influence each other’s controlling, but not during the actual process of erecting the pole.
> 
> Another example of collective control without conflict occurs when a committee unanimously agrees on some course of action to achieve a goal all have as a reference value.
> 
> I don’t think there’s much reason to belabour the point further, because the issue seems to be not whether this kind of effect occurs when many control systems act on the same environmental degrees of freedom, but whether “collective control” means something quite different, the influence one controller has on another. These cross-influences can and do happen, creating all sorts of feedback loops both positive and negative. The question, as so often is the case on CSGnet, is how best to use the term “collective control”, one or the other exclusively (and which?) or both, with the distinction being context dependent. My preference is to use it exclusively for the influence of many control systems that makes it look to an observer or experimenter as though the variable is under the influence of a single control unit.
> 
> Martin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/bnhpct/32/34_2.png) [@bnhpct](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/bnhpct)\
**Post date:** [November 17, 2018, 2:40pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/8 "2018-11-17T14:40:29Z")

</div>

[Bruce Nevin 2018-11-17\_13:43:45 UTC]

Boris Hartman [no ID tag] Nov 17, 2018, 4:18 AM –

Thank you, Boris, for this collation of excerpts from Kent’s writings about collective control. It’s useful and helps to clarify the terms of the conversation. I’m grateful for it. You have excerpted from his 1994 “Perceptual control and social power” (_Sociological Perspectives_ 37:461-496). Twelve years more recent is his 2006 “Understanding collective control processes” (in McClelland & Fararo, eds., _Purpose, Meaning and Action: Control systems theories in sociology_). I can send you a copy if you don’t have it. And of course we are all waiting for the publication of LCS IV, in which he and Martin both have chapters dealing with collective control.

A comment about one excerpt:

> KM : Each perception that the individual is controlling at a given moment, that is, anything in the individual’s current perceptual world that would prove disturbing if arbitrarily changed or anything the individual is currently using to perform an action, would be the target of a feedback loop

I understand “target of a feedback loop” to mean “controlled variable” (more precisely, a perception of it is the controlled variable), and the things that “the individual is currently using to perform an action” for a current control process are things in the environmental feedback path by which the action effects control. When the individual perceives something as instrumental to their control, that’s a controlled perception: anything that reduces its usefulness is not only a disturbance to control in the main control loop, it is also a disturbance to the perception of the instrumentality of that element of the feedback path.  This is the locus of collective control. Further, if such an instrumentality in the feedback path is not perceived as such, when an influence on it affects control through the main loop, problem-solving control activities result in it becoming a perceived variable subject to control (and collective control).

Thank you, too, Boris, for staying clear of forms of discussion that have made it difficult to see how to respond in any useful way to other posts of yours. By this, I mean ad hominem attacks and an assumption of personal authority to correct, lecture, and ‘warn’ others about perceived transgressions of what might be called terminological puritanism. I appreciate that you have stuck to the subject and helped to advance our understanding of it.

![image002109.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/d0c828c0981f50f8c54499d8d0ea0a9eee2b36dc.jpeg)

![image002109.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/d0c828c0981f50f8c54499d8d0ea0a9eee2b36dc.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> > /Bruce Nevin
> 
> On Sat, Nov 17, 2018 at 4:18 AM “Boris Hartman” [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu) wrote:
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > Â
> 
> > **From:** Richard Marken ([rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com) via csgnet Mailing List) [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu)  
> > **Sent:** Wednesday, November 14, 2018 4:17 AM  
> > **To:** csgnet [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu)  
> > **Subject:** Re: Collective Control:
> 
> > Â
> 
> > [Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_19:15:51]
> 
> > > [Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.17.32]
> 
> > > > RM:…What I want is an example of collective control of the type demonstrated in Kent’s simulations, where two or more separate controllers control the same variable relative to different references, keeping it n a virtual reference state, protected from disturbance.
> 
> > > MT: …And for a real-world example of that, I think you could use a pretty good proportion of unresolved political conflicts
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â RM: Please be more specific. Say who the different controllers are and what the variable is that is being maintained in a virtual reference state. But these conflicts don’t seem to be good examples of social stability; they are always on the cusp of violence.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > > MT: (I exclude ones like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over who has the right to live in a certain land area, where one side has overwhelming force.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > RM: I agree that Kent’s model doesn’t work for that one for the reason you give: the land is not being kept in a virtual reference state (which I suppose would be a state where all the land was equally occupied by both Israeli and Palestinian forces) but, rather, in the reference state desired by the Israelis – completely occupied (under the control of) Israel.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > > MT: By the way, I don’t think there is a good rationale for saying that conflict between independent controllers in a single body is in principle any different between a conflict between control units in separate bodies.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > RM: The conflicts are not different “in principle”, the principle being that both conflicts are a result of two (or more) systems having different references for the same (or a similar) perceptual variable. But I think there is a good rational for saying that there is an important difference between conflict (or cooperation) in these two cases. When the systems are in the same body, the references creating the conflict (or cooperation) are presumably determined by other systems within that body;
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : So it’s general principle of how organisms function.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > RM : …but when the systems aree in different bodies, the references creating the conflict (or cooperation) are in two separate bodies. I think this makes the “separate bodies” case quite different than the “same body” case.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : I agree, that they seems to be different, but stil is “collective control”, because individual LCS (with their nervous system) are doing control in shared environment. So definition of “social collective control” is about how separate organisms control in common environment and how influences all involved. It’s about “intersection of control loops”. Intersection of control loops means in Kents definition, intersection of “effects of output on input”. It’s PCT definition. That’s what “gossamer thread” is about. Effects of control in organisms are done through external environment and “collective effects” of individual control can be considered as “collective control”.   Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Kent M :
> 
> > …according to the mathematics of the controll-system equations that Powers presents (1973a: 84-85), the variable actually stabilized in a control loop is the perceptual signal, which, when the control system is operating normally, is kept nearly equal to the reference signal.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Powers emphasizes that human organisms can only control their perceptions.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > To understand the sociological implications of this model of human agency as control of perceptions, we need to take a fresh look the relationship between human actors and their environments.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : I understand It says how individual perception is controlled and that sociaological implication means that you have to turn two PCT diagrams (for ex. LCS III) against each other (human agency as control of perception).
> 
> > Â
> 
> > ![cid:image001.jpg@01D37ABE.36063DF0]()
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > KM : Suppose feedback loops were visible, like gossamer threads stretching from an individual’s body through objects in the environment and back to the individual’s sense organs.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : Kent is clear that he is using PCT. As I understand what Kent is talking about I see that basic understanding of “gossamer threads” is part of “Control of perception” (see diagram) in the form of simple “feedback function”.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Bill P (B:CP) :
> 
> > FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : It’s clear at least to me that Kent is using “actions” and “individual sense organs” to describe how “gossamer thread” works. And it’s in accordance to Bills definition of “feedback function”.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > KM : Each perception that the individual is controlling at a given moment, that is, anything in the individual’s current perceptual world that would prove disturbing if arbitrarily changed or anything the individual is currently using to perform an action, would be the target of a feedback loop
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : I understand that “feed-back” loop which is actually representing “control of perception”, and disturbances to that control and performance of action is what “feedback loop” is counteracting.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > KM :Â Observing an individual in action, we would see an intricate ever-changing web of many thousands of feedback loops, some passing through objects near at hand, like a chair on which the individual sits or computer screen at which the individual gazes.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : I see no problem in Kents view about what control units are controllng and how “intersection” of control loops function. It’s PCT. LCS are controlling inside (perceptual control) and causing effects to environment, where they are “mixing” and are perceived by actors (sense organs) in shared environment and of course controlled as “control of perception”.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > RM : And I think the study of “collective control” is, indeed, a special instance of multiple control systems and deserves to be treated as a special application of perceptual control.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : And how would you treat it differently ? Multiple control system controlling external environment with “Control of behavior” ? “Social collective control” follows the same rules of “perceptual control” in individuals with affecting environment with action and perceiving and thus follows Bills diagrams (LCS III).
> 
> > Â
> 
> > RM : I think “collective control” is a good name for that application of PCT,
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : All in all I’m glad Rick that you changed your mind about term “collective control” and that you’ll not demolish your home anymore.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > RM earlier : Feel free to try again if you like but if you do please avoid using the term “collective control” since it elicits in me a strong urge to throw things at the computer screen;-)
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > RM : ….butt as a description of the general phenomenon to be explained – controlling accomplished by control systems in separate individuals – rather than as an explanation itself.Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : It’s interesting that you changed your mind just in right moment and you are not arguing that “people can control each other all the time”. I’m glad for this change. My oppinion is that you are right.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > But as I see it this is the same as Kent is talking about. “Social collective control” is the result of “Perceptual control” in separate organisms and effects to common environment researched.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > KM : To understand the sociological implications of this model of human agency as control of perceptions, we need to take a fresh look the relationship between human actors and their environments.
> 
> > Â
> 
> > HB : Here are some examples from Kents PCT legacy about “relationship between human actors” :
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Kent McClleand (1994) :
> 
> > **A PCT Definition of Force**
> 
> > In colloquial usage, force refers to physical violence. One person directly interferes with the bodily movements of another in order to prevent the other from acting. Hitting or grabbing another person is usually regarded as an act of force, as isthe use of a weapon to injure the other’s body. From a PCT viewpoint, force has been applied when the other person encounters a disturbance so great as to make him lose control of his own actions. Putting it more generally in PCT terms, and in terms of an interaction between individuals _A_ and _B_, we get this definition:
> 
> > _A_ uses force on _B_ when _A_ acts with the intent of creating a disturbance for _B_ which is serious enough to cause _B_ to lose control of one or more of the perceptual variables _B_ is currently controlling.
> 
> > **A PCT Definition of Coercion**
> 
> > Coercion refers to the threat of force. One person dissuades another from doing something by somehow reminding him of the possibility that force may be used. For example, one might warn off an intruder by assuming a fighting posture or displaying a weapon. Putting it in PCT terms,
> 
> > _A_ coerces _B_ by acting to produce a disturbance which _A_ intends _B_ to perceive as initiating a sequence in which _A_’s actions will force _B_ to lose perceptual control of one or more of _B_’s currently operative goals.
> 
> > **A PCT Definition of Influence**
> 
> > All of three of these strategies are more effective when combined with influence. We say one person has influenced another when the first has been able to tell the second what to think or do. We also describe it as influence when the second person imitates the behavior of the first. A single PCT definition for influence covers both those events.
> 
> > _A_ influences _B_ by acting to create a disturbance from which _B_ constructs a reference level for perceptual control of _B_’s own actions.
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > BestÂ
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > Â
> 
> > > In each case there is a single degree of freedom at issue, and you can get the virtual control situation described by Kent (and Professor Higgins in “My Fair Lady”, who, if I remember rightly, had the line “and rather than do either, we do something that neither wants at all.”)
> 
> > > Martin
> 
> > > > Â
> 
> > > > BestÂ
> 
> > > > Â
> 
> > > > Rick
> 
> > > > Â
> 
> > > > > I don’t think there’s much reason to belabour the point further, because the issue seems to be not whether this kind of effect occurs when many control systems act on the same environmental degrees of freedom, but whether “collective control” means something quite different, the influence one controller has on another. These cross-influences can and do happen, creating all sorts of feedback loops both positive and negative. The question, as so often is the case on CSGnet, is how best to use the term “collective control”, one or the other exclusively (and which?) or both, with the distinction being context dependent. My preference is to use it exclusively for the influence of many control systems that makes it look to an observer or experimenter as though the variable is under the influence of a single control unit.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Martin
> 
> > > >
> 
> > > > Â
> 
> > > > –
> 
> > > > Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> > > > "Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you  
> > > > have nothing left to take away.�  
> > > > Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â --Antoine de Saint-Exupery
> 
> > > Â
> 
> > 
> 
> > Â
> 
> > –
> 
> > Richard S. MarkenÂ
> 
> > "Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you  
> > have nothing left to take away.�  
> > Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ee7513/32.png) [@MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/MartinT)\
**Post date:** [November 17, 2018, 3:19pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/9 "2018-11-17T15:19:09Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2018.11 18.09.44]

> **···**
>
> > [Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_19:15:51]
> 
> > ```
> > ... I think "collective control" is a good name for that
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > application of PCT, but as a description of the general  
> > phenomenon to be explained – controlling accomplished by  
> > control systems in separate individuals – rather than as an  
> > explanation itself.
> 
> > 
> 
> ```
> At least we can agree that collective control is one possibility
> 
> ```
> 
> for controlling accomplished by control systems in separate  
> individuals, but perhaps not on the usage of the term. To say that  
> we should not use “collective control” as an explanation is  
> analogous to saying that Euclid should never have used in his  
> later theorems what he had proved i his earlier theorems, but  
> should have worked only from the axioms, re-proving for every  
> theorem what he had already proved.
> 
> ```
> Just as not every effect of control is an example of control
> 
> ```
> 
> (side-effects), so not every example of the effects of control  
> systems inside different individuals working in the same  
> environment is an example of collective control. Control has to be  
> observed before the question “Is this an example of Collective  
> Control” can be asked. That question then becomes whether the  
> controller’s controlled variable can be localized or is  
> distributed over places. Usually (perhaps always?) the observed  
> effect of control is on a single environmental variable, and as  
> Bill P often pointed out, the rest is theory. Often, we are  
> concerned with situations in which only one individual affects the  
> observed variable. for that case, the theory is that there is a  
> controlled perception of that environmental variable inside a  
> brain, and the observed “control” of the environmental variable is  
> a consequence of the perception being controlled.
> 
> ```
> When you look at that theory, which we call PCT, and go back to
> 
> ```
> 
> Bill’s writings, we find that the internal (theoretical) value of  
> that (theorized to exist) perception is theorized to be the value  
> of a “neural current”. So, as when we try to work through one of  
> Euclid’s later theorems and go back to earlier ones that are  
> referenced, so we go back to find out what a “neural current” is  
> defined to be.
> 
> ```
> We find that a "neural current" is the summed rate of firing of
> 
> ```
> 
> the neurons that belong to a “bundle”. The average itself is not  
> located in any single place in the brain, again according to  
> theory. Nevertheless, an observer or experimenter in the  
> environment sees and tests what appears to be “control” of the  
> environmental variable, and what the observer/experimenter  
> perceives is, for that person, the only thing of which he or she  
> can be sure, despite that according to theory, what they perceive  
> is an effect of many different neurons functioning collectively.
> 
> ```
> When we talk of "collective control" we are engaging in the same
> 
> ```
> 
> kind of theorizing. If the theorized “perceptions” can be the  
> non-localizable average of neural firings within an individual,  
> they can equally be the non-localized average of those averages  
> over a “social bundle” of distinct individuals.
> 
> ```
> "Collective Control" is not an application of PCT. It is not an
> 
> ```
> 
> extension of PCT. It is simply an “axiom” on which all of PCT  
> depends.
> 
> Martin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![FredNickols](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/frednickols/32/2645_2.png) [@FredNickols](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/FredNickols)\
**Post date:** [November 18, 2018, 3:31pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/10 "2018-11-18T15:31:00Z")

</div>

Well, FWIW, I think collective control is the hallmark of effective teams.

To me, “collective control” refers to a situation in which more than one person is attempting to bring a targeted variable to an agreed upon reference value. That is the essence of teamwork.

How they pull that off depends on the goal, the situation and the players but, in all cases, it requires agreement about the goal (i.e., the desired state of the target variable) and no small amount of communication, cooperation, coordination and collaboration.

Frankly, I think the notion of “collective control” would have a great deal of appeal to those concerned with forming and building effective teams.

Regards,

> **···**
>
> Fred Nickols
> 
> _Managing Partner_
> 
> **Distance Consulting LLC**
> 
> _“Assistance at A Distance”_

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ee7513/32.png) [@MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/MartinT)\
**Post date:** [November 18, 2018, 4:57pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/11 "2018-11-18T16:57:59Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.18.11.54]

> **···**
>
> On 2018/11/18 10:31 AM, Fred Nickols  
> wrote:
> 
> > ```
> > Well, FWIW, I think collective control is the
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > hallmark of effective teams.
> 
> > ```
> > To me, "collective control" refers to a situation in which
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > more than one person is attempting to bring a targeted  
> > variable to an agreed upon reference value. That is the  
> > essence of teamwork.
> 
> ```
> It is, but Kent showed that collective control works also in a
> 
> ```
> 
> conflict where two controllers want the same external variable to  
> be perceived as having two incompatible values. The kind of  
> teamwork collective control you are talking about is one or other  
> of what I called “coordinated” or “collaborative” control in my  
> little taxonomy o collective control types.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > How they pull that off depends on the goal, the situation
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > and the players but, in all cases, it requires agreement about  
> > the goal (i.e., the desired state of the target variable) and  
> > no small amount of communication, cooperation, coordination  
> > and collaboration.
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > Frankly, I think the notion of "collective control" would
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > have a great deal of appeal to those concerned with forming  
> > and building effective teams.
> 
> > 
> 
> Yes, one would hope so.
> 
> Martin
> 
> > Regards,
> 
> > 
> 
> > Fred Nickols
> 
> > _Managing Partner_
> 
> > **Distance Consulting LLC**
> 
> > _“Assistance at A Distance”_
> 
> > 
> 
> > ```
> > On Sat, Nov 17, 2018 at 10:19 AM Martin Taylor
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > \<csgnet@lists.illinois.edu \>  
> > wrote:
> 
> > > [Martin Taylor 2018.11 18.09.44]
> 
> > >
> 
> > > > [Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_19:15:51]
> 
> > > > ```
> > > > ... I think "collective control" is a good name for
> > > > 
> > > > ```
> > > > 
> > > > that application of PCT, but as a description of the  
> > > > general phenomenon to be explained – controlling  
> > > > accomplished by control systems in separate  
> > > > individuals – rather than as an explanation itself.
> 
> > > >
> 
> > > ```
> > > At least we can agree that collective control is one
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > possibility for controlling accomplished by control  
> > > systems in separate individuals, but perhaps not on the  
> > > usage of the term. To say that we should not use  
> > > “collective control” as an explanation is analogous to  
> > > saying that Euclid should never have used in his later  
> > > theorems what he had proved i his earlier theorems, but  
> > > should have worked only from the axioms, re-proving for  
> > > every theorem what he had already proved.
> 
> > > ```
> > > Just as not every effect of control is an example of
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > control (side-effects), so not every example of the  
> > > effects of control systems inside different individuals  
> > > working in the same environment is an example of  
> > > collective control. Control has to be observed before the  
> > > question “Is this an example of Collective Control” can be  
> > > asked. That question then becomes whether the controller’s  
> > > controlled variable can be localized or is distributed  
> > > over places. Usually (perhaps always?) the observed effect  
> > > of control is on a single environmental variable, and as  
> > > Bill P often pointed out, the rest is theory. Often, we  
> > > are concerned with situations in which only one individual  
> > > affects the observed variable. for that case, the theory  
> > > is that there is a controlled perception of that  
> > > environmental variable inside a brain, and the observed  
> > > “control” of the environmental variable is a consequence  
> > > of the perception being controlled.
> 
> > > ```
> > > When you look at that theory, which we call PCT, and go
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > back to Bill’s writings, we find that the internal  
> > > (theoretical) value of that (theorized to exist)  
> > > perception is theorized to be the value of a “neural  
> > > current”. So, as when we try to work through one of  
> > > Euclid’s later theorems and go back to earlier ones that  
> > > are referenced, so we go back to find out what a “neural  
> > > current” is defined to be.
> 
> > > ```
> > > We find that a "neural current" is the summed rate of
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > firing of the neurons that belong to a “bundle”. The  
> > > average itself is not located in any single place in the  
> > > brain, again according to theory. Nevertheless, an  
> > > observer or experimenter in the environment sees and tests  
> > > what appears to be “control” of the environmental  
> > > variable, and what the observer/experimenter perceives is,  
> > > for that person, the only thing of which he or she can be  
> > > sure, despite that according to theory, what they perceive  
> > > is an effect of many different neurons functioning  
> > > collectively.
> 
> > > ```
> > > When we talk of "collective control" we are engaging in
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > the same kind of theorizing. If the theorized  
> > > “perceptions” can be the non-localizable average of neural  
> > > firings within an individual, they can equally be the  
> > > non-localized average of those averages over a “social  
> > > bundle” of distinct individuals.
> 
> > > ```
> > > "Collective Control" is not an application of PCT. It is
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > not an extension of PCT. It is simply an “axiom” on which  
> > > all of PCT depends.
> 
> > > Martin
> 
> > >

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![FredNickols](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/frednickols/32/2645_2.png) [@FredNickols](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/FredNickols)\
**Post date:** [November 18, 2018, 5:05pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/12 "2018-11-18T17:05:23Z")

</div>

Fred Nickols (2018.11.18.1205 ET)

Where would I find your taxonomy, Martin?

> **···**
>
> Fred Nickols  
> Distance Consulting LLC  
> “Assistance at A Distanceâ€?  
> [www.nickols.us](http://www.nickols.us)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ee7513/32.png) [@MartinT](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/MartinT)\
**Post date:** [November 18, 2018, 7:22pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/13 "2018-11-18T19:22:16Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2018.11.18.14.15]

> **···**
>
> On 2018/11/18 12:05 PM, Fred Nickols  
> wrote:
> 
> > Fred Nickols (2018.11.18.1205 ET)
> 
> > 
> 
> > Where would I find your taxonomy, Martin?
> 
> ```
> I posted it to CSGnet this morning ,[Martin Taylor
> 
> ```
> 
> 2018.11.18.09.40] but Like Bruce’s message of last night, I  
> haven’t seen it in my in box yet.
> 
> It’s supposed to be Canada Post on strike, not CSGnet Post!
> 
> Martin
> 
> > ```
> > On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 11:58 AM Martin Taylor
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > [mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net](mailto:mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net) wrote:
> 
> > > [Martin Taylor 2018.11.18.11.54]
> 
> > > ```
> > > On
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > 2018/11/18 10:31 AM, Fred Nickols wrote:
> 
> > > > ```
> > > > Well, FWIW, I think collective control is
> > > > 
> > > > ```
> > > > 
> > > > the hallmark of effective teams.
> 
> > > > ```
> > > > To me, "collective control" refers to a situation
> > > > 
> > > > ```
> > > > 
> > > > in which more than one person is attempting to bring  
> > > > a targeted variable to an agreed upon reference  
> > > > value. That is the essence of teamwork.
> 
> > >
> 
> > > ```
> > > It is, but Kent showed that collective control works
> > > 
> > > ```
> > > 
> > > also in a conflict where two controllers want the same  
> > > external variable to be perceived as having two  
> > > incompatible values. The kind of teamwork collective  
> > > control you are talking about is one or other of what I  
> > > called “coordinated” or “collaborative” control in my  
> > > little taxonomy o collective control types.
> 
> > > >
> 
> > > > ```
> > > > How they pull that off depends on the goal, the
> > > > 
> > > > ```
> > > > 
> > > > situation and the players but, in all cases, it  
> > > > requires agreement about the goal (i.e., the desired  
> > > > state of the target variable) and no small amount of  
> > > > communication, cooperation, coordination and  
> > > > collaboration.
> 
> > > >
> 
> > > > ```
> > > > Frankly, I think the notion of "collective
> > > > 
> > > > ```
> > > > 
> > > > control" would have a great deal of appeal to those  
> > > > concerned with forming and building effective teams.
> 
> > > >
> 
> > > Yes, one would hope so.
> 
> > > Martin
> 
> > >
> 
> > > > Regards,
> 
> > > >
> 
> > > > Fred Nickols
> 
> > > > _Managing Partner_
> 
> > > > \*\* Distance  
> > > > Consulting LLC\*\*
> 
> > > > _“Assistance at A Distance”_
> 
> > > >
> 
> > > > ```
> > > > On Sat, Nov 17, 2018 at 10:19 AM Martin
> > > > 
> > > > ```
> > > > 
> > > > Taylor \<csgnet@lists.illinois.edu \>  
> > > > wrote:
> 
> > > > > [Martin Taylor 2018.11 18.09.44]
> 
> > > > >
> 
> > > > > > [Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_19:15:51]
> 
> > > > > > ```
> > > > > > ... I think "collective control" is a good
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > ```
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > name for that application of PCT, but as a  
> > > > > > description of the general phenomenon to be  
> > > > > > explained – controlling accomplished by  
> > > > > > control systems in separate individuals –  
> > > > > > rather than as an explanation itself.Â
> 
> > > > > >
> 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > At least we can agree that collective control
> > > > > 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > 
> > > > > is one possibility for controlling accomplished  
> > > > > by control systems in separate individuals, but  
> > > > > perhaps not on the usage of the term. To say  
> > > > > that we should not use “collective control” as  
> > > > > an explanation is analogous to saying that  
> > > > > Euclid should never have used in his later  
> > > > > theorems what he had proved i his earlier  
> > > > > theorems, but should have worked only from the  
> > > > > axioms, re-proving for every theorem what he had  
> > > > > already proved.
> 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > Just as not every effect of control is an
> > > > > 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > 
> > > > > example of control (side-effects), so not every  
> > > > > example of the effects of control systems  
> > > > > inside different individuals working in the same  
> > > > > environment is an example of collective control.  
> > > > > Control has to be observed before the question  
> > > > > “Is this an example of Collective Control” can  
> > > > > be asked. That question then becomes whether the  
> > > > > controller’s controlled variable can be  
> > > > > localized or is distributed over places. Usually  
> > > > > (perhaps always?) the observed effect of control  
> > > > > is on a single environmental variable, and as  
> > > > > Bill P often pointed out, the rest is theory.  
> > > > > Often, we are concerned with situations in which  
> > > > > only one individual affects the observed  
> > > > > variable. for that case, the theory is that  
> > > > > there is a controlled perception of that  
> > > > > environmental variable inside a brain, and the  
> > > > > observed “control” of the environmental variable  
> > > > > is a consequence of the perception being  
> > > > > controlled.
> 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > When you look at that theory, which we call
> > > > > 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > 
> > > > > PCT, and go back to Bill’s writings, we find  
> > > > > that the internal (theoretical) value of that  
> > > > > (theorized to exist) perception is theorized to  
> > > > > be the value of a “neural current”. So, as when  
> > > > > we try to work through one of Euclid’s later  
> > > > > theorems and go back to earlier ones that are  
> > > > > referenced, so we go back to find out what a  
> > > > > “neural current” is defined to be.
> 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > We find that a "neural current" is the summed
> > > > > 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > 
> > > > > rate of firing of the neurons that belong to a  
> > > > > “bundle”. The average itself is not located in  
> > > > > any single place in the brain, again according  
> > > > > to theory. Nevertheless, an observer or  
> > > > > experimenter in the environment sees and tests  
> > > > > what appears to be “control” of the  
> > > > > environmental variable, and what the  
> > > > > observer/experimenter perceives is, for that  
> > > > > person, the only thing of which he or she can be  
> > > > > sure, despite that according to theory, what  
> > > > > they perceive is an effect of many different  
> > > > > neurons functioning collectively.
> 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > When we talk of "collective control" we are
> > > > > 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > 
> > > > > engaging in the same kind of theorizing. If the  
> > > > > theorized “perceptions” can be the  
> > > > > non-localizable average of neural firings within  
> > > > > an individual, they can equally be the  
> > > > > non-localized average of those averages over a  
> > > > > “social bundle” of distinct individuals.
> 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > "Collective Control" is not an application of
> > > > > 
> > > > > ```
> > > > > 
> > > > > PCT. It is not an extension of PCT. It is simply  
> > > > > an “axiom” on which all of PCT depends.
> 
> > > > > Martin
> 
> > > > >
> 
> > –  
> > Fred Nickols
> > 
> > ```
> > Distance Consulting LLC
> > 
> > “Assistance at A Distance�
> > 
> > [www.nickols.us](http://www.nickols.us)
> > 
> > ```

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/_/e8c25b/32.png) [@\_Boris\_Hartman](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/_Boris_Hartman)\
**Post date:** [November 18, 2018, 9:45pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/collective-control/2644/14 "2018-11-18T21:45:36Z")

</div>

Bruce,

![image002109.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/d0c828c0981f50f8c54499d8d0ea0a9eee2b36dc.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> **From:** Bruce Nevin [bnhpct@gmail.com](mailto:bnhpct@gmail.com)  
> **Sent:** Saturday, November 17, 2018 3:40 PM  
> **To:** [boris.hartman@masicom.net](mailto:boris.hartman@masicom.net)  
> **Cc:** csgnet@lists.illinois.edu  
> **Subject:** Re: Collective Control:
> 
> [Bruce Nevin 2018-11-17\_13:43:45 UTC]
> 
> Boris Hartman [no ID tag] Nov 17, 2018, 4:18 AM –
> 
> BN : Thank you, Boris, for this collation of excerpts from Kent’s writings about collective control. It’s useful and helps to clarify the terms of the conversation. I’m grateful for it. You have excerpted from his 1994 “Perceptual control and social power” (_Sociological Perspectives_ 37:461-496).
> 
> HB : Not exactly. I saw this 1994 article which you are mentioning and I have it. But the basis for “collation of excerpts” is directly from his internet page that was available at that time.Â
> 
> BN : Twelve years more recent is his 2006 “Understanding collective control processes” (in McClelland & Fararo, eds., _Purpose, Meaning and Action: Control systems theories in sociology_). I can send you a copy if you don’t have it.
> 
> HB : Thank you for your concern. But I don’t understand how can you send copy of authorized book ? You mean I have to pay for it ?
> 
> BN : And of course we are all waiting for the publication of LCS IV, in which he and Martin both have chapters dealing with collective control.
> 
> HB : Yes it’s been quite some years arround since first talkings about LCS IV appeared. Well nothing happened. I have some doubts about this book because I don’t see some special understanding of LCS III book which probably LCS IV should upgrade. And diagram on p. 191 (B:CP) is not finnished yet. Well let us see what publication is about ?
> 
> BN : A comment about one excerpt:
> 
> > KM : Each perception that the individual is controlling at a given moment, that is, anything in the individual’s current perceptual world that would prove disturbing if arbitrarily changed or anything the individual is currently using to perform an action, would be the target of a feedback loop
> 
> BN : I understand “target of a feedback loop” to mean “controlled variable” (more precisely, a perception of it is the controlled variable),
> 
> HB : I hope that you don’t mean “perception of controlled variable” ?
> 
> I hardly understand why you choosed example from Kents’ work that could have at least “double meaning” ? The “target of contol loop” can be interpreted in so many ways that I understand why it suits you. it hasn’t precise meaning and thus enable phylosophy. Why didn’t you choose more precise “excerpt” ???
> 
> BN : ….and the things thatt “the individual is currently using to perform an action” for a current control process are things in the environmental feedback path by which the action effects control.
> 
> HB : Sorry I don’t understand ? I’ll event not try to understand you phylosophical “excursions”.
> 
> BN : When the individual perceives something as instrumental to their control, that’s a controlled perception:
> 
> HB : Do you mean that “perceptual signal” is “controlled perception” ? It isn’t. “Control” is not entering organism. But anyway it seems that you want to talk about certain example of control. Which is it ? We need general model of how organisms function.
> 
> BN : ….anything that reduuces its usefulness is not only a disturbance to control in the main control loop, it is also a disturbance to the perception of the instrumentality of that element of the feedback path.
> 
> HB : I don’t understand what you want to say ? There are more disturbances to more processes in control loop ??? What are you talking about ? Here is diagram LCS III and definitions. Explain what you want to explain through diagram and definitions of control loop ?
> 
> ![cid:image001.jpg@01D37ABE.36063DF0]()
> 
> PCT Definitions of control loop :
> 
> Bill P (B:CP):
> 
> 1. CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.
> 
> Bill P (B:CP):
> 
> 1. OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system
> 
> Bill P (LCS III):…¦ **the output function** shown in it’s own box represents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.
> 
> Bill P (LCS III):
> 
> 1. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.
> 
> Bill P (B:CP) :
> 
> 1. INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.
> 
> Bill P (B:CP) :
> 
> 1. COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.
> 
> Bill P (B:CP)
> 
> 1. ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior.
> 
> Bill P (B:CP) :
> 
> 1. ERROR SIGNAL : A signal indicating the magnitude and direction of error.
> 
> HB : So whatever you have to say use diagram and definitions.
> 
> BN : This is the locus of collective control. Further, if such an instrumentality in the feedback path is not perceived as such, when an influence on it affects control through the main loop, problem-solving control activities result in it becoming a perceived variable subject to control (and collective control).
> 
> HB : Bruce you know that I don’t like phylosophy. And you choosed something from Kents work that is uncertain and I’m beggining to understand what you are trying to achieve. You want to continue phylosophical discussion about “PCT control loop”. You know my standards and arguments. So I expect from you PCT and physiological and biological and so on evidences for what you are talking about. Do we understand  each other ? If you will continue with phylosophy this conversation is finnished.
> 
> BN : Thank you, too, Boris, for staying clear of forms of discussion that have made it difficult to see how to respond in any useful way to other posts of yours.
> 
> HB : My discussion is difficult for anybody that don’t use clear definitions and scientific arguments but present some subjective views and imagination.
> 
> BN : By this, I mean ad hominem attacks and an assumption of personal authority to correct, lecture, and ‘warn’ others
> 
> HB : Well this is the “real target” of your post. You want to lecture me how to talk on CSGnet ??? Buzz of Bruce Nevin… This is the last tine that you are lecturing to me how to talk. I told you once that you should sweep in fromt of your door. You start insulting me. And somebody who is insulting others should teach others how to behave ??? Where are you from ? Mars ?
> 
> I’ll continue correcting, lecturing and warning anybody that is misleading CSGnet forum with some imagined constructs without any scientific support like Ricks “protected from disturbances” is. Such insinuations shouldn’t be part of discussions here and the same goes for your “constructs” with “new diagrams” and “model of interaction” which you performed some time ago.
> 
> BN : ….about perceived transggressions of what might be called terminological puritanism.
> 
> HB : I’ll take this as new insult in the row of insults I was exposed on CSGnet.
> 
> BN : I appreciate that you have stuck to the subject and helped to advance our understanding of it.
> 
> HB : Well I don’t understand this either. First you are thanking me than you insult me and after that again thanking… Conversation is over…
> 
> Boris
> 
> > /Bruce Nevin
> 
> On Sat, Nov 17, 2018 at 4:18 AM “Boris Hartman” [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu) wrote:
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > **From:** Richard Marken ([rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com) via csgnet Mailing List) [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu)  
> > **Sent:** Wednesday, November 14, 2018 4:17 AM  
> > **To:** csgnet [csgnet@lists.illinois.edu](mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu)  
> > **Subject:** Re: Collective Control:
> 
> > [Rick Marken 2018-11-13\_19:15:51]
> 
> > > [Martin Taylor 2018.11.13.17.32]
> 
> > > > RM:…What I want is an example of collective control of the type demonstrated in Kent’s simulations, where two or more separate controllers control the same variable relative to different references, keeping it n a virtual reference state, protected from disturbance.
> 
> > > MT: …And for a real-world example of that, I think you could use a pretty good proportion of unresolved political conflicts
> 
> > RM: Please be more specific. Say who the different controllers are and what the variable is that is being maintained in a virtual reference state. But these conflicts don’t seem to be good examples of social stability; they are always on the cusp of violence.
> 
> > > MT: (I exclude ones like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over who has the right to live in a certain land area, where one side has overwhelming force.
> 
> > RM: I agree that Kent’s model doesn’t work for that one for the reason you give: the land is not being kept in a virtual reference state (which I suppose would be a state where all the land was equally occupied by both Israeli and Palestinian forces) but, rather, in the reference state desired by the Israelis – completely occupied (under the control of) Israel.
> 
> > > MT: By the way, I don’t think there is a good rationale for saying that conflict between independent controllers in a single body is in principle any different between a conflict between control units in separate bodies.
> 
> > RM: The conflicts are not different “in principle”, the principle being that both conflicts are a result of two (or more) systems having different references for the same (or a similar) perceptual variable. But I think there is a good rational for saying that there is an important difference between conflict (or cooperation) in these two cases. When the systems are in the same body, the references creating the conflict (or cooperation) are presumably determined by other systems within that body;
> 
> > HB : So it’s general principle of how organisms function.
> 
> > RM : …but when the systems are in different bodies, the references creating the conflict (or cooperation) are in two separate bodies. I think this makes the “separate bodies” case quite different than the “same body” case.
> 
> > HB : I agree, that they seems to be different, but stil is “collective control”, because individual LCS (with their nervous system) are doing control in shared environment. So definition of “social collective control” is about how separate organisms control in common environment and how influences all involved. It’s about “intersection of control loops”. Intersection of control loops means in Kents definition, intersection of “effects of output on input”. It’s PCT definition. That’s what “gossamer thread” is about. Effects of control in organisms are done through external environment and “collective effects” of individual control can be considered as “collective control”.
> 
> > Kent M :
> 
> > …according to the mathematics of the control-system equations that Powers presents (1973a: 84-85), the variable actually stabilized in a control loop is the perceptual signal, which, when the control system is operating normally, is kept nearly equal to the reference signal.
> 
> > 
> 
> > Powers emphasizes that human organisms can only control their perceptions.
> 
> > 
> 
> > To understand the sociological implications of this model of human agency as control of perceptions, we need to take a fresh look the relationship between human actors and their environments.
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : I understand It says how individual perception is controlled and that sociaological implication means that you have to turn two PCT diagrams (for ex. LCS III) against each other (human agency as control of perception).
> 
> > ![cid:image001.jpg@01D37ABE.36063DF0]()
> 
> > 
> 
> > KM : Suppose feedback loops were visible, like gossamer threads stretching from an individual’s body through objects in the environment and back to the individual’s sense organs.
> 
> > HB : Kent is clear that he is using PCT. As I understand what Kent is talking about I see that basic understanding of “gossamer threads” is part of “Control of perception” (see diagram) in the form of simple “feedback function”.
> 
> > Bill P (B:CP) :
> 
> > FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.
> 
> > HB : It’s clear at least to me that Kent is using “actions” and “individual sense organs” to describe how “gossamer thread” works. And it’s in accordance to Bills definition of “feedback function”.
> 
> > 
> 
> > KM : Each perception that the individual is controlling at a given moment, that is, anything in the individual’s current perceptual world that would prove disturbing if arbitrarily changed or anything the individual is currently using to perform an action, would be the target of a feedback loop
> 
> > 
> 
> > HB : I understand that “feed-back” loop which is actually representing “control of perception”, and disturbances to that control and performance of action is what “feedback loop” is counteracting.
> 
> > 
> 
> > KM : Observing an individual in action, we would see an intricate ever-changing web of many thousands of feedback loops, some passing through objects near at hand, like a chair on which the individual sits or computer screen at which the individual gazes.
> 
> > HB : I see no problem in Kents view about what control units are controllng and how “intersection” of control loops function. It’s PCT. LCS are controlling inside (perceptual control) and causing effects to environment, where they are “mixing” and are perceived by actors (sense organs) in shared environment and of course controlled as “control of perception”.
> 
> > RM : And I think the study of “collective control” is, indeed, a special instance of multiple control systems and deserves to be treated as a special application of perceptual control.
> 
> > HB : And how would you treat it differently ? Multiple control system controlling external environment with “Control of behavior” ? “Social collective control” follows the same rules of “perceptual control” in individuals with affecting environment with action and perceiving and thus follows Bills diagrams (LCS III).
> 
> > RM : I think “collective control” is a good name for that application of PCT,
> 
> > HB : All in all I’m glad Rick that you changed your mind about term “collective control” and that you’ll not demolish your home anymore.
> 
> > RM earlier : Feel free to try again if you like but if you do please avoid using the term “collective control” since it elicits in me a strong urge to throw things at the computer screen;-)
> 
> > RM : ….but as a description of the general phenomenon to be explained – controlling accomplished by control systems in separate individuals – rather than as an explanation itself.
> 
> > HB : It’s interesting that you changed your mind just in right moment and you are not arguing that “people can control each other all the time”. I’m glad for this change. My oppinion is that you are right.
> 
> > But as I see it this is the same as Kent is talking about. “Social collective control” is the result of “Perceptual control” in separate organisms and effects to common environment researched.
> 
> > KM : To understand the sociological implications of this model of human agency as control of perceptions, we need to take a fresh look the relationship between human actors and their environments.
> 
> > HB : Here are some examples from Kents PCT legacy about “relationship between human actors” :
> 
> > Kent McClleand (1994) :
> 
> > **A PCT Definition of Force**
> 
> > In colloquial usage, force refers to physical violence. One person directly interferes with the bodily movements of another in order to prevent the other from acting. Hitting or grabbing another person is usually regarded as an act of force, as isthe use of a weapon to injure the other’s body. From a PCT viewpoint, force has been applied when the other person encounters a disturbance so great as to make him lose control of his own actions. Putting it more generally in PCT terms, and in terms of an interaction between individuals _A_ and _B_, we get this definition:
> 
> > _A_ uses force on _B_ when _A_ acts with the intent of creating a disturbance for _B_ which is serious enough to cause _B_ to lose control of one or more of the perceptual variables _B_ is currently controlling.
> 
> > **A PCT Definition of Coercion**
> 
> > Coercion refers to the threat of force. One person dissuades another from doing something by somehow reminding him of the possibility that force may be used. For example, one might warn off an intruder by assuming a fighting posture or displaying a weapon. Putting it in PCT terms,
> 
> > _A_ coerces _B_ by acting to produce a disturbance which _A_ intends _B_ to perceive as initiating a sequence in which _A_’s actions will force _B_ to lose perceptual control of one or more of _B_’s currently operative goals.
> 
> > **A PCT Definition of Influence**
> 
> > All of three of these strategies are more effective when combined with influence. We say one person has influenced another when the first has been able to tell the second what to think or do. We also describe it as influence when the second person imitates the behavior of the first. A single PCT definition for influence covers both those events.
> 
> > _A_ influences _B_ by acting to create a disturbance from which _B_ constructs a reference level for perceptual control of _B_’s own actions.
> 
> > Boris
> 
> > Best
> 
> > Rick
> 
> > > In each case there is a single degree of freedom at issue, and you can get the virtual control situation described by Kent (and Professor Higgins in “My Fair Lady”, who, if I remember rightly, had the line “and rather than do either, we do something that neither wants at all.”)
> 
> > > Martin
> 
> > > > Best
> 
> > > > Rick
> 
> > > > > I don’t think there’s much reason to belabour the point further, because the issue seems to be not whether this kind of effect occurs when many control systems act on the same environmental degrees of freedom, but whether “collective control” means something quite different, the influence one controller has on another. These cross-influences can and do happen, creating all sorts of feedback loops both positive and negative. The question, as so often is the case on CSGnet, is how best to use the term “collective control”, one or the other exclusively (and which?) or both, with the distinction being context dependent. My preference is to use it exclusively for the influence of many control systems that makes it look to an observer or experimenter as though the variable is under the influence of a single control unit.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Martin
> 
> > > >
> 
> > > > –
> 
> > > > Richard S. Marken
> 
> > > > "Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you  
> > > > have nothing left to take away.�  
> > > > –Antoine de Saint-Exupery
> 
> > 
> 
> > –
> 
> > Richard S. Marken
> 
> > "Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you  
> > have nothing left to take away.�  
> > –Antoine de Saint-Exupery