Collective Controlled Variables

[from Gary Cziko 930622.0323 UTC]

Rick Marken said:

After thinking
about this for a bit I realize that I am wrong -- there is no such
thing as a collective controlled variable. ...

Tom Bourbon said:

Glad you have seen the light, brother! I thought you were going a little
too far in your interpretation of the three-line pattern. It *is* a
controlled variable (but not a collective one), some times, but not others.

But don't collective controlled variables exist? I can understand why the
above example doesn't count as one, but what about the situation when two
or more people have a common reference level but neither alone can satisfy
it. For example, my wife and I both want to see the picnic table in the
shade (it is now in the sun), but neither one of use alone can get it there
(too heavy and big). In this case we both have the same reference level
but we don't have adequate output functions unless we put them together.
Shared reference levels, combined output functions.

Or what about the warehouse worker helping the truck driver back up to a
narrow loading dock? Both of them want to see the truck docked, but
neither can do it alone. Here it has to do with the driver making use of
the perceptual functions of the warehouse worker. Again, there are shared
reference levels here. But this time the two individuals are sharing their
perceptual functions.

Then there is the case when both my wife and I want to have the doors
locked before we go to sleep. If she goes up to bed first, I lock the
doors. If I go up first, she locks them. Here we have again a shared
reference level, but we share neither output functions nor perceptions to
lock the doors.

--Gary

···

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From Tom Bourbon (930622.0817)

[from Gary Cziko 930622.0323 UTC]

Rick Marken said:

After thinking
about this for a bit I realize that I am wrong -- there is no such
thing as a collective controlled variable. ...

Tom Bourbon said:

Glad you have seen the light, brother! I thought you were going a little
too far in your interpretation of the three-line pattern. It *is* a
controlled variable (but not a collective one), some times, but not others.

But don't collective controlled variables exist?

In a word, no. Not in the sense raised so often on the net in recent days.

...I can understand why the
above example doesn't count as one, but what about the situation when two
or more people have a common reference level but neither alone can satisfy
it.

They don't have a common reference level. Each has a reference level for a
reference perception and neither alone can satisfy his or hers (or its -- I
have become a model rights activist).

... For example, my wife and I both want to see the picnic table in the
shade (it is now in the sun), but neither one of use alone can get it there
(too heavy and big).

See what I mean? Each of you has a reference perception that pertains
to an object and some relationships in your shared environment. The
environment comes the closest to being something you "have" in common.
"Common reference signals" really are individual reference signals that
bring people into mutual influence on common features in the environment.
And when people act in concert to satisfy their personal references, the
fact of their (the references') individuality usually becomes clear --
"Right here." "No, over here." "What do you mean over there? I thought
you wanted it in the shade!" And all of the other verbal and nonverbal
attempts by each person to get her or his perceptions "just right."

... In this case we both have the same reference level
but we don't have adequate output functions unless we put them together.
Shared reference levels, combined output functions.

See my comments immediately above.

Or what about the warehouse worker helping the truck driver back up to a
narrow loading dock? Both of them want to see the truck docked, but
neither can do it alone. Here it has to do with the driver making use of
the perceptual functions of the warehouse worker. Again, there are shared
reference levels here. But this time the two individuals are sharing their
perceptual functions.

Take my eyes, please!

Then there is the case when both my wife and I want to have the doors
locked before we go to sleep. If she goes up to bed first, I lock the
doors. If I go up first, she locks them. Here we have again a shared
reference level, but we share neither output functions nor perceptions to
lock the doors.

Yes? And?

···

=================

Try to portray each of your examples in a diagram showing each of the
persons as a single-loop PCT model, carefully draw in the various CEVs and
the paths to them and from them, for each modeled person, and draw in the
paths of communicative deliberate interactions between the modeled people.
I'll bet the results look more like some of the social diagrams I posted
a few days ago than like a system with a common (single) reference signal,
set to the same reference level for all people.

I think this artistic exercise would be especially helpful were you to
make another pass at the example of the truck driver who "uses the
perceptual functions" of the assistant! ("Excuse me. Can you show me where
these optic nerve thingies plug in?")

Until later,
   Tom Bourbon

[from Gary Cziko 930622.2000 UTC]

Tom Bourbon (930622.0817) said:

Try to portray each of your examples in a diagram showing each of the
persons as a single-loop PCT model, carefully draw in the various CEVs and
the paths to them and from them, for each modeled person, and draw in the
paths of communicative deliberate interactions between the modeled people.
I'll bet the results look more like some of the social diagrams I posted
a few days ago than like a system with a common (single) reference signal,
set to the same reference level for all people.

I never meant to claim that people could share a common (single) reference
signal (having two separate brains gets in the way). But they can come to
have very similar separate reference signals nonetheless, such as the way
you and I (but not always Rick Marken) spell English words.

I will have to go back and look at your diagrams again. I think the ones
you asked me to consider drawing have already been drawn by McPhail and
Tucker in their American Behavioral Scientist "Purposive Collective Action"
paper.

I think this artistic exercise would be especially helpful were you to
make another pass at the example of the truck driver who "uses the
perceptual functions" of the assistant! ("Excuse me. Can you show me where
these optic nerve thingies plug in?")

You should have seen how they renovated the inside of our football stadium
last year. Huge cranes were used reaching inside the stadium with the
operators seated outside the stadium. Inside the stadium were guys with
radios saying things like "you're getting close, slow down, a bit more to
the right, take it away." Seems to me there would have been big trouble
for the crane operators if the inside guys lost their eyesight all of a
sudden.--Gary

···

------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary Cziko Telephone: 217-333-8527
Educational Psychology FAX: 217-244-7620
University of Illinois E-mail: g-cziko@uiuc.edu
1310 S. Sixth Street Radio: N9MJZ
210 Education Building
Champaign, Illinois 61820-6990
USA
------------------------------------------------------------------

[From: Bruce Nevin (Wed 930623 08:47:27 EDT)]

If language is based on control of perceptions of contrasts or
distinctions, I think that I no longer need to suppose that speakers of
the same language share similar settings of similar reference
perceptions. The similarities across individuals fall out from
maintaining distinctions in a recognizable way.

    Bruce Nevin
    bn@bbn.com

From Tom Bourbon (930623.0850)

[from Gary Cziko 930622.2000 UTC]

Tom Bourbon (930622.0817) said:

Try to portray each of your examples in a diagram showing each of the
persons as a single-loop PCT model, carefully draw in the various CEVs and
the paths to them and from them, for each modeled person, and draw in the
paths of communicative deliberate interactions between the modeled people.
I'll bet the results look more like some of the social diagrams I posted
a few days ago than like a system with a common (single) reference signal,
set to the same reference level for all people.

I never meant to claim that people could share a common (single) reference
signal (having two separate brains gets in the way). But they can come to
have very similar separate reference signals nonetheless, such as the way
you and I (but not always Rick Marken) spell English words.

I really didn't think you did, but you were posting on a net where some
particpants have come to believe in unicorns and social control systems. I
was only encouraging you to remember *they* are watching and often take such
things literally. (I tried to indicate my tongue in cheek attitude by the
silly remarks about eyeballs and optic nerves.)

I will have to go back and look at your diagrams again. I think the ones
you asked me to consider drawing have already been drawn by McPhail and
Tucker in their American Behavioral Scientist "Purposive Collective Action"
paper.

Again, that was a hint more for the watchers than for you. But you *did*
leave a nice opening.

I think this artistic exercise would be especially helpful were you to
make another pass at the example of the truck driver who "uses the
perceptual functions" of the assistant! ("Excuse me. Can you show me where
these optic nerve thingies plug in?")

You should have seen how they renovated the inside of our football stadium
last year. Huge cranes were used reaching inside the stadium with the
operators seated outside the stadium. Inside the stadium were guys with
radios saying things like "you're getting close, slow down, a bit more to
the right, take it away." Seems to me there would have been big trouble
for the crane operators if the inside guys lost their eyesight all of a
sudden.

No doubt! But that has nothing to do with sharing someone else's
perceptual functions -- not in the sense some people on the net probably
would take it. It would be a lot more like my diagrams, which differ in some
important respects from Clark's.

Until later,
  Tom