[From Bruce Abbott (950527.1320 EST)]
Rick Marken (950526.2100)
Bruce Abbott (950526.2000 EST)]
And you're right, I haven't changed my position on this matter [the
importance of PCT accounting for conventional behavioral science
data]. Why would I want to change it from right to wrong? (;->
You wouldn't, of course, unless you enjoyed experiencing error. What
I hope you will be able to do (and precious few have) will be to change
the reference for what your position is, so that what you currently
perceive as the wrong position is perceived as the right one.
You wouldn't, of course, unless you enjoyed experiencing error. What
I hope you will be able to do (and precious few have) will be to change
the reference for what your position is, so that what you currently
perceive as the wrong position is perceived as the right one.
You agree that you are controlling for what I said you were controlling
for:
the idea that descriptions of the appearance of behavior from the
point of view of a human observer (the typical way behavior is
described in the behavioral sciences) should be accounted for by PCT.
This isn't quite right. What I am attempting to maintain is the perception
that my views on various points are correct. I will quite happily change
them if you can demonstrate to my satisfaction that they are incorrect; so
far, you have failed to do so. However, I am willing, as always, to listen
to your arguments and to any evidence for them you may present, and to
consider these carefully.
How about stating, just for the record, what my argument was?
I believe that you think PCT should account for descriptions of the
appearance of behavior (actually, for the findings of conventional
psychology) for at least two reasons: 1) to convince psychologists
(including yourself) that PCT is a viable alternative to conventional
theories and 2) because a new theory should be able to account for all
the data that has been handled by previous theories, and then some (in
the way that relativity physics handled all the data handled by
Newtonian physics, and then some).
This is a good start, but it needs some work. PCT should be shown to
account for _certain_ well-known behavioral phenomena as a demonstration of
its explanatory power. The "findings of conventional psychology" is far too
big a territory. Many of these findings are irrelevant simply because they
are based on group averages. Many studies deal with behavior only as a way
to explore aspects of some system, such as perceptual input functions or
memory phenomena. These may (or may not) provide information that would be
helpful in guiding the construction of a PCT model; there would be no need
to model the perceptual control systems involved in generating these data.
Moreover, I do not see the need to carry on demonstrations ad infinitum; a
certain carefully chosen few should be enough to convince; if they fail to
do so, then it is unlikely that further demonstrations would convince either.
The demonstrations I have in mind are actually full-blown PCT research
projects, not superficial attempts to show how some PCT model _could_
account for some behavioral phenomenon. Although we did some of the latter
in the SD and classical conditioning modeling, these exercises represent
only a preliminary exploration of the problem; they also provided an
opportunity to learn how to write programs that would collect the data or
model the system. The full-blown projects would kill two flies with one
swat: elucidate the perceptual variables being controlled in the test
situation and provide a cogent theoretical account for the well-established
behavioral phenomon under investigation. This account would also allow one
to predict or explain what would be viewed as anomalies under the
conventional views.
I think we have tried to deal with these points, though perhaps it has
not seemed so to you. This whole flurry of posts about "describing
fly landing behavior" gets to the nitty gritty of my objection to your
argument.
I have tried to answer the first part of your argument by arguing that
PCT is not about the same phenomenon that conventional theories of
behavior are about. Conventional theories are about "behavior" which
is tacitly assumed to be caused results of action; PCT is about controlled
results of actiony -- results that are brought to reference states and
protected from the effects of disturbance.
I must have missed something here, because I thought PCT was about behavior,
just as conventional theories are about behavior. Bill's book is called
"BEHAVIOR: the Control of Perception," is it not? The difference is not in
what they are about, but in how they go about explaining it. This
difference leads to a different approach to data collection, a different
view on what variables should be observed and measured, what manipulations
should be performed, and many other differences.
Yet there are points of contact, especially with the experimental analysis
of behavior and with ethology (behavioral biology), both of which focus on
the behavior of single subjects. The subjects behaving in these studies are
autonomous biological control systems; the observed behavioral phenomena are
the products of such systems operating in a well-defined environment under
known conditions. If PCT has any merit at all it should be able to explain
why the subjects of these observations behave as they do--given suitable
research. A nice example of this approach is the e. coli research, which
identified how the bacterium's input and behavioral output mechanisms,
organized into control systems, produce the observed changes in tumble
frequency as a function of various types of gradient (heat, nutrient, etc.).
I think where you are getting confused is that you think I am proposing that
we should go around developing ad hoc models of known behavioral phenomena
without doing the research that would ground these models in appropriate
PCT-relevant data. That's not my view.
The answer to the second part of your argument is based on the same
point: the distinction between caused and controlled results of action.
PCT cannot be expected to handle data that has been "handled" by
previous theories when this data is not about controlled results of
action.
Again, I am not proposing that we just try to "plug in" a PCT model and
thereby "explain" some set of data. I agree that this would be a waste of
effort. I am suggesting that we select some interesting behavioral
phenomena for which a conventional explanation has been offered and research
those phenomena using standard PCT tecnology, such as applying "the Test"
for controlled variables. The resulting model would be a model of the
organism, not of the organism's behavior. This model could then be "run"
under the conditions in which the behavioral phenomenon of interest occurs;
if at all valid, it should then demonstrate said behavioral phenomenon.
Bruce:
You mean in addition to the Nachtigall and Dethier book references
Of course. Neither Nachtigall nor Dethier did any PCT-type research.
Pardon, your closed-minded prejudice is showing. As you have read neither,
you could not know that for a fact.
Try reading Nachtigall: 40. How is flight velocity regulated? (Pp.
134-139) It has a familiar ring to it.
Why don't you have a look at this book, Rick, and judge Nachtigall's
understanding for yourself?
Based on your description of his work and the extended quote from his
book, I judge that I can eliminate Nachtigall's book from my list of
books that are possibly relevant to PCT research.
You judge wrong.
Nachtigall's description of how a fly lands on the ceiling explains it from
the observer's point of view; it was not INTENDED to provide a control
system explanation, which would explain how the fly accomplishes what the
observer sees. This has nothing to do with whether Nachtigall does or does
not understand control theory (as I said in my previous post to you) and it
says nothing about whether his other discussions provide a control systems
analysis.
Nachtigall's book is intended to give a lay reader a good, general picture
of how insects fly, including basic structures and mechanisms, much as you
might describe how an aircraft flies. You would discuss the structural
properties of the wings and fuselage, the functions of the various
components as they relate to flight, some of the basic physics
(aerodynamics), engine characteristics, and so on. Most of this discussion
would not be about control theory, not until you began to talk about how the
pilot (or the autopilot) manages to fly the plane. But there, you would
talk about it. That's the way it comes up in Nachtigall's book.
I note that having rejected the book suggestions out of hand, you made no
mention of the research articles I suggested. Does this mean you _will_
look them up, or that these have been rejected out of hand as well?
Maybe it's best to finish this up with a question related to your first
question to me:
Why do you think we (PCTers) don't believe that PCT needs to account for the
descriptions of behavior provided by conventional psychology?
I'm a PCTer, too, but "we" don't subscribe to your view, so it is not true
that "PCTers" don't believe this.
To answer your question, my perception is that you have at least two
reasons: 1) most conventional research did not collect data that can be
used to construct an adequate control system model. A model developed
specifically to explain the behavioral data in question, absent the relevant
information about controlled variables, would be purely speculative, a mere
fantasy, and 2) the better approach would be to start from scratch with
studies designed to elucidate the controlled perceptual variables and from
those data develop a model of the organism. Eventually such a model should
"behave" appropriately (i.e., in agreement with observation, within
experimental error) under whatever conditions you choose.
My problem with this is NOT that I advocate just fitting models to extant
data (I don't, and thus agree with point 1), but rather, that I see no
reason why one should not explore the controlled variables that come into
play in some of the situations already extensively studied using
conventional approaches, then applying the resulting model to explain the
known behavioral phenomena that occur in those situations.
Well, look what just arrived:
Rick Marken (950527.0930)
So let me ask the queston again and try to make the intent clearer:
We PCTers believe that PCT should not be required to account for most
of the descriptions of behavior provided by conventional psychology, nor
should it be required to account for most of the results of conventional
psychological research.
Why do you (Bruce or anyone else for that matter) think we believe this?
Ah, BIG change! The added word MOST changes everything. I AGREE with THAT
statement (see above).
I would prefer an essay answer. But, if you prefer multiple choice, here
are some alternative short answers:
I've already provided the requested essay answer. As to the multiple choice
question, the best answer is g, but I'd also give some weight to b:
b) We have already accounted for some of these descriptions and results
and we are tired of doing it.
(and of seeing our theory rejected out of hand)
Skinner would say that it's a case of punishment suppressing behavior. I
wonder how PCT would account for that? Darn! There I go again, trying to
account for conventional findings with PCT. When will I learn? (;->
Regards,
Bruce