Commands Sans Results

[From Rick Marken (990308.1230)]

Me:

I think it's perfectly OK to think of a reference signal as a
command for _input_.

Bruce Gregory (990308.1312 EST)--

A command for input, but _only_ when the associated variable
is being controlled.

I would say that even when a perceptual variable is not being
controlled it is still being commanded by the reference signal,
it's just not being commanded _successfully_. If the perceptual
variable is not controlled -- either because it is not part of
a control loop or because the control loop is not functional or
because there is conflict -- it is still being _commanded_ by
the reference signal.

I think the fact that a reference signal can command a perceptual
variable _unsuccessfully_ is important for clinicians and
educators to understand. If I want ("command") a particular
perception (a date with some person, say) and don't get it,
either because 1) there is a conflict that prevents the commanded
perception from happening or 2) I have not learned (built the
control loop) to produce the commanded perception, I (my reference
signal) am still commanding that it occur. And I'm frustrated
because I am not getting what I commanded; so I feel stress,
anger, depression, etc., that is, I feel all the stuff that
clinicians and educators see in their patients and students.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Bruce Gregory (990308.1550 EST)]

Rick Marken (990308.1230)

I would say that even when a perceptual variable is not being
controlled it is still being commanded by the reference signal,
it's just not being commanded _successfully_. If the perceptual
variable is not controlled -- either because it is not part of
a control loop or because the control loop is not functional or
because there is conflict -- it is still being _commanded_ by
the reference signal.

Here's what I had in mind. You are driving on the highway and traffic is
light. You don't like the music you are hearing so you look down at your
radio and tune for another station. While you are looking at the radio,
you are no longer controlling the distance between you and the car ahead
of you. Instead you are controlling selecting a station. In this
example, where your attention is directed determines what reference
signal is commanding the perceptual input. You aren't controlling badly
for car separation, you aren't controlling for it at all while you are
tuning the radio. You still have the reference level but there is no
appropriate perception for it to command.

I think the fact that a reference signal can command a perceptual
variable _unsuccessfully_ is important for clinicians and
educators to understand. If I want ("command") a particular
perception (a date with some person, say) and don't get it,
either because 1) there is a conflict that prevents the commanded
perception from happening or 2) I have not learned (built the
control loop) to produce the commanded perception, I (my reference
signal) am still commanding that it occur. And I'm frustrated
because I am not getting what I commanded; so I feel stress,
anger, depression, etc., that is, I feel all the stuff that
clinicians and educators see in their patients and students.

Yes I agree. But this is quite different from situations where your
ability to control is limited by the limited bandpass of attention. If
you kept your attention on the road, you would have no difficulty
maintaining your desired distance behind the car ahead of you. It is
only because you are directing your attention elsewhere that the
reference level for separation is not commanding a perceptual input.

Bruce Gregory

[From Rick Marken (990308.2150)]

Bruce Gregory (990308.1550 EST) --

While you are looking at the radio, you are no longer controlling
the distance between you and the car ahead of you. Instead you are
controlling selecting a station. In this example, where your
attention is directed determines what reference signal is
commanding the perceptual input.

What you are proposing here represents a change in the PCT model.
You are saying that attention determines what reference signal is
commanding a particular perceptual variable (such as the
_distance_ between your car and the car ahead). But this is not
how the PCT model currently works. Right now, each perceptual
variable has a fixed association with a particular reference
signal (see my spreadsheet hierarchy at

http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/demos.html

to see the structure of the HPCT model, with one reference
signal per perceptual variable).

In humans, many (probably hundreds of) perceptual variables are
being controlled simultaneously, each with respect to a different
reference signal. The reference for the perception of music, for
example, is commanding a particular type of music _while_ the
reference for distance is commanding a particular distance between
you and the car in front of you. If you have to take your eyes off
the road to change the music perception, the reference for distance
doesn't go away. The _perception_ of distance _does_ go away,
but (hopefully) only briefly. While you are looking away from the
road (while you adjust the radio) you cannot control the perception
of distance (the reference for distance won't get the perception
it is commanding); but you are still controlling for the distance
between you and the car ahead.

Actually, your example describes a type of conflict. There are
(according to PCT) two control systems involves here; one with
a reference for distance; another with a reference for music.
Both use a lower level system (that controls perceived direction
of gaze) as part of the means of controlling their perceptions.
When the gaze control system has to be used to look at the radio
dial it cannot be used to look at the car ahead. What happens in
this case is that the reference for gaze switches quickly back and
forth (to satisfy the demands of both the distance and music
control systems. If one system were able to win this conflict
(get the gaze system to continuously look only at road or the
radio) the other system would be very unhappy (large error).

It may be that attention _is_ involved in controlling in the way
you describe. If so, this would require a major revision of
the PCT model. It would be great if some research would be
done to see how variations in attention affect controlling. But
as it sits now, all we have is subjective (anecdotal) evidence;
and that evidence suggests (to me, anyway) that we are controlling
perceptions (successfully) whether we are attending to them or
not.

I think the current "dogma" about attention and control (from
a PCT perspective) is that directing attention to a particular
controlled perception starts the process of reorganization in
the control system involved. That (according to PCT) may be why
attending to (becoming aware of) the controlled perceptions
involved in an internal conflict is theraputic.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Rick Marken (990309.0740)]

Bruce Gregory (990308.1550 EST)--

While you are looking at the radio, you are no longer controlling
the distance between you and the car ahead of you. Instead you
are controlling selecting a station. In this example, where your
attention is directed determines what reference signal is
commanding the perceptual input.

I posted a reply to this last night but it seems to have fallen
into the bit bucket. Very briefly, what I said was 1) this
is not how the PCT model works; attention doesn't determine
what reference signal is commanding a perceptual input 2) what
you describe is a conflict between two systems, one controlling
distance and the other controlling the radio station, that are
using the same lower level variable (direction of gaze) as the
means of controlling their inputs and 3) it may be that attention
works in the way you suggest but research is needed to test this;
the results of this research could lead to a change in the current
PCT model of attention (which is based on subjective evidence)
in which attention functions as the instigator of reorganization
in the system(s) controlling the perceptions to which attention
(awareness) is directed.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[from Tracy Harms (19990309.1320)]

Bruce Gregory (990308.1550 EST) wrote:

... In this
example, where your attention is directed determines what reference
signal is commanding the perceptual input. You aren't controlling badly
for car separation, you aren't controlling for it at all while you are
tuning the radio. You still have the reference level but there is no
appropriate perception for it to command.

...
If you kept your attention on the road, you would have no difficulty
maintaining your desired distance behind the car ahead of you. It is
only because you are directing your attention elsewhere that the
reference level for separation is not commanding a perceptual input.

Bruce Gregory

"Driving with safe separation" typically does remain a controlled
perception even while competing control loops monopolize visual
behavior. I disagree with your claim to the contrary.

A perceptual control system may involve periodic or otherwise
discontinuous attention. I propose to call this "polling". In my
thinking such a pattern brings topics such as "open loop" and
"modelling" into clearer focus.

When discontinuity in the pre-input aspects are accepted parts of a
control system, the lapses that occur involve "flying blind". Insofar
as behavior occurs in these periods, it is controlling subperceptions
which contribute to the satisfaction of the primary perception. The
more behavior is "blind" in this manner, the more we deal with "open
loop" control. As Bill Powers stated at the latest CSG conference,
so-called "open loop" control is a misnomer. Insofar as control exists
the loops are always closed, but in "open" loops there are important
delays (etc.) in feedback and correction that limit the accuracy of
control.

To go further, I propose that the involvement of subperceptions that
allow delays in attention constitute a type of modelling. This
modelling is very, very simple (merely controlled perception of time
elapsed) but it may well provide a sort of "model based" control. (I
suspect it is the most economical sort.)

The model that is effectively in operation consists of the conjecture "I
can get away with a degree of inattention." The degree in question
itself involves a perception: As the duration of inattention increases
the perception of "being within the acceptable margin of inattention"
becomes disrupted.

Periodicity of relevant sensation does not reduce the presence of
control, even though it may degrade the accuracy of the control or the
effectiveness of the behavior. During the "blind" periods the error
level of the main perception is heavily weighted by the contribution of
delay-modelling subperceptions. When the delay becomes prolonged the
perceptual error increases and behavior will change (such as a glance at
the roadway).

Tracy Harms
Bend, Oregon

[From Bruce Gregory (990310.0955 EST)]

Tracy Harms (19990309.1320)

"Driving with safe separation" typically does remain a controlled
perception even while competing control loops monopolize visual
behavior. I disagree with your claim to the contrary.

If you perform the Test I suggested to Rick, you might arrive at a
different conclusion.

A perceptual control system may involve periodic or otherwise
discontinuous attention. I propose to call this "polling". In my
thinking such a pattern brings topics such as "open loop" and
"modeling" into clearer focus.

You seem to be proposing a significant modification to PCT. I'll leave
it to the experts to comment on your model.

Bruce Gregory

[From Bruce Gregory (990310.0940 EST)]

Rick Marken (990308.2150)

Bruce Gregory (990308.1550 EST) --

> While you are looking at the radio, you are no longer controlling
> the distance between you and the car ahead of you. Instead you are
> controlling selecting a station. In this example, where your
> attention is directed determines what reference signal is
> commanding the perceptual input.

What you are proposing here represents a change in the PCT model.
You are saying that attention determines what reference signal is
commanding a particular perceptual variable (such as the
_distance_ between your car and the car ahead). But this is not
how the PCT model currently works. Right now, each perceptual
variable has a fixed association with a particular reference
signal (see my spreadsheet hierarchy at

http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/demos.html

to see the structure of the HPCT model, with one reference
signal per perceptual variable).

I don't think I am disagreeing with this model. Let me try a slightly
different tack. I have a reference perception for the sweetness of the
coffee I drink (no sugar). This reference level is part of the
hierarchy, but is not relevant if I am driving (and not drinking
coffee). _If_ I were perceiving myself drinking coffee, the reference
signal would command the perception, but since I am _not_ drinking
coffee, the reference signal is not playing an active role. Unless you
want to talk about virtual control (that is if-then control).
Virtual-control can be subject to the Test, but it seems to me that it
is different than actual control.

In humans, many (probably hundreds of) perceptual variables are
being controlled simultaneously, each with respect to a different
reference signal. The reference for the perception of music, for
example, is commanding a particular type of music _while_ the
reference for distance is commanding a particular distance between
you and the car in front of you. If you have to take your eyes off
the road to change the music perception, the reference for distance
doesn't go away. The _perception_ of distance _does_ go away,
but (hopefully) only briefly. While you are looking away from the
road (while you adjust the radio) you cannot control the perception
of distance (the reference for distance won't get the perception
it is commanding); but you are still controlling for the distance
between you and the car ahead.

Suppose we performed the Test. The car in front of me brakes rapidly
while I am tuning the radio. I collide with the car in front. As an
observer, you would conclude that I was _not_ controlling for distance,
would you not?

Actually, your example describes a type of conflict. There are
(according to PCT) two control systems involves here; one with
a reference for distance; another with a reference for music.
Both use a lower level system (that controls perceived direction
of gaze) as part of the means of controlling their perceptions.
When the gaze control system has to be used to look at the radio
dial it cannot be used to look at the car ahead. What happens in
this case is that the reference for gaze switches quickly back and
forth (to satisfy the demands of both the distance and music
control systems. If one system were able to win this conflict
(get the gaze system to continuously look only at road or the
radio) the other system would be very unhappy (large error).

O.K. That's a helpful way to describe the situation.

It may be that attention _is_ involved in controlling in the way
you describe. If so, this would require a major revision of
the PCT model.

Again, I don't think so.

It would be great if some research would be
done to see how variations in attention affect controlling. But
as it sits now, all we have is subjective (anecdotal) evidence;
and that evidence suggests (to me, anyway) that we are controlling
perceptions (successfully) whether we are attending to them or
not.

I'm willing to wager that your ability to track a target depends
critically on your paying attention to the task. I agree that your
abilities to walk and chew gum do not require your attention. So there
are at least two types of tasks, those that require attention and those
that do not. In PCT these types of tasks are not differentiated as far
as I can tell. But that doesn't mean that they can't be, does it?

I think the current "dogma" about attention and control (from
a PCT perspective) is that directing attention to a particular
controlled perception starts the process of reorganization in
the control system involved. That (according to PCT) may be why
attending to (becoming aware of) the controlled perceptions
involved in an internal conflict is therapeutic.

I guess I am unpersuaded by this particular dogma. When traffic gets
heavy I pay more attention to my driving, but I don't have any evidence
that I am reorganizing.

Bruce Gregory

[From Bill Powers (990311.0921 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (990308.1550 EST) --

Here's what I had in mind. You are driving on the highway and traffic is
light. You don't like the music you are hearing so you look down at your
radio and tune for another station. While you are looking at the radio,
you are no longer controlling the distance between you and the car ahead
of you. Instead you are controlling selecting a station. In this
example, where your attention is directed determines what reference
signal is commanding the perceptual input. You aren't controlling badly
for car separation, you aren't controlling for it at all while you are
tuning the radio. You still have the reference level but there is no
appropriate perception for it to command.

This is a mistake that lots of people seem to make -- I guess that the
hierarchy isn't taken as seriously as it might be. Try your analysis again,
but this time taking into account the hierarchical structure in which a
lower system's reference signal is adjusted by a higher system that is
controlling a more general perception, with many systems operating in
parallel at each level.

Just keep in mind that there are 11 levels of "you", with many parallel
control processes going on at each level.

You do bring up an advanced subject that the present model doesn't deal
with explicitly: time-sharing of resources. We can control more variables
than there are output devices to control them with, provided that the
variables are inherently slow-changing (the one-armed paper-hanger effect).
The driver of a car can and does divert the eyes from control of road
position for 1500-2500 milliseconds at a time (Traffic Institute study at
Northwestern University) without fear that something will change radically
in that time. Of course accidents do happen nonetheless, but this seems to
be a common solution to driving while tuning the radio. Old fashioned
radios, the kind that were in my parents' 1939 Oldsmobile, didn't require
any visual attention at all -- they could be tuned by feel and hearing
alone, so they were much safer. Have you tried to tune a modern radio with
those tiny scan buttons by feel and sound alone? I can't even turn my radio
on and off that way. I practically have to duck down and lift my bifocal
glasses so the near-vision part is in the line of sight, while trying to
read the tiny labels, some not even painted. That's why I generally don't
have the radio on while driving.

But this is quite different from situations where your
ability to control is limited by the limited bandpass of attention. If
you kept your attention on the road, you would have no difficulty
maintaining your desired distance behind the car ahead of you. It is
only because you are directing your attention elsewhere that the
reference level for separation is not commanding a perceptual input.

Imagine a perceptual signal that is the averaged value of a succession of
samples of a set of inputs. The samples could come, say, 2 seconds apart,
so the smoothing might have to have a time constant of 5 seconds or so.
This would yield an essentially smooth perceptual representation,
especially if the signal were the output of a sample-and-hold system (i.e.,
the value of the last sample is held as a steady perceptual signal until
the next sample occurs, so the need for smoothing is minimized).

This would yield an adequate perceptual representation of a controlled
variable that varied only slowly -- slowly enough so it couldn't change
significantly in 2 seconds. Since the sampling process itself may require
only a tenth of a second or so, this would permit the eyes to serve
simultaneously in some significant number of independent control systems.
Think of an airplane pilot simultaneously controlling for collision
avoidance, altitude, compass heading, airspeed, attitude in pitch, roll,
and yaw, oil temperature and pressure, carburetor heat, engine RPM, and
propellor pitch. This is done by continuously and frequently sampling a
visual image of the instrument panel, as well as visual images of the
outside world through windshield and side windows. A single visual input
device thus provides perceptual signals simultaneously to (at least) a
dozen different control systems, each with its own reference signal and
comparator. To some extent, lower-order control systems must also operate
the hands and feet in a time-shared way.

I don't know what this has to do with attention -- nobody has yet done
experiments that would provide the kind of data we would need to test a
model of this sort. The word "attention" really has no meaning, has it?
It's just a vague reference to some sort of experience that remains to be
defined scientifically.

Best,

Bill P.