Conflict escalation and psychopathology

CONFLICT ESCALATION AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

[From Brian D'Agostino (951007.0700 EDT)

This responds to Bill Powers' "population measures; conflict and
war" (951005.0600 MDT). Bill wrote:

     Going to war is not necessarily pathological; it may simply
     represent the natural outcome of quite normal control systems
     interacting under particular circumstances. . . . By my
     defense, I may do something that you take as a threat. In
     defending yourself against that disturbance, you may draw upon
     resources that I perceive as giving you power not just to
     insult me further, but to harm me, and I may start to draw
     upon my own resources to improve my own defenses accordingly.
     And of course you can see me doing that. Thus starting with a
     casual remark, we may both end up armed to the teeth, and
     eventually one of us will perceive that waiting for one more
     round will create a fatal disadvantage, so it is necessary to
     commit an overt act that will reduce the other's power: i.e.,
     start a war. So a war can begin with both parties seeing
     themselves as simply defending themselves against a
     disturbance, and with nobody taking any voluntarily aggressive
     action (in either party's view of himself).

Reply: After reading this--what you call "the basic PCT picture of
conflict and how it escalates"--I realized something for the first
time. This "PCT picture" is _exactly_ what political scientists
call "threat escalation," which is the foundation of "spiral
theory," one of the most widely accepted explanations of war in
mainstream political science. (See Robert Jervis, _Perception and
Misperception in International Politics_, pp. 62-78). I believe
this theory is essentially correct as far as it goes, but that it
is not a complete or adequate explanation. Before discussing the
limitations of this theory, however, let me draw your attention to
something.

The remarkable convergence you have demonstrated here between "PCT"
and a "mainstream" political science theory should alert us to the
hazards of generalizing about or stereotyping the "mainstream." If
PCT is a profoundly true approach to understanding human psychology
and behavior, then we should not be surprised if some intelligent
thinkers in other fields of knowledge independently discover it in
one form or another. Such "diamonds in the rough" often coexist in
the mainstream side by side with implicitly S-R thinking. For
example, the leading competitor to "spiral theory" in political
science is "deterrence theory," which is based on the premise that
the behavior of other countries can be "controlled" by negative
reinforcements, especially the threat and use of force. (See
Jervis, 58-62).

Your unique and indispensable contribution has been to articulate
in a formal, explicit, and highly coherent manner PCT _as such_,
while other thinkers have applied control theory implicitly,
intuitively, and unsystematically in various fields. I believe one
of the most constructive and important tasks for the CSG is to
identify these implicit applications of PCT, and to weigh in on the
side of the proto-PCT theorists in their debates with proto-
behaviorist colleagues, showing how an explicit understanding of
PCT clarifies the debate to the advantage of the former. Your
comments about PCT and conflict escalation encourage me to do this
with the spiral-deterrence debate in political science.

Let us now turn, however, to the limitations of this "spiral
theory" of conflict and war. Regarding this kind of explanation,
you wrote:

     My point is that the control systems on both sides of the
     conflict are operating perfectly normally -- there is nothing
     pathological in either of them. What is pathogenic is the
     particular combination of goals that results in direct
     conflict . . .

Reply: I agree that it is not necessary to invoke psychopathology
to explain the dynamics of _a specific conflict or war_, but it is
a different matter with the more general phenomenon of war as an
institution, or the _war system_. In the context of such a system
--where conflicts between nations are ultimately settled by force--
the positive feedback dynamics you describe frequently take over
once control systems get locked into a conflictual interaction.
However, this model does not explain what maintains the war system
itself in the absence of specific conflicts. Under those
circumstances, the same positive feedback process should then work
in reverse. However, history is full of examples where such
disarmament initiatives began but were stymied by hawks who were
unwilling to relinquish military power, even in the absence of
external threats.

After World War I, for example, the world saw enhanced diplomatic
efforts to dismantle the war system culminating in the League of
Nations, the 1921 naval disarmament conference, and the 1929
Kellogg-Briand Pact. After World War II, we saw similar efforts
with the formation of the United Nations and global pledges of
"never again" and "saving future generations from the scourge of
war." After the Cold War and the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the
U.S. held the keys to world peace and the U.S. public clamored for
a "peace dividend." The spiral model predicts that under such
circumstances, country A's force reductions, by reducing the threat
posed to country B, should result in country B reducing _its_
forces and thus the threat it poses to country A, etc. The logic
of this process on a global basis should lead inexorably to general
and complete disarmament, and thus a state of affairs in which
_conflict_ could not lead to _war_ because all the potential
belligerants had beat their swords into plowshares.

The fact that this does not occur suggests that the majority of
policymakers in key countries such as the U.S. regard military
power as something more than a rational instrument of defense.
That is all I mean by "psychopathology" in this public policy
context. My data suggest that many if not most "hawks" are
unwilling to relinquish military power because for them it has a
positive symbolic value associated with maintaining their personal
machismo. This is clearly not an explanation of what motivates
_all_ hawks, but it is a step towards understanding why countries
are unwilling to relinquish military advantages regardless of
objective conditions of threat. I am willing to explore and test
other plausible explanations of militarism as well, if anyone wants
to suggest any.

Bill wrote: . . . one explanation for the selection of macho males
in policy-making positions could be that many women feel safer with
them in power. They want to know that if they feel a threat to
those whom they nurture, those in power are willing to take steps
to protect them. Of course I speak in stereotypes (or "ideal
types"), too, echoing the opposite stereotype just to show that the
picture is not completely unbalanced.

Reply: Yes, absolutely, and I didn't mean to exclude that kind of
explanation. This is something I will need to explore in my
interviews of female hawks. However, it should be noted that women
and children have the most to lose in an economic sense from
unnecessary war preparations, since tax revenues thus squandered
are not available for child care, housing, etc. This may be part
of the explanation for the small but statistically significant
"gender gap" in public opinion data, which show that 7% to 9% more
women than men are doves. Adding women voters to the picture
therefore only exacerbates the inability of the spiral model to
explain why disarmament fails to occur in the absence of specific
conflicts.

Bill wrote: Such time-bombs are more likely to go off when groups
are deciding on courses of action than when individuals are. Groups
are very much less intelligent than individuals. . . . Thus
governments march toward war for the simple reason that they can't
agree, internally, on any but the most simple-minded strategies:
someone is pushing, so we have to push back. Governments are
incapable of going up a level. Perhaps to solve the problem of war,
we need to be thinking about how to give them that ability.

Reply: Yes, absolutely, and this overlaps very much with C. G.
Jung's views about individuals vs. groups. As for giving
governments the ability to "go up a level," I would only add that
a small circle of key individuals including the president are
disproportionately influential in deciding government policy, and
they then use their special access to the media to shape public
opinion accordingly. The Council on Foreign Relations is a pretty
good cross section of this policy elite, and my data indicate that
hawks outnumber doves in the Council by a ratio of about 2 to 1.
If my theory is correct that hawks use military power to meet self
system needs, then one way of giving governments the ability to go
up a level is to build relevant psychotherapies into the support
systems surrounding policymakers. Since writing my article, I am
increasingly realizing that male hawks will never agree to this if
their group is singled out as uniquely in need of such
psychotherapy. I am therefore moving towards looking equally at
the psychopathologies of females as well as males, and doves as
well as hawks.

Best regards,

Brian

[From Kent McClelland (951007.1730 CDT)]

Brian D'Agostino (951007.0700 EDT) writes in response to Bill Powers,

[Bill:]

    My point is that the control systems on both sides of the
    conflict are operating perfectly normally -- there is nothing
    pathological in either of them. What is pathogenic is the
    particular combination of goals that results in direct
    conflict . . .

[Brian]: I agree that it is not necessary to invoke psychopathology
to explain the dynamics of _a specific conflict or war_, but it is
a different matter with the more general phenomenon of war as an
institution, or the _war system_. In the context of such a system
--where conflicts between nations are ultimately settled by force--
the positive feedback dynamics you describe frequently take over
once control systems get locked into a conflictual interaction.
However, this model does not explain what maintains the war system
itself in the absence of specific conflicts. Under those
circumstances, the same positive feedback process should then work
in reverse. However, history is full of examples where such
disarmament initiatives began but were stymied by hawks who were
unwilling to relinquish military power, even in the absence of
external threats.

My spreadsheet models of conflicts between interacting control systems have
led me to some unexpected conclusions, one of which relates to Brian's
argument and brings up a question I've been meaning to ask Bill (and
others) for some time.

My models show that when two systems controlling their perceptions of the
same environmental variable have different reference points for the
variable, their outputs rapidly diverge in the kind of escalation sequence
described earlier in Bill's post. However, when the conflict is suddenly
resolved (by my arbitrarily imposing the same intermediate reference level
on the two systems), the outputs do not then converge. Contrary to what
Brian says (and to my own expectations), the "positive feedback process"
does not seem to work in reverse. (Convergence comes only very slowly, if
at all, depending in some way I don't fully understand on the "leaky
integration" factor I'm using in the formulas.) The outputs may not ever
return to zero, at least not in any reasonable length of time. Basically,
neither system changes its output (because the perceptual errors have
already been erased) so that both continue pulling vigorously in opposite
directions while not, of course, diverging any further. Thus, the
resolution in the difference in reference levels just freezes the status
quo in output.

My question, then: In a PCT world, do conflicts ever get fully resolved?
If so, how?

I know that when I have a charley horse, the classic example of a low-level
organismic conflict, the tenseness and pain of the residual conflict can
last long after the stressful situation that occasioned the conflict is
ancient history.

Kent

<[Bill Leach 951007.18:55 U.S. Eastern Time Zone]

[Brian D'Agostino (951007.0700 EDT)

... If PCT is a profoundly true approach to understanding human
psychology and behavior, then we should not be surprised if some
intelligent thinkers in other fields of knowledge independently
discover it in one form or another. Such "diamonds in the rough" often
coexist in the mainstream side by side with implicitly S-R thinking.

Absolutely! An excellent example is William James (that has been cited
several times on csg-l) as a person that was trying to express "control
system ideas" without benefit of a codified control systems concept.

...the positive feedback dynamics you describe frequently take over
once control systems get locked into a conflictual interaction.
However, this model does not explain what maintains the war system
itself in the absence of specific conflicts. Under those
circumstances, the same positive feedback process should then work
in reverse. However, history is full of examples where such ...

The "positive feedback" that you and Bill P. reference is an observed
phenomenon and _is not_ inherent within the individual control systems.
Thus the expected "positive feedback" phenomenon you described would
indeed have to function much as you explain (ie: disarmament to zero
weapons of war) if such feedback was actually part of the control systems
involved in the conflict.

The apparent "positive feedback" is rather the disturbance to a
controlled perception of one negative feedback system that is caused by
active control by a second negative feedback control system and vice
versa.

I see at least two problems for the "spiral theory" here. The first is
that many control systems have control loops that are effectively
"bi-directional pairs". That is, if the perception deviates from the
reference in one direction, one of the loops acts to correct the error
and if the deviation is in the opposite direction then a different
control loop again acts to correct the error.

Thus, if the reference were for "no war" then the expected "positive
feedback effect" leading to total disarmament based upon "spiral theory"
would indeed take place.

However, if the reference is for some (non-zero) level of "security" then
when the perceived ability for "protecting oneself" dropped below the
reference for security further disarmament would be resisted with a
"fervor" similar to that which was "leading" to war in the first place.

Secondly, if it is recognized that human control systems are highly
complex and that various references "compete" for the limited degrees of
freedom of the output functions on a priority basis and that the priority
changes based somewhat upon the amount of error in each control loop as
well as the control loops importance in support of higher level
references, then it would be expected that as "hostility" or the
perceived "threat of hostility" was reduced that other control systems
that had previously been "preempted" would be allowed to again attempt
control.

Either of these ideas is sufficient to both explain the apparent "spiral
theory" effect as well as why the "spiral" does not seem to "work both
ways."

-bill

<[Bill Leach 951007.23:48 U.S. Eastern Time Zone]

[Kent McClelland (951007.1730 CDT)]

... integration" factor I'm using in the formulas.) The outputs may not
ever return to zero, at least not in any reasonable length of time.

Kent, I believe you are encountering an artifact of digital computing.
A good example of the sort of problem that you might be encountering is
the "spice" simulation of a blocking oscillator circuit when exactly
symetrical componets are simulated. The circuit will not oscillate yet
in practice the real circuit will always oscillate.

Basically, neither system changes its output (because the perceptual
errors have already been erased) so that both continue pulling
vigorously in opposite directions while not, of course, diverging any
further. Thus, the resolution in the difference in reference levels just
freezes the status quo in output.

The statement that neither system changes its' output because the
perceptual error have already been erased is not correct. If the
magnitude of the error signal changes, the output must change in a
control system.

Specifically, in the basic control system as used in PCT, if the error
signal value actually becomes zero then there will be no output force
generated. This condition does not have to exist for all control systems
(for example engineered systems) and probably does not even have to exist
for complex (that is multilevel) living control systems but for any
single control loop the output must either be maximum or minimum for a
zero error value and for the generally presumed PCT structure minimum is
the only option.

In the PCT model then "status quo" requires unchanged error signal
magnitude. Thus, in your spreadsheet example, when the reference was
changed so that both systems suddenly found no error between perception
and reference then the error signal value should have dropped to zero.
The actual output of both control loops should have decayed to zero at a
rate determined by the appropriate time constants. If one system had
different time constants then the output magnitude of both would appear
to decay at the rate of the longer time constant control loop.

I would suggest that this explaination is an assertion that "yes,
conflicts can be fully resolved" and that one way is if the references
"match".

charley horse

I don't know that I believe that the cause of a "charley horse" is
necessarily a "low level organismic conflict". I always thought that a
"charley horse" was a muscle injury as a result of overstress regardless
of cause. Thus an external force applied quickly enough to a muscle that
was tensioned properly can result in the experience.

As to the lasting tenseness and pain could they not the tenseness be a
normal control of perception of the concentration of certain chemicals
present in the muscle following injury and the pain just plain perception
of such chemicals?

-bill