Conflict (was Re: Perception vs Interpretation)

Martin Taylor 2007.01.15.14.26]

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.14.2320)]

Bruce Nevin (2007.1.14 19:45 EST) --

Conflict can result when two control systems control perceptual
variables which are, in each of them independently, functions of the
same environmental variables. (Cooperation can also result, or
intermediate or alternating conditions.)

In order to have conflict, the perceptual functions of the same environmental variables must be non-orthogonal (produce outputs that are correlated). There will be no conflict if the perceptual functions of the same environmental variables are orthogonal. If x and y are two environmental variables, then there will be conflict between two systems if one controls x + y and the other controls 2x + 2y and there will be no conflict if one controls x + y and the other controls x - y.

I think you had a demo to show that this is an insufficient description of conflict. Maybe you still do, or maybe my memory is playing me false. Either way, there will be a conflict if I am controlling x + y and you are controlling the orthogonal peception x - y, and we have only one slider between us to act on our respective perceptions.

Conflict is guaranteed if at any point in a set of control loops there is a bottleneck where the available degrees of freedom are fewer than the degrees of freedom among the perceptions to be controlled.

Psuedo-conflict (i.e. difficult control of one variable caused by attempted control of another) happens under much less rigourous conditions. It's theoretically possible for me to set x + y to its reference value while you are setting 0.9x + 1.1y to an independent reference value (which implies there's no conflict), but it's not so easy as setting x + y when you are doing nothing (implying something like conflict exists).

Even when the two controlled perceptions are truly orthogonal and the control mechanisms are independent, something very like conflict can still exist.

If we each have separate sliders, my actions in influencing x + y will probably have side-effects that influence x - y, because I will have to change x or y or both. You will need to compensate for my actions unless there's some kind of structural arrangement, invisible to us both, that ensures that I don't change x - y when I change x + y. Under normal circumstances, your compensatory actions will have side-effects on my perception, setting up a feedback loop (not a control loop) through both of us.

The feedback loop between us gnerates what amounts to disturbances to each of us, since nether control system can perceive the existence of the other. This automatically generated "disturbance" makes control more difficult than it might otherwise have been. Another way of looking at it is that the feedback loop through the two of us changes the dynamics of each of our two control loops, almost certainly in the sense of slowing the approach of the perception to its reference value.

Depending on the various functions in our individual control loops (perceptual, output, transport lags, etc.) the loop through both of us might even be unstable, in which case the theoretically possible control of both variables is not in practice achievable. A state in which each controlled perception was at its reference value would be a metastable state, perturbed by the slightest disturbance to either x or y, and causing an ever-increasing departure from effective control for both of us. It would look as though we were in conflict when we should not be.

The fact that x + y can be set independently of x - y wouldn't stop me getting annoyed with you when I find that your actions are preventing me from setting my perceptual variable where I want it. (Of course, that would involve an entirely different set of perceptual control loops :slight_smile:

Bottom line: there's more to conflict than having two control systems attempt to set the same perceptual variable.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.15.1400)]

Martin Taylor (2007.01.15.14.26]

Rick Marken (2007.01.14.2320)--

Bruce Nevin (2007.1.14 19:45 EST) --

Conflict can result when two control systems control perceptual variables which are, in each of them independently, functions of the same environmental variables.

In order to have conflict, the perceptual functions of the same environmental variables must be non-orthogonal (produce outputs that are correlated). There will be no conflict if the perceptual functions of the same environmental variables are orthogonal.

I think you had a demo to show that this is an insufficient description of conflict.

Perhaps you are referring to Cost of Conflict. In that case, two completely orthogonal (in the geometric sense) perceptions -- of the position of a square in the x and y dimensions -- are controlled and there is conflict because of the environmental connection between mouse movements and movements of the square in the x and y dimensions. The position of the square in the x dimension is x = mx+.5my+dx and the position of the square in the y dimension is y = my +.5mx+dy, where mx and my are mouse position in the x and y dimension and dx and dy are disturbances to square position in the x and y dimension, respectively.

My point above was just addressing Bruce's claim that "conflict can result when two control systems control perceptual variables which are functions of the same environmental variables". This is just true in general. It's the similarity of the _functions_ that compute the perceptions, not just the equivalence of the environmental variables on which the perception are based, that matters.

Bottom line: there's more to conflict than having two control systems attempt to set the same perceptual variable.

Perhaps. But I think it's awfully close to being all of it. Even in my net demo (described above) the x and y perceptions can be thought of as having become functionally equivalent do to the connection of the mouse to both variables.

I think we should be able to agree, however, that conflict is _never_ the result of "perceiving things differently".

Best

Rick

···

---

Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bruce Nevin (2007.01.15 22:29 EST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.15.1401) --

My point above was just addressing Bruce's claim that "conflict can
result when two control systems control perceptual variables which are

functions of the same environmental variables". This is just NOT true
in general.

The statement that conflict CAN result under these circumstances
certainly is true in general. I am aware that there are other factors;
that is why I included the word "can".

Do you understand how this important word "can" escaped your notice?

Rick Marken (2007.01.15.1140)--

These could be different higher order perceptions for which people

control.

... the model for which different people control is the source of the
different references for healthcare financing (and other things) that
are the basis the right-left conflict. But, again, the basis of the
conflict is different references for the same (or functionally

equivalent)

perceptual variables; it's not the result of perceiving things

differently.

Rick Marken (2007.01.15.1400)--

I think we should be able to agree, however, that conflict is _never_
the result of "perceiving things differently".

Ah, I see. You believe I am saying "conflict results when two control
systems perceive THE VARIABLE THAT IS IN CONFLICT differently. But that
would be a foolish thing to say. I must have done very poorly over the
past 15 years demonstrating my understanding of perceptual control, for
you to assume so quickly and easily that I meant something as foolish as
that. Or maybe you are only trivializing what I am saying, reducing it
to something that is easy to refute. Hmm. That interpretation would fit
your overlooking that little word "can" earlier. Gee, now I don't know
which to believe. Maybe I'm pretty foolish after all, not to understand
why you're doing this.

Perceiving things very differently at the higher level sets different
references at the lower level. You are saying that conflict results from
the setting of references immediately above the conflict, and you deny
that the conflict results from those references being set differently by
the different ways of perceiving higher-order perceptions. That seems to
me to be an unnecessary restriction on the meaning of "result". Surely
the difference at the level of conflict results from the differences at
the level that sets the references.

I do not recall actually saying "conflict is the result of perceiving
things differently," but let's go with that formulation. It is easy to
see that the two interpretations hinge on what you mean by "is the
result of". Conflict is the immediate result of two different references
being set for controlling one variable. Those respective different
references are the result of either perceiving and controlling different
things at higher levels (I want to go out the door, you want to go in)
or "perceiving things differently" at higher levels (the family is a
strict moral hierarchy, the family is a nurturing matrix; in both cases,
there are mother, father, children, but those relationships are
perceived differently).

Here's another way to look at this. The two models of the family (and,
by metaphoric extension, for society and politics) are in conflict. As
the very complex systems concept perceptions that they are, they are
controlled by many diverse means. A strict father can control it by
disciplining his child or his wife or by opposing single-payer
insurance, among many other means. Whatever means he uses to control it,
it may happen that a nurturing parent is also controlling the model of
family/society/politics by the same means. The immediate conflict is at
the lower level (doing what will result in a dependant person becoming
independent and responsible, doing what will result in an effective and
morally correct distribution of healh care to those who should have it),
but that is only symptomatic of the higher-level conflict, and the lower
level conflict can never be resolved without going up levels
sufficiently to resolve the higher-level conflict.

By the way, rarely if ever does any one person hold entirely to one
model or the other in every department of life (to recycle a quaint but
useful phrase). A man who is nurturing and a great communicator at work
may be a disciplinarian bear with his family (I know a good example).
There are many possible combinations and gradations. This is the key to
the path to communication and resolution that Lakoff proposes: Identify
the area of life in which the other person controls from the family
model that you would like to see controlled in politics; establish
communication and agreement in that area, then draw analogies to
taxation, or health care, or whatever it is that is your focus of
change.

In fact, the right wing has done exactly this in a systematic and very
well funded way over the past 40 or 45 years. (There's a brief summary
at
<http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2004/Republican-Propaganda1sep04.htm&gt;\.\)
As an example of their well thought out use of metaphor in their
rhetoric, Lakoff says elsewhere (I'm oversimplifying) that once you
accept the "tax relief" you have lost the debate, because relief is
rescue from something onerous, and the one who provides it is a good
guy, and whoever opposes it is a bad guy. So he suggests using metaphors
like paying your dues (I used that one in an earlier post) or making a
wise investment like the wise investments that our parents' generation
made with the result that we now benefit from the highway system, and
the internet, and for that matter the airline industry.

But to find out more you'd have to read the book.

  /BN

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.15.2130)]

Bruce Nevin (2007.01.15 22:29 EST)

Rick Marken (2007.01.15.1401) --

My point above was just addressing Bruce's claim that "conflict can result when two control systems control perceptual variables which are functions of the same environmental variables". This is just NOT true in general.

The statement that conflict CAN result under these circumstances certainly is true in general. I am aware that there are other factors; that is why I included the word "can".

Do you understand how this important word "can" escaped your notice?

Are you scolding me, Bruce? Um, I love it! :wink:

Rick Marken (2007.01.15.1400)--

I think we should be able to agree, however, that conflict is _never_ the result of "perceiving things differently".

Ah, I see. You believe I am saying "conflict results when two control systems perceive THE VARIABLE THAT IS IN CONFLICT differently.

No, I just thought you were saying that conflict results from "perceiving things differently". I had no idea how you think that would work. I'm still waiting to hear how it does.

But that would be a foolish thing to say.

Not really. Nothing you say is foolish. I think some of what you say is wrong but I may be wrong about that. I'm just trying to figure out how you think conflict works.

I must have done very poorly over the past 15 years demonstrating my understanding of perceptual control, for you to assume so quickly and easily that I meant something as foolish as that.

I think you overestimate my cleverness;-)

Or maybe you are only trivializing what I am saying, reducing it to something that is easy to refute. Hmm. That interpretation would fit your overlooking that little word "can" earlier.

Wish I had though of it;-)

Perceiving things very differently at the higher level sets different
references at the lower level. You are saying that conflict results from
the setting of references immediately above the conflict, and you deny
that the conflict results from those references being set differently by
the different ways of perceiving higher-order perceptions.

Actually, no. I am saying conflict results when two (or more) control systems simultaneously act to control functionally equivalent perceptions relative to different references. I presume that those different references are set by higher level systems.

I do not recall actually saying "conflict is the result of perceiving things differently," but let's go with that formulation. It is easy to see that the two interpretations hinge on what you mean by "is the result of". Conflict is the immediate result of two different references being set for controlling one variable.

Not one variable; two functionally equivalent variables. Conflict between two control systems results when system 1 controls p1 relative to r1, system 2 controls p2 relative to r2, there is a high correlation between p1 and p2 (ie. p1 and p2 are non-orthogonal) and r1<>r2.

Those respective different references are the result of either perceiving and controlling different things at higher levels (I want to go out the door, you want to go in) or "perceiving things differently" at higher levels (the family is a strict moral hierarchy, the family is a nurturing matrix; in both cases, there are mother, father, children, but those relationships are perceived differently).

Now your talking. If what you are saying is that different references (set by high level systems each of which controls a different perception) for functionally equivalent perceptions are the cause of conflict then we're on the same page.

Here's another way to look at this. The two models of the family... are in conflict. As the very complex systems concept perceptions that they are, they are controlled by many diverse means. A strict father can control it by disciplining his child or his wife or by opposing single-payer insurance, among many other means. Whatever means he uses to control it, it may happen that a nurturing parent is also controlling the model of family/society/politics by the same means. The immediate conflict is at the lower level (doing what will result in a dependant person becoming independent and responsible, doing what will result in an effective and morally correct distribution of healh care to those who should have it), but that is only symptomatic of the higher-level conflict, and the lower level conflict can never be resolved without going up levels sufficiently to resolve the higher-level conflict.

So you are saying that the higher level systems that set the references that create what I would the _actual_ conflict at the lower level are themselves "in conflict"? Since the higher level systems control different perceptions the conflict can said to be the result of perceiving the world in different ways? Is that it?

By the way, rarely if ever does any one person hold entirely to one model or the other in every department of life (to recycle a quaint but useful phrase). A man who is nurturing and a great communicator at work may be a disciplinarian bear with his family (I know a good example). There are many possible combinations and gradations. This is the key to the path to communication and resolution that Lakoff proposes: Identify the area of life in which the other person controls from the family model that you would like to see controlled in politics; establish
communication and agreement in that area, then draw analogies to taxation, or health care, or whatever it is that is your focus of change.

I guess this is similar to the PCT approach, which is MOL. The difference is that Lakoff assumes that he knows the higher level controlled perceptions that are the higher level source of the conflict; MOL doesn't assume that you know the higher level reasons for the conflict. Again, I prefer the MOL approach which is so mind bogglingly well described in Tim Carey's _Method of Levels_ book.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

From Bill Powers (2007.01.16.0615 EST)]

Bruce Nevin (2007.01.15 22:29 EST) --

Perceiving things very differently at the higher level sets different
references at the lower level. You are saying that conflict results from
the setting of references immediately above the conflict, and you deny
that the conflict results from those references being set differently by
the different ways of perceiving higher-order perceptions. That seems to
me to be an unnecessary restriction on the meaning of "result". Surely
the difference at the level of conflict results from the differences at
the level that sets the references.

Bruce N. has the answer to Rick Marken's claim that conflict never results from people's having different perceptions of the same thing. In MSOB I defined three levels (at least) involved in a conflict. The lowest is the level where the conflict is expressed: a single variable is being urged toward two different values at the same time. The second is the level where the conflict is caused: two different control systems, for different reasons, send reference signals to a lower level which turn out to require a variable to be in two different states at once. And the third level is the level that creates the conditions that call for the two different goals at the second level.

Clearly, Rick is talking only about the lowest level, where the conflict is expressed. Since a conflict is defined as a state in which the same variable must be in different states, what he says is true about that level. But perceiving things differently can easily be responsible for the generation of the reference signals that cause the conflict, so the conflict results from the difference in perceptions. The child wants a cute, friendly, lovable puppy, and the mother does not want another smelly, messy, expensive to maintain dependent in addition to the ones she already has. The same animal is perceived in two different ways: one way results in setting a zero reference level for owning a puppy, the other results in setting a high reference level for the same variable. It is the different in perceptions that results in the conflict.

In my new book I have a demonstration of reorganization involving three independent control systems. Each input function senses all three of the environmental variables that exist, and each output function affects all three of them. The three input weights in each system are selected at random in the range -1 to +1. The three output weights for each system are set by reorganization. For any combination of input weights, the perceptual signals eventually come to match their respective reference signals, which repeatedly trace out a pattern shown in a 3-D space for easy visualization. But each time the perceptions finally match the reference signals, after a new set of input weights is established, the environmental variables trace out a different pattern. If the input matrix is nearly orthogonal, the environmental variables follow a pattern of about the same size and shape as the pattern of the reference signals -- but rotated in three dimensions relative to the reference pattern. When the input weight matrix is far from orthogonal, the environmental variables trace out a pattern that is much larger than the reference signal pattern, of a different shape, and of course still oriented differently in space. When a condition of conflict is approached the environmental variables go to extreme values, but even without conflict, the behavior of the environment does not match the behavior of the perceptual signals. This combination of control systems is completely blind to spatial orientation.

So there is a very fundamental epistemological problem here. Two systems containing reference signals that vary in the same way, and which control the environment so that their perceptual signals accurately follow the changes in the reference signals, can come into conflict because they require different behaviors of the same environmental variables. That is because they are perceving those variables in different ways. If the environmental variables change in combinations that allow the perceptions in one system to follow their reference signals, that same pattern of environmental changes will cause errors in the other system. Neither system will be able to see why this conflict exists.

There are probably much simpler ways to demonstrate this phenomenon, and after Rick gets through trying so hard to be right, he will probably think of one. He's good at that. The real issue here, of course, is whether we can assume that our own view of the world is necessarily everyone's view, and whether any one of these views is privileged to claim being the only right one. While some views are less workable than others, and harder to control, and less self-consistent, the fact is that the environment has a lot more degrees of freedom than any product of perceptual reorganization can represent (as Martin Taylor has said for years) and there must be vast areas of reality that we cannot represent at all. My demo controls in three lineal dimensions, but can't perceive angular orientation, so as James Clerk Maxwell said 150 years ago, there are "coordinates" that we have no choice but to ignore.

Reorganization, fortunately, can deal with the results of conflict without knowing what is causing the problem. So we bacteria can swim happily around in this universe even though we have no idea of its true nature.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.16.0900)]

Bill Powers (2007.01.16.0615 EST)

Bruce N. has the answer to Rick Marken's claim that conflict never results from people's having different perceptions of the same thing.

Saved by the Bill :wink:

Clearly, Rick is talking only about the lowest level, where the conflict is expressed.

Duh!

Wouldn't it have been simpler if you had just said, at the beginning of this discussion: "Rick, when you say that conflict _does not_ result from people perceiving things differently, you are correctly describing the situation at the level at which the conflict is expressed. At that level conflict results from what you say: two or more systems controlling virtually the same perceptual variable. When I say that conflict results from people having different perceptions I am talking about the different perceptions controlled by the higher level systems that set the conflicting goals for the lower level systems".

My guess is that you didn't say this because you didn't think it at the time. You know as well as I do (I presume) that I know how conflict works; and I think you also knew what I was talking about but you persisted in saying that "conflict results from people perceiving things differently" because you know that's how most non-modeling types like to describe it. I believe that you (as you seem so often to do) were verbally pandering to your acolytes in order to sell PCT. At least, you look to me like you are pandering -- probably as much as I look to you like I'm trying to be right.

Since a conflict is defined as a state in which the same variable must be in different states, what he says is true about that level.

Oh, thank you, your majesty;-)

But perceiving things differently can easily be responsible for the generation of the reference signals that cause the conflict, so the conflict results from the difference in perceptions.

Which is something I obviously know. To say now that that is what you were talking about all along is just, well, insulting. I guess you're confident that it's your science I care about and not your approach to scientific dialog.

There are probably much simpler ways to demonstrate this phenomenon, and after Rick gets through trying so hard to be right, he will probably think of one.

I am not trying to be right just to be right (though that perception is up to you;-) What I think I am doing is trying to present a correct picture of how conflict works from a control perspective because I want people -- especially the clinically inclined types who are the ones who most often want to see conflict as a result of "perceiving things differently" -- to understand why MOL is such a promising approach to counseling. Based on my understanding of PCT, solving conflicts is about new ways of setting goals; it's _not_ about new ways of perceiving. Current approaches to counseling emphasize helping people "see things differently" under the assumption, articulated informally by you and the rest here on CSGNet, that conflict results when people see things differently. I think MOL is mainly about helping people _want_ things differently (via reorganization). So I will keep pushing to be "right" about how conflict works, not as an ego trip for me but to help push Tim Carey's wonderful book on MOL.

Best

Rick

···

----
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bruce Nevin (2007.01.17 23:44 EST)

Bill Powers (2007.01.16.0615 EST) --

I am delighted to hear that you have a new book in progress. And
obviously the warm weather in Hilton Head agreed with you. But we have
moved from this prolonged Sprinter or Wing or Wintumn or whatever this
weird season has been and overnight it's arctic winter outside, all but
the snow, and that's probably not long coming, so I can empathize with
your return westward. They had black ice on the roads in San Jose this
morning, so Rick maybe you've had some weather wierdmess mucking up your
commute as well even as far south as LA, laying out a stage setting for
discontent.

there is a very fundamental epistemological problem here.

Yes, indeed.

Successful control is a common argument for the veridicality of
perceptions. An organism whose perceptions did not accord with reality,
goes the argument, could not long survive. But as you point out we
paramecia, frogs, and humans perceive such very different smidgeons,
each distinct perceptual universe veridical by the test of species and
individual survival, yet so different. Physics may claim to unify all,
but at such a remove from our immediate perceptions! And we humans
diverge over what even such simple physical perceptions as snowfall and
sunshine constitutes at higher levels of perception.

The real issue here, of course, is whether we can assume
that our own view of the world is necessarily everyone's
view, and whether any one of these views is privileged
to claim being the only right one. While some views are
less workable than others, and harder to control, and less
self-consistent, the fact is that the environment has a
lot more degrees of freedom than any product of perceptual
reorganization can represent (as Martin Taylor has said
for years) and there must be vast areas of reality that
we cannot represent at all. My demo controls in three
lineal dimensions, but can't perceive angular orientation,
so as James Clerk Maxwell said 150 years ago, there are
"coordinates" that we have no choice but to ignore.

Reorganization, fortunately, can deal with the results
of conflict without knowing what is causing the problem.
So we bacteria can swim happily around in this universe
even though we have no idea of its true nature.

Which brings us to wonder about the place of science, and to ask whether
scientific method inches us fractionally closer and closer to a
representation of reality, or maybe only carries us fractally deeper and
deeper into a particular way of swimming through an ocean of infinite
degrees of freedom by behaving as though it is a reflection of how we
are organized.

(The swimming paramecia story, if we pursue it, suggests that creation
continues; that each of us is a center of expression for That which
creates and sustains the universe; that we are in this operational sense
made in God's image, as the story goes, and that we in turn construct
our perceptual universe in the image of how we are structured both by
inheritance and by reorganization. As to inheritance, we're committed to
what we -- the evolutionary we of chemical-biological time -- have
created so far, but there's still lots of wiggle room for reorganization
to reach into the random. But it's perhaps best to turn from religious
questions, about which people tend to be particularly quarrelsome, back
to an inquiry about the nature and value of science.)

It seems to me that scientific method is a codification of what every
organism does. Many-to-one neural functions that construct input
perceptions and reference perceptions, and one-to-many output functions
that transform an error signal to lower-level references and to actions
in the environment, are functionally like hypotheses and theories of the
environment. In science, hypotheses are explicitly stated in verbal or
otherwise symbolic form; a neural organization that constructs a
perception is an hypothesis in an embodied or immanent form. Both sorts
are subject to verification in the sensed environment and adjustment so
as to improve control. I am not saying that verbal statements actually
function as input functions or output functions or that a community of
scientists in a field constitute some kind of aggregate control system.
Aside from the sort of superficial observation that scientific method
systematizes what we do naturally, the point of the analogy goes in the
other direction, to argue that, to whatever extent we believe that
scientific method gradually comes to a closer and closer approximation
of representing reality in its hypotheses, theories, and models, in an
analogous way we might consider that organisms construct perceptions
which by processes of reorganization gradually approximate reality.

But it gets more interesting. Social organisms, at least mammalia,
certainly humans, attend to the behavior of others and from those
perceptions of outward behavior construct perceptions of the perceptions
of others; they compare their perceptions of the environment with what
they perceive to be others' perceptions of the environment. Also -- and
this idea has been strongly resisted in the past here -- they control a
perception of agreement. Evidence of the control of agreement is
abundant: doubt of one's own way of construing the issue, or confident
rejection of the other's construction; forming of like-minded groups
whose members disagree with the members of certain other such groups;
control activities running the gamut from politely ignoring evidence of
disagreement to outright hostility. In science, replication and peer
confirmation is an explicit formal requirement, but all the varieties of
ways of controlling dissent/agreement nonetheless still occur among
scientists as surely as among kindergartners or politicians or email
participants in CSG-net (some of whom are scientists).

The perspective of the swimming paramecium brings us too to the nature
of creativity, which it seems to me always begins with reaching into the
random. Which is what reorganization does: try something else. Another
hypothesis.

Now what does it do to science if, instead of being a quest to discover
the true nature of the universe, it is an investigation into available
degrees of freedom? There would be lower gain, I should think, on
defending what we have theorized so far. But some resistance is
essential. An effort to integrate the new discovery into a systemic
whole with the old has the effect of resistance, and yes, we do seem to
control for grasping the whole ball of wax. Excellent sculpting
material, wax. There's got to be some resistance to the medium. What's
the point of trying to sculpt liquid water? You can make a pretty good
soup, but then what?

So then the familiar metaphor of primordial soup brings us, by way of
your lovely little tale of the origin of life out of molecules that
maintain their integrity against disruptions, to the now popular notion
of memes, the notion that the development and spread of ideas or
concepts is in some way analogous to the evolution and environmental
propagation of living things. An observer on Mars with a powerful
telescope might with equal justice suppose that the spread of suburban
housing tracts and other buildings across the face of this planet was
some living organism like moss or lichen. Ideas persist because people
resist changing them, and they spread because by controlling the
perceptions that we call ideas or concepts or memes people are able to
control other perceptions successfully (or more successfully than
otherwise), and also, as noted above, because people control agreement
about ideas and concepts, the combination of which can result in
quarrels, etc.

Thank you, and we return you now to your regular programming.

  /BN

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.18.1235)]

Bill Powers (2007.01.18.0600 MST)--

I think the present discussion, if we may stretch the meaning of that term, is an example of two people (or more) perceiving the same things in different ways and, as a result, coming into conflict.

Yes. It's a conflict over how we would describe the same situation.

But now, when you look back, you see me saying that all differences of perception cause conflict, which is how you saw it the first time

Not true. Even saying that some differences in perception cause conflict is misleading. And it is misleading to say that controlling different perceptions causes conflict (I am controlling the perceptions of the movements of 10 fingers -- 10 different perceptions -- sans conflict). Only when control of the different perceptions -- like the perception of being thin and the perception of eating tasty food -- leads to inconsistent settings of references for lower level perceptions -- like eating ice cream -- is there conflict.

I was focusing on conflict at the level of the conflict -- saying that a conflict results from inconsistent settings for the same perception (the person wants to eat and not eat ice cream) -- and correctly describing it at that level. You claim that you and others were focusing on the higher level cause of the conflict -- the different higher level perceptions which are controlled by setting the inconsistent references for the lower level perceptions -- but, if that is the case, you were doing a piss poor job of that since it is _very_ misleading to say that controlling different perceptions (even specifying that you mean _higher level ones) is the cause of conflict because sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't.

There is nothing inherently conflict producing about controlling different higher level perceptions. This is demonstrated by the fact that we control many different higher level perceptions all the time without any conflict occurring at the lower levels. If you had written a paper for my class saying what you did about conflict I would give it a C or a D (giving you partial credit because at least you did demonstrate some knowledge of hierarchical control).

, and you accuse me of changing my view to pander to those less intellectually fortunate and in need of my aid. That's why I cited the page in MSOB, to correct your mistaken impression that I have changed my mind on this matter.I didn't. Or do you think I went back and changed MSOB to support what I am saying now?

I said you were pandering because I _knew_ that you had correctly described conflict in MSOB as inconsistent references set for the same lower level perception by systems controlling different higher level perceptions. I don't think of pandering as changing your mind; I think of it as you saying people understand your view of conflict when they don't. You have done the same kind of "pandering" in other PCT related areas as well.

I don't think you purposefully lie, by the way, so maybe it's not really correct to call what you do "pandering". I don't know if there is one word for it. But what you do is try your best to perceive a correct understanding of your work from acolytes. You don't do this with everyone -- you haven't done it with Carver and Scheier because, though they have used your work they have never solicited your approval; they are not acolytes -- you do this only with acolytes.

It's OK with me; you can do whatever way you like; but now that I'm teaching a class I am in a position where I can try to teach what I consider a correct (and useful) version of PCT (which is the way it is presented in all of your wonderful works). I am reluctant to point students to this discussion group because your approach on this net is just not regularly at the academic level I'm going for (sometimes you are stupendously brilliant, particularly when dealing with non-acolytes, but I can't count on it; so the net is great for me but I think it wouldn't be good for students).

Do you understand how this important word "can" escaped your notice?

to which Marken replies, not having understood what Nevin said,

Yes, it's a contrast of references, not ways of perceiving.

That addressed your misunderstanding that Bruce, and earlier I, said that differences in perception always lead to conflict. They CAN lead to conflict... There is a difference between

All conflicts result from higher systems with different perceptions

and

Higher systems with different perceptions all result in conflicts.

Yes, that is an important difference. But it is irrelevant because Bruce and you (and everyone else) was talking about conflict resulting from different perceptions _not_ conflict resulting from _higher level systems_ controlling different perceptions. That's why this silliness about the word "can" escaping my notice is irrelevant.

Bruce said "conflict _can_ result when two control systems control perceptual variables which are functions of the same environmental variables". What's important about that statement is the implication that conflict results from two systems _at the same level_ controlling perceptions of the same environmental variables. Bruce is clearly not talking about conflict resulting from higher level systems setting incompatible references for a lower level perception. He is saying that conflict _could_ result from two systems simultaneously controlling variables which are functions of the same environmental variables. I actually didn't disagree with this; I just clarified it, saying that the conflict results (or is expressed) in this case only when the functions of those environmental variables are non-orthogonal (highly correlated).

I guess Bruce got upset about the "can" because he thought I was implying that he didn't understand this. But I was actually just clarifying his correctly noted conditional: conflict can result when two control systems control perceptual variables which are functions of the same environmental variables, and this _can_ only happen when the functions are non-orthogonal. The stuff about _can_ referring to the fact that conflicts _can_ but don't necessarily result from higher level systems controlling different perceptions is your contribution. If that's what Bruce was talking about, then he did a pretty poor job of communicating it. A D level job at best.

Bruce: The strict father model is a hierarchical arrangement of moral authority from God...

In the nurturing parent model, the parents (if there are two) share household responsibilities...

Rick: These could be different higher order perceptions...

That is what Bruce just said. The conflict results from two different control systems controlling different perceptions by choosing conflicting reference levels for lower-order variables. That is what I was talking about and what Bruce was talking about. What were you talking about?

If that is what Bruce and you were saying, then why did he say what he said rather than what he was saying? When I get to the section on conflict in my course and I want them to learn that conflict results from two different control systems controlling different perceptions by choosing incompatible reference levels for the _same_lower-order percpetion I will probably say something like "conflict results from two different control systems controlling different perceptions by choosing incompatible reference levels for the same lower-order perception" rather than "The strict father model is a hierarchical arrangement of moral authority from God...In the nurturing parent model, the parents (if there are two) share household responsibilities...".

And anyway, Bruce WAS talking about a difference in perceptions resulting in setting incompatible references at a lower level. That's what a conflict is, isn't it?

I'm sorry, I wasn't really trying to misinterpret Bruce (or you). I guess I'm just too dumb to understand your crystal clear prose. But since I am the teacher, the students in my class will have to write down to my level. If I want them to understand that conflicts result from two different control systems controlling different perceptions by choosing incompatible reference levels for the _same_ lower-order perception they are going to have to say something like that rather than, say, something like "conflicts result when people see things differently". I think they could have learned the latter from People magazine and I want it to be worth their while to have bought that expensive MSOB;-)

You were the only one making that misinterpretation, Rick.

Apparently. I'm not that bright but I am very sexy;-)

I have no idea what you mean when you say "conflict usually _doesn't_ result from a difference in perceptions at the higher levels that generate the reference signals for lower level systems."

What it means is that higher level systems control many different perceptions and conflict rarely results. When there is conflict, it is a result of higher level systems, which are controlling different perceptions, setting incompatible references for lower level perceptions. But, as I said above, there is nothing inherently conflict producing about controlling different perceptions. What matters, in terms of conflict, is that the higher level systems are setting incompatible references for a lower level system.

It's not the fact that the higher level systems are controlling different perceptions that matters -- all of these systems control different perceptions -- it's that control of those different perceptions is requiring that incompatible references be set for the same lower level perception. There's nothing inherently conflict producing about the fact that one higher level systems is controlling for, say, attractiveness and another is controlling for a proper diet, as long as these two different perceptions (attractiveness and diet) don't require incompatible settings for a lower level perception like eating.

Perhaps what you meant to write was "A difference in perceptions at the higher levels usually _doesn't_ result in conflict." What you did say was that a conflict usually doesn't result from a difference in higher-level perceptions," meaning that it usually arises in some other way, and that is what I say is false. It usually DOES arise that way. However, most of the time. this overlap of higher-order outputs does not result in conflict.

Right. I said it incorrectly and you are correct to correct me! I get a D on that one. Thanks. Ain't communication great!

When you read "conflict as a result of different perceptions" , you simply don't see the same meaning I see. I certainly don't see "result of" as implying that is it only the difference in perceptions that causes the conflict, with no intermediate steps, whereas apparently you do. To me, one thing results from another if there is some sort of connection between them. If I meant a direct connection, I'd say one thing directly determines the other.

I just think it's non-essential and misleading. It implies that the difference in higher order perceptions is the essential problem in a conflict, and it's not. The problem in my eating example is not that the person wants to control different perceptions -- appearance and diet -- by eating. When a conflict exists, the problem is that the particular values of the two different higher level controlled perceptions -- appearance and diet -- require incompatible goals for a single lower level perception: amount eaten. So the way to fix conflicts is not to try to get a person to stop controlling different perceptions and start controlling the same one; the way to fix things is to find a way to control those different perceptions in a way that doesn't require incompatible settings for the lower level perception. This could be done by going up a level, figuring out why the references for appearance and diet are where they are and then figuring out new values to want -- like resetting attractiveness to "full figured" -- and the conflict could be solved with the person still controlling appearance and diet, just at different levels.

OK, everyone is wrong but you.

I'm not saying everyone is wrong or that I am right. You were all certainly way too unclear for me. I may be wrong, for all I know. But I am now teaching a class on PCT so I am thinking like a teacher. And, as the teacher, I would (as I said) have to give you all Cs or Ds on your descriptions of conflict. This may by because you don't understand it (I'm sure that's not true in your case) or because you can't communicate in a way that shows me that you understand conflict in the same way I do. I don't know. But all I can do as a teacher is read what you write and see, based on what you said, whether you seem to understand what's going on in the same way I do or not.

But that is not what any of us said: we said that conflict can result from seeing the same situation differently.

That strikes me as a vague and almost useless definition of conflict. It doesn't capture what I consider to be the essential components of conflict as revealed by PCT, which is that higher level systems are setting incompatible references for a single lower level perceptions. Again, if you were in my class and that were the extent of what you could say about conflict you would get a D on your paper (it's pass/no pass so you would not pass; you need a C or better;-))

By the way, one of the reasons for the low grade is that there was overwhelming disagreement with my description of conflicts as being the result of different references for the _same_ perception. If all of you understood conflict so well, why not just say "Yeah, that's true at the level at which the conflict is expressed" or something like that. I expect my students to know that "controlling the same perception relative to differnet references" is, in fact, a correct description of how a conflict is _expressed_. If my students wanted to say that conflicts don't result from controlling for the same perception they'd better be pretty quick to assure me that they know that this applies to the _higher level_ systems setting the incompatible references for the _same_ perception controlled by the lower level systems; they had better know that the conflict occurs when there are two different goals for the state of the _same_ perception.

Your bias becomes obvious when you scold me for not understanding that all the talk of "different perceptions" presumably referred to the perceptions controlled by "higher level" systems (a dubious proposition at best) and you don't scold the others (and yourself) for not understanding that my talk of "the same perception" referred to the perceptual variable in conflict; the one for which incompatible references are being set.

You are sticking to your original incorrect interpretations of what the others meant and insisting that we have changed our minds when we haven't.

All I know about what's on your minds is what I read. And everything I have read about conflict from the participants in this discussion (except some of your comments in the last two posts and, of course, everything you have written about conflict in B:CP and MSOB) is D level material. If you like it, that's fine. But remind me not to take your course or recommend it to my students;-)

Best

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
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[From Bruce Nevin (2007.01.18 16:47 EST)]

Bill Powers (2007.01.18.0600 MST)

···


Rick Marken (2007.01.17.2250) –

Bruce Nevin certainly didn’t mean “result from” in the sense of higher level systems

setting incompatible references for a lower level perception when he said:

Bruce Nevin (2007.1.14 19:45 EST)
Conflict can result when two control systems control perceptual variables

which are, in each of them independently, functions of the same environmental

variables.

“Certainly?” I’d say that he quite probably meant exactly what you say he didn’t mean.

But why not ask Bruce? None of us here is a telepath.

[Rick] This is not a description of two higher level systems setting incompatible references
for a lower level perception. Bruce is implying that two different ways of perceiving the same
environmental variables is the basis of conflict.

… in fact this is correct: the basis,

the reason for or the underlying explanation of conflict is that two higher-level control systems
controlling different perceptions set incompatible references for one lower-level perception.

We include more detail in some contexts which we leave unstated in others. In the quote from my 1/14 post, above, I was not foregrounding the fact that according to HPCT elementary control systems get their reference signals from higher-level elementary control systems. Instead, what was in the foreground in that post was the relationship between the perceived environment variables and the perception thereof. I was responding to your insistance, Rick, that the CV is not in the environment, but rather is perceptual input in the organism which is a function of environmental variables. This nice distinction is frequently not explicitly stated in posts to CSG-net, and I’m sure with very little effort you could find examples of just about everyone who has posted to CSG-net talking about the CV as a variable in the environment whose state two control systems are trying simultaneously to control – yourself included.

(This is right at the crux of the epistomological question that you were raising, Bill. What is controlled is a perception – hence, Rick’s insistance that the CV is a perception – but the control loop is closed through the environment, and we have no doubt that we are affecting real conditions in the environment. This is especially clear in collaboration or in conflict with someone else in the same physical environment, when the communications and other activities of that other person (as we perceive them) are consistent with the perception that both they and we are perceiving the same environment variables.)

In any case in that post I certainly was not implying that conflict arises from two control systems perceiving the same environment variables differently. That post has not connection with the exchange that is in dispute.

In the exchange of email about Lakoff’s hypotheses, at your request using single-payer insurance as an example, I said that two people whose beliefs contrast in the way Lakoff describes would perceive that fairly complex and somewhat abstract concept differently. The differences can be traced up the hierarchy (according to this hypothesis) to different systems concepts, but the differences are not limited to the systems concept level. Two people understand that single-payer insurance is a tax-funded, government-run social program that benefits people who are less well off. They perceive each of those attributes differently – social program, government operation of a program, taxes, people who are not thriving economically. You could try to say that they are controlling the same variable with different references, but though the words, like “tax”, are the same, the perceptual constructs that the different people associate with those words are different. (It appears to me that people may construct such perceptions so as to be consistent with a systems concept, but I don’t know of any serious investigation being done of control processes that result in philosophical consistency.)

There’s a learning process when a person first hears the phrase “single-payer insurance”. They learn what’s involved – tax, social program, etc. To learn what’s involved means to identify perceptions that that they already control as aspects of this new concept. As a result “single-payer system” becomes a verbal label for their existing control of what they now recognize as aspects of a single-payer system. Same label, maybe even same verbal labels for the several aspects, but at some point different perceptions under the same label “tax” or “government-run”. And there are some labels that one side uses and the other doesn’t, like “socialized medicine,” which is associated with socialism, communism, and various other cachements like atheism and depravity depending on how the individual has organized their perceptions.

The control of these different perceptions – tax as perceived by person A, tax as perceived by person B, social program as perceived by person A, social program as perceived by person B, and so on – sets references at lower levels for control of perceptions like a check box on a survey form, writing a letter to the editor of the local paper, or telling someone they’re a stupid idiot, because obviously they couldn’t believe THAT unless they were out of their minds.

/BN

[From Bill Powers (2007.01.18.1410 MST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.18.1235) –

Not true. Even saying that some
differences in perception cause conflict is misleading. And it is
misleading to say that controlling different perceptions causes conflict
(I am controlling the perceptions of the movements of 10 fingers – 10
different perceptions – sans conflict). Only when control of the
different perceptions – like the perception of being thin and the
perception of eating tasty food – leads to inconsistent settings of
references for lower level perceptions – like eating ice cream – is
there conflict

Can we say that that point is no longer important since we both agree on
it? Simply having control systems controlling different variables at the
same level does not, most of the time, cause conflict. However, when
conflict is caused, it is caused by control systems contr4olling
different perceptions at the same level sending conflicting signals
(signals specifying opposite or incompatible conditions) to a lower-level
system.

I was focusing on conflict at
the level of the conflict – saying that a conflict results from
inconsistent settings for the same perception (the person wants to eat
and not eat ice cream) – and correctly describing it at that
level.

At the level where the conflict is expressed, there is only one setting
of the reference signal (I think you meant to say reference). It is the
sum of the outputs from the two higher-order systems that are causing the
conflict. The net reference signal does not say eat and not eat ice
cream, because there is only one net reference signal with one value,
somewhere between the positive eat and the negative don’t eat.The only
place where both “eat” and “don’t eat” exist is at
the outputs of the two higher-level systems. Those signals are being sent
because one of the systems uses eating as a way of controlling its own
perception, while the other uses not eating as a way of controlling its
perception. One system might use eating as a way to make up for
loneliness. The other might use not eating as a way of losing weight. The
output of either system alone would set the eating reference level of the
lower level to the appropriate low or high value. When both control
systems at the higher level try to operate at the same time, the result
is conflict. They are trying to use the lower system to do two
incompatible things at the same time. The cause of the conflict is the
fact that the higher-level systems are issuing incompatible signals to
the reference input of the one lower-level system. The immediate effect
of the conflict is that the lower reference signal does not conform to
either of the higher-order output signals.

You claim that you and
others were focusing on the higher level cause of the conflict – the
different higher level perceptions which are controlled by setting the
inconsistent references for the lower level perceptions – but, if that
is the case, you were doing a piss poor job of that since it is very
misleading to say that controlling different perceptions (even specifying
that you mean _higher level ones) is the cause of conflict because
sometimes it is and sometimes it isn’t.

I won’t try to grade myself, but perhaps you might reconsider your claim
that there are two incompatible reference signals at the lower level. Two
incompatible signals certainly get to the reference input at the lower
level, but they add there to produce a single net (or maybe average?)
reference signal. Perhaps the “eat more” signal from one higher
system is excitatory, while the “eat less” signal from the
other higher system goes through a Renshaw cell and arrives with an
inhibitory effect.

The higher systems are not setting inconsistent references, plural, for
the lower-level perceptions, plural. They are sending inconsistent
signals to the single reference input of one lower system, so the net
reference signal and the resulting perceptual signal in the lower system
is not what either of the conflicted higher systems are specifying. The
cause of the conflict is not the lower level reference signal, but the
outputs from the two higher-level systems. The lower-level system works
just fine to achieve the net reference condition.

There is nothing inherently
conflict producing about controlling different higher level
perceptions.
This is demonstrated by the fact that we control many
different higher level perceptions all the time without any conflict
occurring at the lower levels.

Again, I agree with this and always have agreed with it. Remember my
model with 500 control systems at the same level, acting conflict-free?
However, sometimes two different higher-level systems will become
organized so they act by sending opposing signals to the same lower-order
system; in that case, the higher systems come into conflict with each
other. They can’t control loneliness at a low level and weight at a low
level at the same time, not because these goals conflict, but because the
actions required to achieve both goals conflict.

I said you were pandering
because I knew that you had correctly described conflict in MSOB as
inconsistent references set for the same lower level perception by
systems controlling different higher level perceptions. I don’t think of
pandering as changing your mind; I think of it as you saying people
understand your view of conflict when they don’t. You have done the same
kind of “pandering” in other PCT related areas as well.

I don’t think you purposefully lie, by the way, so maybe it’s not really
correct to call what you do “pandering”. I don’t know if there
is one word for it. But what you do is try your best to perceive a
correct understanding of your work from acolytes. You don’t do this with
everyone – you haven’t done it with Carver and Scheier because, though
they have used your work they have never solicited your approval; they
are not acolytes – you do this only with acolytes.

Carver and Scheier did solicit my approval by sending me chapters from
their manuscript. I told them they did very well at representing the
basic idea of PCT, but that I had reservations about other things they
said.

Those acolytes, perhaps better called people who are studying control
theory, deserve the benefit of the doubt, don’t they? It may even be that
some of them are marginally capable of actually understanding PCT, if
they are allowed to work out the answers for themselves and are told when
I agree with them. Some of them may even be almost as smart as you
are.

Bruce said “conflict can
result when two control systems control perceptual variables which are
functions of the same environmental variables”. What’s
important about that statement is the implication that conflict results
from two systems at the same level controlling perceptions of the same
environmental variables.

By sending their outputs to the same lower system’s reference input. Yes,
I agree with what he said. Apparently you are reading it in such a way
that you don’t agree with it.

Bruce is clearly not
talking about conflict resulting from higher level systems setting
incompatible references for a lower level perception.

Of course he is. “Trying to set incomptible references” might
be more accurate, because only one reference ends up getting set. When he
says this “results in” conflict he means, as I do, that the
end-result is that a conflict occurs. It occurs because the result is an
attempt to send two incompatible reference signals to the same lower
system.

All I know about what’s on your
minds is what I read. And everything I have read about conflict from the
participants in this discussion (except some of your comments in the last
two posts and, of course, everything you have written about conflict in
B:CP and MSOB) is D level material. If you like it, that’s fine.
But remind me not to take your course or recommend it to my students;-)

Well, let’s call it a gentleman’s D. Of course when you write things, you
know what you mean, so when you read them again you see that the words
say what you mean (even if they don’t, like “setting
perceptions”) But when you read what others say, you still see only
what you mean, and seem impervious to suggestions that others may have
meant something else. Oh, well. You’re not the first to do this, nor will
you be the last. But I don’t think that I have the secret to ending this
impasse, so I’ll just retire from the fray.

Best,.

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.18.1230)]

Bill Powers (2007.01.18.1410 MST)

Can we say that that point is no longer important since we both agree on it? Simply having control systems controlling different variables at the same level does not, most of the time, cause conflict.

Sure.

Rick Marken (2007.01.18.1235) --

I was focusing on conflict at the level of the conflict -- saying that a conflict results from inconsistent settings for the same perception (the person wants to eat and not eat ice cream) -- and correctly describing it at that level.

At the level where the conflict is expressed, there is only one setting of the reference signal (I think you meant to say reference). It is the sum of the outputs from the two higher-order systems that are causing the conflict.
The net reference signal does not say eat and not eat ice cream, because there is only one net reference signal with one value, somewhere between the positive eat and the negative don't eat...

Very good points. See, it's not that hard to communicate. When the conflict is internal it's the combination of outputs from two higher level systems that determines the net reference for a single lower level perception. I was being too loose in my language; a conflict results from inconsistent settings (plural) for the same perception only when the conflict is _interpersonal_; when the control systems controlling controlling the same or similar perceptions are in two different people. However, it is also possible to have intrapersonal conflict when the two higher level references are sent to different lower level systems; this happens when the perceptions that are controlled by those two different lower level systems are the same or very similar. But your point is still well taken.

�You claim that you and others were focusing on the higher level cause of the conflict -- the different higher level perceptions which are controlled by setting the inconsistent references for the lower level perceptions -- but, if that is the case, you were doing a piss poor job...

I won't try to grade myself, but perhaps you might reconsider your claim that there are two incompatible reference signals at the lower level.

Sure. This is probably the best way to model intrapersonal conflict (though it could also be done using separate lower level systems controlling the same or similar perceptions, as I said). But I think it's still correct to look at conflict as the result of two incompatible references (plural) at the lower level when the conflict is interpersonal and the lower level systems are in two separate people.

I don't think you purposefully lie, by the way, so maybe it's not really correct to call what you do "pandering". I don't know if there is one word for it. But what you do is try your best to perceive a correct understanding of your work from acolytes. You don't do this with everyone -- you haven't done it with Carver and Scheier because, though they have used your work they have never solicited your approval; they are not acolytes -- you do this only with acolytes.

Carver and Scheier did solicit my approval by sending me chapters from their manuscript. I told them they did very well at representing the basic idea of PCT, but that I had reservations about other things they said.

Good for you!

Those acolytes, perhaps better called people who are studying control theory, deserve the benefit of the doubt, don't they?

I think that most of these problems result from people's reluctance to give up agendas. I think the conventional notion that conflict results from people "seeing things differently" is one of those agendas. While you can certainly reinterpret such an agenda in PCT terms -- the different perceptions are perceptions controlled by higher level systems that result in an incompatible net reference for a single lower level perception (intrapersonal conflict) or incompatible references for the different lower level systems controlling the same lower level perception (interpersonal conflict) -- I think the net result of doing this is just to confirm the agenda (which is that the conflict is actually a direct result of people perceiving the same situation differently; not that it results from different higher level systems that happen to be controlling different perceptions sending incompatible outputs to produce the net reference for a single lower level perception). I don't believe pretending that such agendas are consistent with PCT is good for PCT science or applications. But it does avoid giving people offense, which, I suppose, is a good thing.

It may even be that some of them are marginally capable of actually understanding PCT, if they are allowed to work out the answers for themselves and are told when I agree with them. Some of them may even be almost as smart as you are.

I doubt it;-) But for me it's not a matter of proving how smart one is. I think it's about agendas. Obviously, virtually everyone who has studied PCT (with one possible exception;-)) is smart enough to understand it. If I'm smart enough, anyone is! The problem is that people come to PCT with agendas that ultimately prevent them from understanding what I think are some very _useful_ aspects of PCT. The "conflict based on different perceptions" agenda seems like a clear example to me. If you are sure that the problem of conflict is a problem of systems perceiving things differently then it seems to me that you are a long way from understanding why conflict occurs and how to solve it.

All I know about what's on your minds is what I read. And everything I have read about conflict from the participants in this discussion (except some of your comments in the last two posts and, of course, everything you have written about conflict in B:CP and MSOB)� is D level material. If you like it, that's fine. But remind me not to take your course or recommend it to my students;-)

Well, let's call it a gentleman's D. Of course when you write things, you know what you mean, so when you read them again you see that the words say what you mean (even if they don't, like "setting perceptions") But when you read what others say, you still see only what you mean, and seem impervious to suggestions that others may have meant something else. Oh, well. You're not the first to do this, nor will you be the last. But I don't think that I have the secret to ending this impasse, so I'll just retire from the fray.

I think you're making a mountain out of a molehill. I have no problem understanding what you mean and you seem to understand what I mean when we talk and write. The problems you describe above -- of my apparent imperviousness to suggestions about what others meant -- come up only (in my experience on this net) when you want someone to mean what you would like them to have meant. You're not the first to do this either: Tony Snow does it for his pal Bush all the time. I agree that we are at an impasse so I, too, will retire from the fray, for now -- until someone else says something with which I take issue, at which time I'll expect you to return to the fray and tell me that what the person said is exactly what you said on p. n of B:CP and that I'm "attacking them" because I'm jealous, or some such. Please don't feel like you have to stay out of these frays, by the way, because it seems to invigorate me and I know it also makes Dag very happy;-)

Best regards

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400