consciousness

[From Bruce gregory (980407.1200 EDT)]

Bruce Nevin (980407.1128)]

Bruce Gregory 9980407.1015 EDT) --

>Rick is stepping well beyond the bounds
>of HPCT when he identifies consciousness with the reorganization
>mechanism. Clearly reorganization can and does take place in the
>total absence of consciousness. And, as Bill points out, HPCT
>works in exactly the same what with or without consciousness.

Doesn't follow. Consciousness can not be aware of itself. If you identify
consciousness with reorganization, it follows that we are not conscious of
reorganization itself any more than we are conscious of consciousness itself.

Sorry, I don't follow you. Your comments do not seem to bear on
my statements. Since consciousness is not a HPCT concept,
your comments seem in addition to rather than opposed to my
statements. What am I missing? (Typo correction-- I said "same
what" and should have typed "same way").

Bruce

[From Bruce Nevin (980407.1420 EDT)]

Bruce gregory (980407.1200 EDT) --

Sorry, I don't follow you. Your comments do not seem to bear on
my statements. Since consciousness is not a HPCT concept,
your comments seem in addition to rather than opposed to my
statements. What am I missing?

What you said (9980407.1015 EDT) that I commented on:

Rick is stepping well beyond the bounds
of HPCT when he identifies consciousness with the reorganization
mechanism. Clearly reorganization can and does take place in the
total absence of consciousness. And, as Bill points out, HPCT
works in exactly the same what with or without consciousness.

Sounded to me like you were drawing this conclusion about boundaries
because (a) Rick identified consciousness with the reorganization system
but (b) reorganization happens without consciousness.

What I said that puzzled you:

Doesn't follow. Consciousness can not be aware of itself. If you identify
consciousness with reorganization, it follows that we are not conscious of
reorganization itself any more than we are conscious of consciousness

itself.

My suggestion is that if the claim (a) that you attribute to Rick is true
then you would expect reorganization always to happen without consciousness
(since consciousness cannot have itself as an object, and we've identified
consciousness with reorganization), so there is no contradiction between
that experience and Rick's claim.

If Rick's claim is correct, then you cannot ever be conscious of
reorganization itself. This would also follow from the reorganization
system being separate from the perceptual hierarchy and providing no
perceptual inputs to it, so it doesn't prove anything about Rick's claim
either way. But it might explain why reorganization and learning is such a
puzzle to us. By the time you're aware of learning something you've already
learned it. You can re-examine memories of partial learning from different
stages in the learning process but they do not represent the learning
process itself, a reef on which many a pedagogical theory has left itself
high and dry, as I am sure Gary could recount in detail.

  Bruce Nevin

[From Rick Marken (980407.1020)]

Stefan Balke (980704) --

what do you think, how does the reorganization system control
itself?

I don't think it "controls itself". The reorganization controls
perceptions, like any other control system. It just controls
perceptions associated with the operation of the control hierarchy
itself (rather than perceptual representations of external reality,
which is what is controlled by the control hierarchy).

Here's a VERY simple representation of the reorganizing system,

                 r
                 >
             p--|C|--e

···

from my point of view:
             > >
            >i> >o> reorganizing system
---------------------------------
             > > control hierarchy
      d ---> iv<----qo

It looks just like a control system. Of course, this is just one
of _many_ control systems that make up the reorganizing system.
The only thing special about the reorganizing system is what
is controlled; rather than controlling representations of the
external environment, reorganizing control systems control
representations of the control hierarchy itself; I'll call the
aspects of the control hierarchy that are controlled by
reorganizing control systems "intrinsic variables" or iv's.
These may be things like "average error in the hierarchy" or
"average error at some level of the hierarchy" or "blood sugar
level". The reorganizing system controls iv's by taking action
(qo) on the control hierarchy itself. This action might involve
changing the way systems in the control hierarchy perceive
the environment, changing the gain of control systems, changing
whether a control system is involved in controlling at all, etc.
The reorganizing control system might try all kinds of things to
get iv's to remain at their reference.

What you can't see in the diagram is that qo has no determinate
effect on iv; unlike control systems in the hierarchy, the re-
organizing system cannot use the usual _functional_ approach to
controlling a perceptual variable.So the control process used by
a reorganizing control system is probably a version of the biased
random walk system used by e. coli to navigate to targets. The
reorganizing system randomly changes qo and remains with the
selected qo only as long as p is moving toward r; if p starts
moving away from r, a new qo is selected (randomly). If this
qo starts p toward r then there is no change; if p doesn't
start moving toward r an new qo is randomly selected.

The point is that the reorganizing control system doesn't "know"
what to do to the hierarchy in order to bring intrinsic perceptions
to their references; learning (reorganization), which is a control
process aimed at changing the hierarchy to reduce intrinsic error,
is a unique control process becuase it involves trial (select
qo) and error (difference between p and r). It is a goal directed
trial and error process because the system only stays with a "trial"
as long as the trial is reducing error; the bias is to spend more
time doing what helps (reduce error) and less time doing what
doesn't help.

Is it following a simple hedonic rule like: produce a mininum
error sum at the higher levels?

Based on what I have described above I would say "yes"; reorganization
is about reducing intrinsic error (difference between perceived
iv and reference for that perception).

How could the MOL approach affect the reorganization system.
Do you have an idea? Or is my question misleading?

This is a GREAT question. But, as Bruce Gregory (9980407.1015 EDT)
notes, I have to step outside the bounds of HPCT (as a formal,
working model, such as my spreadsheet implementation) to answer
it. I think reorganization is the main issue for people who are
dealing with people who have (or are creating) problems! HPCT
does show that the main _behavioral_ problem people encounter
is CONFLICT. People who have fears, anxieties, depressions --
personal problems -- are suffering the consequences of _intrapersonal_
conflicts (one or more control systems within the person have
incompatible goals). People who are having problems with _other_
people (as in your RTP program, where teachers are having problems
with disruptive students) are suffering the consequences of
_interpersonal_ conflicts (one or more control systems within EACH
person have incompatible goals).

My "Cost of Conflict" demo:

http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/ControlDemo/Conflict.html

illustrates the problem of intrapersonal conflict. The conflict in
this demo is perfectly explained by HPCT. What HPCT doesn't explain
is _how_ you solve such conflicts. One thing HPCT _does_ tell you
is that the HPCT hierarchy itself cannot solve this conflict.
Something has to change the controlling done by the HPCT hierarchy;
something separate from the hierarchy of control that is suffering
the conflict. The HPCT system that is designed to control the
dot in the X and Y dimensions will just remain in the conflict
unless changed by an outside agency; it will keep working against
itself because that's the way the environment is set up; efforts to
bring the dot closer to its X reference move the dot from its
Y reference. The HPCT hierarchy _itself_ cannot solve this conflict.

But we know that people _do_ solve conflicts like this all the time.
They do it by becoming aware of the fact that they are in the
conflict and then figuring out non-conflicting was to control. The
method of levels is a process (based on an understanding of conflict
in hiearchical control systems) that helps people 1) identify
existing conflicts and 2) find solutions themselves. We can't
model the process or how it works (yet); we only know about the
benefits of the MOL from experience. But we DO know (from HPCT)
that something _like_ MOL is the ONLY way people can solve their
problems (inter and intrapersonal conflicts). That's because we know
from the HPCT model 1) what conflict _is_ and 2) that it cannot
be eliminated by the operation of the hierarchy of control
systems itself.

The HPCT model has no mechanism, for example, for "choosing" to not
be in a conflict. If, in order to control higher level perceptions,
the HPCT model has to control the X and Y position of a dot (like
the one in the demo) then there will be conflict -- and the conflict
will keep the HPCT hierarchy from achieving it's higher level
goal (as well as the X and Y goals). Something outside the hierarhcy
must change something about the hierarchy in order to eliminate
conflict. So there _must_ be something like consciousness or
a reorganizing system -- something that operates _on_ the control
hierarchy-- because we know that people often _do_ manage to solve
their conflicts, if only by developing ways to avoid them.

I think the MOL is the only method we currently know of that
helps whatever it is that is external to the control hierarchy --
consciousness, the reorganization systems, whatever you want to
call it -- solve control problems, ie. conflict. The only
evidence I have that the MOL is effective is personal experience;
I've gotten pretty good at "going up a level" and it always feels
better up there.

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Bruce Nevin (980407.1519 EST)]

What is happening when I observe something without control? "Observing" is
itself a controlled perception.

I follow the activities of a bird with my eyes. I have no intention of
changing it in any way. I do have an intention of continuing to observe it,
so I control the perception of perceiving its actions.

I sit for an hour with the intention of observing sensations in the area of
my nostrils. When I find myself perceiving something else, I do whatever it
takes (I don't know what it takes) to resume observing sensations there. I
am controlling a perception of perceiving sensations in the area of my
nostrils.

I suggest that perceptions of perceiving (metaperceptions if you will) are
what constitute self consciousness; other perceptions in the perceptual
hierarchy constitute subconsciousness.

The particular elementary control system that is controlling a perception
is paying attention to that perception. I am not so sure, however, that a
perception of controlling a perception (like a perception of perceiving) is
self-conscious control. Nevertheless, there is control of which we are not
aware. So perhaps something like witnessing one's control or observing
while controlling is what makes the difference between that and control of
which we are aware.

Control and awareness are distinct. I can be aware without control. I can
control a perception without conscious awareness of it or of doing so.

I suggest that control and attention are not distinct. I cannot control
without attention at least by the ECS involved. When I cannot pay attention
without control, either control of the perception or control of perceiving
that perception. Attention is the elimination of conflict between
controlling one perception and concurrently controlling another. I can
ignore one and that is how I concentrate on the other. I can control both
by perceiving both as parts of a whole from another ECS. That may require a
new input function, as in playing a piano with both hands.

In part this is a matter of definition, but I think it is not artificially
so, but rather a sharpening of the existing meanings of the words
attention, awareness, and consciousness, in relation to control. It reduces
ambiguity between awareness and attention. If we don't use them as synonyms
we can perhaps clear this up.

  Bruce Nevin

[From Bruce Gregory ((80407.1508 EST)]

Bruce Nevin (980407.1420 EDT)

Let me preface this by assuring you that I am not playing
stupid, I _am_ stupid. Must be the springlike weather... (or old
age...)

My suggestion is that if the claim (a) that you attribute to Rick is true
then you would expect reorganization always to happen without consciousness
(since consciousness cannot have itself as an object, and we've identified
consciousness with reorganization), so there is no contradiction between
that experience and Rick's claim.

However the more telling criticism is that consciousness cannot
be modeled and therefore is Beyond PCT (BPCT). It would help me
if Rick would point out when he is going BPCT or WBPCT (see
below). I promise to do the same.

If Rick's claim is correct, then you cannot ever be conscious of
reorganization itself. This would also follow from the reorganization
system being separate from the perceptual hierarchy and providing no
perceptual inputs to it, so it doesn't prove anything about Rick's claim
either way. But it might explain why reorganization and learning is such a
puzzle to us. By the time you're aware of learning something you've already
learned it. You can re-examine memories of partial learning from different
stages in the learning process but they do not represent the learning
process itself, a reef on which many a pedagogical theory has left itself
high and dry, as I am sure Gary could recount in detail.

Yes, what you say may be true but is definitely Way BPCT
(WBPCT).

Bruce

[From Bruce Gregory (980407.1628 EDT)]

Bruce Nevin (980407.1519 EST)

What is happening when I observe something without control? "Observing" is
itself a controlled perception.

I follow the activities of a bird with my eyes. I have no intention of
changing it in any way. I do have an intention of continuing to observe it,
so I control the perception of perceiving its actions.

Exactly.

I sit for an hour with the intention of observing sensations in the area of
my nostrils. When I find myself perceiving something else, I do whatever it
takes (I don't know what it takes) to resume observing sensations there. I
am controlling a perception of perceiving sensations in the area of my
nostrils.

Right with you, nostrils and all.

I suggest that perceptions of perceiving (metaperceptions if you will) are
what constitute self consciousness; other perceptions in the perceptual
hierarchy constitute subconsciousness.

Sachs and Crick (in different books!)describe individuals who
are blind but do not perceive that they are. As bizarre as it
mmay seem, they think there is nothing wrong with them. Sachs's
patient say he enjoys "watching" TV! I am not sure what this
tell us about our ability to perceive that we are perceiving,
however.

The particular elementary control system that is controlling a perception
is paying attention to that perception.

This is not clear. It is certainly perceiving, but is it
excluding other perceptions? I think not. I don't think I want
to say it is paying attention because that simply makes PA
synonymous with perceiving.

I am not so sure, however, that a
perception of controlling a perception (like a perception of perceiving) is
self-conscious control.

I'm not sure what a perception of controlling perception is. Is
it identical with noticeing that you are controlling a
perception? How could you do this? Would you have to perform the
TEST?

Nevertheless, there is control of which we are not
aware. So perhaps something like witnessing one's control or observing
while controlling is what makes the difference between that and control of
which we are aware.

Control and awareness are distinct. I can be aware without control. I can
control a perception without conscious awareness of it or of doing so.

Indeed.

I suggest that control and attention are not distinct. I cannot control
without attention at least by the ECS involved.

Cannot control without _perception_. True. Cannot control
without attention not obvious.

When I cannot pay attention
without control, either control of the perception or control of perceiving
that perception. Attention is the elimination of conflict between
controlling one perception and concurrently controlling another.

I'm not sure how you arrived at this. When a mother runs into a
burning building to rescue her child has she eliminated, or
overwhelmed conflict?

I can
ignore one and that is how I concentrate on the other.

Remember "ignore" is BPCT, unless ignore means zero gain.

I can control both
by perceiving both as parts of a whole from another ECS. That may require a
new input function, as in playing a piano with both hands.

Indeed.

In part this is a matter of definition, but I think it is not artificially
so, but rather a sharpening of the existing meanings of the words
attention, awareness, and consciousness, in relation to control. It reduces
ambiguity between awareness and attention. If we don't use them as synonyms
we can perhaps clear this up.

We still have a way to go :wink:

Bruce
First Church of Life Science (FCLS)

···

[From Bruce Gregory ((80407.1722 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980407.1020)

The HPCT model has no mechanism, for example, for "choosing" to not
be in a conflict. If, in order to control higher level perceptions,
the HPCT model has to control the X and Y position of a dot (like
the one in the demo) then there will be conflict -- and the conflict
will keep the HPCT hierarchy from achieving it's higher level
goal (as well as the X and Y goals). Something outside the hierarhcy
must change something about the hierarchy in order to eliminate
conflict. So there _must_ be something like consciousness or
a reorganizing system -- something that operates _on_ the control
hierarchy-- because we know that people often _do_ manage to solve
their conflicts, if only by developing ways to avoid them.

I think the MOL is the only method we currently know of that
helps whatever it is that is external to the control hierarchy --
consciousness, the reorganization systems, whatever you want to
call it -- solve control problems, ie. conflict. The only
evidence I have that the MOL is effective is personal experience;
I've gotten pretty good at "going up a level" and it always feels
better up there.

Since we doing some BPCT speculation here, I'll put in my two
cents. Everything I know about MOL suggests that it shifts that
BPCT element "attention". This is the basis for my conjecture
that changing what you perceive is a crucial step in reducing
conflict and increasing the domain over which you exercise
control.

Bruce
First Church of Life Science

[From Bruce Nevin (980407.2208 EDT)]

The problem with these terms like attention and ignoring that I am trying
to sort out is that our ordinary meanings for them have two perspectives,
our subjective experience and our observations of actions (our own or those
of others doing what we take to be the same as what we subjectively
experience), and what I am trying to get to is their meaning within a model
of control, which is a perspective different from either of those. It is
difficult not to slip from one to another perspective, and I'm afraid I
don't always notice that I have. Your responses bring this to my attention.
(We know what that means subjectively even though we can't model it yet so
we don't really know very well at all. But that's two senses of "know".)

Bruce Gregory ((80407.1508 EST)

the more telling criticism is that consciousness cannot
be modeled and therefore is Beyond PCT (BPCT).

"Cannot be modelled" is much too strong a statement. Probably: must be
modelled as something outside the control hierarchy but having influence in
it, much as we currently guess about reorganization and memory.

Bruce Gregory (980407.1628 EDT) --

individuals who
are blind but do not perceive that they are [... who]
think there is nothing wrong with them. [...]
enjoys "watching" TV! I am not sure what this
tell us about our ability to perceive that we are perceiving

This is about words and reports of subjective experience using words.

I'm not sure what a perception of controlling perception is.

I had in mind observing one's performance, the perception that you are
controlling as well as the actions by which you control it. This is how we
can intuit the control hierarchy, as Bill describes doing in coming up with
his understanding of the hierarchy.

The particular elementary control system that is controlling a perception
is paying attention to that perception.

This is not clear. It is certainly perceiving, but is it
excluding other perceptions? I think not. I don't think I want
to say it is paying attention because that simply makes PA
synonymous with perceiving.

No, it just says that paying attention is coincident with control. Whatever
attention is, the statement is that we see an instance of it when a control
system controls a perception. In this instance, there is no question of
excluding other perceptions, from the point of view of the control system
(ECS) that is done by its place in the hierarchy and by its perceptual
input function. But having clarified what I meant, I may end up conceding
your point.

I cannot control
without attention at least by the ECS involved.

Cannot control without _perception_. True. Cannot control
without attention not obvious.

I agree that for this we do not need an extra term, attention; control
suffices. Trying to understand "attention" I was supposing that in the ECS
controlling its perceptual input we see the simplest instance of attention.

Observing outwardly, attention is indicated by actions that enable us to
control a perception or (if the perception is not controlled) by actions
that increase the number of sensory inputs to the perceptual input function
and/or that control a perception of the given perception continuing.
Observing inwardly, attention to a perception is experienced as
concentration, ignoring other perceptions. How do we model "ignoring" in HPCT?

When I cannot pay attention
without control, either control of the perception or control of perceiving
that perception. Attention is the elimination of conflict between
controlling one perception and concurrently controlling another.

I'm not sure how you arrived at this. When a mother runs into a
burning building to rescue her child has she eliminated, or
overwhelmed conflict?

What useful distinction is there between the two?

I can
ignore one and that is how I concentrate on the other.

Remember "ignore" is BPCT, unless ignore means zero gain.

"ignore" is unaccounted for. It is a subjective term. It does not mean zero
gain in the case of unconscious control, but that is an overlap of meaning
of "ignore" and "unconscious". Unfortunately, it is not sufficient to say
that "ignore" should be restricted to perceptions that one could be
conscious of but is not at the time. The experience of meditation shows
that we can become conscious of or pay attention to a great many
perceptions of which we are normally quite ignorant. So you see the more we
lean on these words the less firm they seem. That is why we have to figure
out how to model what is going on. Then we can give the words precise
definitions when they refer to the model and clarify our experience in
model-based terms. But so far all I have is the words and the subjective
experiences that I attempt to report with them.

  Bruce Nevin

[From Bill Powers (980408.0248 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980407.1628 EDT)--
Bruce Nevin (980407.1519 EST)--

What is happening when I observe something without control? "Observing" is
itself a controlled perception.

...

Exactly.

Is that true? It doesn't seem so to me. If I realize "Ah, I'm observing the
apple," I am no longer doing that. I can observe various things, but how do
I choose them in order to observe them? To say I control which of them I am
observing is to say that I know of them before I start observing them,
which is self-contradictory (that is, I know of something without, at
first, observing it). If I am observing an apple, there is an apple in my
consciousness. But if I am obnserving the act of observing, my attention is
no longer on the apple, but on the observing.

The Method of Levels is based on the hypothesis that the Observer is never
aware of itself.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (980408.0255 MST)]

Bruce Nevin (980407.2208 EDT)--

The problem with these terms like attention and ignoring that I am trying
to sort out is that our ordinary meanings for them have two perspectives,
our subjective experience and our observations of actions (our own or those
of others doing what we take to be the same as what we subjectively
experience), and what I am trying to get to is their meaning within a model
of control, which is a perspective different from either of those. It is
difficult not to slip from one to another perspective, and I'm afraid I
don't always notice that I have. Your responses bring this to my attention.
(We know what that means subjectively even though we can't model it yet so
we don't really know very well at all. But that's two senses of "know".)

This is the problem. We experience; we divide experience into compartments
("experience" and "action", which are both experiences). We then try to
bring these concepts together into a model, which is another experience.
Confusing.

Bruce Gregory ((80407.1508 EST)

the more telling criticism is that consciousness cannot
be modeled and therefore is Beyond PCT (BPCT).

Bruce N.

"Cannot be modelled" is much too strong a statement. Probably: must be
modelled as something outside the control hierarchy but having influence in
it, much as we currently guess about reorganization and memory.

I agree with Bruce N. But "having influence on" seems backward to me:
consciousness seems more like receiving information _from_ something rather
than acting _on_ something. I think of awareness as a sort of tunable
receiver; tuning it brings various activities in the perceptual hierarchy
into view of the Observer. The perceptual signals that are tuned in appear
in awareness, so we can say that those signals are the content of
consciousness. But perceptual signals that are not tuned in are still
present, like all the radio stations that are broadcasting signals outside
the range of the receiver's tuning.

I had in mind observing one's performance, the perception that you are
controlling as well as the actions by which you control it. This is how we
can intuit the control hierarchy, as Bill describes doing in coming up with
his understanding of the hierarchy.

If you pursue this farther you come up against the problems of
self-reflexiveness. Can you perceive yourself perceiving an apple (etc.)? I
think not. The infinite regress never starts. The "perception of
perceiving" is always a higher level perception involving a different type
of perception. That is the basis of the Method of Levels. If you observe
what you are perceiving at one level, you become aware of perceptions
_about_ the first perceptions, but not of the same type as the first
perceptions.

... paying attention is coincident with control. Whatever
attention is, the statement is that we see an instance of it when a control
system controls a perception.

But what about control systems that are controlling perceptions of which
you are not, at the moment, aware? Right now (unless you're in bed) you are
balancing, and you have been doing so for some time. But you were not, I'll
bet, aware of controlling the perceptual variables of balance. There are
many perceptual signals at levels both higher and lower than the level at
which you're habitually aware that are under control, but they are not in
the field of consciousness. The higher systems are determining the
reference signals that set the highest goals of which you're aware, and
your conscious control actions result in varying controlled perceptions at
lower levels, also outside awareness. You can become aware of many of these
signals, but most of the time you are not aware of them even though they
are present and being controlled.

So the existence of a perceptual signal in an input channel, and the
process of controlling that signal, are not the same thing as consciousness
-- awareness of that perceptual signal.

BN

I cannot control
without attention at least by the ECS involved.

BG

Cannot control without _perception_. True. Cannot control
without attention not obvious.

BN

I agree that for this we do not need an extra term, attention; control
suffices. Trying to understand "attention" I was supposing that in the ECS
controlling its perceptual input we see the simplest instance of attention.

Attention is a phenomenon of what I can only refer to as the Observer. It
does not seem to be a phenomenon of the learned hierarchy of control
systems. It is a selective or restricted reception of information by the
Observer -- that's the nearest I can come to modeling it or relating it to
my experiences. It's unlike the relation of a perceptual input function of
one level to perceptual signals from lower levels, in that it seems
completely mobile; it can be receiving from one level in the hierarchy at
one moment, and a different level at the next. One's first thought is of a
giant switching matrix, but that would require a switch with as many poles
as there are neurons in the perceptual systems -- hardly a practical idea.

Yet the only other "practical" model would have to say that this "receiver"
exists in more than three dimensions, so that it can move its receptors
freely about inside the solid three-dimensional brain without physically
disrupting it.

How do we model "ignoring" in HPCT?

I don't know, but clearly we have a problem with this idea similar to that
of "selecting perceptions" to which to attend. We can't ignore something
unless we have first noticed it (else how would you know what you're
ignoring?). I think ignoring usually means continuing to be aware of
something but intentionally turning off all reference signals relating to
it, so no action is ever called for no matter what happens. We know the
vase is starting to fall off the mantle, but we continue administering CPR
to the victim without any thought of leaping to save the vase. We thus
ignore what is happening to the vase, although we are quite aware of it.
This is different from "ignoring" something of which one is totally unaware.

When I cannot pay attention
without control, either control of the perception or control of perceiving
that perception. Attention is the elimination of conflict between
controlling one perception and concurrently controlling another.

I don't think attention has anything to do (directly) with control.
Attention is the reception of information from perceptual channels by
something outside those channels. If any influence on the process of
control is to occur, it would have to be carried out through a different
path, going _from_ the outside something _to_ the control system. The label
for that kind of channel would be more like "volition" than "attention" (or
"awareness").

So attention may be a necessary ingredient for affecting control systems,
but the direction of effects is wrong; there must be some other process
that generates effects ON the control systems, in order to affect how they
operate.

This is the sort of thing that led me to conjecture about a connection
between awareness/volition and the reorganizing system.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (980408.0719 EDT)]

Bill Powers (980408.0248 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980407.1628 EDT)--
Bruce Nevin (980407.1519 EST)--

What is happening when I observe something without control? "Observing"

is

itself a controlled perception.

...

Exactly.

Is that true? It doesn't seem so to me. If I realize "Ah, I'm observing the
apple," I am no longer doing that.

This is not obvious to me at all. I can both observe the apple and have the
thought, "I am observing the apple" at the same time as far as I can tell.

I can observe various things, but how do
I choose them in order to observe them?

Wonderful question. And the answer is......?

To say I control which of them I am
observing is to say that I know of them before I start observing them,
which is self-contradictory (that is, I know of something without, at
first, observing it).

The idea I was trying to get across is that observing is an intentional
process. Intentions involve controlled perceptions.

If I am observing an apple, there is an apple in my

consciousness. But if I am obnserving the act of observing, my attention is
no longer on the apple, but on the observing.

Again, this does not fit my experience.

The Method of Levels is based on the hypothesis that the Observer is never
aware of itself.

What happens if one does not adopt this hypothesis? What changes?

Bruce G.

[From Bruce Gregory (980408.0956 EDT)]

Bill Powers (980408.0255 MST)]

So attention may be a necessary ingredient for affecting control systems,
but the direction of effects is wrong; there must be some other process
that generates effects ON the control systems, in order to affect how they
operate.

I would have though that this goes without saying. Since it does
not, you are obviously interpreting some statements I have made
in a way that I did not intend.

Bruce the Obscure

[From Bruce Gregory 9980408.1043 EDT)]

Bruce Nevin (980407.2208 EDT)

I said

>the more telling criticism is that consciousness cannot
>be modeled and therefore is Beyond PCT (BPCT).

You said.

"Cannot be modelled" is much too strong a statement. Probably: must be
modelled as something outside the control hierarchy but having influence in
it, much as we currently guess about reorganization and memory.

You are quite right. I should have said consciousness has not
been modeled and is therefore BPCT.

Observing outwardly, attention is indicated by actions that enable us to
control a perception or (if the perception is not controlled) by actions
that increase the number of sensory inputs to the perceptual input function
and/or that control a perception of the given perception continuing.
Observing inwardly, attention to a perception is experienced as
concentration, ignoring other perceptions. How do we model "ignoring" in HPCT?

Good question.

>> When I cannot pay attention
>> without control, either control of the perception or control of perceiving
>> that perception. Attention is the elimination of conflict between
>> controlling one perception and concurrently controlling another.
>
>I'm not sure how you arrived at this. When a mother runs into a
>burning building to rescue her child has she eliminated, or
>overwhelmed conflict?

What useful distinction is there between the two?

In one case she is not aware of being in danger, in the other
case she is aware of being in danger but the "avoid" danger
hierarchy is not in control.

>> I can
>> ignore one and that is how I concentrate on the other.
>
>Remember "ignore" is BPCT, unless ignore means zero gain.

"ignore" is unaccounted for. It is a subjective term. It does not mean zero
gain in the case of unconscious control, but that is an overlap of meaning
of "ignore" and "unconscious". Unfortunately, it is not sufficient to say
that "ignore" should be restricted to perceptions that one could be
conscious of but is not at the time. The experience of meditation shows
that we can become conscious of or pay attention to a great many
perceptions of which we are normally quite ignorant. So you see the more we
lean on these words the less firm they seem.

I've noticed.

That is why we have to figure
out how to model what is going on. Then we can give the words precise
definitions when they refer to the model and clarify our experience in
model-based terms. But so far all I have is the words and the subjective
experiences that I attempt to report with them.

I'm with you!

Bruce the Obscure

[From Bruce Nevin (980407.1252 EST)]

Bill Powers (980408.0248 MST) --

I'm not following your objection. Yes, the Observer is not aware of itself.
I don't see how that bears on what I said.

Bruce Nevin (980407.1519 EST)--

What is happening when I observe something without control? "Observing" is
itself a controlled perception.

Is that true? It doesn't seem so to me. If I realize "Ah, I'm observing the
apple," I am no longer doing that. I can observe various things, but how do
I choose them in order to observe them? To say I control which of them I am
observing is to say that I know of them before I start observing them,
which is self-contradictory (that is, I know of something without, at
first, observing it). If I am observing an apple, there is an apple in my
consciousness. But if I am obnserving the act of observing, my attention is
no longer on the apple, but on the observing.

The Method of Levels is based on the hypothesis that the Observer is never
aware of itself.

Suppose observing (without controlling that which is observed) is a
controlled perception: it does not follow that the control system doing the
controlling is also observing.

Suppose observing cannot be a controlled perception: then what is going on
when in meditation I return from distraction to observing the breath at the
nostrils? (Or whatever the meditation object is.) Seems like control to me.

  Bruce Nevin

[From Bruce Nevin (980408.1321 EDT)]

Bill Powers (980408.0255 MST)--

Let me chew on this a while. There's a lot in the reorg hopper.

This is the sort of thing that led me to conjecture about a connection
between awareness/volition and the reorganizing system.

I mentioned that imagination seems to me to involve more than the
imagination loop sending a copy of the reference input to the perceptual
input. It seems to me that the encounter with all those aniccha
"impermanent" distractions during meditation is a puddling traipse along
the wave-lapped shore of an ocean of chaos from which imagination draws and
from which reorganization draws. Creativity dips into the random -- I think
Bateson suggested something like that. This touches on the role of the
Observer in creativity. It's as though the thing we focus on were a seed
crystal being held in a supersaturated solution. If we hold one thing there
persistently, or consistently over time, we tend to bring it about in our
world of perceptions. Isaac saw gorgeous butts, Bruce saw other things.
Other experiences follow.

  BN

[From Bill Powers (980408.1143 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980408.0719 EDT)-

I can both observe the apple and have the
thought, "I am observing the apple" at the same time as far as I can tell.

Looking at an apple and running some words through your mind is not
observing your own observing. Observing is silent.

Best,

Bill P.

I was referring to statements implying that attention somehow acts on
hierarchical control systems, rather than being a perception-like function
acted upon BY perceptual signals. Attention is an "ingredient" in that it
may be the input part of some process that has outputs that affect the
hierarchy. But I don't see attention itself as an output.

Best,

Bill P.

···

At 09:56 AM 4/8/98 EST, you wrote:

[From Bruce Gregory (980408.0956 EDT)]

Bill Powers (980408.0255 MST)]

So attention may be a necessary ingredient for affecting control systems,
but the direction of effects is wrong; there must be some other process
that generates effects ON the control systems, in order to affect how they
operate.

I would have though that this goes without saying. Since it does
not, you are obviously interpreting some statements I have made
in a way that I did not intend.

[From Bruce Gregory 9980408.1515 EDT)]

Earlier today Bill wrote:

I was referring to statements implying that attention somehow acts on
hierarchical control systems, rather than being a perception-like function
acted upon BY perceptual signals. Attention is an "ingredient" in that it
may be the input part of some process that has outputs that affect the
hierarchy. But I don't see attention itself as an output.

I didn't mean to imply that attention somehow acts on hierarchical control
systems or that it is an output. I'm sorry if I left that impression. Things
"attended to" are a subset of things perceived.

Bruce the obscure

[From Bill Powers (980408.1420 MST)]

Bruce Nevin (980407.1252 EST)--

I'm not following your objection. Yes, the Observer is not aware of itself.
I don't see how that bears on what I said.

Bruce Nevin (980407.1519 EST)--

What is happening when I observe something without control?

"Observing" >>>> is itself a controlled perception.

Maybe this is the point of misunderstanding. The Observer does not control
anything; the Observer Observes. If it has any goals for what it observes,
I don't know what they are. My brain doesn't know.

Suppose observing (without controlling that which is observed) is a
controlled perception: it does not follow that the control system doing the
controlling is also observing.

I don't think it is a controlled perception. When you cease to observe you
are either unconscious or dead. Observing, in the sense we mean here, is
not the same as perceiving. Perceptual signals exist and can be controlled
whether they are Observed or not. The Observer is present whether there are
any perceptual signals or not.

So what is Observing for? I can only guess, and my guesses are awfully
simple. Basically, leading reorganization to where it's needed. But why do
this? What's in it for the Observer? I don't know, and I haven't heard any
persuasive suggestions yet.

Suppose observing cannot be a controlled perception: then what is going on
when in meditation I return from distraction to observing the breath at the
nostrils? (Or whatever the meditation object is.) Seems like control to me.

The observer observes the perceptions that are "distractions," then it
returns to observing the perception of breath in the nostrils (you have
noticed that _trying_ to return to observing the breath just creates more
distractions). Then it does not do that, either. When it's not doing that,
either, you're experiencing awareness without content or desire. I think
you know what I mean. This is a temporary state, but apparently one that is
useful to be in now and then, and to know about when you run into problems.
Your brain has to be taught to remember that this state exists, and to
remember to go through whatever little ritual prepares it to accept the
temporary disengagement of the Observer. My friend Sam called this sort of
thing the sticky feather that you give to your brain to keep it harmlessly
occupied while you take a little vacation.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (980408.1442 MST)]

Bruce Nevin (980408.1321 EDT)--

I mentioned that imagination seems to me to involve more than the
imagination loop sending a copy of the reference input to the perceptual
input.

I agree. I've said what I could make sense of, but it isn't much.

It seems to me that the encounter with all those aniccha
"impermanent" distractions during meditation is a puddling traipse along
the wave-lapped shore of an ocean of chaos from which imagination draws and
from which reorganization draws. Creativity dips into the random -- I think
Bateson suggested something like that. This touches on the role of the
Observer in creativity. It's as though the thing we focus on were a seed
crystal being held in a supersaturated solution. If we hold one thing there
persistently, or consistently over time, we tend to bring it about in our
world of perceptions. Isaac saw gorgeous butts, Bruce saw other things.
Other experiences follow.

"Random" is an elusive concept. All it really means is "not ordered
according to any scheme our brains know about." "Random" number generators
are perfectly systematic -- but the method for generating pseudo-random
numbers has no known relation to any physical or mathematical universe of
discourse.

In short, random reorganization might be a very orderly process, but one
not organized the way anything in the brain ends up being organized.

I like the idea of the reorganizing system "leading" the hierarchy by
selecting preferred perceptions -- seed crystals -- and waiting for the
hierarchy to catch on. Another piece for the puzzle.

Best,

Bill P.