[From Bill Powers (920505.1840)]
Got a adaptive map going to correct the difference between kinesthetic and
visual coordinates in the Little Man. So far it seems to work for a while,
then goes bonkers. These closed-loop systems are hard to understand. Plod,
plod.
Bruce Nevin (920505?) --
In your header you write "[From: Bruce Nevin (Mon 92044 13:48)]". Is that a
typo? If not, pls. translate 92044.
We ARE talking about different meanings for "continuous" and
"discontinuous." You use these words, apparently, in the sense of
"constant" or "variable." I use "continuous" in the sense of having
derivatives everywhere. In other words, a continuous (analog) perception
gets from one state to another by traversing a continuum of states between
the starting and ending states. A discontinuous one goes from the beginning
state to the ending state instantaneously, without passing through
intermediate states. Thus the perception of a variable like "spatial
separation" is continuous in my terms because for the separation between
real things to go, say, from large to small, it must shrink through a
continuum of intermediate separations. Perception of a variable like "dog,"
on the other hand, remains the same until the underlying perceptions change
enough to cross a category boundary; then the perception changes instantly
to "cat" (or whatever -- armadillo) without occupying any intermediate
states. This meaning of the terms distinguishes between "analog" and
"digital" variables, the meaning I was using.
There can be change in either the analog or the digital world. The
difference is whether the changes are smooth or occur in jumps. Clearly,
perceptions that change in a continuum don't lend themselves to description
in words or symbols (unless the symbols are intended to represent
continuous variables). The nearest we can come is to use discrete modifiers
to refer to selected points in the continuum: very far apart, somewhat far
apart, not very far apart, and not at all far apart. Those terms simply
sample a tiny part of the possibilities and don't reflect the quantitative
relationship.
I think that perceptions from relationships on down are essentially
continuous -- although they are certainly continuously changing! From
categories on up, they are discontinuous, either-or, sequential, logical in
nature and while they are still changeable they can change only in finite
jumps.
···
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The experience of shifting levels is the experience of
identifying with one level rather than the other.
Right. I mean, agree.
The point of view or witness is something other than either.
Agree. Some call it the observer.
One can identify with that without the experience of first identifying
with a succession of levels of perception as point of view on the next
level below.
Agree. But the normal state is for one to be identified with some level,
habitually. I think it takes some experience with leaving that habitual
level (the hardest one to leave) and seeing it as a level, before the
attachment weakens enough to allow detaching at will regardless of the
current point of view.
The unattached witness experienced when looking at the highest >accessible
level is actually available everywhere and one can identify >with it even
while looking at level n from level n+1.
Agree. It is always the witness (or observer) who is aware; the particular
level involved merely provides the content, the interpretations, the
desires, and the habitual actions.
There is much greater freedom in this.
That's why it's worth doing.
I think holding out ecstasy as a reward is at best a well intended >fraud
perpetrated on behalf of those who otherwise would not poke into >these
questions.
Yes. Control theory (among other approaches) teaches us that the
understanding person is unrewardable, and thus uncontrollable through
rewards. It hardly seems appropriate to teach this by holding out rewards,
unless the intent is to reverse the desire that tempted the person, sort of
like a koan. "You can have anything you want, provided you don't want it."
I've never thought of the Quakers as a religious group. They behave more
like support groups I've seen. I like sermons that anyone can stand up and
deliver, like here.
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Len Lansky (920505) --
As I see it that theory [psychoanalysis] is about my perceptions and
keeping them constant, especially notions of defense mechanisms and how
they operate. But I am still struggling with the ideas.
If you browse through Freud's book on dreams, you'll find his "lens
analogy." He said that perception is like one lens looking at the image
formed by another lens, which is looking at the image formed by a still
lower lens ... . I think he understood about levels of perception. His
emphasis on conflict agrees completely with the CT concept. He, however,
thought that certain particular conflicts were universal and explained
everything, not seeing that it's conflict itself, whatever it's about, that
causes the problems.
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Gary Cziko et. al.
The thought of replying to the Bridgeman article in PSYCHOLOQUY just makes
me want to take a nap. I'll leave that up to you guys.
Rick says "The basic point of his paper is completely unconvincing to me --
it is simply the assertion that the word "consciousness" refers to the
process of carrying out these "plans". "
Everybody thinks consciousness is so easy to define. Yawn.
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Best to all -- no time for all this jabber.
Bill P.