# Control of reinforcement

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993>\
**Category:** CSG1995\
**Created:** [July 30, 1995, 5:58pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993 "1995-07-30T17:58:22Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 3

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**Author:** ![David\_Goldstein1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/d/58f4c7/32.png) [@David\_Goldstein1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/David_Goldstein1)\
**Post date:** [October 18, 1998, 5:48pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/41 "1998-10-18T17:48:35Z")

</div>

Sounds like an interesting article. I do remember coming across a few  
articles in the past, very few.

I suspect that the Psychologists who come the closest will be found in the  
area of Family Therapy where a systems perspective is at least respectable.  
Another thought is to look at Psychologists who study reinforcement  
preferences.

Warmest regards,  
David

> **···**
>
> From: David Goldstein  
> Subject: Re: Control of reinforcement [From Rick Marken (981018.0900)]  
> Date: 10/18/98
> 
> -----Original Message-----  
> From: Rick Marken \<rmarken@EARTHLINK.NET\>  
> To: Multiple recipients of list CSGNET \<CSGNET@POSTOFFICE.CSO.UIUC.EDU\>  
> Date: Sunday, October 18, 1998 12:03 PM  
> Subject: Re: Control of reinforcement
> 
> > [From Rick Marken (981018.0900)]
> > 
> > Yesterday [Rick Marken (981017.1650)] I asked Bruce Abbott  
> > the following:
> > 
> > > what I want to know is whether, after they perform their  
> > > version of The Test for the Controlled Variable, conventional  
> > > psychologists have a special name for the dependent variables  
> > > that turn out to be controlled variables?
> > 
> > I don't know if Bruce will help me out on this or not; he seems  
> > to be a bit cranky towards me these days. So I just want to say  
> > that I would really appreciate help on this from any of the  
> > psychologists (or sociologists, etc) on CSGNet who might know  
> > something about how behavioral scientists have delt with  
> > controlled variables.
> > 
> > Let me give some context again. I am planning to write a paper  
> > on \_controlled variables\_ (indeed, the current working title  
> > is "Controlled Variables") which I want to try to publish in a  
> > major psychological journal (the curernt target is Psychological  
> > Review). The thesis of the paper will be that psychologists have,  
> > by and large, ignored or been completely unaware of the existence  
> > of controlled variables. The paper will explain what controlled  
> > variables are, why they are important and how to find them.
> > 
> > What I need to know about are cases where psychologists \_have not\_  
> > ignored or been unaware of the existence of controlled variables.  
> > In particular, I want to find published psychological research  
> > studies where the researchers \_themselves\_ did or said things that  
> > indicate that \_they\_ were attentive to or aware of the fact  
> > (or even the \_possibility\_) that some variables were being  
> > \_controlled by\_ their subjects. I want to be able to include  
> > references to these research studies in my paper.
> > 
> > I think such papers exist; I have found one or two in the baseball  
> > catching literature. But even in these papers the evidence of  
> > awareness of controlled variables is often fleeting -- a brief  
> > mention of the "desired" state of a variable, for example. But if  
> > there are other papers where the \_researchers themselves\_ seem to  
> > be aware of the possibility that a variable might be \_controlled by  
> > the subject\_ then I would like to get the reference.
> > 
> > What I \_don't want\_ are examples of research that can be  
> > \_interpreted\_ (by you) in terms of controlled variables. I know  
> > that virtually any research project can be explained in terms  
> > of controlled variables. The problem with this is that such  
> > explanations are useless until they are tested (it was easy to  
> > explain operant behavior, for example, in terms of control of  
> > reinforcement rate; but it turns out that what little evidence  
> > we have on this -- since no tests have been done to determine  
> > what variable(s) \_are\_ controlled in operant experiments --  
> > suggests that rate of reinforcement is not a controlled variable).  
> > The other problem with this is that it makes it seem like the  
> > people who did the research \_were\_ aware of the possible existence  
> > of controlled variables. I am only interested in reporting (in my  
> > paper) examples of research where the researchers \_themselves\_  
> > were \_actually\_ aware of the possible existence of controlled  
> > variables.
> > 
> > If you do know of published psychological resarch papers in  
> > which there is evidence that the researcher(s) knew about the  
> > possible existence of controlled variables (it's not necessary  
> > that the term "controlled variable" appear in the paper; just  
> > any terminology or data collection that suggests an awareness  
> > that the subjects were trying to get something for themselves)  
> > please send me the reference in APA format: author (year), title,  
> > journal, volume, pages.
> > 
> > Thanks
> > 
> > Rick  
> > --  
> > Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> > Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net  
> > [http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/)

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**Author:** ![R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/R_Marken)\
**Post date:** [October 18, 1998, 7:05pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/42 "1998-10-18T19:05:51Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (981018.1110)]

Bill Powers (981017.1708 MDT) re: Bruce Abbott (981017.1630 EST)

> Please pay careful attention to Bruce's words.

Bruce Gregory (981017.2017 EDT) --

> I try to, Bill, but I never succeed in reading into them the  
> subtle attacks on PCT that you and Rick discern. I'll have to  
> try harder.

YThat would be nic. And a good place to start trying harder is  
with Bill Powers (981018.0922 MDT).

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net  
> [http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/)

---

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**Author:** ![Tim\_Carey1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/t/4491bb/32.png) [@Tim\_Carey1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Tim_Carey1)\
**Post date:** [October 18, 1998, 7:44pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/43 "1998-10-18T19:44:49Z")

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[From Tim Carey (981019.0555)]

> [From Rick Marken (981018.0900)]

> I don't know if Bruce will help me out on this or not; he seems  
> to be a bit cranky towards me these days. So I just want to say  
> that I would really appreciate help on this from any of the  
> psychologists (or sociologists, etc) on CSGNet who might know  
> something about how behavioral scientists have delt with  
> controlled variables.

I'm really looking forward to your paper Rick. At my university the  
academics I have spoken do not know a thing about controlled variables.  
IV/DV research is alive and going strong down under.

With regard to references. A couple of weeks ago Isaac sent me these  
references:

NATURE, May 14, Vol 393, "Postural Control in hte Mollusk"  
NATURE, April 16, Vol 392, "Multiple stored views and landmark guidance in  
ants"

Isaac describes these as two "test-like" studies. I haven't had a chance to  
check them out but I trust his judgement. They may be what you're looking  
for. Sorry about the reference it's not a complete APA but that was all  
Isaac sent me.

Cheers,

Tim

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**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/4bbf92/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory)\
**Post date:** [October 18, 1998, 8:11pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/44 "1998-10-18T20:11:47Z")

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[From Bruce Gregory (981018.1600 EDT)]

Rick Marken (981018.1110)

> YThat would be nic. And a good place to start trying harder is  
> with Bill Powers (981018.0922 MDT).

Thanks. I'll check it out. I want to play with the big guys...the ones  
who \_really\_ know what its all about. I want to grow up to be just  
like you, Rick.

Bruce Gregory

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**Author:** ![Marc\_Abrams5](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/f08c70/32.png) [@Marc\_Abrams5](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Marc_Abrams5)\
**Post date:** [October 18, 1998, 8:30pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/45 "1998-10-18T20:30:43Z")

</div>

> From [ Marc Abrams (981018.1607)

> [From Bill Powers (981018.0922 MDT)]

> Granted, although I have a hard time imagining how you  
> measure "availability." How did you prove that

"availability", \>rather than, say, amount of food in the  
cup, was controlled?

Not trying to be cute, but what difference does it make? We  
are controlling so many things at the same time and they  
change so frequently why does it matter what one CV in one  
person ( or rat in this case ) is controlling at one  
specific point in time. What does it prove? What kinds of  
insights are to be gained with this kind of knowledge? This  
has been my agrument with Rick. How can you ever "prove"  
\_what\_ a cv is for any one person. The \_test\_ might put you  
in the ballpark, but that is for \_one\_ cv not \_all\_ cv's  
that might be controlled for at that time.

How are the experimental designs coming Rick?

Marc

---

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**Author:** ![Abbott\_Bruce](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/eb9ed0/32.png) [@Abbott\_Bruce](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Abbott_Bruce)\
**Post date:** [October 18, 1998, 9:31pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/46 "1998-10-18T21:31:55Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (981018.1730 EST)]

> Bill Powers (981018.0922 MDT) --

> > Bruce Abbott (981017.2155 EST)

> > What a strange thing to say, after I have proposed that availability of food  
> > in the chamber is controlled, rather than its rate of occurrence.

> Granted,

I've separated this from the rest of your sentence, so that it gets noticed.  
But now comes a caveat:

> although I have a hard time imagining how you measure  
> "availability." How did you prove that "availability", rather than, say,  
> amount of food in the cup, was controlled?

You're right--the experiment wasn't designed to test how \_much\_ food the rat  
wanted to see in the cup before it stopped pressing and started eating. On  
CRF (1 press per food-delivery), some rats did develop the habit of pressing  
twice (and thereby getting two pellets into the cup) before moving to the  
cup and consuming the food. But that falsify my statement that the rats  
controlled for having food in the cup, it elaborates it by specifying a that  
they wanted a specific quantity there. On schedules other than CRF, by the  
way, the rat never allowed two pellets to accumulate in the cup before  
moving to the cup and eating what was there.

> It
> 
> > is also obvious that ruling out one CV does not rule out the possibility  
> > that the rat's actions may be controlling some other CV. It's not the sort  
> > of logical error I'm likely to commit.

> OK, I hoped not and now you say you don't make this sort of error. I can  
> only accept your claim until you disprove it (it doesn't take long: see  
> below).

I looked below: the promised disproof is not there. Instead, I find you  
making the same error you made the first time. (See below.)

> In that model, decreasing the reinforcement rate
> 
> > (by lengthening the average interreinforcement interval of the VI schedule)  
> > was supposed produce an increased rate of lever-pressing as the rat  
> > attempted to offset the reduced reinforcement rate. In fact the opposite  
> > happened. The model is incorrect.

> No, the opposite did NOT happen, because the (apparent and illusory)  
> decrease in the rate of pressing was not caused by a decrease in the rate  
> of reinforcement, but by time away from the lever that affected both the  
> apparent rate of pressing and the apparent rate of reinforcement.

Bill, you're making a terrible mistake here; I only wish I could figure out  
how to set your thinking strait about this. All I can do is try.

First, we are talking about performance on variable-interval schedules, not  
ratio schedules. Both require the rat to press the lever in order to  
receive food pellets, but -- and I'll separate this for emphasis -- the two  
schedules

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;differ in their their environmental feedback functions.

On ratio schedules, each pellet is delivered only after a certain number of  
lever-presses has been completed. The ratio of the ratio schedule specifies  
the number of lever-presses per pellet delivery. Pellet delivery is thus  
directly proportional to responses completed and consequently, rate of  
pellet delivery depends directly on rate of responding.

On interval schedules, each pellet is delivered only after (a) a certain  
interval of time has passed since the previous pellet delivery and (b) a  
single lever-press has occurred \_after\_ the interval has elapsed. (Any  
presses occurring prior to the end of the interval are counted but have no  
effect on pellet delivery.) What is the nature of this environmental  
feedback function?

To answer this question, I'll start with the case in which the interval is  
of fixed length (a so-called fixed-interval or FI schedule). For  
simplicity, assume that we replace the rat with a timer that closes the  
switch on the lever every t seconds. The fixed interval is tau seconds.

> From this information we can deduce the following three cases:

1. If t is equal to tau, then a pellet will be delivered for each  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"response" (tick of the timer) at a rate of one pellet per tau  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;seconds. Every response will be immediately followed by food  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;delivery.

2. If t is greater than tau, then a pellet will be delivered for each  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;response at a rate of one pellet per t seconds. Every response will  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;be immediately followed by food delivery.

3. If t is less than tau, then a pellet will be delivered only when nt  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;is greater than or equal to tau, and n-1 responses will occur without  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;being followed immediately by food delivery.

Assume that tau = 30 seconds (an FI 30-s schedule) and t = 8 seconds. The  
first three responses produce nothing (nt = 24 seconds, less than tau). The  
fourth response occurs at nt = 32 seconds, 2 seconds greater than tau, and  
is immediately followed by pellet delivery. The "programmed" interpellet  
interval is tau (30 seconds), but the "observed" interpellet interval (for  
this particular interval) is 32 seconds, or about 6.7% longer than it would  
be if the timer were running at an infinite rate rather than at one tick  
per 8 seconds.

But this analysis assumes that the rat can generate accurately timed  
responses at a constant interval. In fact the intervals between responses  
vary to some degree. In that case the time at which a given response occurs  
will be unrelated to the time at which tau elapses. If the mean time  
between responses is 8 seconds, then sometimes a response will occur just as  
tau elapses, producing the reward, and sometimes it will occur just prior to  
tau elapsing, producing nothing. In the latter case the next response will  
occur on average 8 seconds later. It can be shown that on average the delay  
between the end of tau and the next response will be t/2. Thus, for t = 8  
seconds, the observed time between rewards will be tau + t/2 = 30 + 8/2 = 34  
seconds.

\_Doubling\_ the response rate to 1 press per 4 seconds cuts the time between  
rewards to 32 seconds. Doubling it again cuts it to 31 seconds. Doubling  
it yet again cuts it to 30.5 seconds. So an increase in response rate from  
7.5 responses per minute (1 press per 8 seconds) to 60 responses per minute  
(1 press per second) reduces the average waiting time for food from 34  
seconds to 30.5 seconds, or about a 10% improvement in waiting time at a  
cost of an 8-fold increase in response rate. As tau increases, there is a  
decline in the percentage improvement in waiting time produced by a given  
increase in response rate. For example, on FI 300-s, the obtained reward  
interval at 1 press per 8 seconds is 304 seconds (within 1.3% of the  
theoretical optimum), and this falls to 300.5 seconds (about 1.2%  
improvement) at 1 press per second.

In variable interval schedules, tau changes after each reward, but tau  
averages to some specified value. The variation in tau makes it impossible  
for the rat (or anyone else) to "time" responses to match tau, which makes  
the analysis in terms of the rat's somewhat variable response rate have even  
more force: the end of tau and occurrence of the next response can be  
treated as randomly related with some specified mean difference.

So as you should be able to see, at relatively high rates of responding,  
rate of reward is nearly independent of rate of responding (that is, reward  
rate varies little with variation in response rate). Rats on VI schedules  
typically maintain response rates sufficient to place them within this  
region of the environmental feedback function. Until the increase in t  
becomes significant, the reduced response rates associated with higher  
values of tau are not accompanied by any appreciable change in reward rate.

> The  
> independent variable is time away from the lever; the two apparent rates  
> both depend on time away from the lever and are not causally related to  
> each other (based on \_that\_ measurement).

The rat can reduce its response rate by (a) generating a longer average time  
between presses wile standing at the lever or (b) maintaining a relatively  
constant rate while at the lever but spending a greater time away from the  
lever. I have indicated that both changes occur on VI schedules over the  
range of values of tau investigated. What I don't see is why you think the  
difference is so important, as if the rat's doing b rather than a somehow  
invalidated my analysis. It doesn't.

> The prediction from PCT is that a disturbance of a controlled variable and  
> the action that does the controlling will vary equally and oppositely. But  
> any application of that principle presupposes you have successfully  
> identified a controlled variable. PCT does not predict what variables will  
> prove to be controlled. PCT is not at fault for predicting that rate of  
> reinforcement is a controlled variable.

Do you imagine that I believe otherwise? Show me where I said that PCT was  
at fault. Go ahead. It's time to back up your assertions -- or rather,  
aspersions.

> My assumption was at fault: that if  
> the rate of reinforcement varied, it was because the rate of pressing  
> varied as well as because of the change in ratio (this was all on FR  
> schedules). You then proved with data that the rate of pressing was  
> effectively a constant, and thus was actually independent of both rate of  
> reinforcement and schedule.

Yes -- for ratio schedules. Different ballgame altogether. Entirely  
different environmental feedback function, you can't generalize from the  
ratio-schedule result to the VI-schedule situation we are discussing.

> I decided, and said a year and a half ago, that the particular model I came  
> up with couldn't be right because it assumed that the rate of pressing  
> changed with the (hypothetical) error. I acknowledged at the same time that  
> my fit of a control-system model to the Motheral data was spurious. Why are  
> you still harping on this? Do you want me to repeat once a week, or day,  
> that my first attempt at a specific model wasn't correct?

The VI result was reported to you -- privately -- last Spring. I haven't  
mentioned it since -- until now. I brought it up because of this:

&nbsp;&nbsp;Bill Powers (981014.0522 MDT)

&nbsp;&nbsp;By the way, I recall that you were quite sure the story would be different  
&nbsp;&nbsp;for Variable-Interval schedules. As I recall, your more recent experiments  
&nbsp;&nbsp;with VI schedules seemed to be showing the same effect: no significant  
&nbsp;&nbsp;variations in pressing rate on different schedules. Is that still holding up?

I mentioned your prediction because it was that prediction that led to my  
interest in reevaluating the VI interval-length vs response rate data, and  
because Rick had gone so far as to claim that this would be a crucial  
experiment between PCT and reinforcement theory. If my memory serves, he  
has made this claim again fairly recently, and I wanted to disabuse him of  
the notion.

I'm sure that a perfectly good PCT model can be built that will handle these  
data. However, it does give one pause for thought. The results confirm a  
perfectly clear if only loosely qualitative prediction based on  
reinforcement theory. That does not mean that reinforcement theory is  
correct, but at least it made a definite prediction. Given our present  
state of knowledge, PCT's predictions can only be made, as it were, after  
the fact, that is, after you have learned what variables are being  
controlled and how.

> Or could it be -- this just occurred to me -- that while rate of food  
> delivery is not a controlled variable, you're assuming it might still be a  
> reinforcer? That, of course, is ruled out because the behavior rate is  
> constant and does not vary with rate of food delivery. The same data that  
> rule out rate of food delivery as a controlled variable rule it out as a  
> reinforcer. The behavior rate does not change with "reinforcement" rate.

Not so, reinforcement theory can handle these observations -- again because  
of the difference between ratio and interval schedules. We went over this  
once before, but you refused to listen to me then, and now you repeat the  
assertion as if we'd never had the conversation. You leave me little hope  
that a second attempt would make any greater impression on you, so I'll just  
leave it at that.

> Your VI example in which both behavior rate and reinforcement rate decline  
> means nothing because the actual cause of the decline is time away from the  
> lever; it is not the decline in reinforcement rate that causes the decline  
> in behavior rate.

You keep saying this but the logic of it -- if any there be -- escapes me.  
See my above discussion of how VI schedules work.

> > There I go again, trying to pull the wool over everyone's eyes. How  
> > fiendishly clever of me.

> I'm beginning to think it's your own eyes you're pulling the wool over.

Bill, you're blind to your own blindness.

> > \_Of course\_ reinforcement rates decline with increases in the interval used  
> > in the schedule -- changing the interval sizes is how we experimentally vary  
> > the reinforcement rate.

> That is not what I am talking about. If time away from the lever increases  
> with the interval or ratio, that alone will result in a decline in behavior  
> rate and reinforcement rate, when both are measured as total number during  
> a session divided by duration of the session. You do not see any  
> significant change in pressing rate (corrected for collection time) until  
> the animal starts spending significant time away from the lever in addition  
> to collection time. This occurs at the higher intervals or ratios.

Your statements apply correctly to ratio schedules. They are wrong when  
applied to interval schedules. Why do you keep bringing up the ratio data  
when we are discussing the interval study?

> Perhaps so, but that is irrelevant. Time away from the lever increases with  
> increased intervals, doesn't it? That would automatically decrease both  
> apparent rates equally: pressing and reinforcement. If your mind-set tells  
> you that pressing rate depends on reinforcement rate, you will interpret  
> that simultaneous decline as causal, when it is not.

It is your mind-set, not mine, that is the problem. You keep thinking in  
terms of ratio schedules, and drawing conclusions that do not apply to the  
inteval schedules under discussion. Then, when the results do not agree  
with my statements, you attribute the problem to \_my\_ thinking!

> > But on high VI schedules, most programmed interreinforcement  
> > intervals are long enough that (a) reinforcement-events would not have  
> > occurred during most pauses and (b) most pauses will end relatively soon  
> > after a programmed interval has elapsed and the next reinforcement  
> > opportunity set up. Reinforcement rate consequently is little affected.

> That is mathematical gibberish, Bruce. What is little affected is the  
> \_whole-session\_ reinforcement (and behavior) rate. The short-term behavior  
> rate is drastically affected. You are rationalizing.

We're talking about slightly different things, Bill. When the rat is  
pausing, it is not responding and of course "the short-term behavior rate is  
drastically affected," if by short-term you mean the duration of the pause.  
But what I'm talking about is a somewhat longer interval -- the time between  
presses (some of which consist of pauses away from the lever) relative to  
the durations of tau. So long as the pauses are much shorter than tau,  
there will be little effect of these pauses on the obtained rate of reward.  
And that, my friend, is not mathematical gibberish, and it is not rationalizing.

> > And don't forget that the data consist of the times at which each and every  
> > response occurred, not session averages. However, it is convenient to  
> > report the result in terms of session averages, because those averages  
> > reflect the typical rates observed at any time within a session.

> More gibberish. It is convenient because you get the answer you want, not  
> because there is either logical or mathematical justification for this  
> number-juggling. The data initially consist of each and every response.  
> When you use session averages, you throw out most of the relevant information.

If the session averages and averages computed for various times within a  
session are similar, then one can argue strongly that one is as good as the  
other for depicting the relationships observed. Tell me, Bill, if you were  
assessing the performance of a control system at various levels of gain  
while the system was under a relatively constant disturbance, how would you  
proceed? Would you average over the noise in the CV being produced by the  
small variations in the disturbance to find the level of the CV produced at  
each value of gain for a given reference level? Is there anything terribly  
wrong with this procedure, when the observations are taken after the system  
has passed beyond the transient values of start-up? Because that's exactly  
analogous to what my procedure involved.

> > But we can state with certainty that increasing X, the programmed interval  
> > size (which is independent of the rat's behavior), reliably results in a  
> > lowered response rate, Y.

> That is because it reliably decreases the fraction of the total time the  
> rat spends pressing the bar. You are varying both numerators (total  
> presses, total reinforcements) while the demonominator stays the same  
> (session duration). There is no causal relation between X and Y.

There is no reason why Y (number of responses emitted) should fall just  
because X (number of rewards programmed) has been reduced -- after all, the  
denominator stays the same. Furthermore, as noted previously (and proven  
above) X can change over a wide range while hardly affecting X' (number of  
rewards obtained) at all. Thus the major reason X' changes is because X has  
been manipulated by the experimenter.

> If you  
> deliberately close your eyes to the obvious explanation of the decline in X  
> and Y, you can claim an overall effect, but in doing so you only reveal  
> that you want the conclusion to be true more than you want to arrive at it  
> by legitimate means.

Really, Bill, you're getting to be like Rick -- you think you can accurately  
guess at other people's motives. Not only that, but it seems to me that you  
have such confidence in your own thinking that it never occurs to you that  
you might be mistaken; consequently you brashly accuse anyone whose  
conclusions disagree with yours of muddy or even biased thinking. I've  
never had that degree of confidence that I've correctly understood or  
reasoned about something, and for that reason I've always been willing to  
consider yours or anyone else's arguments on their merits, on the chance  
that I've missed something significant. Sometimes I've discovered that my  
thinking was wrong, but even then I can take comfort in the fact that I've  
learned something. I've learned quite a bit from you, Bill. But I've also  
learned that you don't know everything, and that you can on occasion be  
quite wrong in your opinions. If you could bear that in mind, perhaps you  
would be less inclined to treat me like the village idiot in your replies.

Regards,

Bruce

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Abbott\_Bruce](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/a/eb9ed0/32.png) [@Abbott\_Bruce](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Abbott_Bruce)\
**Post date:** [October 18, 1998, 11:22pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/47 "1998-10-18T23:22:57Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Abbott (981018.1920 EST)]

> Rick Marken (981018.1600) --

> Marc Abrams (981018.1607)

> > why does it matter what one CV in one person ( or rat in  
> > this case ) is controlling at one specific point in time.

> Before answer this question let's consider the equivalent  
> question that could be asked of a conventinoal psychologist: Why  
> does knowing how a person (or rat) responds to a reinforcement  
> schedule matter? It matters because most psychologists (like Bruce  
> Abbott) believe that environmental events control behavior. So  
> learning things like "variable interval schedules produce higher  
> rates of responding than fixed ratio schedules" tells them something  
> about the behavior of organisms. And they can use this data in  
> applied settings; they can tell managers "if you want more work  
> out of your employees pay them at random intervals rather than  
> for fixed amounts of work".

If you're going to tell this little fairy tale, Rick, at least get your  
facts straight.

1. Bruce Abbott doesn't believe that environmental events control  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;behavior, not in the sense that you mean "control." You know  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;that, but for some reason you evidently feel compelled to lie  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;about it. (Try increasing your medication: that may help  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;control the cumpulsion.)

2. You have the schedule effects reversed and failed to mention an  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;important qualifier. Ratio schedules support a higher rate of  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;responding than interval schedules do, \_when rate of reward is  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;equated between the schedules\_. For someone who supposedly  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;got a PhD. in experimental psychology you sometimes display an  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;amazing ignorance of the subject. Perhaps that explains why  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;you decided to abandon the field.

Hmmm. I'm getting a little peevish myself! Time to up my own dosage . . .  
again. There, I feel much better now.

> Learning that a person (or rat) is controlling a particular  
> variable matters because control theorists believe that behavior  
> is the control of perception. So learning things like "a rat  
> controls the probability of a reinforcement" tells them something  
> about the behavior of organisms. And they can use this data in  
> applied settings; they can tell managers "don't try to control  
> your workers work levels by controlling the rewards they get  
> because they are trying to control the rewards themselves and  
> you will just get into conflict with them".

If all control theory can do is tell managers that they can't do their jobs,  
it isn't going to become very popular. As a control theorist myself, I  
would tell managers to arrange work conditions so that employees can achieve  
control over many variables important to them (self-esteem, job  
satisfaction, morale, perception of being treated fairly, fair wage for good  
work, and so on) while behaving in ways that also help the managers to  
acheive their goals and thus maintain control over variables important to  
them (like meeting production schedules, avoiding unnecessary costs, getting  
high quality in the work product, etc.). With some degree of effort it may  
even be possible to suggest ways in which employees' efforts to achieve  
control over their own important variables also contribute to the managers'  
achieving their own goals. This may involve setting up contingencies which  
allow the employees to bring certain of their CVs toward desired levels by  
efforts which also (not incidentally) contribute to achievement of the  
managers' goals.

This advice avoids the conflict problem emphasized in your advice while  
helping managers to get what they want, too.

> > How are the experimental designs coming Rick?

> Which ones?

You see, Marc, he's forgotten already. In fact, he's forgotten to answer  
your excellent first question, as well!

Regards,

Bruce

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/R_Marken)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 12:00am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/48 "1998-10-19T00:00:14Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (981018.1600)]

Tim Carey (981019.0555)

> I'm really looking forward to your paper Rick. At my university  
> the academics I have spoken do not know a thing about controlled  
> variables.

They probably just haven't read Bruce Abbott's methods text which,  
I'm sure, explains how you can tell a dependent variable that is  
controlled from a dependent variable that isn't.

> With regard to references. A couple of weeks ago Isaac sent me these  
> references:
> 
> NATURE, May 14, Vol 393, "Postural Control in hte Mollusk"  
> NATURE, April 16, Vol 392, "Multiple stored views and landmark  
> guidance in ants"

Thanks very much. That's a good start.

Marc Abrams (981018.1607)--

> why does it matter what one CV in one person ( or rat in  
> this case ) is controlling at one specific point in time.

Before answer this question let's consider the equivalent  
question that could be asked of a conventinoal psychologist: Why  
does knowing how a person (or rat) responds to a reinforcement  
schedule matter? It matters because most psychologists (like Bruce  
Abbott) believe that environmental events control behavior. So  
learning things like "variable interval schedules produce higher  
rates of responding than fixed ratio schedules" tells them something  
about the behavior of organisms. And they can use this data in  
applied settings; they can tell managers "if you want more work  
out of your employees pay them at random intervals rather than  
for fixed amounts of work".

Learning that a person (or rat) is controlling a particular  
variable matters because control theorists believe that behavior  
is the control of perception. So learning things like "a rat  
controls the probability of a reinforcement" tells them something  
about the behavior of organisms. And they can use this data in  
applied settings; they can tell managers "don't try to control  
your workers work levels by controlling the rewards they get  
because they are trying to control the rewards themselves and  
you will just get into conflict with them".

> How are the experimental designs coming Rick?

Which ones?

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --
> 
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net  
> [http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/4bbf92/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 2:02am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/49 "1998-10-19T02:02:17Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory (9810.22000]

Rick Marken (981018.1815)]

> Seems to me like the only peeved people around here are you,  
> Marc and the persistently peeved Bruce Gregory.

You must have me confused with somebody else. Since I turned in my PCT  
card, I am hardly ever peeved. Bored, yes. Peeved, no. Isaac gave me  
copies of "Models and Their Worlds," and "Mimicry, Repetition, and  
Perceptual Control." It's hard to believe that it was only five years  
ago that Bill and Tom were writing superb material like these  
articles. Instead we get the drivel that clogs CSGnet today. (Oops, I  
do sound peevish, don't I?) Why don't take a leave of absence from the  
net and write something of the quality of your articles in \_Mind  
Readings\_? You can't really get much satisfaction from saying the same  
thing over and over again. I can't believe there are too many of us  
who get satisfaction from hearing you play your one note refrains. If  
we haven't gotten it by now, what makes you think that continuing to  
play it will make any difference? Remember, trying to teach a pig to  
sing doesn't work and only succeeds in annoying the pig.

Oink. Oink.

Bruce Gregory

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/R_Marken)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 2:13am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/50 "1998-10-19T02:13:31Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (981018.1815)]

Me:

> psychologists (like Bruce Abbott) believe that environmental  
> events control behavior.

Bruce Abbott (981018.1920 EST)

> If you're going to tell this little fairy tale, Rick, at least  
> get your facts straight.
> 
> 1. Bruce Abbott doesn't believe that environmental events control  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;behavior, not in the sense that you mean "control."

I meant "control" in the sense that you mean "control" (whatever  
that is). A PCTer doesn't believe that the environment controls  
behavior, in \_any\_ sense of the word "control"; the environment  
is \_controlled\_ by behavior.

> 2. You have the schedule effects reversed... For someone who  
> supposedly got a PhD. in experimental psychology you sometimes  
> display an amazing ignorance of the subject. Perhaps that  
> explains why you decided to abandon the field.

Yes. I was just holding on by my fingertips.

> Hmmm. I'm getting a little peevish myself!

Seems to me like the only peeved people around here are you,  
Marc and the persistently peeved Bruce Gregory.

> If all control theory can do is tell managers that they can't do  
> their jobs, it isn't going to become very popular.

Well, now you know why control theory isn't going to become very  
popular... at least in the near future. The problem is that many  
managers seem to assume that there job is to control people. Control  
theory doesn't tell these managers that they can't so their job;  
it just says that, if they see their job to be "controlling" then  
they are going to experience constant conflict.

> As a control theorist myself, I would tell managers to arrange  
> work conditions so that employees can achieve control over many  
> variables important to them (self-esteem, job satisfaction, morale,  
> perception of being treated fairly, fair wage for good work, and so  
> on)

How did you determine that employees are controlling these  
variables? How did you determine that control of these variables  
was important to every employee? You don't mention suggesting  
to the manager that s/he negotiate with the employees before  
arranging work conditions so that employees can achieve control;  
what if many -- or most -- employees think the manager's well-  
intentioned arrangements suck?

> This advice avoids the conflict problem emphasized in your  
> advice while helping managers to get what they want, too.

This advice is behaviorism re-phrased in PCT-speak, something you  
do with considerable aplomb.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net  
> [http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Marc\_Abrams5](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/f08c70/32.png) [@Marc\_Abrams5](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Marc_Abrams5)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 2:32am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/51 "1998-10-19T02:32:53Z")

</div>

> From [Marc Abrams (981018.2210)]

> [From Rick Marken (981018.1600)]

> Marc Abrams (981018.1607)--
> 
> > why does it matter what one CV in one person ( or rat in  
> > this case ) is controlling at one specific point in time.
> 
> Before answer this question let's consider the equivalent  
> question that could be asked of a conventinoal

psychologist:

Why?, We are not looking for the same things. We already  
know that most conventional psychologists do not research  
the CV, even if they know about it.

> Why does knowing how a person (or rat) responds to a  
> reinforcement schedule matter? It matters because most  
> psychologists (like Bruce Abbott) believe that

environmental \>events control behavior.

So?, What does that have to do with my question?

> So learning things like "variable interval schedules

produce \>higher rates of responding than fixed ratio  
schedules" tells \>them something about the behavior of  
organisms.

Like what? I am \_dead\_ serious. What insight or new  
knwoledge does this provide? and \_again\_, what does this  
have to do with my question?

> And they can use this data in applied settings; they can

tell \>managers "if you want more work out of your employees  
pay \>them at random intervals rather than for fixed amounts  
of \>work".

I see you haven't done much business consulting :-). How  
would knowing what one cv from one individual change how you  
would deal with that kind of problem. ( I am not suggesting  
that the one suggested by you is a real one )

> Learning that a person (or rat) is controlling a particular  
> variable matters because control theorists believe that  
> behavior is the control of perception.

I could not agree more. But \_one\_ cv, \_one\_ perception. I'm  
not comfortable with the notion that interactions and  
actions can be explained by the dynamics of \_one\_ cv.

> So learning things like "a rat controls the probability of

a \>reinforcement" tells them something about the behavior of

> organisms.

You said this before, so I'll ask again, \_What\_ does it tell  
them?

> And they can use this data in applied settings; they can

tell \>managers "don't try to control your workers work  
levels by \>controlling the rewards they get because they are  
trying to \>control the rewards themselves and you will just  
get into \>conflict with them".

Yes, and people have their palms read, and do \_all\_ kinds of  
BS to try and figure out how to get other people to do what  
they want them to do. No news scoop here. But Rick, what  
does this have to do with my question?

> > How are the experimental designs coming Rick?
> 
> Which ones?

Any

Marc

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Chris\_Cherpas](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/c/a3d4f5/32.png) [@Chris\_Cherpas](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Chris_Cherpas)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 2:44am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/52 "1998-10-19T02:44:35Z")

</div>

[From Chris Cherpas (981018.1900 PT)]

Chris Cherpas (981016.2340 PT)--

> > I think kids learning about PCT, and especially how it relates  
> > to understanding themselves, i.e., in a computer curriculum full  
> > of experiments that gradually build up the hierarchy, would be  
> > fantastic.

Tim Carey (981018.-655)--

> I'd be keen to hear where you're up to in your thinking with this.

I come from a perspective of doing computer-based curricula,  
so you may need to translate (also my native language is  
American, rather than English).

Many proposals have been made to teach higher-order thinking,  
problem-solving, and other undoubtedly worthy skills that  
presumably transcend the merely rote, factual, algorithmic,  
and otherwise basic skills that make up much of the curricula  
of public schools. To a great extent, I think that if students  
could get individualized tutoring and practice with greater  
amounts of better structured curriculum materials, they'd be  
better thinkers and problem-solvers than any previous  
generation by virtue of just having a more extensive repertoire  
of elements to recombine for whatever purposes arose in their  
lives...all without miracle programs on How to Solve It,  
exploreware for discovering Pythagorea's theorem on their own,  
or whole language, whole math, and whole holism.

Individualized computer-based systems could do a lot for  
achieving that kind of educational improvement without  
having to resort to fanciful, wish-fulfilling notions  
about teaching all-purpose super-concepts and methods  
that automatically integrate all experience into expert  
wisdom, wherein each child learns the secrets that  
previously only people like Einstein knew, but  
just didn't know how to communicate to others...

But another "meta-" approach to pursue, assuming you've  
already established a system for continuously improving  
the standard track, is to take individualization another  
step further. Computer technology has made it feasible  
for programs, teachers, and students to examine, analyze,  
and model extensive amounts of each student's history  
of going through an educational process. That in itself  
is an advance for tracking and repairing, planning and  
explaining, various aspects of the process. But what  
if we use not only a rational methodology for experimenting  
with the "contents of subjects" in relation to individual  
learning, but also develop a theory of the student  
from the perspective of PCT?

At the bottom of the hierarchy, one can imagine a suite  
of PCT-based "psychophysics" experiments which students  
could run to give themselves, and the system, a profile  
of their perceptual capabilities. The data could have  
many uses, including using them as examples for teaching  
analysis skills (which are already being taught starting  
at the kindergarten level). Individualization of the  
standard material could be refined by testing and updating  
the evolving perceptual capabilities of students, which  
so obviously varies to anyone who has watched children of  
the same age exhibiting variations in say, the ability  
to use the computer mouse. Consider that millions of  
students would be providing data to improve PCT itself  
all the while.

But all that barely gets to what I think you are asking  
about, which I promise to spout on about in a future  
message, but have run out of time at the moment.

Best regards,  
cc

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Marc\_Abrams5](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/f08c70/32.png) [@Marc\_Abrams5](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Marc_Abrams5)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 2:48am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/53 "1998-10-19T02:48:46Z")

</div>

> From [Marc Abrams (981018.2246)]

> [From Bruce Gregory (9810.22000]

Thank you Bruce. I could not have said it any better.

Marc

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/R_Marken)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 3:52am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/54 "1998-10-19T03:52:21Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (981018.1950)]

Bruce Gregory (9810.22000) --

> (Oops, I do sound peevish, don't I?)

Indeed.

> Remember, trying to teach a pig to sing doesn't work and only  
> succeeds in annoying the pig.

Excellent advice. But it's so much fun watching pigs who think  
they \_can\_ sing. It's kind of like watching Elmer Fudd sing  
Wagner:"Kill da wabbit! Kill da wabbitt!

Best

The Waskelly Wabbitt

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net  
> [http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 5:47am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/55 "1998-10-19T05:47:04Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (981018.2237 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (981018.1730 EST)--

> Bill, you're making a terrible mistake here; I only wish I could figure out  
> how to set your thinking strait about this. All I can do is try.

I understand interval schedules, and even variable-interval schedules. I  
understand that you are talking about VI schedules. I understand all of  
your painstaking illustrations of elementary relationships. Let's cut to  
the chase.

Me:

> > The  
> > independent variable is time away from the lever; the two apparent rates  
> > both depend on time away from the lever and are not causally related to  
> > each other (based on \_that\_ measurement).

You:

> The rat can reduce its response rate by (a) generating a longer average time  
> between presses wile standing at the lever or (b) maintaining a relatively  
> constant rate while at the lever but spending a greater time away from the  
> lever. I have indicated that both changes occur on VI schedules over the  
> range of values of tau investigated. What I don't see is why you think the  
> difference is so important, as if the rat's doing b rather than a somehow  
> invalidated my analysis. It doesn't.

Suppose the rat happened to stay at the lever during the whole session,  
pressing at some average rate and getting food pellets at some other  
average rate (which would happen on any schedule). Pressing would produce a  
total number P of presses during the session and a total number of  
reinforcements R. If the duration of the session is T, we have a mean  
pressing rate of P/T and a mean reinforcement rate of R/T.

Now, arbitrarily, let us add a period of duration tau at the end of the  
session, during which no pressing of the lever takes place, and thus no  
reinforcements ever occur. We can simply remove the rat from the cage and  
let it do other things beside press the bar, while we let the clock run for  
an additional tau minutes or hours or days. Now, at the end of the  
additional time period, we calculate the mean rate of pressing and the mean  
rate of reinforcement. They are P/(T+tau) and R/(T+tau). Notice that  
P/(T+tau) is less than P/T if tau and T are positive numbers. Can you  
conclude from this that a decrease in the session-average rate of  
reinforcement has caused a decrease in the session-average rate of pressing?

Obviously it makes no difference if we add the extra time tau at the end of  
the session of continuous responding, or break it up into many much shorter  
periods during which the rat is away from the lever. Also the type of  
schedule makes absolutely no difference.

Periods away from the bar create a spurious indication of an effect of a  
changing reinforcement rate on the calculated rate of pressing. Spurious.

And finally, if it is true that the rat spends more time away from the  
lever when the scheduled intervals are longer, we can express this as tau =  
f(I) where f is some positive monotonic function and I is the scheduled  
interval. The result:

mean pressing rate = P/(T+f(I))

mean reinforcement rate = R/(T+f(I))

Note that neither P nor R is a function of the interval, and the decrease  
in mean pressing rate is not due to the decrease in the mean reinforcement  
rate.

As to who is blind, I leave that to others to say. You have yet to admit  
that there is a single thing wrong with the basic methods and analyses of  
EAB, so you must think me an extraordinarily stupid person for seeing so  
many problems (quite independently of what PCT has to say).

Bill

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 5:54am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/56 "1998-10-19T05:54:07Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (981018.1147 MDT)]

Marc Abrams (981018.1607) --

> > Granted, although I have a hard time imagining how you  
> > measure "availability." How did you prove that
> 
> "availability", \>rather than, say, amount of food in the  
> cup, was controlled?
> 
> Not trying to be cute, but what difference does it make? We  
> are controlling so many things at the same time and they  
> change so frequently why does it matter what one CV in one  
> person ( or rat in this case ) is controlling at one  
> specific point in time.

I've heard this from you more than once, and am still not impressed. It's  
like saying that the physical world has so many things going on in it at  
once that there's no point in looking for any regularities in the details.  
The point, which I'm sure you could supply as well as I if you stopped  
feeling threatened, is to find regular laws that stay the same in the midst  
of all those ever-changing details. To do that you have to study what is  
going on at one specific point in time, then another, then another -- until  
you can predict how all these variables are going to change through time in  
recognizeable patterns.

> What does it prove? What kinds of insights are to be gained with this kind  
> of knowledge? This has been my agrument with Rick. How can you ever "prove"  
> \_what\_ a cv is for any one person. The \_test\_ might put you  
> in the ballpark, but that is for \_one\_ cv not \_all\_ cv's  
> that might be controlled for at that time.

You're obviously asking these questions as a way of expressing doubt that  
there are any real answers. But my answer is that what is to be gained is  
EVERYTHING: the first real understanding of human nature in the history of  
the world.

Best,

Bill P.

> **···**
>
> > How are the experimental designs coming Rick?
> > 
> > Marc

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Marc\_Abrams5](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/f08c70/32.png) [@Marc\_Abrams5](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Marc_Abrams5)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 7:21am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/57 "1998-10-19T07:21:48Z")

</div>

> From [Marc Abrams (981019.0221)]

Let me begin this post with a short note. I had a major  
heart attack in April of 1997. Because of that my kidney  
function was greatly reduced and I became anemic. I could  
not attend this years conference because of my health ( two  
episodes of congestive heart failure, one right before the  
conference ) and deeply regretted it. For the past month I  
have been \_extremely\_ ill. Sleeping upwards of 14- 16 hours  
a day and feeling like death ( which i really thought was  
not far away ). Last week in my visit to my hematologist we  
tried a new therapy of medication to help elevate my red  
blood count which was down to about 7. ( normal being 14 ) I  
am feeling \_much\_ stronger and certainly much more  
clearheaded over the past week then I have in a long time. I  
am going to be all right. I am not a bad person nor do I  
have evil intentions. I like PCT. I believe it will one day  
be the way all of us are taught about behavior. Bill, I  
sometimes think you think I am some wise ass punk from NY  
looking to give you a hard time. Get a life my friend. It's  
\_real\_ precious, I \_know\_, and not worth wasting on BS. I  
am here because I think PCT is right about behavior, but it  
ain't finished ( I don't give a Sh-t was marken says.) I am  
here because it matters to me. I would like to be able to  
contribute someting to the cause. If the only thing I can  
contribute are worthwhile questions then that's what i will  
continue to do. You don't want to read them don't. I ask  
them because I want answers to them I don't have time to  
waste trying to break yours or anyone elses chops. Including  
Marken's.

> [From Bill Powers (981018.1147 MDT)]

> I've heard this from you more than once, and am still not  
> impressed.

I can tell from the number of times I've gotten some  
response to it. This is the first. I really don't care if  
you are impressed. I don't ask questions to impress people  
with how much I know I ask becase I \_don't\_ know and I would  
\_like\_ to know. Do you have a particular problem with that  
style or do you think I'm being some kind of smart ass or  
doubting thomas.

> It's like saying that the physical world has so many things  
> going on in it at once that there's no point in looking for

any \>regularities in the details. The point, which I'm sure  
you \>could supply as well as I

Bill, if there are no answers to my questions. say so. I  
think there are. I think modeling might give us some insight  
into the dynamics of the PCT process. I think discussion  
about it might help. Are you saying that what you did 40  
years ago is the extent of what can be done and known. I  
don't believe that to be true.

> if you stopped feeling threatened,

Threatened about what? I want to learn, I want to  
understand. Do I need to learn it and understand it exactly  
like you did an do. These questions are important to me.

> is to find regular laws that stay the same in the midst  
> of all those ever-changing details. To do that you have to  
> study what is going on at one specific point in time, then  
> another, then another -- until you can predict how all

these \>variables are going to change through time in

> recognizeable patterns.

I do not disagree How do you intend to do this? At one  
specific point in time any number of interactions are taking  
place both inside and outside the individual. Can this all  
be replicated. I don't think so. How do you decide \_what\_ to  
look at. Well I think a basic model of the environment with  
a basic PCT agent doing somrthing real might give us a  
clue. Who knows? Or are we going to feel sorry for ourselves  
because others can't and won't do what we are incapable of  
doing. Bill, if you have, in your mind, a next step that  
requires certain types of research and work, come out and  
say so. I'll shut up, sit on the sidelines watch, try to  
develop the kind of models i think might help and that'll be  
it. It all might be one big waste of time, but I see  
\_nothing\_ coming constructively from Rick.lately. I have  
asked Rick on any number of occasions privately, if there is  
any kind of data i might be able to collect or get, ir there  
are any experiments I might be able to help with. I have  
gotten \_0\_ responses.

> > What does it prove? What kinds of insights are to be  
> > gained with this kind of knowledge? This has been my  
> > agrument with Rick. How can you ever "prove"  
> > \_what\_ a cv is for any one person. The \_test\_ might put  
> > you in the ballpark, but that is for \_one\_ cv not \_all\_

cv's

> > that might be controlled for at that time.
> 
> You're obviously asking these questions as a way of  
> expressing doubt that there are any real answers.

Bill, you don't use your own theory. This statement could  
not be any further from the truth. Is that why I recommended  
the SD modeling to the list? Is that why I got you in touch  
with Bob Eberlein. Sorry pal your off base. I \_know\_ there  
are answers. Just gotta figure out what the right questions  
are.

> But my answer is that what is to be gained is  
> EVERYTHING: the first real understanding of human nature  
> in the history of the world.

Not if you stay where you are, and I am asking the kinds of  
questions that you are going to have to answer at some point  
in time, for your statement above to prove accurate

Marc

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 12:47pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/58 "1998-10-19T12:47:33Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (981019.0549 MDT)]

Marc Abrams (981019.0221) --

If PCT is so wonderful, how come it can't make you well? Unfortunately,  
when it comes to practical applications, there are just too many where  
something wonderful is needed but, as it happens, there is nobody who can  
supply it. We have to accept the state of knowledge as it is, knowing that  
it's not good enough but also knowing that if we give up trying to make it  
better, it will never be any better than it is. And it does help to realize  
that it's better than it used to be -- if you were living 100 years ago,  
you'd be dead.

You want to make a contribution to the future. So do I. I think we're both  
doing it, all of us on CSGnet are doing it. We're involved in the  
development of an idea that is greater than any person, not to inflate our  
egos or to dominate other people, but because of what it will mean for the  
future, after we're gone. This puts us in contact with generations not yet  
born, so in a way we're already living beyond our lifetimes. What we do now  
will still be a part of the lives of all people in a hundred or even a  
thousand years. Maybe not exactly the part we now imagine, but the bases of  
PCT are too firm for it to be overthrown and forgotten.

This is why we have to be firm about sticking to and teaching the basics of  
PCT. The applications will come, but only if enough people begin to realize  
just how different a negative feedback control system is from any other  
kind of organization. This is why it's important to play with a Vensim  
model of a thermostat -- not because the world needs to understand  
thermostats, but because the world needs to understand, deeply and  
intuitively, the implications of an organization in which the actions are  
only a means for controlling a sensory representation of the external  
world. By experimenting with the model, you can challenge your own  
intuition, until you get to the point where you can predict correctly what  
will happen when you change the model and disturb its operation in all  
possible ways. And then you will understand WHY the results are as they  
are. Understanding why is far more important, right now, than applying the  
theory to real behavior. It's the "why" that will lead to endlessly  
multiplying applications.

But this means that we have to let go of the anchors of theories that are  
really not theories at all, but are merely incomplete summaries of WHAT  
happens. Despite the hopes of pure empiricists, knowing WHAT happens is  
only a feeble and deceptive substitute for knowing WHY it happens. When you  
know why, you can predict and understand things that haven't happened yet,  
that may never have happened before, and that certainly have never been  
understood before. You can see how to bring about new results by doing  
different things to the environment. This is very different from studying  
only what happens, and confining your predictions to the statement that the  
future is likely to repeat the past. If that's all you know, that's all  
that will happen.

When we try to apply PCT today, we do so without benefit of research and  
without knowing where PCT will lead and how it will change. That's all  
right, of course; we always act with insufficient knowledge, and can get  
away with it exactly because we are control systems and can correct  
mistakes. But if we have to choose, because of limitations on ability or  
resources, between developing more applications and teaching the  
fundamentals of negative feedback control, it's the teaching that will have  
effects far outlasting any applications we can dream up right now.

Neither you nor I, Marc, will live to see the ultimate flowering of PCT,  
this kernel of a revolution we have in our custody. Time and chance  
happeneth to us all; you may outlive me, and we both have already outlived  
younger and healthier people (I'm thinking of Kenny, too). But PCT will  
outlive us both, and somewhere in the future it will seen as more valuable  
than any other treasure we could be laying up in our lifetimes. It holds  
the key to human nature, to the nature of all living systems, to a complete  
revolution in all the sciences that study life -- and in all the people who  
live it.

Best,

Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@R\_Marken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/R_Marken)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 2:53pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/59 "1998-10-19T14:53:05Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (981019.0800)]

Bruce Gregory (9810.22000) --

> Isaac gave me copies of "Models and Their Worlds," and "Mimicry,  
> Repetition, and Perceptual Control." It's hard to believe that it  
> was only five years ago that Bill and Tom were writing superb  
> material like these articles. Instead we get the drivel that  
> clogs CSGnet today... Why don't [you --meaning me;-))] take a  
> leave of absence from the net and write something of the quality  
> of your articles in \_Mind Readings\_?

Just out of curiosity, what is the "drivel" that clogs CSGNet  
today? I presume some of this drivel is coming from Bill Powers  
since you are contrasting his "superb material" of five years  
ago with today's drivel. So what is Bill saying that's so drivelly  
now as opposed to what he was saying in his earlier articles?

I'd like to know because it seems to me that the stuff Bill posts  
to the net is magnificent. I think CSGNet is a GREAT resource for  
learning PCT and that CSGNet, in particular, has a very low drivel  
to quality ratio compared to other internet "chat rooms".

As for me, I've written several articles since \_Mind Readings\_;  
some publsihed; some not (though not through lack of trying).  
Some of these articles are available at my website:

[http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/papers.html](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/papers.html)

They were written while I was on the net. I think they're as  
good (or poor) as anything in \_Mind Readings\_. And, of course,  
you are familiar with my "Dancer..." paper which was just  
published a year ago. I think it's a pretty darn good paper --  
and, again, one written while I was on CSGNet; indeed, I got  
some help (indirectly) with that paper via CSGNet.

I think that what I say on the net is basically the same as  
what I write in my papers. What am I saying now that you  
consider drivel? Maybe you could fill out a little table  
like the one below:

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Brilliant Stupid, Post-  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\_Mind Readings\_ | \_Mind Readings\_  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;era material(s) | CSGNet drivel

> **···**
>
> -----------------------------------------  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;\>
> 
> Best
> 
> Rick  
> --  
> Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313  
> Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net  
> [http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken](http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/4bbf92/32.png) [@Bruce\_Gregory](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bruce_Gregory)\
**Post date:** [October 19, 1998, 3:19pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/control-of-reinforcement/2993/60 "1998-10-19T15:19:01Z")

</div>

[From Bruce Gregory [981019.1130 EDT)]

Rick Marken (981019.0800)

> Bruce Gregory (9810.22000) --
> 
> \> Isaac gave me copies of "Models and Their Worlds," and "Mimicry,  
> \> Repetition, and Perceptual Control." It's hard to believe that it  
> \> was only five years ago that Bill and Tom were writing superb  
> \> material like these articles. Instead we get the drivel that  
> \> clogs CSGnet today... Why don't [you --meaning me;-))] take a  
> \> leave of absence from the net and write something of the quality  
> \> of your articles in \_Mind Readings\_?
> 
> Just out of curiosity, what is the "drivel" that clogs CSGNet  
> today? I presume some of this drivel is coming from Bill Powers  
> since you are contrasting his "superb material" of five years  
> ago with today's drivel. So what is Bill saying that's so drivelly  
> now as opposed to what he was saying in his earlier articles?

Most of the drivel comes from you, but Bill occasionally contributes. It  
largely consists of pontifications in the absence of data. I would remind  
you, but I refuse to start one of these absurd exchanges again. The drivel  
consists of lengthy "corrections" to imagined mistakes of understanding. It  
also consists of gratuitous insults such as, "psychologists (like Bruce  
Abbott) believe that environmental events control behavior." We are all  
quite familiar with your views on Bruce Abbott, myself, and everyone else  
for that matter. Reminding us of your prejudices is, frankly, quite boring.  
I am prepared to stipulate that only you, Bill, and Mary really understand  
PCT, just stop reminding us of the fact. If you have something constructive  
to add, please do, you have much to offer. If you want to play your hostile,  
defensive, and paranoid act, please don't.

When Bill has thought carefully about something and presents his reasoning  
to us, the results are as good as anything he has ever done. Frankly, they  
are about the only thing that makes CSGnet worthwhile. But he too has been  
both defensive and paranoid lately. One would almost think that the two of  
you imagine that the Bruces and Marc have somehow devoted their lives to  
undermining PCT, which only three people in the world understand to begin  
with. I speak for all of us when I say that nothing could be further from  
the truth. If we didn't share your view of the deep and fundamental  
importance of PCT we wouldn't be wasting our time on CSGnet.

Bruce Gregory

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