[Rick Marken 2018-05-26_22:34:54]
Philip 5/26 13:23
PY: Rick refers to q.i as a hypothesis and as a perception of the researcher (or the researcher's surrogate).Â
"q.i is a perception in the researcher (or the researcher's surrogate, such as a computer), which, when there is sufficient evidence from the test, is presumed to correspond to the perception, p, that S is controlling." -Rick
PY: The way his sentence is written makes it seem as though q.i may, at the same time, not correspond to the perception, p, that S is controlling, as well as still be a perception in the researcher. What is a false hypothesis in PCT? Is it a perception? an imagination?
RM: A false hypothesis in PCT is a guess about what an organism is controlling that turns out to be wrong. In the coin game, for example, my first hypothesis about what is being controlled -- my first guess about q.i -- might be the size order of the coins. This hypothesis may be based on the fact I perceive the coins arranged from small to large. So I apply disturbances by changing the size order of the coins pattern in various ways and find that some changes are resisted and some aren't. So size order is not controlled. So I come up with a new hypothesis about q.i -- perhaps the pattern of the coins because I perceive that the coins have remained in a straight line. So I apply disturbances by moving the coins from the line and find again that some disturbances are resisted and some aren't. So the pattern of the coins is not controlled. So I keep coming up with new hypotheses -- new guesses about q.i -- until I come up with a guess about q.i to which all disturbances are resisted. Perhaps it's the order of the dates; perhaps it's the relative thickness of the coins; perhaps the relative wear of the coins. But each guess about what is being controlled is a guess about whether my (or my surrogate's) perception of a possible controlled quantity, q.i, is controlled by S and, thus, corresponds to the perception S is controlling.
Best
[Rick Marken 2018-05-26_12:03:32]
Martin Taylor (2018.05.25. 23 13)--
RM: The problem is thinking of p as a function of q.i. You have to remember that q.i is not an environmental variable; it is a function of environmental variables,
MT: The question that underlies this often-repeated statement is whether a particular function of environmental variables corresponds to a structure that exists in Real Reality (RR).
RM: No, I think this is not really relevant to my point I am making about the relationship between q.i and p. I'll try another approach.
RM: I think the difference between p and q.i becomes obvious when you actually do research on PCT. The "coin game" described in B:CP is one example of PCT research that illustrates the relationship between q.i and p rather nicely. E's hypotheses about the aspect of the coins that S is controlling are E's own perceptions of different aspect of the coins -- different q.i's. For example, one hypothesis about the aspect of the coins being controlled is the pattern of the coins (straight line, Z pattern, etc); another is the relative size of the coins; another is the relative value of the dates on the coin. All these hypotheses about q.i are E's perceptions that might correspond to the perception, p, that S is controlling. The goal of the test is for E to find his own perception of an aspect of the coins, his own q.i, that corresponds to the aspect of the coins, p, that S is controlling. This happens when E finds that S corrects for all disturbances to q.i, the current hypothesis about the controlled variable.Â
RM: E's perception of q.i need not be a "direct" perception of the hypothetical controlled variable, as it is in the coin game, where E uses his own perceptual system to see whether S is controlling the pattern, relative size, relative value of the dates, or something else about the coins. Indeed, in formal PCT research the hypothesis, q.i, about the perception, p, S is controlling is typically computed by a computer rather than E's own perceptual systems. An example of this kind of research is our paper on intercepting toy helicopters:
<https://www.dropbox.com/s/eymkj4bxuorpyuy/Chasin'Choppers.pdf?dl=0>>> Dropbox - Chasin'Choppers.pdf - Simplify your lifeRM: This paper was meant to be an example of how to study behavior from a PCT perspective. The behavior under study was object interception -- running to intercept a relatively randomly moving toy helicopter. Several different hypotheses about the perceptions that S is controlling in this situation were tested. These hypotheses are E's perception, q.i, of the perception being controlled by S, p, just as in the coin game. But these hypotheses about p -- these q.i -- were defined by mathematical functions and computed by a computer. The test was done by putting different computed values of q.i into a model (as the perceptual variable, p) of S's behavior to see which resulted in the closest fit to S's behavior.Â
RM: There is another example of doing the test by having the computer compute the hypothetical controlled variable in Marken, R. S. (2014) Testing for Controlled Variables: A Model-Based Approach to Determining the Perceptual Basis of Behavior, Attention, Perception and Psychophysics, 76, 255-263, which is reprinted as Chapter 4 in "Doing Research on Purpose" (<https://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/>https://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/\). In that paper two different hypotheses about the perception controlled in a tracking task are tested. The two different hypotheses are two different mathematical functions that define for E the perceptions -- q.i -- that might correspond to the perception - p -- that is controlled by S. Again, these hypotheses are tested using modeling.Â
RM: Another way to get a sense of the relationship between q.i and p is by doing the hierarchical control demo at <http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Hierarchy.html>http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Hierarchy.html\. In this case, you are S and the computer is E. The computer has three hypotheses -- three different q.i -- about the perception, p, you are controlling: one q.i is shape, another is direction of movement and the third is the sequence of shapes. The computer tests the hypothesis about the perception you are controlling by seeing which perception is best protected from disturbance, which is measured as the proportion of a trial that each hypothetical controlled perception -- each q.i -- is kept in a reference state.Â
RM: I hope you can see that when you actually get down to rolling up your sleeves and doing PCT research the relationship between q.i and p becomes quite apparent: q.i is a perception in the researcher (or the researcher's surrogate, such as a computer), which, when there is sufficient evidence from the test, is presumed to correspond to the perception, p, that S is controlling.
BestÂ
RickThat is something we can never know for sure, but what we can know is that if we have a perceptual function that does not correspond reasonably closely to some true property of RR, controlling it isn't going to do much to help our intrinsic variables maintain us in good condition, so reorganization will tend to remove it more quickly than it would remove perceptual functions that do correspond to real structures in RR. Controlling those variables has a better chance of producing side-effects that are valuable for keeping intrinsic variables in good condition. The same goes in spades for perceptual functions that might have been developed by evolution because they are likely to correspond to structures that have persisted in RR over evolutionary time.
The takeaway is that transient perceptual functions (and arbitrary ones programmed into robots) have no necessary relationship with structures in RR, but persistent perceptual functions probably do. Going back to what I think lies behind Rick's statement, all perceptual functions produce perceptions by manipulating a bunch of variables. Some of them have outputs that change in the same way that a property of the environment does when a particular input variable is changed. For these, q.i is likely to be a value of a variable in the environment, not simply a mirror of the perceptual function output "p". For the ones that don't, there is no structure in the environment that is constrained to vary as the perceptual function output does when one of the input variables changes. For these, q.i is a synthetic variable imposed on the environment by the perceptual function, not a variable constrained by a structure in the environment.
To make this concrete, suppose that in RR there is something that produces the visual appearance we call a simple table, with four legs and a top. Maybe there is a table there, but maybe the visual appearance is a contrived illusion. You try placing the perceived table top in a desired location. If the visual appearance of "table" is the result of there being a real table "out there", then when you move the table top, all the legs will move as well, and they will move in ways that cause the 3-D perceptual appearance of "table" to be invariant. If the table is rotated, then the legs will move to keep each one under the same bit of the table top, and so forth. On the other hand, if it was an illusion, you might move the table top and find that one or more of the legs does not come along. That (non-)table was a construction created by your perceptual function. The one that kept its 3-D shape might also have been, but it is much more likely that the table was real than is the case of the one that did not keep its shape.
The important concept here is that there are two feedback processes involved. One is the immediate control of perception now, the other is a slow reorganization loop that changes perceptual functions according to what is really out there, bringing perceptual functions more into alignment with Real Reality. In this loop Boss Reality acts on the internal structure of the organism, tuning the perceptual functions that produce the perceptions that are controlled by influencing Real Reality. It was in this sense that Powers called the influence of Real Reality on organisms "Boss Reality". Boss Reality determines what actually happens, and perceptual control develops over the eons and over individual lives toward a state in which perceptual reality approaches, but never exactly matches, some part of Real Reality.
Martin
--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
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On Sat, May 26, 2018 at 12:03 PM, Richard Marken <<mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu>csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery
--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery