Controlling another's purpose (was Re: agency in language)

[Rick Marken 2019-08-30_10:55:01]

[From Bruce Nevin (20190830.10:15 ET)]

RM: I’d be interested in hearing what you think is an example of a social variable and how work in “collective control” shows that it can have a strong theoretical basis in PCT.

BN: Huh?

RM: Huh huh? Actually, I was replying to this:

BN: That is not the ghost of which I wrote. The dispute was over Bill’s resistance, perhaps around 1992, to notions like social variables or shared perceptions, I’m sure I don’t remember the precise words that were in play. Work on collective control showed how something like those notions can have a sound theoretical basis in PCT.

RM: So is it any clearer if I ask to see an example of how work on collective control gave notions like social variables or shared perceptions a strong theoretical basis in PCT?

Best

Rick

···

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

From Fred Nickols 2019.08.30.1415 ET

There’s all kinds of good stuff lurking in that example.

First, there is a discrepancy or error resulting from my wife’s comparison of her current feeling of warmth with her preferred feeling of warmth.

She probably decides she wants the room temperature lowered. That entails running cooler air into the room. That entails activating the air conditioner.

She might or might not have considered doing it herself but I sit right next to the thermostat so she asks me to turn down the thermostat.

She doubtless wants to see me do that so she can consider the problem dealt with nd go back to what she was doing.

Lurking in there is doubtless more than one level of the hierarchy; more than one input quantity; more than one output quantity, more than one reference signal and more than one perceptual signal. But, too much detail can get tedious.

···

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours”

www.nickols.us

[Martin Taylor 2019.08.30.14.31]

Since we agree on this, and also (I think) that "correct PCT"

hierarchic control, I am baffled by what you think you are
correcting. You seem to be implying that in a control hierarchy only one single
perception can be controlled at a time. If so, your idea of “correct
PCT” is VERY different from mine, as mine assumes that many
different kinds of perceptions are being simultaneously controlled
up and down the hierarchy.
By the way PCT-language is a specialized subset of English, so if
your “I think they say two different things using the same
language”, it’s a minor quibble. But if you indeed believe that in
“correct PCT” it is impossible to control your perception of the car
steering-wheel angle while you are controlling your perception of
the position of the car in its lane, we have a very significant
difference of opinion.
And in case you are interested, I did point out that getting Fred to
have the purpose (controlling Fred’s purpose) of turning down the
thermostat was not the only means she had to perceive the thermostat
turned down. As I quoted earlier in this thread: “.” Acting to bring Fred to a state of having the
purpose of perceiving the thermostat to be turned down was just the
means she chose, by explicitly asking him to do it.
Martin

···

On 2019/08/30 1:45 PM, Richard Marken
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

rsmarken@gmail.com

[Rick Marken 2019-08-30_10:44:23]

[Martin Taylor 2019.08.30.12.02]

          MT: Fred, I think your analysis is correct except for one

thing that I trust is a matter of semantics. When we
analyze everyday occurrences, we are tempted to use
everyday language, and to think that PCT language doesn’t
apply or is unnecessary. You can be correct in either
language, but when you mix them, sometimes you miss
contradictions.

          MT: You say: "*                I don't think she wanted to control my

purpose. I do think she wanted me to turn down the
thermostat* ."Â The first sentence is PCT language,
the second is everyday language.

        RM: I think this is the source of your problem. You think

these two sentences say the same thing using different
“languages”, PCT and English, respectively. I think they
say two different things using the same language: English.
They can be understood as saying two different things if one
understands PCT. Indeed, if one didn’t understand PCT that
first sentence would be quite puzzling. But knowing PCT and
that in PCT “control” is “purpose” and that what one
controls are perceptual variables, then that first sentence
clearly means that Fred’s wife wasn’t controlling her
perception of Fred turning down the thermostat * on
purpose* . And based on a understanding of PCT, the
second sentence can be understood to mean that Fred’s wife
just wanted to control for a perception of Fred turning down
the thermostat.Â

        RM: So Fred was quite correctly making a distinction that

could only be made with a correct understanding of PCT; that
one can control a perception of someone doing something
or of them doing something on purpose . Those are two
different perceptions that people can control.Â

  •  Many means to
    

the same end*

st

RickÂ

Â

          I think that is not a perfect

contradiction, but it is close. Did she want you to want
to turn down the thermostat of your own volition, and to
want to do it, for whatever reason (you say the reason
probably came from what I would say in PCT language was
“controlling your perception of your wife’s feelings
toward you with a reference of positive” or something like
that, or in short form “controlling for your wife to feel
well disposed toward you”. You say you actually did it
deliberately, on purpose, which in PCT-speak is translated
as “having a reference to perceive [some state]”, the
states you wished to perceive being the thermostat at 72,
and your wife well disposed to you.

          Now, your wife might have wanted to perceive the

thermostat being at 72, but not wanted to perceive you
doing it on purpose. Suppose it was not your wife, but
some horrible person who you hated and who hated you.
Maybe that person might get you to turn the thermostat
down by asking you to turn it up. You would still be
turning it down intentionally.

          Or, suppose the thermostat had a control lever that stuck

out. A person could get you to lower the thermostat
setting, though not accurately, by positioning some
furniture so that when you passed by for some other
purpose you would brush the lever and lower the setting.
You would reset the thermostat as a side-effect of
intending something unrelated in your mind, but not in the
mind of the person who moved the furniture.

          Since both of these latter possibilities are highly

unlikely, I argue that your quoted sentences should read “* I
think she wanted me to want to turn down the thermostat,
and I think she wanted to see me actually do it*.”

          It's sometimes called "cooperation", when A wants to do

what they perceive B wants them to do.

          Martin

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

** Distance
Consulting LLC**

  •                                                "My Objective is
    

to Help You Achieve
Yours"*

www.nickols.us

                On Fri, Aug 30, 2019

at 10:17 AM Bruce Nevin <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

                        [From

Bruce Nevin (20190830.10:15 ET)]

                          Rick Marken

2019-08-29_18:57:25 –

                            RM:

I’d be interested in hearing what you
think is an example of a social variable
and how work in “collective control”
shows that it can have a strong
theoretical basis in PCT.

Huh?

                    On Thu, Aug 29,

2019 at 10:00 PM Richard Marken <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-08-29_18:57:25]

                              [From

Bruce Nevin 20190829.15:46 ET)]

                                Rick Marken

2019-08-28_17:25:13Â --Â

                                  RM: I don't disagree with any

of this. I am just saying that
controlling for a person doing
something on purpose is
controlling for a different
perception that controlling for a
person just doing that
something…Â

                              BN:

I would suggest, though, that the
discussion of controlling a perception
that you do not manipulate (in the
case of sunrise and traffic light you
cannot) is pertinent to your dispute
with Martin.

                          RM: I don't see it. And I think it's

possible that Martin and I don’t disagree
about anything. As I said above, I thought
we disagreed about whether controlling for
a person doing something on purpose  is
different than controlling for a person
simply doing something . I think
those are different perceptions and I
think Martin agreed that they were as
well. If we disagree about anything it may
be which of these perceptions is the one
that is more often controlled. I think
controlling for a person doing something  is
far more common that controlling for a
person doing something on purpose

Â

                                    RM: The ghost of which

you speak – that we can’t know
another’s perceptions  Â

                              BN:

That is not the ghost of which I
wrote. The dispute was over Bill’s
resistance, perhaps around 1992, to
notions like social variables or
shared perceptions, I’m sure I don’t
remember the precise words that were
in play. Work on collective control
showed how something like those
notions can have a sound theoretical
basis in PCT.

                          RM: I don't think so. But I'd be

interested in hearing what you think is an
example of a social variable and how work
in “collective control” shows that it can
have a strong theoretical basis in PCT.

BestÂ

Rick

/Bruce

                              On

Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 8:27 PM Richard
Marken <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

                                  [Rick Marken

2019-08-28_17:25:13]

                                        [From

Bruce Nevin (20190828.17:19
ET)]

                                          Â RM:

I can’t think of a
situation where one
controls a perception of
another person’s purpose.

Â

                                        BN:

The antecedent question is,
“can we perceive another’s
purpose?” I take the answer
to be unequivocally yes, we
can and frequently do.

                                    RM: I agree. And I think we

are doing it all the time.

Â

                                        BN:

Of course, the perception
may be mistaken, just as any
other perception may be
mistaken.

                                    RM: Yes, indeed. Which is the

subject of the paper I attached
in reply to Eetu.Â

Â

                                        BN:Â  The Test for the

Controlled Variable ensures
that we are not mistaken
when we attribute a purpose
to a perceived activity, but
we usually employ less
rigorous means of assuring
ourselves,

                                    RM: Precisely the point of

the “Theory of Mind” paper that
I posted! It’s really a good
paper; I just re-read it and it
made me jealous of what a great
writer the author was;-)

Â

                                        BN:

The idea that such a
perception might necessarily
be imaginary is the restless
ghost of an argument on
csgnet a good many years
ago, about agreements. How
could we have agreed or
‘shared’ perceptions, it was
argued, because perceptions
are inherently private. They
are inside the dotted line
that separates the organism
from the environment in our
diagrams. But reference
values are observable in the
environment. (The reference
signal  is private and
presumably idiosyncratic,
but the reference value  that
it represents is public, in
the environment; else the
Test would not be possible.)

RM: Very nicely put.

Â

                                        BN:

Subsequent work on
collective control has put
that dispute to rest–with
an occasional rattling of
ghostly chains, as noted.
Collectively controlled
variables are individually
controlled with respect to
shared reference values.

                                    RM: The ghost of which you

speak – that we can’t know
another’s perceptions – was put
to rest by Bill Powers well
before the ghost appeared. So,
to paraphase Mae West in reply
to your claim that collective
control put the ghost to rest I
say “Collective control had
nothing to do with it”.Â

Â

                                        BN:

OK, but I asked “When we
control a perception of
another’s purpose, is that
perception imaginary?” The
way I framed the question
further presumes that the
perception of another’s
purpose can be controlled.
It might be helpful to
remember that control is not
limited to manipulation. As
Bill pointed out, we control
the sun rising in the east,
as would be evidenced by our
consternation were it to
rise in some other quarter.
Navajos construct their
hogans in such a way that
they control a perception of
the sun rising in the east
in the morning, which a
right-living Navajo indeed
endeavors to do (as do many
other people). Stonehenge
was arranged to control a
number of perceptions, one
of which was the sun rising
due east on the equinox.

                                        BN:

Perceptions of other
people’s purposes are an
important part of the
environment within which we
control. For example,
Goffman documented how we
determine the intentions of
oncoming pedestrians on a
sidewalk–angle of shoulder
or foot, tilt of head, lift
of hand. Try noticing these
tells sometime; they’re
typically done without
awareness. I can’t
manipulate the color of the
traffic light, but just as
the cat crouched before the
mouse-hole controls a
perception of a mouse I
control a perception of a
green arrow before I turn
left across traffic.

                                    RM: I don't disagree with any

of this. I am just saying that
controlling for a person doing
something on purpose is
controlling for a different
perception that controlling for
a person just doing that
something.As you said, people do
distinguish purposeful from
accidental behavior. So saying
that you control for a person
having the purpose of opening a
window is actually saying that
you are doing something
different that controlling for a
person opening the window. And
while I did say that I couldn’t
think of a situation where I
would want to control for
someone doing something on
purpose rather than just
controlling for having the do
it, that was before Martin
suggested a situation where
Iago would want to control for
Othello doing something on
purpose rather than just doing
it!

BestÂ

Rick

/Bruce

                                        On Wed,

Aug 28, 2019 at 4:38 PM
Martin Taylor <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

                                          [Martin Taylor

2019.08.28.15.39]

                                                [Rick Marken

2019-08-28_09:56:42]

                                                    [Martin Taylor

2019.08.27.17.00]

                                                      MT: Alice has

a reference to
perceive Bob
as having the
purpose of
opening the
window she
wants open.

                                                      RM:

That’s
possible, but
I think that
in most cases
people like
Alice would be
perfectly
happy if Bob
opened the
window by
accident.

                                                    MT: Sure. But

what does that
have to do with
it?

                                                  RM: Just noting

that there is a
difference between
controlling for a
person * having
the purpose*
of doing something
and controlling
for having the
person * do
something*.

                                          Not quite as self-evident

as it appears on the
surface, as Bill’s
rubber-band demo
demonstrates (see below).

                                          "*                                                All (purposeful)

behaviour is the control
of perception* ", No?

                                          When you want someone to

control a perception of,
for example, perceiving a
window to be open as a
means of perceiving it to
be open, you know how well
you are succeeding by
observing whether they act
to open the window. If
that was already their
purpose, there is zero
error in your control
loop, but the fact there
is no error at the moment
does not mean you are not
controlling for them to
have that purpose. If the
window opens because of
someone else’s agency, you
are still controlling to
perceive it to be open,
but since that error is
now zero, you are no
longer acting to control
the other person’s
perception.

                                                  It sounded to

me that you and
Bruce were saying
that when you
control for
perceiving a
person doing
something you are
always controlling
for perceiving
them having the
purpose of doing
it.

                                          So when I control for

perceiving myself to be
riding my bicycle, I am
always controlling for
perceiving myself to be
riding my bicycle? I don’t
think so:-).

                                                  I was just

pointing out that
this is not the
case.

                                          True. It is not the case.

But I doubt anybody would
ever think it was, so why
mention the fact?

                                                  RM: ... I just

think that in most
cases people
control for the
activity and don’t
really care
whether it is (or
appears to be)
carried out
purposefully.

                                          Yes, but remember, we are

assume that there exists a
perceptual control
hierarchy in which each
level provides the means
whereby the next higher
level controls its
perceptions. One of the
means of changing some
perceptions of the
environment is to control
someone else’s intention
so that they act make the
desired change. That you
control for perceiving
something does not
preclude you from
controlling some other
perception as a method of
controlling the original
perception. I

                                          f you go up to a bank

teller intending to
withdraw $50, and as you
walk up, the teller gives
you $50 before you ask,
you no longer need to
control the perception of
gaining $50, so you no
longer act to control the
teller’s intention. But
that is unlikely to
happen, so, to get your
$50, you try to control
the tellers intentions so
that they include
withdrawing $50 from your
account and giving you the
cash.

                                                  RM: ...Bill

Powers’ demo where
the subject write
“hello” as a side
effect of keeping
a cursor on target
is a good example
of a situation
where the desired
behavior (the
written word
“hello”) is not
produced on
purpose but
observers usually
think it is. Bill
wrote the demo to
show that you can
control people’s
behavior (get them
to write “hello”)
by disturbing a
variable they are
controlling. In
this case, the
behavior that is
controlled
(“hello”) is
definitely not
produced on
purpose – that
is, it is not a
controlled result
– but it is still
controlled.

                                          Yes, indeed. There are

lots of ways you can
arrange for someone to do
what you want as a
side-effect of intending
to do someone else, but
you are likely to be most
effective if you control
for what that “something
else” intention might be.
Bill controlled for the
subject to intend to keep
the cursor on target. If
his control was
successful, then because
of the way he arranged the
physical environment, the
result will be the
behaviour (writing
“hello”) that Bill wanted
to see. Why did he want to
see that? Because he
wanted to show that what
looks intentional to an
observer who has no
influence on what happens
in that part of the
environment may not in
fact be intentional. It’s
Bill’s act, as a means to
fulfil Bill’s intention.

                                          We can describe a similar

effect for the Alice-Bob
Open Window situation.

                                          Alice:"*                                                Bob, I see Dave

out there. Could you
call him for me, please* ?"
Bob opens the window and
calls to Dave. By
hypothesis, Alice didn’t
care at all about Bob
calling Dave, except as a
means to get the window
open, but she did control
his intention to call. For
Dave, the opening of the
window was a side-effect,
while for Alice it was the
intended effect, achieved
by controlling Dave’s
intention to call Dave.

                                          Martin


Richard
S. MarkenÂ

                                                      "Perfection

is achieved
not when you
have nothing
more to add,
but when you
have
nothing left
to take away.�
Â
      Â
      Â
 --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery


Richard
S. MarkenÂ

                                                  "Perfection

is achieved not
when you have
nothing more to
add, but when you
have
nothing left to
take away.�
Â
        Â
     Â
–Antoine de
Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
   Â
            --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery

From Fred Nickols 2019.08.30.1459 ET

All this raises a question in my mind.

I’ve been somewhat sloppy in my thinking, I think. It just dawned on me that I’ve thought of the Reference Signal as specifying an intended value for the Input Quantity. But Bill’s diagram indicates that the Reference Signal specifies an intended value for the Perceptual Signal, not the Input Quantity. I will have to ponder this more but I suspect it will lead to some pretty fundamental shifts in my thinking - and in the way I’ve adjusted/adapted PCT for my use. Maybe this ties to some of Boris’s concerns.

···

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours”

www.nickols.us

[From Bruce Nevin (20190830.16:30 ET)]

Rick Marken 2019-08-30_10:55:01Â –

Yes, I understood your question, and I was being responsive. Your question had two parts. You first asked for an example of a ‘social variable’, and then you aid you’d like to hear how investigations of collective control give such variables a strong theoretical basis in PCT. I replied to the first part of your question with an example. After you recognize that, we can continue with the second part of your question.

You did not respond to the word “Huh?” as an example of a collectively controlled (‘social’) variable. If you had, you might have commented that the word “Huh?” and its intonation (indicated by the question mark) conventionally indicates not understanding what was just said, or alternatively consternation that such a thing might be said, and you might have acknowledged that “conventionally indicating” something is a function of collective control. We’ve discussed the nature of social conventions a fair amount.

Instead, your response participates in that collective control. But that response suffices just as well to move discussion of the “Huh?” example forward. Your response has three parts. You quote the context that you were replying to, you rephrase your question, and you explicitly ask if doing this overcomes my failure to understand, very nicely demonstrating your personal participation in collective control of perceptions associated with the word “Huh?”. Not a surprise, since you fluently participate in collective control of our shared English language of which it is part.

I confess that the ‘consternation’ meaning is also relevant. You seriously do not remember any of our discussions of language and culture in terms of collective control?

The context, as you generously reminded us, was “The dispute … over Bill’s resistance, perhaps around 1992, to notions like social variables or shared perceptions.” In the early 1990s notions of ‘social variables’ got caught up in Bill’s rejection of any notion of a ‘superorganic’ (Kroeber’s term) or of a collective consciousness or social mind, control systems superordinate to the individual human beings who are its members. Confirmed to materialist science as he was, he said he would want to see the input and output functions, etc. It looked like this resistance was going to make it difficult to talk about language and culture within PCT. Investigations of collective control showed how humans in social groups create and maintain such ‘social variables’, and they do so without having to posit collective control systems (but note their reincarnation as “giant virtual controllers” etc.). Some of us are interested in developing these lines of research further. Others have different interests.

I did argue, a few years later, that if there were such multi-human or ‘superorganic’ control systems we individual humans would necessarily be unaware of its perceptual input signals etc. as such, just as a neuron necessarily is oblivious to its firing rate as such, because if the firing rate were among the variables that neurons sense as cells then sooner or later they would come to control that variable in their own interest and come in conflict with the organism of which they are part. This is more a caution against being too dogmatic, rather than providing any insight of use to theory or experiment. In reply, Bill said he felt like the floor and the ceiling had both been removed, but after that brief and inconsequential disorientation we returned to our regular themes of discussion.

···

/Bruce

On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 1:56 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-08-30_10:55:01]

[From Bruce Nevin (20190830.10:15 ET)]

RM: I’d be interested in hearing what you think is an example of a social variable and how work in “collective control” shows that it can have a strong theoretical basis in PCT.

BN: Huh?

RM: Huh huh? Actually, I was replying to this:

BN: That is not the ghost of which I wrote. The dispute was over Bill’s resistance, perhaps around 1992, to notions like social variables or shared perceptions, I’m sure I don’t remember the precise words that were in play. Work on collective control showed how something like those notions can have a sound theoretical basis in PCT.

RM: So is it any clearer if I ask to see an example of how work on collective control gave notions like social variables or shared perceptions a strong theoretical basis in PCT?

Best

Rick


Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[Rick Marken 2019-09-02_11:08:11]

From Fred Nickols 2019.08.30.1459 ET

FN: All this raises a question in my mind.

FN: I’ve been somewhat sloppy in my thinking, I think. It just dawned on me that I’ve thought of the Reference Signal as specifying an intended value for the Input Quantity. But Bill’s diagram indicates that the Reference Signal specifies an intended value for the Perceptual Signal, not the Input Quantity. I will have to ponder this more but I suspect it will lead to some pretty fundamental shifts in my thinking - and in the way I’ve adjusted/adapted PCT for my use. Maybe this ties to some of Boris’s concerns.

RM: It certainly does. Don 't go there Fred; that way madness lies! The perceptual signal is an analog of the Input Quantity (now more commonly known as the Controlled Variable). So when you are maintaining the perceptual signal at the reference level you are maintaining the controlled variable in the observed reference state.Â

RM: That is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. (to quote a phrase).Â

Best

Rick

···

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

From Fred Nickols (2019.09.02.1415 ET)

Thanks, Rick. I understand what you’re saying and I understand that the perceptual signal is an analog of the controlled variable and, assuming it’s a good analog, maintaining the perceptual signal at the reference level will keep the controlled variable in a state that my perceptual signal tells me matches the reference level.

What I didn’t fully understand before the other day was that we actually control the perceptual signal and, assuming correspondence between that and the controlled variable, we can be said to be controlling the controlled variable, too. BUT, in a purely technical sense, we are controlling the perceptual signal, not the controlled variable per se. Or at least that’s what I’m thinking now.

···

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours”

www.nickols.us

[Martin Taylor 2019.09.02.14.16]

Yes, indeed. (This is something on which I used to differ with Rick,

but I changed my mind a few years ago, and now agree with him apart
from a minor subtlety of no interest in this thread).
Well, I wouldn’t go quite that far, but its a good platform on which
to stand when fishing for truths in the universal ocean.
Martin

···

[Rick Marken 2019-09-02_11:08:11]

From Fred Nickols 2019.08.30.1459 ET

FN: All this raises a question in my mind.

            FN: I've been somewhat sloppy in my thinking, I

think. It just dawned on me that I’ve thought of the
Reference Signal as specifying an intended value for the
Input Quantity. But Bill’s diagram indicates that the
Reference Signal specifies an intended value for the
Perceptual Signal, not the Input Quantity. I will have
to ponder this more but I suspect it will lead to some
pretty fundamental shifts in my thinking - and in the
way I’ve adjusted/adapted PCT for my use. Maybe this
ties to some of Boris’s concerns.

        RM: It certainly does. Don 't go there Fred; that way

madness lies! The perceptual signal is an analog of the
Input Quantity (now more commonly known as the Controlled
Variable). So when you are maintaining the perceptual signal
at the reference level you are maintaining the controlled
variable in the observed reference state.

        RM: That is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to

know. (to quote a phrase).

Best

Rick

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

** Distance
Consulting LLC**

  •                                            "My Objective is to
    

Help You Achieve Yours"*

www.nickols.us

            On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at

2:53 PM Martin Taylor <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2019.08.30.14.31]

                On

2019/08/30 1:45 PM, Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via
csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-08-30_10:44:23]

                        [Martin Taylor

2019.08.30.12.02]

                        MT: Fred, I think your analysis is correct

except for one thing that I trust is a
matter of semantics. When we analyze
everyday occurrences, we are tempted to use
everyday language, and to think that PCT
language doesn’t apply or is unnecessary.
You can be correct in either language, but
when you mix them, sometimes you miss
contradictions.

                        MT: You say: "*                              I don't think she wanted to

control my purpose. I do think she wanted
me to turn down the thermostat* ."Â The
first sentence is PCT language, the second
is everyday language.

                      RM: I think this is the source of your

problem. You think these two sentences say the
same thing using different “languages”, PCT
and English, respectively. I think they say
two different things using the same language:
English. They can be understood as saying two
different things if one understands PCT.Â
Indeed, if one didn’t understand PCT that
first sentence would be quite puzzling. But
knowing PCT and that in PCT “control” is
“purpose” and that what one controls are
perceptual variables, then that first sentence
clearly means that Fred’s wife wasn’t
controlling her perception of Fred turning
down the thermostat on purpose . And
based on a understanding of PCT, the second
sentence can be understood to mean that Fred’s
wife just wanted to control for a perception
of Fred turning down the thermostat.Â

                      RM: So Fred was quite correctly making a

distinction that could only be made with a
correct understanding of PCT; that one can
control a perception of someone * doing
something* or of them * doing something
on purpose* . Those are two different
perceptions that people can control.Â

              Since we agree on this, and also (I think) that

“correct PCT” hierarchic control, I am baffled by what
you think you are correcting.

              You seem to be implying that in a control hierarchy

only one single perception can be controlled at a
time. If so, your idea of “correct PCT” is VERY
different from mine, as mine assumes that many
different kinds of perceptions are being
simultaneously controlled up and down the hierarchy.

              By the way PCT-language is a specialized subset of

English, so if your “I think they say two different
things using the same language”, it’s a minor quibble.
But if you indeed believe that in “correct PCT” it is
impossible to control your perception of the car
steering-wheel angle while you are controlling your
perception of the position of the car in its lane, we
have a very significant difference of opinion.

              And in case you are interested, I did point out that

getting Fred to have the purpose (controlling Fred’s
purpose) of turning down the thermostat was not the
only means she had to perceive the thermostat turned
down. As I quoted earlier in this thread: “* Many
means to the same end* .” Acting to bring Fred to
a state of having the purpose of perceiving the
thermostat to be turned down was just the means she
chose, by explicitly asking him to do it.

              Martin

st

RickÂ

Â

                        I think that is not a

perfect contradiction, but it is close. Did
she want you to want to turn down the
thermostat of your own volition, and to want
to do it, for whatever reason (you say the
reason probably came from what I would say
in PCT language was “controlling your
perception of your wife’s feelings toward
you with a reference of positive” or
something like that, or in short form
“controlling for your wife to feel well
disposed toward you”. You say you actually
did it deliberately, on purpose, which in
PCT-speak is translated as “having a
reference to perceive [some state]”, the
states you wished to perceive being the
thermostat at 72, and your wife well
disposed to you.

                        Now, your wife might have wanted to perceive

the thermostat being at 72, but not wanted
to perceive you doing it on purpose. Suppose
it was not your wife, but some horrible
person who you hated and who hated you.
Maybe that person might get you to turn the
thermostat down by asking you to turn it up.
You would still be turning it down
intentionally.

                        Or, suppose the thermostat had a control

lever that stuck out. A person could get you
to lower the thermostat setting, though not
accurately, by positioning some furniture so
that when you passed by for some other
purpose you would brush the lever and lower
the setting. You would reset the thermostat
as a side-effect of intending something
unrelated in your mind, but not in the mind
of the person who moved the furniture.

                        Since both of these latter possibilities are

highly unlikely, I argue that your quoted
sentences should read “* I think she wanted
me to want to turn down the thermostat,
and I think she wanted to see me actually
do it*.”

                        It's sometimes called "cooperation", when A

wants to do what they perceive B wants them
to do.

                        Martin

Regards,

                                                      Fred

Nickols

  •                                                      Managing
    

Partner*

Distance Consulting LLC

  •                                                      "My
    

Objective is
to Help You
Achieve Yours"*

www.nickols.us

                              On

Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 10:17 AM Bruce
Nevin <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

                                      [From

Bruce Nevin (20190830.10:15
ET)]

                                        Rick Marken

2019-08-29_18:57:25 –

                                          RM:

I’d be interested in
hearing what you think is
an example of a social
variable and how work in
“collective control” shows
that it can have a strong
theoretical basis in PCT.

Huh?

                                  On

Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 10:00 PM
Richard Marken <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

                                      [Rick Marken

2019-08-29_18:57:25]

                                            [From

Bruce Nevin
20190829.15:46 ET)]

                                              Rick Marken

2019-08-28_17:25:13Â --Â

                                                RM: I don't

disagree with any of
this. I am just
saying that
controlling for a
person doing
something on purpose
is controlling for a
different perception
that controlling for
a person just doing
that something…Â

                                            BN:

I would suggest, though,
that the discussion of
controlling a perception
that you do not
manipulate (in the case
of sunrise and traffic
light you cannot) is
pertinent to your
dispute with Martin.

                                        RM: I don't see it. And I

think it’s possible that
Martin and I don’t disagree
about anything. As I said
above, I thought we
disagreed about whether
controlling for a person * doing
something on purpose* Â is
different than controlling
for a person simply * doing
something* . I think
those are different
perceptions and I think
Martin agreed that they were
as well. If we disagree
about anything it may be
which of these perceptions
is the one that is more
often controlled. I think
controlling for a person
doing something  is
far more common that
controlling for a person * doing
something on purpose*.Â

Â

                                                  RM: The ghost of which

you speak – that
we can’t know
another’s
perceptions  Â

                                            BN:

That is not the ghost of
which I wrote. The
dispute was over Bill’s
resistance, perhaps
around 1992, to notions
like social variables or
shared perceptions, I’m
sure I don’t remember
the precise words that
were in play. Work on
collective control
showed how something
like those notions can
have a sound theoretical
basis in PCT.

                                        RM: I don't think so. But

I’d be interested in hearing
what you think is an example
of a social variable and how
work in “collective control”
shows that it can have a
strong theoretical basis in
PCT.

BestÂ

Rick

/Bruce

                                            On

Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at
8:27 PM Richard Marken
<csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

                                                [Rick Marken

2019-08-28_17:25:13]

                                                      [From

Bruce Nevin
(20190828.17:19
ET)]

                                                      Â RM:

I can’t think
of a situation
where one
controls a
perception of
another
person’s
purpose.

Â

                                                      BN:

The antecedent
question is,
“can we
perceive
another’s
purpose?” I
take the
answer to be
unequivocally
yes, we can
and frequently
do.

                                                  RM: I agree.

And I think we are
doing it all theÂ
time.

Â

                                                      BN:

Of course, the
perception may
be mistaken,
just as any
other
perception may
be mistaken.

                                                  RM: Yes,

indeed. Which is
the subject of the
paper I attached
in reply to Eetu.Â

Â

                                                      BN:Â  The Test

for the
Controlled
Variable
ensures that
we are not
mistaken when
we attribute a
purpose to a
perceived
activity, but
we usually
employ less
rigorous means
of assuring
ourselves,

                                                  RM: Precisely

the point of the
“Theory of Mind”
paper that I
posted! It’s
really a good
paper; I just
re-read it and it
made me jealous of
what a great
writer the author
was;-)

Â

                                                      BN:

The idea that
such a
perception
might
necessarily be
imaginary is
the restless
ghost of an
argument on
csgnet a good
many years
ago, about
agreements.
How could we
have agreed or
‘shared’
perceptions,
it was argued,
because
perceptions
are inherently
private. They
are inside the
dotted line
that separates
the organism
from the
environment in
our diagrams.
But reference
values are
observable in
the
environment.
(The reference
signal  is
private and
presumably
idiosyncratic,
but the
reference value  that
it represents
is public, in
the
environment;
else the Test
would not be
possible.)

                                                  RM: Very nicely

put.

Â

                                                      BN:

Subsequent
work on
collective
control has
put that
dispute to
rest–with an
occasional
rattling of
ghostly
chains, as
noted.
Collectively
controlled
variables are
individually
controlled
with respect
to shared
reference
values.

                                                  RM: The ghost

of which you speak
– that we can’t
know another’s
perceptions – was
put to rest by
Bill Powers well
before the ghost
appeared. So, to
paraphase Mae West
in reply to your
claim that
collective control
put the ghost to
rest I say
“Collective
control had
nothing to do with
it”.Â

Â

                                                      BN:

OK, but I
asked “When we
control a
perception of
another’s
purpose, is
that
perception
imaginary?”
The way I
framed the
question
further
presumes that
the perception
of another’s
purpose can be
controlled. It
might be
helpful to
remember that
control is not
limited to
manipulation.
As Bill
pointed out,
we control the
sun rising in
the east, as
would be
evidenced by
our
consternation
were it to
rise in some
other quarter.
Navajos
construct
their hogans
in such a way
that they
control a
perception of
the sun rising
in the east in
the morning,
which a
right-living
Navajo indeed
endeavors to
do (as do many
other people).
Stonehenge was
arranged to
control a
number of
perceptions,
one of which
was the sun
rising due
east on the
equinox.

                                                      BN:

Perceptions of
other people’s
purposes are
an important
part of the
environment
within which
we control.
For example,
Goffman
documented how
we determine
the intentions
of oncoming
pedestrians on
a
sidewalk–angle
of shoulder or
foot, tilt of
head, lift of
hand. Try
noticing these
tells
sometime;
they’re
typically done
without
awareness. I
can’t
manipulate the
color of the
traffic light,
but just as
the cat
crouched
before the
mouse-hole
controls a
perception of
a mouse I
control a
perception of
a green arrow
before I turn
left across
traffic.

                                                  RM: I don't

disagree with any
of this. I am just
saying that
controlling for a
person doing
something on
purpose is
controlling for a
different
perception that
controlling for a
person just doing
that something.As
you said, people
do distinguish
purposeful from
accidental
behavior. So
saying that you
control for a
person having the
purpose of opening
a window is
actually saying
that you are doing
something
different that
controlling for a
person opening the
window. And while
I did say that I
couldn’t think of
a situation where
I would want to
control for
someone doing
something on
purpose rather
than just
controlling for
having the do it,
that was before
Martin suggested a
situation where
Iago would want to
control for
Othello doing
something on
purpose rather
than just doing
it!

BestÂ

Rick

/Bruce

                                                      On

Wed, Aug 28,
2019 at 4:38
PM Martin
Taylor <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
wrote:

[Martin Taylor
2019.08.28.15.39]

                                                      [Rick

Marken
2019-08-28_09:56:42]

[Martin Taylor
2019.08.27.17.00]

                                                      MT: Alice has

a reference to
perceive Bob
as having the
purpose of
opening the
window she
wants open.

                                                      RM:

That’s
possible, but
I think that
in most cases
people like
Alice would be
perfectly
happy if Bob
opened the
window by
accident.

                                                      MT: Sure. But

what does that
have to do
with it?

                                                      RM: Just

noting that
there is a
difference
between
controlling
for a person* having the
purpose* of
doing
something and
controlling
for having the
person * do
something*.

                                                      Not quite as

self-evident
as it appears
on the
surface, as
Bill’s
rubber-band
demo
demonstrates
(see below).

                                                      "*                                                          All

(purposeful)
behaviour is
the control of
perception* ",
No?

                                                      When you want

someone to
control a
perception of,
for example,
perceiving a
window to be
open as a
means of
perceiving it
to be open,
you know how
well you are
succeeding by
observing
whether they
act to open
the window. If
that was
already their
purpose, there
is zero error
in your
control loop,
but the fact
there is no
error at the
moment does
not mean you
are not
controlling
for them to
have that
purpose. If
the window
opens because
of someone
else’s agency,
you are still
controlling to
perceive it to
be open, but
since that
error is now
zero, you are
no longer
acting to
control the
other person’s
perception.

                                                      It

sounded to me
that you and
Bruce were
saying that
when you
control for
perceiving a
person doing
something you
are always
controlling
for perceiving
them having
the purpose of
doing it.

                                                      So when I

control for
perceiving
myself to be
riding my
bicycle, I am
always
controlling
for perceiving
myself to be
riding my
bicycle? I
don’t think
so:-).

                                                      I was

just pointing
out that this
is not the
case.

                                                      True. It is

not the case.
But I doubt
anybody would
ever think it
was, so why
mention the
fact?

                                                      RM: ... I

just think
that in most
cases people
control for
the activity
and don’t
really care
whether it is
(or appears to
be) carried
out
purposefully.

                                                      Yes, but

remember, we
are assume
that there
exists a
perceptual
control
hierarchy in
which each
level provides
the means
whereby the
next higher
level controls
its
perceptions.
One of the
means of
changing some
perceptions of
the
environment is
to control
someone else’s
intention so
that they act
make the
desired
change. That
you control
for perceiving
something does
not preclude
you from
controlling
some other
perception as
a method of
controlling
the original
perception. I

                                                      f you go up to

a bank teller
intending to
withdraw $50,
and as you
walk up, the
teller gives
you $50 before
you ask, you
no longer need
to control the
perception of
gaining $50,
so you no
longer act to
control the
teller’s
intention. But
that is
unlikely to
happen, so, to
get your $50,
you try to
control the
tellers
intentions so
that they
include
withdrawing
$50 from your
account and
giving you the
cash.

                                                      RM:

…Bill
Powers’ demo
where the
subject write
“hello” as a
side effect of
keeping a
cursor on
target is a
good example
of a situation
where the
desired
behavior (the
written word
“hello”) is
not produced
on purpose but
observers
usually think
it is. Bill
wrote the demo
to show that
you can
control
people’s
behavior (get
them to write
“hello”) by
disturbing a
variable they
are
controlling.
In this case,
the behavior
that is
controlled
(“hello”) is
definitely not
produced on
purpose –
that is, it is
not a
controlled
result – but
it is still
controlled.

                                                      Yes, indeed.

There are lots
of ways you
can arrange
for someone to
do what you
want as a
side-effect of
intending to
do someone
else, but you
are likely to
be most
effective if
you control
for what that
“something
else”
intention
might be. Bill
controlled for
the subject to
intend to keep
the cursor on
target. If his
control was
successful,
then because
of the way he
arranged the
physical
environment,
the result
will be the
behaviour
(writing
“hello”) that
Bill wanted to
see. Why did
he want to see
that? Because
he wanted to
show that what
looks
intentional to
an observer
who has no
influence on
what happens
in that part
of the
environment
may not in
fact be
intentional.
It’s Bill’s
act, as a
means to
fulfil Bill’s
intention.

                                                      We can

describe a
similar effect
for the
Alice-Bob Open
Window
situation.

                                                      Alice:"*                                                          Bob,

I see Dave out
there. Could
you call him
for me, please* ?"
Bob opens the
window and
calls to Dave.
By hypothesis,
Alice didn’t
care at all
about Bob
calling Dave,
except as a
means to get
the window
open, but she
did control
his intention
to call. For
Dave, the
opening of the
window was a
side-effect,
while for
Alice it was
the intended
effect,
achieved by
controlling
Dave’s
intention to
call Dave.

                                                      Martin


Richard
S. MarkenÂ

                                                      "Perfection

is achieved
not when you
have nothing
more to add,
but when you
have
nothing left
to take away.�
Â
      Â
      Â
 --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery


Richard
S. MarkenÂ

                                                      "Perfection

is achieved
not when you
have nothing
more to add,
but when you
have
nothing left
to take away.�
Â
      Â
      Â
 --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery


Richard S.
MarkenÂ

                                              "Perfection

is achieved not when
you have nothing more
to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take
away.�
Â
          Â
    --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery


Richard S. MarkenÂ

                                "Perfection

is achieved not when you have
nothing more to add, but when you
have
nothing left to take away.�
   Â
            --Antoine de
Saint-Exupery

From Fred Nickols 2019.09.02.1423 ET

Thanks, Martin.Â

···

Fred Nickols
Solution Engineer & Chief Toolmaker
Distance Consulting LLC
“Assistance at A Distance�
www.nickols.us

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2019-09-03_10:48:43 UTC]

Fred, that’s how I think it:

The perceptual signal is determined by and follows the changes in the effect of some external variable (which I assume to be a property of some object). In the lowest
(basic) level of the control hierarchy that external effect is transformed to a perceptual signal via some – probably not simple and linear – transforrmation function in the so called input function or a sense organ. In higher levels there are probably new
input functions which combine and re-transform the signals from the lower levels. So there happens information processing and bits of memory / imagination is added. And even from some level upwards the analogical processing seems to changes digital. So the
higher level perception the more there can be distance between the changes of original sense effects and the changes in the perceptual signal. But from the point of view of evolution and the self-preservation of the organism there is probably some pressure
to maintain some correspondence between then external effects and perceptual signals. However it is that transformed perceptual signal which is compared to the reference signal and the output tries make them match by affecting the external variable. And when
perception and reference match together then the external variable is affected to a certain state which can be called the reference state. That is the loop or circular interdependence: perceptual signal depends (at least partially; via more or less complex
transformation function containing many arguments) on the input quantity and the reference state of the input quantity depends (perhaps via similar but “backwards� function) on the reference signal.

A little bit garbled story, sorry…

···

Eetu

From: Martin Taylor csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Monday, September 2, 2019 9:22 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Controlling another’s purpose (was Re: agency in language)

[Martin Taylor 2019.09.02.14.16]

[Rick Marken 2019-09-02_11:08:11]

From Fred Nickols 2019.08.30.1459 ET

FN: All this raises a question in my mind.

FN: I’ve been somewhat sloppy in my thinking, I think. It just dawned on me that I’ve thought of the Reference Signal as specifying an intended value for the Input Quantity. But Bill’s diagram indicates that
the Reference Signal specifies an intended value for the Perceptual Signal, not the Input Quantity. I will have to ponder this more but I suspect it will lead to some pretty fundamental shifts in my thinking - and in the way I’ve adjusted/adapted PCT for
my use. Maybe this ties to some of Boris’s concerns.

RM: It certainly does. Don 't go there Fred; that way madness lies! The perceptual signal is an analog of the Input Quantity (now more commonly known as the Controlled Variable). So when you are maintaining the
perceptual signal at the reference level you are maintaining the controlled variable in the observed reference state.

Yes, indeed. (This is something on which I used to differ with Rick, but I changed my mind a few years ago, and now agree with him apart from a minor subtlety of no interest in this thread).

RM: That is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. (to quote a phrase).

Well, I wouldn’t go quite that far, but its a good platform on which to stand when fishing for truths in the universal ocean.

Martin

Best

Rick

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours”

www.nickols.us

On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 2:53 PM Martin Taylor csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2019.08.30.14.31]

On 2019/08/30 1:45 PM, Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-08-30_10:44:23]

[Martin Taylor 2019.08.30.12.02]
MT: Fred, I think your analysis is correct except for one thing that I trust is a matter of semantics. When we analyze everyday occurrences, we are tempted to use everyday language, and to think that PCT language doesn’t apply or is unnecessary. You can be
correct in either language, but when you mix them, sometimes you miss contradictions.
MT: You say: “I don’t think she wanted to control my purpose. I do think she wanted me to turn down the thermostat.” The first sentence is PCT language, the second is everyday language.

RM: I think this is the source of your problem. You think these two sentences say the same thing using different “languages”, PCT and English, respectively. I think they say two different things using the same
language: English. They can be understood as saying two different things if one understands PCT. Indeed, if one didn’t understand PCT that first sentence would be quite puzzling. But knowing PCT and that in PCT “control” is “purpose” and that what one controls
are perceptual variables, then that first sentence clearly means that Fred’s wife wasn’t controlling her perception of Fred turning down the thermostat
on purpose. And based on a understanding of PCT, the second sentence can be understood to mean that Fred’s wife just wanted to control for a perception of Fred turning down the thermostat.

RM: So Fred was quite correctly making a distinction that could only be made with a correct understanding of PCT; that one can control a perception of someone
doing something or of them doing something on purpose. Those are two different perceptions that people can control.

Since we agree on this, and also (I think) that “correct PCT” hierarchic control, I am baffled by what you think you are correcting.
You seem to be implying that in a control hierarchy only one single perception can be controlled at a time. If so, your idea of “correct PCT” is VERY different from mine, as mine assumes that many different kinds of perceptions are being simultaneously controlled
up and down the hierarchy.
By the way PCT-language is a specialized subset of English, so if your “I think they say two different things using the same language”, it’s a minor quibble. But if you indeed believe that in “correct PCT” it is impossible to control your perception of the
car steering-wheel angle while you are controlling your perception of the position of the car in its lane, we have a very significant difference of opinion.
And in case you are interested, I did point out that getting Fred to have the purpose (controlling Fred’s purpose) of turning down the thermostat was not the only means she had to perceive the thermostat turned down. As I quoted earlier in this thread: “* Many
means to the same end*.” Acting to bring Fred to a state of having the purpose of perceiving the thermostat to be turned down was just the means she chose, by explicitly asking him to do it.

Martin

st

Rick

I think that is not a perfect contradiction, but it is close. Did she want you to want to turn down the thermostat of your own volition, and to want to do it, for whatever reason (you say the reason probably came
from what I would say in PCT language was “controlling your perception of your wife’s feelings toward you with a reference of positive” or something like that, or in short form “controlling for your wife to feel well disposed toward you”. You say you actually
did it deliberately, on purpose, which in PCT-speak is translated as “having a reference to perceive [some state]”, the states you wished to perceive being the thermostat at 72, and your wife well disposed to you.
Now, your wife might have wanted to perceive the thermostat being at 72, but not wanted to perceive you doing it on purpose. Suppose it was not your wife, but some horrible person who you hated and who hated you. Maybe that person might get you to turn the
thermostat down by asking you to turn it up. You would still be turning it down intentionally.
Or, suppose the thermostat had a control lever that stuck out. A person could get you to lower the thermostat setting, though not accurately, by positioning some furniture so that when you passed by for some other purpose you would brush the lever and lower
the setting. You would reset the thermostat as a side-effect of intending something unrelated in your mind, but not in the mind of the person who moved the furniture.
Since both of these latter possibilities are highly unlikely, I argue that your quoted sentences should read “I think she wanted me to want to turn down the thermostat, and I think she wanted to see me actually do it.”

It’s sometimes called “cooperation”, when A wants to do what they perceive B wants them to do.

Martin

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Managing Partner

Distance Consulting LLC

“My Objective is to Help You Achieve Yours”

www.nickols.us

On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 10:17 AM Bruce Nevin csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Bruce Nevin (20190830.10:15 ET)]

Rick Marken 2019-08-29_18:57:25 –

RM: I’d be interested in hearing what you think is an example of a social variable and how work in “collective control” shows that it can have a strong
theoretical basis in PCT.

Huh?

On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 10:00 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-08-29_18:57:25]

[From Bruce Nevin 20190829.15:46 ET)]

Rick Marken 2019-08-28_17:25:13 –

RM: I don’t disagree with any of this. I am just saying that controlling for a person doing something on purpose is controlling for a different perception
that controlling for a person just doing that something…

BN: I would suggest, though, that the discussion of controlling a perception that you do not manipulate (in the case of sunrise and traffic light you
cannot) is pertinent to your dispute with Martin.

RM: I don’t see it. And I think it’s possible that Martin and I don’t disagree about anything. As I said above, I thought we disagreed about whether controlling for a person
doing something on purpose is different than controlling for a person simply
doing something. I think those are different perceptions and I think Martin agreed that they were as well. If we disagree about anything it may be which of these perceptions is the one that is more often controlled. I think controlling for a person doing
something is far more common that controlling for a person doing something on purpose.

RM: The ghost of which you speak – that we can’t know another’s perceptions

BN: That is not the ghost of which I wrote. The dispute was over Bill’s resistance, perhaps around 1992, to notions like social variables or shared perceptions,
I’m sure I don’t remember the precise words that were in play. Work on collective control showed how something like those notions can have a sound theoretical basis in PCT.

RM: I don’t think so. But I’d be interested in hearing what you think is an example of a social variable and how work in “collective control” shows that it can have a strong theoretical basis in PCT.

Best

Rick

/Bruce

On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 8:27 PM Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2019-08-28_17:25:13]

[From Bruce Nevin (20190828.17:19 ET)]

RM: I can’t think of a situation where one controls a perception of another person’s purpose.

BN: The antecedent question is, “can we perceive another’s purpose?” I take the answer to be unequivocally yes, we can and frequently do.

RM: I agree. And I think we are doing it all the time.

BN: Of course, the perception may be mistaken, just as any other perception may be mistaken.

RM: Yes, indeed. Which is the subject of the paper I attached in reply to Eetu.

BN: The Test for the Controlled Variable ensures that we are not mistaken when we attribute a purpose to a perceived activity, but we usually employ
less rigorous means of assuring ourselves,

RM: Precisely the point of the “Theory of Mind” paper that I posted! It’s really a good paper; I just re-read it and it made me jealous of what a great writer the author was;-)

BN: The idea that such a perception might necessarily be imaginary is the restless ghost of an argument on csgnet a good many years ago, about agreements.
How could we have agreed or ‘shared’ perceptions, it was argued, because perceptions are inherently private. They are inside the dotted line that separates the organism from the environment in our diagrams. But reference values are observable in the environment.
(The reference signal is private and presumably idiosyncratic, but the reference
value that it represents is public, in the environment; else the Test would not be possible.)

RM: Very nicely put.

BN: Subsequent work on collective control has put that dispute to rest–with an occasional rattling of ghostly chains, as noted. Collectively controlled
variables are individually controlled with respect to shared reference values.

RM: The ghost of which you speak – that we can’t know another’s perceptions – was put to rest by Bill Powers well before the ghost appeared. So, to paraphase Mae West in reply to your claim that collective control
put the ghost to rest I say “Collective control had nothing to do with it”.

BN: OK, but I asked “When we control a perception of another’s purpose, is that perception imaginary?” The way I framed the question further presumes
that the perception of another’s purpose can be controlled. It might be helpful to remember that control is not limited to manipulation. As Bill pointed out, we control the sun rising in the east, as would be evidenced by our consternation were it to rise
in some other quarter. Navajos construct their hogans in such a way that they control a perception of the sun rising in the east in the morning, which a right-living Navajo indeed endeavors to do (as do many other people). Stonehenge was arranged to control
a number of perceptions, one of which was the sun rising due east on the equinox.

BN: Perceptions of other people’s purposes are an important part of the environment within which we control. For example, Goffman documented how we determine
the intentions of oncoming pedestrians on a sidewalk–angle of shoulder or foot, tilt of head, lift of hand. Try noticing these tells sometime; they’re typically done without awareness. I can’t manipulate the color of the traffic light, but just as the cat
crouched before the mouse-hole controls a perception of a mouse I control a perception of a green arrow before I turn left across traffic.

RM: I don’t disagree with any of this. I am just saying that controlling for a person doing something on purpose is controlling for a different perception that controlling for a person just doing that something.As
you said, people do distinguish purposeful from accidental behavior. So saying that you control for a person having the purpose of opening a window is actually saying that you are doing something different that controlling for a person opening the window.
And while I did say that I couldn’t think of a situation where I would want to control for someone doing something on purpose rather than just controlling for having the do it, that was before Martin suggested a situation where Iago would want to control
for Othello doing something on purpose rather than just doing it!

Best

Rick

/Bruce

On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 4:38 PM Martin Taylor csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2019.08.28.15.39]

[Rick Marken 2019-08-28_09:56:42]

[Martin Taylor 2019.08.27.17.00]

MT: Alice has a reference to perceive Bob as having the purpose of opening the window she wants open.

RM: That’s possible, but I think that in most cases people like Alice would be perfectly happy if Bob opened the window by accident.

MT: Sure. But what does that have to do with it?

RM: Just noting that there is a difference between controlling for a person having the purpose of doing something and controlling for having the person
do something.

Not quite as self-evident as it appears on the surface, as Bill’s rubber-band demo demonstrates (see below).
All (purposeful) behaviour is the control of perception”, No?

When you want someone to control a perception of, for example, perceiving a window to be open as a means of perceiving it to be open, you know how well you are succeeding by observing whether they act to open the window. If that was already their purpose, there
is zero error in your control loop, but the fact there is no error at the moment does not mean you are not controlling for them to have that purpose. If the window opens because of someone else’s agency, you are still controlling to perceive it to be open,
but since that error is now zero, you are no longer acting to control the other person’s perception.

It sounded to me that you and Bruce were saying that when you control for perceiving a person doing something you are always controlling for perceiving them having the purpose of doing it.

So when I control for perceiving myself to be riding my bicycle, I am always controlling for perceiving myself to be riding my bicycle? I don’t think so:-).

I was just pointing out that this is not the case.

True. It is not the case. But I doubt anybody would ever think it was, so why mention the fact?

RM: … I just think that in most cases people control for the activity and don’t really care whether it is (or appears to be) carried out purposefully.

Yes, but remember, we are assume that there exists a perceptual control hierarchy in which each level provides the means whereby the next higher level controls its perceptions. One of the means of changing some perceptions of the environment is to control someone
else’s intention so that they act make the desired change. That you control for perceiving something does not preclude you from controlling some other perception as a method of controlling the original perception. I

f you go up to a bank teller intending to withdraw $50, and as you walk up, the teller gives you $50 before you ask, you no longer need to control the perception of gaining $50, so you no longer act to control the teller’s intention. But that is unlikely to
happen, so, to get your $50, you try to control the tellers intentions so that they include withdrawing $50 from your account and giving you the cash.

RM: …Bill Powers’ demo where the subject write “hello” as a side effect of keeping a cursor on target is a good example of a situation where the desired behavior (the written word “hello”) is not produced on
purpose but observers usually think it is. Bill wrote the demo to show that you can control people’s behavior (get them to write “hello”) by disturbing a variable they are controlling. In this case, the behavior that is controlled (“hello”) is definitely not
produced on purpose – that is, it is not a controlled result – but it is still controlled.

Yes, indeed. There are lots of ways you can arrange for someone to do what you want as a side-effect of intending to do someone else, but you are likely to be most effective if you control for what that “something else” intention might be. Bill controlled for
the subject to intend to keep the cursor on target. If his control was successful, then because of the way he arranged the physical environment, the result will be the behaviour (writing “hello”) that Bill wanted to see. Why did he want to see that? Because
he wanted to show that what looks intentional to an observer who has no influence on what happens in that part of the environment may not in fact be intentional. It’s Bill’s act, as a means to fulfil Bill’s intention.
We can describe a similar effect for the Alice-Bob Open Window situation.
Alice:“Bob, I see Dave out there. Could you call him for me, please ?” Bob opens the window and calls to Dave. By hypothesis, Alice didn’t care at all about Bob calling Dave, except as a means to get the window open, but she did control his intention
to call. For Dave, the opening of the window was a side-effect, while for Alice it was the intended effect, achieved by controlling Dave’s intention to call Dave.

Martin

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                            --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                            --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                            --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                            --Antoine de Saint-Exupery