[From Bruce Nevin (990910.2200 EDT)]
(branching from Re: Character Acting)
I frequently control for something that I imagine happening. Don't you?
That is what I meant by risk. That is why a bully's threat is effective. If
I were in a building where there was a bomb scare, I would leave the
building for two reasons. The first is because I imagine awkward
consequences if I ignore those who are given charge of the evacuation
process, such as the police. The second is because I imagine even more
unpleasant consequences if in fact there is a bomb and it goes off near me.
The second is a more pressing reason than the first for me to grant
authority to the police in this situation -- somewhat as I would cede
control to a bully who has issued a persuasive threat.
Rick Marken (990910.1520) --
What I usually control for is the ... program
perception "if X is proposed then conclude that
X is true only if evidence of X is true". In the case of
the bomb, this program is:"If 'bomb in building' is proposed then conclude 'bomb in
building' is true if 'sight of bomb' is true".Instead of controlling for this program, I controlled for
a different program, namely;"If 'bomb in building' is proposed, then the accept 'bomb
in building' is true".
You wouldn't accept such a proposal from just anyone, would you? For
example, if a well-known practical joker told you to leave because there
was a bomb in the building, wouldn't you be much more likely to check it
out? This account seems too simplified. In this account, there's not a clue
as to why you would shift from your customary "don't act without evidence"
to "whatever you say". If another account were more explanatory, would you
consider it?
Here's what I think happened. You controlled your proximity to a bomb about
to go off. The bomb was an imagined perception. I suppose your proximity
was also imagined, I'm not clear about that; your proximity to the building
was not imagined. You imagined and controlled this bomb perception because
you believed the people who told you about it. A credible report of risk
has exactly the same standing in PCT as a credible threat when we're
talking about coercion.
A police statement that there was a significant risk of a bomb being
present was sufficient evidence for you to control your proximity to an
imagined bomb. You could verbalize this as a conclusion something like
"There might not be a bomb, but the consequences if a bomb explodes here
are so bad for me that it's not worth the risk sticking around. I'll let
the experts test the hypothesis by looking for physical evidence, thank you
very much." This conclusion is based on evidence, namely, credible
assertions by the police.
This is why I said that you were in fact still following your principle (or
program) of basing conclusions on evidence. Your conclusion was not that
there is a bomb present. Your conclusion was that there was enough of a
credible risk for you to skedaddle.
You ignored the rest of what I said. A possible mechanism for ignoring
might be by controlling imagined inputs in place of certain other sensory
inputs. The "real" inputs are thereby ignored. They haven't a chance of
getting in because the relevant input functions are receiving imagined
inputs. The only way they can come to awareness (whatever that is) is by
entering those input functions in place of the imagined inputs. By such a
mechanism we could account for how what we fear (risk) and what we desire
(opportunity) supplants evidence of what actually is--the fearing and
desiring both being matters of imagination. We still control adequately
because what is is notoriously ambiguous with respect to what we make of
it, e.g. the half full/empty glass and the differing careers of the
siblings after their encounters (in the fairy tales) with the old woman at
the crossroads, etc. And it might be that modelling such a mechanism could
give a window into what awareness is about. Among other things.
Bruce Nevin
···
At 03:17 PM 09/10/1999 -0700, Richard Marken wrote: