# Controlling for; PCT and cognitive psychology

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/controlling-for-pct-and-cognitive-psychology/3089>\
**Category:** CSG1993\
**Created:** [April 28, 1993, 5:11pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/controlling-for-pct-and-cognitive-psychology/3089 "1993-04-28T17:11:59Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/w/c67d28/32.png) [@William\_T\_Powers2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/William_T_Powers2)\
**Post date:** [April 28, 1993, 5:11pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/controlling-for-pct-and-cognitive-psychology/3089/1 "1993-04-28T17:11:59Z")

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[From Bill Powers (930428.0815)]

Bruce Nevin (930427.1232) --

> A while back (it has been a while) as I was going over  
> something that I was preparing to send to CSG-L, I made the  
> following correction:

> controlling for the perception of X ==\> controlling the  
> perception of X

> Since then, I have noticed this locution a number of times,  
> even in something that Bill wrote. The reason I thought of it  
> as an error and corrected it is because it seems to say  
> "controlling actions for the perception of X," when what we  
> want to say is that perception and not action is what is  
> controlled.

This was something that my students in a 1972-1973 seminar  
started saying, and I picked it up. It's used in explaining one's  
actions to someone else (or oneself). If you object that I'm  
driving too close behind another car, I explain that I'm  
controlling for reading the bumper sticker (which says "If you  
can read this, you're too close").

To say that you're controlling for some perception is to explain  
your actions by describing what they're supposed to accomplish.  
First, it means that the actions aren't random even if they  
appear so; they're part of a control process. Second, it names  
the goal-perception. Third, it explains that the control is not  
necessarily being successful -- the actual perception might, at  
the moment, be rather far from its intended goal-state. Parallel  
constructions might be trying for, aiming for, or striving for.  
Controlling for is not the same as controlling, because  
controlling implies that the error is very small and control is  
working well. "Controlling for" allows for the existence of  
visible errors and incomplete counteraction of disturbances. I  
was quite pleased with my students for coming up with such a  
concise way of referring to a rather sophisticated understanding  
of control behavior.

> **···**
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------  
> Ken Hacker (930422) --
> 
> I think you agree now with my characterization of the S-R  
> approach, and that it is widespread. Now we have to talk about  
> the cognitive approach, which also has problems. The cognitive  
> approach is claimed by those who follow it to be the newest and  
> most prevalant version of psychology, but that isn't true -- it  
> only seems true if you read nothing but the cognitivist journals  
> and assume that there's nothing else going on. In fact, most of  
> the work in the behavioral and social sciences is still done  
> under the S-R paradigm, as I have broadly defined it. A good deal  
> of this actually goes on under the name of cognitive science.  
> When Greg Williams starts reporting his findings, and as I  
> continue my reading of the journals and reporting on them, I  
> think that will become clear.
> 
> The cognitivist approach doesn't have all the problems of the S-R  
> approach, but it shares one major problem: defining behavior.
> 
> In your post, you say "Behavioral regularities occur in various  
> forms. First, there are personal regularities, what we call  
> habits and routines..."
> 
> If habits and routines are behavioral regularities, I assume you  
> mean that they are \_visible\_ behavioral regularities: they are  
> things you can see people doing over and over. The usual  
> cognitivist interpretation, I presume, is that these observed  
> regularities are simply reflections of cognitive processes -- in  
> effect, cognitive commands to produce just those behaviors that  
> are observed. They are habits and routines primarily because of  
> habitual and routine cognitive processes.
> 
> Underlying this interpretation is a fundamental assumption: if a  
> governing cognitive process were to repeat itself exactly, the  
> behavior it produces would repeat exactly. There is also a  
> functional (or is it structural?) assumption: a cognitive process  
> has its effects by sending commands to lower systems, ultimately  
> telling the motor systems what to do, and thus producing the  
> indirect effects in the environment that we recognize as the  
> outcome of the cognitive process. So the basic arrangement is
> 
> cognition --\> motor actions --\> behavioral consequences.
> 
> PCT denies both the fundamental assumption and the  
> functional/structural assumption. It says that there can be no  
> regular chain of processes as diagrammed above. This has nothing  
> to do with the difference between "emitted behavior" and  
> "interaction." It has to do with the mechanics of behavior,  
> whether involved in an interaction or not. This is not even a  
> PCT-specific observation; it's simply a fact that has not been  
> taken into account in other theoretical approaches to behavior.  
> PCT is the only theory that does not have to assume the above  
> diagram.
> 
> The true state of affairs should be diagrammed like this:
> 
> cognition --\> motor actions --\> behavioral consequences  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;/ / / / / / / / /  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;d i s t u r b a n c e s
> 
> Disturbances enter into this output chain at every point,  
> starting with the muscles themselves and extending throughout the  
> effects that muscles have on the limbs and environment. Putting a  
> constant cognitive process into the input of this chain will NOT  
> lead to consistent behavioral consequences. Conversely, if  
> consistent (habitual, routine) behavioral consequences are  
> observed, the correct explanation CANNOT be that they are the  
> result of consistent (habitual, routine) cognitive processes.
> 
> PCT explains how it is that "behavioral consequences" can indeed  
> appear consistent, habitual, or routine even though there is no  
> reliable chain of cause and effect extending from the brain  
> outward into the environment. So at one stroke, PCT points out a  
> fact of nature that is glaringly omitted from all cognitivist  
> accounts of behavior and provides a model that can explain the  
> regularities of behavior even with this basic unpredictability in  
> the output chain.
> 
> In order for a consistent behavioral outcome to be produced, it  
> is necessary that the commands entering the muscles vary with  
> every change in environmental disturbances, anywhere along the  
> causal chain between the brain and the final pattern designated  
> as a behavior. The changes in action join with the disturbances  
> in precisely the way needed to create a constant outcome. The  
> only way to explain this phenomenon is to say that the organism  
> is perceiving the outcome, and that it is controlling the  
> perception of the outcome. That is the only known feasible way  
> for outcomes to be repeatable in a variable environment.
> 
> If we observe a repeatable behavioral consequence, as in the  
> diagram
> 
> cognition --\> motor actions --\> behavioral consequences  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;/ / / / / / / / /  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;d i s t u r b a n c e s,
> 
> we can immediately conclude that the cognitive output on the left  
> is NOT repeating. It must be varying in exactly the right way so  
> that when its effects join with the effects of independent and  
> unpredictable disturbances, the result is a constant observed  
> outcome. The logic is perfectly clear. If the cognitive output  
> did NOT change as disturbances change, the outcome would  
> necessarily change. The outcome is repeatable enough to be  
> recognized as a regular behavior; therefore the cognitive output  
> must SOMEHOW be changing in just the required way.
> 
> We must distinguish between cognitive outputs and cognitive  
> inputs: cognitive actions and cognitive perceptions. It is only  
> the cognitive perception that is preserved; the cognitive  
> interpretation of the outcome of action. A certain cognitive  
> outcome is desired (the reference signal). It is compared with  
> the cognitive outcome that follows from the current way of  
> interpreting sensory inputs. If there is a difference, the  
> cognitive output is varied so as to eliminate the difference. The  
> cognitive output specifies different goal-perceptions in lower-  
> level systems, which proceed to provide the new requested  
> perceptions by varying the goal-perceptions of still lower-level  
> systems, until we get to motor activities. These adjustments go  
> on continually and simultaneously at all the levels, including  
> the cognitive levels, until the cognitive perceptions match the  
> desired ones.
> 
> This leads to a picture of cognitive behavior that is very  
> different from the one usually assumed. The usual assumption is  
> that cognition follows laws of rational (or at least rule-driven)  
> thinking, so that given major and minor premises the cognitive  
> systems arrive at a prescribed course of action which is then  
> carried out. We like to think that reasoning drives behavior.
> 
> But the PCT view says that the desired cognitive outcome drives  
> reasoning. The reasoning process is adjusted until the world is  
> perceived as being in the state that is desired. If one desires  
> to perceive that one is winning an argument, yet perceives in  
> fact that one is losing it, the cognitive reasoning processes go  
> into a mode in which various arguments are put forth which are  
> perceived as making one's position stronger. An active search for  
> arguments goes on, with the arguments varying until the final  
> perception of rightness is achieved. This perception may be in  
> completely internal terms, or in terms of the other person's  
> inability to counter an argument.
> 
> Of course this process is fraught with possibilities for logical  
> and other blunders. The primary criterion is not that the  
> argument itself be free of logical or factual blunders, but that  
> it lead to the desired perception: ascendancy over the opposing  
> argument. I think that every honest person will admit that during  
> an argument, the exact truth of every premise pulled up in  
> defense of one's position is not necessarily known, and that the  
> logical structure of all the statements connected by ifs and ands  
> and ors and therefores has not actually been checked out with  
> Boolean algebra. The objective is not to be logically and  
> factually correct, but right in one's own perception or that of  
> someone else.
> 
> This explains many of the phenomena we PCTers have encountered in  
> dealing with people who adhere to other theoretical frameworks.  
> The reviews of rejected papers show that arguments are concocted  
> with a specific objective, not with the idea that the arguments  
> themselves would stand up under detailed scrutiny. One can only  
> speculate about the cognitive reference signals involved, or the  
> modes of perception being applied to the content of the articles.  
> But the overall goal is clear. And it is obvious how the  
> cognitive outputs are manipulated to arrive at a perception that  
> matches the goal.
> 
> If this is the normal way that cognitive systems operate, science  
> itself is obviously an anomalous undertaking. But I've been  
> talking about cognition as reasoning, and in the HPCT model there  
> is a higher level of control involved: principles. Principles are  
> not, to my knowledge, discussed much in cognitivist circles as  
> things existing in the subjects (although the theorist's own  
> principles are freely discussed). Science has adopted certain  
> principles that curb the natural tendency to find a logical way  
> of arriving at desired conclusions. The reasoning processes are  
> supposed to be formally laid out in public, so that one can't  
> arbitrarily adjust them to support a foregone conclusion. One can  
> argue against them using a particular line of reasoning, but the  
> reasoning behind the objection must also be laid out publicly.  
> Furthermore, the premises on which rational argument depends must  
> themeselves be public, and must be supported by evidence, not  
> just preference or expediency.
> 
> With these principles in control, the lower-level processes of  
> rule-governed thinking can no longer be adjusted so freely as a  
> way of proving anything one desires to be true. There are  
> additional constraints: what one desires to be true must fit with  
> publicly-accepted kinds of reasoning, and with premises that have  
> been proven true to everyone's satisfaction. If, then, a  
> difference still exists between what one wants to be true and  
> what accepted interpretations show as being true, there are only  
> a few recourses: change the desire, or associate only with other  
> people who desire the same thing to be true and do not demand  
> such strict standards of proof.
> 
> So PCT leads to seeing cognitive processes in new ways, many of  
> which are contrary to common beliefs. With this revised  
> understanding, I should think that many subjects commonly pursued  
> in cognitive sciences would take on a different look, even when  
> interactions are the object of study.  
> --------------------------------------------------------------  
> Best,
> 
> Bill P.
