# Costs; truth by vote

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/costs-truth-by-vote/3186>\
**Category:** CSG1995\
**Created:** [December 21, 1995, 8:20pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/costs-truth-by-vote/3186 "1995-12-21T20:20:44Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![William\_T\_Powers4](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/w/977dab/32.png) [@William\_T\_Powers4](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/William_T_Powers4)\
**Post date:** [December 21, 1995, 8:20pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/costs-truth-by-vote/3186/1 "1995-12-21T20:20:44Z")

</div>

[From Bill Powers (951221.1315 MST)]

Martin Taylor 951221 00:45 --

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;But I tempered that by saying essentially what you said above, that  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the exact form of the function didn't matter, so long as it had a  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;sufficient increasing derivative, and that everyday experience with  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;resource limitations suggest that our \_perceived\_ cost functions do  
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;have that characteristic.

The \_perceived\_ cost function doesn't enter unless the organism is  
controlling for costs. This is why I said your proposal is excessively  
cognitive for a rat model. All that is really required is that the  
effectiveness of reinforcers fall off with increasing behavior rate (or  
reinforcement rate). There is no need for any perception of the cost,  
and indeed if you propose such a perception then you have to propose an  
auxiliary system for perceiving it, comparing it with the desired cost,  
and acting on the food-getting system as appropriate. This takes us  
pretty far from the original subject, which was the addition of ad-hoc  
nonlinearities to make the reinforcement model match what is observed.

> **···**
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Kent McClelland (951220.1500 CST) --
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In terms of the argument I was making, something could be a fact  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;whether you agree or not, as long as the preponderance of those who  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;are socially designated as competent to make the judgment agree  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;that it is. ... In saying something is a "collectively controlled  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;perception," I am emphatically not arguing that the complete  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;agreement of everyone involved is necessary for the perception to  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;be controlled, so your comment that it's "self-negating" misses the  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;mark.
> 
> I think you missed my point. I was discussing what you propose as a  
> sociological fact, namely:
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A scientific fact is deemed true if competent judges agree that it  
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;is true.
> 
> Is the indented statement above a fact? It is a fact if a preponderance  
> of those who are socially designated as competent to make the judgment  
> agree that it is true, but otherwise it is not a fact. So all it would  
> take would be for a preponderance of competent judges to reject the  
> indented statement, and it would no longer be true that the statement is  
> a fact if enough competent judges say it is true. And from then on it  
> would not be possible to make the statement true again, because once the  
> statement is rejected, it cannot be made true simply by a sufficient  
> number of competent judges saying it is true. Once denied, the statement  
> is false forever.
> 
> One of the great battles of science was the battle against argument by  
> authority. "All the best (most revered, holiest, most ancient, most  
> intelligent, most powerful) people agree that X is true" does not make X  
> true. All the best people can be completely wrong if X is a statement  
> about nature (rather than a matter of definition). The procedures of  
> science are supposed to begin with low-level observations (as you  
> pointed out) on which there is essentially no disagreement. The theories  
> of science are then related to those observations BY METHODS OF  
> REASONING THAT ARE PUBLIC. Most generally, this means by mathematical  
> methods. No number of authorities can make a mathematically-incorrect  
> derivation correct.
> 
> The invention of new theories is not the question here; theories are  
> generated by a creative act which is far from public. But the methods of  
> \_testing\_ a theory, of deriving the implications of the theory and  
> making predictions from it, are (or are supposed to be) public. What  
> this means is that anyone given a statement of a theory should be able  
> to arrive at exactly the same predictions from it as anyone else who  
> knows the same method of reasoning. And these predictions, on which the  
> truth of the theory rests, are to be judged by comparison with low-level  
> observations, not merely by agreement that they are correct.
> 
> Any suggestion, therefore, that a scientific fact can be based on mere  
> agreement -- "truth by vote" -- is contrary to this view of science. I  
> can agree with you that there are social organizations in which the  
> people do judge truth by a preponderance of authoritative statements,  
> and that these people often claim that they are doing science. But my  
> definition of science, which is shared by many, rejects this claim.
> 
> We're talking about system concepts here. My concept of science differs  
> from the one you appear to be supporting. Simply as a matter of  
> pragmatics, I claim that adopting my system concept will lead to greater  
> scientific progress than adopting the other one will. When scientific  
> facts are determined by majority vote, all kinds of pressures come to  
> bear -- the desire for approval, self-doubt, the desire for power, fame,  
> and fortune, religious or philosophical beliefs, political maneuvering,  
> prejudices, rhetoric, and so on down the line. There are many ways to  
> win agreement, most of them being irrelevant to the determination of  
> facts.
> 
> Under the system concept I have adopted (from others), there is only one  
> kind of pressure on the scientist: the pressure to make predictions  
> match observations. Ten thousand of your colleagues may say your theory  
> is wrong, but if your theory predicts correctly, they are wrong and you  
> are right.  
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------  
> Best to all,
> 
> Bill P.