# Counter-Control, Moderation and Grand Guignol (was Re: What is CSG for?) **URL:** \ **Category:** CSG2004\ **Created:** [March 23, 2004, 5:00pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192 "2004-03-23T17:00:54Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\ **Post date:** [March 23, 2004, 5:00pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/1 "2004-03-23T17:00:54Z")
[From Rick Marken (2004.03.23.0900)] > Michelle Ivers (2004.03.19.8.35 EST) > I believe that we are living > control systems who are designed to control perceptions rather than BE > controlled. I don't believe it is possible to design a control system that controls but cannot be controlled. As long as the output of the system is regularly related to disturbances to the variable controlled by the system, then the output of the system can be controlled. This is true even if there are secular variations in the system's reference for the controlled variable, a fact that is demonstrated in my "Control of Behavior" demo at [http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Coercion.html](http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Coercion.html). > I find it really hard to believe that people who supposedly subscribe > to the view that we are all control systems can then try to control > what other people say. Controlling what other people say (and do) seems like exactly the kind of thing control systems would do. Whether a person subscribes to the view that we are all control systems or not, that person, being a control system, is likely to want to control what other people say, at least at sometime or another, in particular when what is said is a disturbance to perceptions that person controls. > From what I can see Bill Williams clearly states that his comments are > only his perceptions. Does this make his "comments" OK with you? If I said that it is my perception that Michelle Ivers is an ignorant slut (you're probably too young to remember the great SNL skit from which that phrase is taken) would I be immune from criticism for having said it? I think not. > In my position as chief lurker, it appears that you have a reference > for how other people should behave and act, and what they should say > on this list. Of course I do. And you do as well or you would not have written this post to me. I want (have a reference) to see substantive, intelligent posts on topics related to PCT. You want (have a reference) to see me change my references (so that I want people say to say nasty things about me) so as not to set up a perfect opportunity for counter-control. > Clearly that sets up a perfect opportunity for counter-control. Controlling per se sets up the perfect opportunity for "counter-control" because counter-control is simply control that takes advantage of the fact that another system is controlling. Counter-control occurs when the object of control is a control system rather than a non-control system. The only thing that distinguishes counter-control from any other kind of control is that it is based on knowledge of a variable that a control system is controlling. In counter-control you control the actions of a control system by disturbing a known controlled variable. For example, I can counter-control the actions of a thermostat by blowing on an ice cube near the sensor. The cold air disturbs the temperature that is sensed and controlled by the thermostat. The thermostat acts to counter this disturbance by turning on the furnace. I can, thus control the thermostat's actions, making the furnace go on and off as I desire; I am counter-controlling the furnace. My ability to exercise this control exists because I know that the thermostat is controlling temperature. If the thermostat "died" (stopped controlling temperature) I would lose my ability to control the thermostat's actions by applying disturbances to the controlled variable. About the time our paths diverged, Tom Bourbon, for some reason, became very interested in counter-control. Tom's message about counter-control was similar to yours: counter-control was something to be avoided. I never understood this point. The only way to avoid counter-control, as far as I know, is to not control at all. And the only way to not control at all is to die. According to PCT, what living systems do is control. And people (who are living control systems) often take advantage of the fact that other people are controllers, too, in order to "counter-control" each other for social purposes. For example, you are counter-controlling when you buy a $1.50 item and hand the salesperson a $5 bill. You are getting the salesperson to hand you $3.50 by taking advantage of the fact that the salesperson is almost certainly controlling for taking only the amount that the item costs. I don't think either you or the salesperson would find this counter-control something to be avoided. Counter-control is a problem only if you try to get a person to do something that that person doesn't want to do. There are situations where people can take advantage of your controlling to get you to do things you would rather not be doing, such as yelling or calling names. In this case, what one wants to avoid is not the counter-control itself but the undesirable (from one's own point of view) actions one uses to counter the counter-controller's disturbances to what one is controlling. > If you really want to discuss PCT, then do it. No-one is holding your > fingers to the keys and 'making' you respond to comments you class as > "ad hominem attacks". I wasn't suggesting moderation to protect myself. The posts bother me, of course, but they don't bother me that much and I can deal with it, if only by considering the source. I was suggesting moderation as a means of raising the general level of discussion on CSGNet so that CSGNet would be be a place where I could point intelligent people, like my acquaintance from grad school, who would like to learn about PCT and how it is applied. But I guess the moderation issue is moot. Bill Powers doesn't seem to want to do it and PCT is his baby. I think this is a mistake because CSGNet is the only public forum for dissemination of quality information about PCT. Very little good work on PCT is available in refereed publications or on the net. Therefore, I think CSGNet should be a place for high quality information about PCT and its applications. Because the list is not moderated, we get many posts that are not only ridiculously rude and ugly but also posts that reflect a very limited grasp of PCT. Both kinds of posts usually come from the same people. The problem with this is that it reduces the credibility of CSGNet. CSGNet has become a mix of \_National Enquirer\_ and \_Science\_. Bill Powers seems to accept this mix with equanimity. I would prefer to try to filter out the National Enquirer component so that CSGNet becomes a respect source of information about PCT. I would like CSGNEt to become a forum for dissemination of quality discussion about PCT modeling, research and applications. Maintaining quality is a control process; maintaining the quality of the discussions on CSGNet requires a willingness to control what gets onto CSGNet. I think Bill Powers' reluctance to control access to CSGNet has made CSGNet approximately useless as a venue for teaching and promoting PCT to a scientifically competent audience. Only those who already understand PCT quite well are willing to wade through the sewage on CSGNet in order to get to the occasional nugget. The internet provides a remarkable opportunity for getting unpopular scientific ideas, like PCT, out to an intelligent audience. I think we have squandered this opportunity by keeping CSGNet unmoderated. I would never think of pointing anyone I know to CSGNet. If, however, CSGNet were properly moderated by a qualified moderator -- a person with demonstrated competence in PCT modeling, research and applications -- then I would be happy to refer several people to PCT. These people might not end up becoming "converts" to PCT but they would certainly be able to provide intelligent criticism of it. But, again, this is apparently not what is going to happen. CSGNet will, go on as it is, as Grand Guignol. And I will enjoy watching and playing in it occasionally. But my real work will be carried on, as in the past, alone, with a little help from my friends. Best Rick > **···** > > -- > Richard S. Marken > MindReadings.com > Home: 310 474 0313 > Cell: 310 729 1400 ---
**Author:** ![Michelle\_Ivers](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ad7895/32.png) [@Michelle\_Ivers](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Michelle_Ivers)\ **Post date:** [March 24, 2004, 12:19am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/2 "2004-03-24T00:19:36Z")
Michelle Ivers (2004.03.24. 0900 EST) [From Rick Marken (2004.03.23.0900)] > I don't believe it is possible to design a control system that controls but > cannot be controlled. I actually said that we are designed to control our perceptions rather than BE controlled by others. I think what happened on this discussion forum is a great example of what happens when people try to control others. Someone stated that when a control system is pushed and doesn't like it, it pushes back with equal force. Wouldn't you agree then that as control systems we don't like being controlled? > Controlling what other people say (and do) seems like exactly the kind of > thing control systems would do. I'm not sure how you think you can control what others say and do. In my opinion, you can attempt to affect another control system, you can create a disturbance for it, you can be part of its feedback function, but I don't see how you can CONTROL someone else. Please correct me if I'm wrong. > Does this make his "comments" OK with you? If I said that it is my > perception that Michelle Ivers is an ignorant slut (you're probably too > young to remember the great SNL skit from which that phrase is taken) would > I be immune from criticism for having said it? I think not. Rick, I made no comment as the the "OK-ness" of Bill Williams' comments. My only comment was that he stated clearly that "it seems to me". (his perception). If your perception of me is that I'm an 'ignorant slut' for disagreeing with you then that's ok. (After all, its only your perception Rick, and that doesn't really matter a whole lot to me.) Whether it comes from a SNL skit or not (the fact that you didn't think I'd get the reference anyway), says to me that I've probably caused you a great deal of disturbance. > Of course I do. And you do as well or you would not have written this post > to me. I want (have a reference) to see substantive, intelligent posts on > topics related to PCT. You want (have a reference) to see me change my > references (so that I want people say to say nasty things about me) so as > not to set up a perfect opportunity for counter-control. I think you've got me wrong here Rick. I don't have any references about how other people behave. As I said to Bill Powers, I was merely offering a suggestion to you about what you could do if you didn't like what was being said. It doesn't affect me either way, and I don't care how you behave or what you say or do in this forum. I cannot control what you say or do, (I'm not sitting there next to you and stopping your fingers from hitting those keys and then clicking on the send button) nor do I have any desire to control you or anyone else. > Controlling per se sets up the perfect opportunity for "counter-control" > because counter-control is simply control that takes advantage of the fact > that another system is controlling. Counter-control occurs when the object > of control is a control system rather than a non-control system. The only > thing that distinguishes counter-control from any other kind of control is > that it is based on knowledge of a variable that a control system is > controlling. In counter-control you control the actions of a control system > by disturbing a known controlled variable. For example, I can > counter-control the actions of a thermostat by blowing on an ice cube near > the sensor. The cold air disturbs the temperature that is sensed and > controlled by the thermostat. The thermostat acts to counter this > disturbance by turning on the furnace. I can, thus control the thermostat's > actions, making the furnace go on and off as I desire; I am > counter-controlling the furnace. My ability to exercise this control exists > because I know that the thermostat is controlling temperature. If the > thermostat "died" (stopped controlling temperature) I would lose my ability > to control the thermostat's actions by applying disturbances to the > controlled variable. I disagree with you here Rick. Counter-control occurs when you (I) have a reference about another control system doing something. Eg. You appear to want people to act a certain way when posting to this forum. You have made your references for this very clear to all who read. It only takes one or two people to post in a manner that is contrary to your references and you are the one being counter-controlled. Over the last few months, it has been really easy to create disturbances for you. (I would suggest that Bill Williams picked up on that quite quickly.) Your example is of controlling a non-living control system (ie. a thermostat). I'm not sure that this is a good example of what you wanted to demonstrate, seeing as we are discussing interacting with other living control systems. > The only way to avoid counter-control, as far as I > know, is to not control at all. See above, the way to avoid counter-control is to stop having references about other people doing things. > According to PCT, what living systems do is control. Yes, living systems control - their own perceptions. > For example, you are counter-controlling when you buy a > $1.50 item and hand the salesperson a $5 bill. You are getting the > salesperson to hand you $3.50 by taking advantage of the fact that the > salesperson is almost certainly controlling for taking only the amount that > the item costs. I don't think either you or the salesperson would find this > counter-control something to be avoided. I would probably be more inclined to say that I was controlling for owning the $1.50 item, and that I gave over my $5.00 bill so that I could control the perception of me owning the $1.50 item. When I go into the shop, I'm not controlling for getting X amount of change. I'm controlling for purchasing the item, window shopping etc. > There are situations where people can > take advantage of your controlling to get you to do things you would rather > not be doing, such as yelling or calling names. In this case, what one wants > to avoid is not the counter-control itself but the undesirable (from one's > own point of view) actions one uses to counter the counter-controller's > disturbances to what one is controlling. So it was Bill Williams who 'made' you type nasty comments and send them to this forum? I still don't see how someone else can 'get you to do things you would rather not be doing'. Surely you have the final choice in whether you say things or not? > I was suggesting moderation as a means of raising > the general level of discussion on CSGNet so that CSGNet would be be a place > where I could point intelligent people, like my acquaintance from grad > school, who would like to learn about PCT and how it is applied. So your friend from grad school would like to see you refering to me as an 'ignorant slut' on a supposedly professional forum? Given that I'm certain you don't even know who I am or where I'm from, I fail to see how this is raising the general level of discussion on CSGNet. > Bill Powers seems to accept this mix with equanimity. I > would prefer to try to filter out the National Enquirer component so that > CSGNet becomes a respect source of information about PCT. Did it occur to you that maybe Bill Powers is controlling his own perceptions and attempting to match them with his references about how this list operates? > Maintaining quality is a control process; maintaining the quality of the discussions on > CSGNet requires a willingness to control what gets onto CSGNet. I think Bill > Powers' reluctance to control access to CSGNet has made CSGNet approximately > useless as a venue for teaching and promoting PCT to a scientifically > competent audience. Only those who already understand PCT quite well are > willing to wade through the sewage on CSGNet in order to get to the > occasional nugget. Again Rick, that's only your perception of things. For example, I wonder how many readers would agree with the language you used in this email as being on a par with 'maintaining the quality' on here. > I would never think of pointing anyone I know to CSGNet. That's a shame Rick. > If, however, CSGNet were > properly moderated by a qualified moderator -- a person with demonstrated > competence in PCT modeling, research and applications -- then I would be > happy to refer several people to PCT. And would I be correct in guessing that you would consider yourself as such a qualified moderator? If a moderator rejected one of your emails Rick, would you continue to feel the same way? > These people might not end up becoming > "converts" to PCT but they would certainly be able to provide intelligent > criticism of it. Yet again, having references about other people will only cause pain. These other people may not want to provide criticism or become converts. Would that be 'intelligent' by your standard? I'm guessing that each of us here would have a different idea about what is considered intelligent. > And I will enjoy watching and playing in it > occasionally. But my real work will be carried on, as in the past, alone, > with a little help from my friends. That's great to hear Rick. Cheers Michelle. ---
**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\ **Post date:** [March 24, 2004, 4:12am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/3 "2004-03-24T04:12:10Z")
[Martin Taylor 2004.03.23.23.03] > Michelle Ivers (2004.03.24. 0900 EST) > > [From Rick Marken (2004.03.23.0900)] > > > I don't believe it is possible to design a control system that controls > > but > > > cannot be controlled. > > I actually said that we are designed to control our perceptions rather than > BE controlled by others. I think what happened on this discussion forum is > a great example of what happens when people try to control others. Someone > stated that when a control system is pushed and doesn't like it, it pushes > back with equal force. Wouldn't you agree then that as control systems we > don't like being controlled? Not necessarily. I think that quite a lot of the time we control a percepion of how we are viewed by others, with a reference to perceive that others view us positively. To control such a perception with such a reference value almost explicitly says we are open to control by others, because if the person we are trying to satisfy shows displeasure, that is a disturbance to our perception that must be countered. How to counter it? Do something the other wants us to do--in other words, be controlled by the other. Less socially, many workers don't really enjoy the job, but do it because of the disturbance to a perception of available money (and food and housing) that would occur if they didn't do the job. In doing the job, they are offering to be controlled by someone else--a boss or foreman, for example. When you are allowing yourself to be controlled, what it really means is that you are finding a way to control a perception of another person's view of you at a level of perceiving the other to be satisfied with you. If you like to think of it, there's a looping feedback path that goes through your actions disturbing the other's perceptions and their actions disturbing your perceptions. Maybe it's counter-control, technically, but the result is cooperation, not conflict. Martin ---
**Author:** ![Michelle\_Ivers](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ad7895/32.png) [@Michelle\_Ivers](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Michelle_Ivers)\ **Post date:** [March 24, 2004, 5:03am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/4 "2004-03-24T05:03:38Z")
Michelle Ivers (2004.03.24 1445 EST) [Martin Taylor 2004.03.23.23.03] > Not necessarily. I think that quite a lot of the time we control a > percepion of how we are viewed by others, with a reference to > perceive that others view us positively. I would say that if someone held this reference point and wanted to be perceived positively by others, then they would really be setting themselves up for a lot of disappointment and counter-control. It doesn't make sense to me to have a reference about other people doing things. I cannot make other people do anything. > Less socially, many workers don't really enjoy the job, but do it > because of the disturbance to a perception of available money (and > food and housing) that would occur if they didn't do the job. In > doing the job, they are offering to be controlled by someone else--a > boss or foreman, for example. I would say that in doing the job they are controlling their perception of available money. I would suggest that it comes down to a conflict of hating the job, having no money and then controlling the perception which was more important to them. If working in a job that they enjoyed was more important to them than a lack of funds then they would be controlling for the perception of being happy in a job. This is all only my opinion, but I still see it as each individual person controlling their own perceptions. Lets say that its really important to me that Bob likes me (I hope there's no Bob's out there reading). If I perceived that Bob doesn't like me then I control that perception by doing whatever to get the desired result. So when Bob likes me, I have no perceptual error and everything is happy. Nowhere in that situation is Bob controlling me. I see it as Bob is chugging along, controlling his own perceptions, and I'm controlling mine. (it's just really unfortunate that my reference is for Bob to do something.) If for some reason I go up a level and control for something else that's more important to me than Bob liking me, then Bob's opinion no longer affects me. Bob hasn't changed anything he's done. He is still just chugging along. If I'm wrong about this then please show me where. Thanks for your thoughts Martin Cheers Michelle ---
**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\ **Post date:** [March 24, 2004, 5:31am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/5 "2004-03-24T05:31:34Z")
[Martin Taylor 2004.03.24.00.17] > Michelle Ivers (2004.03.24 1445 EST) > > [Martin Taylor 2004.03.23.23.03] > > > Not necessarily. I think that quite a lot of the time we control a > > percepion of how we are viewed by others, with a reference to > > perceive that others view us positively. > > I would say that if someone held this reference point and wanted to be > perceived positively by others, then they would really be setting themselves > up for a lot of disappointment and counter-control. It doesn't make sense > to me to have a reference about other people doing things. I cannot make > other people do anything. As Rick pointed out, you can, if you know what perceptions they are controlling and are able to disturb those perceptions in ways that make the actions you desire the most likely way they will counter that disturbance. I think you have a reference for other people doing things almost every time you go about your everyday social interactions. At the bank you have a reference for the teller to give you money (or take your money). At a shop you have a reference for the seller to give you an object you want. And so on. > \>Less socially, many workers don't really enjoy the job, but do it > > > because of the disturbance to a perception of available money (and > > food and housing) that would occur if they didn't do the job. In > > doing the job, they are offering to be controlled by someone else--a > > boss or foreman, for example. > > I would say that in doing the job they are controlling their perception of > available money. True. > This is all only my opinion, but I still see it as each individual person > controlling their own perceptions. That's all anyone ever does, or can do. > Lets say that its really important to me > that Bob likes me (I hope there's no Bob's out there reading). If I > perceived that Bob doesn't like me then I control that perception by doing > whatever to get the desired result. So when Bob likes me, I have no > perceptual error and everything is happy. Exactly what I was saying! >   Nowhere in that situation is Bob > controlling me. I think that we may have a little difference in our understanding of what "controlling" means. If you really want Bob to like you, and "If I perceived that Bob doesn't like me then I control that perception by doing whatever to get the desired result", then Bob is controlling you, because he gets you to act in a way that brings his perception of you to a level near its reference value. Likewise, you are controlling him, getting him into a state where your perception of him is near its reference value. > I see it as Bob is chugging along, controlling his own > perceptions, and I'm controlling mine. Yes. > (it's just really unfortunate that my > reference is for Bob to do something.) If for some reason I go up a level > and control for something else that's more important to me than Bob liking > me, then Bob's opinion no longer affects me. Bob hasn't changed anything > he's done. He is still just chugging along. Yes. > If I'm wrong about this then please show me where. I don't think you are wrong about what actually happens in the control systems. Any disagreement seems to be in what we think of as "controlling" another person. I think of it as getting another person to act as I wish them to act. I'm not sure what you think of it as. Counter-control is ordinarily used when the person you are trying to control has a reference value of "Not" for perceiving him/herself being controlled. Then your disturbing actions are likely to be perceived as giving a value of "Yes" to his/her perception of being controlled. That disturbance can be corrected only if the other person acts in a way that they perceive you not to want, which disturbs a perception in you. That way lies conflict. But most control we do of other people isn't like that. It happens because the other person wants to do whatever it is that you want them to do--perhaps open a window, pass the salt, or sell you an item. Martin ---
**Author:** ![Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/p/d26b3c/32.png) [@Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Peter_Small)\ **Post date:** [March 24, 2004, 6:53am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/6 "2004-03-24T06:53:44Z")
[Peter Small (2004.03.24) Michelle Ivers (2004.03.24 1445 EST) wrote: > This is all only my opinion, but I still see it as each individual person > controlling their own perceptions. Lets say that its really important to me > that Bob likes me (I hope there's no Bob's out there reading). If I > perceived that Bob doesn't like me then I control that perception by doing > whatever to get the desired result. So when Bob likes me, I have no > perceptual error and everything is happy. Nowhere in that situation is Bob > controlling me. I see it as Bob is chugging along, controlling his own > perceptions, and I'm controlling mine. (it's just really unfortunate that my > reference is for Bob to do something.) If for some reason I go up a level > and control for something else that's more important to me than Bob liking > me, then Bob's opinion no longer affects me. Bob hasn't changed anything > he's done. He is still just chugging along. > > If I'm wrong about this then please show me where. Michelle, reading through your last two posts, I find myself totally identifying with your take on PCT. But, I don't think this is the way most of the others are seeing it. They would see the fact that your wanting to be liked by Bob makes you vulnerable to counter control because this is influencing your behavior (because you do things to make Bob like you). But, as you say, you can easily stop the counter control dead in its tracks by moving to a different perspective where it isn't important as to whether or not Bob likes you. The problem I'm having with PCT is that many people are seeing PCT as being at a higher level of organization than I feel is warranted. I don't see it as an overall concept into which other concepts have to fit. I see it more as a neat little concept that is useful to incorporate into other concepts higher up the hierarchy. This idea of concepts fitting into the hierarchy of other concepts is brought out nicely by Herbert Gintis in an article he wrote in February 2003 entitled "Towards a Unity of the Human Behavioral Sciences" ([http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/unity\_abst.html](http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/unity_abst.html)) In this paper, Ginis put a strong case for putting Game Theory at the top of an organizing conceptual framework. This would put PCT into a proper perspective. Not only this, it gives a new perspective to the current discussion between Bill Powers and Bill Williams on using PCT in economics. Peter Small Author of: Lingo Sorcery, Magical A-Life Avatars, The Entrepreneurial Web, The Ultimate Game of Strategy and Web Presence [http://www.stigmergicsystems.com](http://www.stigmergicsystems.com) > **···** > > -- ---
**Author:** ![Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/73ab20/32.png) [@Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Williams1)\ **Post date:** [March 24, 2004, 1:35pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/7 "2004-03-24T13:35:34Z")
From[Bill Williams 24 March 2004 6:50 AM CST] > [Peter Small (2004.03.24) in commenting on > > Michelle Ivers (2004.03.24 1445 EST) wrote: > > The problem I'm having with PCT is that many people \> are seeing PCT as being at a higher level organization \> than I feel is warranted. This is Peter's perception, but it is a mistaken perception. > [Peter doesn't see control theory as] an overall > concept into which other concepts have to fit. I see it > more as a neat little concept that is useful to > incorporate into other concepts higher up the > hierarchy. > > This idea of concepts fitting into the hierarchy of other \> concepts is brought out nicely by Herbert Gintis in an \> article he wrote in February 2003 entitled "Towards a \> Unity of the Human Behavioral > Sciences" ([http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/unity\_abst.html](http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/unity_abst.html)) > > In this paper, Ginis put a strong case Don't believe this for a moment. Gintis's argument is fatally defective. And, it is easy to demonstrate the deficiency. As far as I know, the Santa Fe people have yet to make a fundamental contribution to economic theory. The Gintis paper is based upon a fundametnally mistaken premise-- maximization. > for putting Game Theory at the top of an organizing > conceptual framework. Not at all. Not even close. > This would put PCT into proper perspective. Peter's a bright guy, but he has got this all wrong. All wrong. Not only this, it gives a new > perspective to the current discussion between Bill \>Powers and Bill Williams on using PCT in economics. Peter is almost as fun to play with as Rick. First the discussion between Bill Powers and myself has had nothing at all to do with applying control theory to economics. So far at anyrate the only subject of discussion has been a review of an area of agreement regarding time and modeling, and the start of a discussion concerning macro economic principles. In the Gentis paper to which Peter provides a link there appears an assertion in the section 3: "The Universality of the Rational Actor Model" their appears an assertion: In the first sentence in this section Gentis says, "The rational actor model asserts that agents have \_preferences\_ reflecting their utilities and the trade-offs among these wants, and that agents maximize their utility...." The recent shift of mainstream economics to a game theoretic stance is often said, as Peter and Gentis are asserting that game theory provides the answer to everything, or at least a better answer to the question of how to provide a foundation for social theory. However, as my quotation from Gentis indicates, and I thank Peter for bringing the paper to my attention, the basis of the game theoretic analysis, and this goes back to Frank Knight in the 1920's, remains a conception of behavior that is based upon the principle of maximization. The difficulty presented by adopting maximization as your foundational principle is that it is a conception that can not provide reasonable answers to easily specified situations. Among these is the Giffen Paradox. The principle of maximization assumes that preferences always take the form such that applying the principle of maximization will identify an optimum pattern of behavior-- and when applied in economics it doesn't work. The maximization principle has been known not to work since Alfred Marshall introduced this problem into the mainstream of discussion in his Principles text in 1895. When I was a graduate student as a thesis I attempted to develop an alternative to the principle of maximization. I used the Giffen paradox as an anomalous case from which to make this attempt. But, I didn't get anywhere, so I bluffed my way into a Ph.D. As some people will tell you I am good at bluffing. Thirteen years later, and still trying to find a method that would explain the Giffen behavior I encountered Bill Powers. He was interested in economics, but didn't see a way to apply control theory to economic questions. Together we solved the paradox over a long weekend. The difficulty that I had, knowing the economic side of the issue, and the difficulty Powers had knowing modeling, was that to solve the problem you needed to know more than anyone single person at the time knew. Knowing modeling alone wasn't enough, and neither was knowing the economics. However, one the problem was solved by combining what we knew, I did a literature search and I found that the problem had been solved. See item 4 in the bibliography below. But, Beckman for some reason didn't go on to apply control theory to enough other problems in economics to demonstrate its applicability. If you happen to read the paper which I wrote and Marken edited for "American Behavioral Scientist" be warned that some parts are all fucked up. Marken thought, as usual, that he was smarter, knew more, and etc etc, and he attempted to improve the paper I'd written with consulting me. So, giving the principle of maximization a game theoretic gloss, ala Gentis doesn't explain the Giffen anomaly. However, control theory does explain the anomaly, and in addition provides the basis for asserting that no commensurable preference function can explain Giffenness. The bibliography is a bit out of date, however, as far as I know nothing of any significance has happened in the last year or two, or even threee. Bill Williams 1 Sigler, George J. 1947 "Notes on the History of the Giffen Paradox."        Journal of Political Economy Vol 55 April p. 152-6. 2 Prest, A. R. 1948 "Notes on the History of the Giffen Paradox:       Comment." Journal of Political Economy vol 56 p. 58-6O. 3 Sigler, George J. 1948 "A Reply." Journal of Political       Economy Vol 56 April p. 61-2. 4 Beckman, M. J. 1953. "Comparative Statics in Linear Programing      and the Giffen Paradox." Review of Economic Studies      vol. 22-23. # 61. 5 Alessi, De 1968 "A Methological Appraisal of Giffen's Paradox."       Weltsirtschalftliches Archive vol 1O1 p. 287-96. 6 Gates, J. K. & Pendleton, T. H. 1968. "Giffen's Paradox: An        Alternative Solution." Indian Economic Journal. Vol. 15. # 5.   Other Indian Journal Giffen papers 7 Dholaki, Ravindra H. & Dholaki Bakul H. ??? "Giffen's        A Comment on the Recent Controversy." Indian          Journal. Vol. 26. # 45. ??? 8 Debroy, B. 1982. "More on Giffen and Gates-Pendleton." Indian        Indian Economic Journal. Vol. 29. # 4. 9 Gram, W. P. 197O. "Giffen's Paradox and the Marshallian Demand        Curve." Manchester School Economics and Social Studies         March p. 65-71. 1O Lipsey R and Rosenbrluth G. 1971 "A contribution to the new theory       of demand: A rehabilitation of the Giffen Good"            Canadian Journal economics p. 131-63. 11 Welty, G. A. 1971 "Giffen's Paradox and Falsifiablity."       Weltwirtschalftliches Archivive vol 107 p 139-46. 12 Ng, Yew Kwang. 1972. "Step-Optimization, Secondary Costraints, and         Giffen Goods." Canadian Economic Journal. Vol. 5. # 4. 13 Vandermeulen, D. C. 1972 "Upward Sloping Demand Curves without         the Giffen paradox" American Economic Review 62 (June): 453-58. 14 Steindl, Frank G. 1973 "Money and Bonds as Giffen Goods."       Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies Vol 41 # 4        December p. 418-24. 15 Henderson, J. P. 1973. "William Shewell's Mathematical Statement of         Price Flexiblity, Demand Elasticity and the Giffen's Paradox."          Manchester School Journal of Economics. 16 Goldfarb, Robert S. 1977 "The Demand Curve for an 'Otherwise-Normal'         Good can have an upward sloping Segment under Coupon or Time Rationing."          Atlantic Economic Journal December p. 68-7O. 17 Boland, L. A. 1977 "Giffen Goods, Market Prices and Testability."         Australian Economic Papers p. 1O4-9. 18 Koenker, Roger. 1977 "Was Bread Giffen? The Demand for Food       in England Circa 179O." Review of Economics and Statistics         vol 59 # 2 May p. 225-229. 19 Rashid, SAlim 1979 "THe Beeke good: a note on the origins of the "Giffen         Good" History of Political Economy vol 11 pp 6O6-7. 2O Hughes, Joseph P. 1981 "Giffen Inputs and the Theory of        Multiple Production [Substitution and Expansion Effects        in Production Theory: The Case of Joint Production]          Journal of Economic Theory Vol 25 # 2 October p. 287-3O1. 21 Masuda E. & Newman P. 1981. "Gray and Giffen Goods." Economic         Journal. Vol. 91. # 364. 22 Hoy, M. and Robson, A. J. 1981 "Insurance as a Giffen Good."         Economic Letters vol 8 p. 47-51. 23 Dougan, William R. 1982 "Giffen Goods and the Law of Demand."         Journal of Political Economy" vol 9O # 4 p. 8O9-15. 25 Battalio, Raymond C., Kagel, John H. and Kogut, Carl. 1983         "Giffen Goods: They Really Exist." unpublished Paper Texas A & M            University 26 Ammer, Christine and Ammer, Dean S. 1977,84 \_Dictionary of Business       and Economics: Revised and Expanded Edition\_ New York: Macmillian          p. 196. and 229. 27 Dwyer, Gerald P. & Lindsay Cottan M. 1984. "Robert Giffen         and the Irish Potatoe." AER Vol. 74. # 1. p. 188-92. 28 Silverberg, Eugene and Walker, Donald A. 1984 "A Modern        Analysis of Giffen's Paradox." International Economic Review          vol 25 October p. 687-94 29 Ulrich, Kohli. 1985 "Inverse Demand and Anti-Giffen Goods"         European Economic Review April vol 27 p. 397-4O4. 3O Dooley, P. C. 1985 "Giffen's Hint? " Austrialian Economic Papers         vol 28 p. 142-44. 31 Pearce, David W., 1986 \_The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics\_          Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press p. 169. 32 Kohli, Ulrich 1986 "Robert Giffen and the Irish Potato: Note"         American Economic Review Vol: 76 # 3 June p. 539-542 33 Hurwicz, Leonid., James, Jordan., Yakar, Kannai. 1987       "On the Demand Generated by a Smooth Concavifiable Preference         Ordering." Journal of Mathematical Economics; Amsterdam 34 Walker, Donald A. 1987 "Giffen's paradox." in \_The New Palgrave       A Dictionary of Economics\_ edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate        and Peter Newman. volume 2 E to J London, United Kingdom:          MacMillian Press 35 Silberberg, A., F. F. Waren-Boulton, and T. Asana 1987.         Inferior-good and Giffen-good effects in Monkey Choice          Behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal           Behavior Processes 13 July: 292-3O1. 36 Berg, Morten. 1987 "Giffen's Paradox Revisited." Bulletin of         Economic Research vol 39 January p. 79-85. 37 Dooley, Peter C. 1988 "Porter's Hint and Alternative Theories         of the Giffen Paradox: A Reply." Australian Economic           Papers Vol. 27. # 5O. June p. 142-44. 38 White, Michael. 1988 "Porter's Hint and Alternative Theories         of the Giffen Paradox: A Rejoinder." Australian Economic           Papers Vol. 27. # 5O. June p. 145-46. 39 # Corcoran, Elizabeth 1989 "Science and Business: An Economic Animal"         Scientific American Vol: 260 # 3 March p: 73. 4O Mason, Roger S. 1989 \_Robert Giffen and the Giffen Paradox." Oxford:        Philip Allen 41 Briys. E. G. Dionne, and Eeckhoudt G., 1989 "More on Insurance as a        Giffen Good. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty vol 2 ( December          p. 415-2O. 42 Silberberg, JAlan, Hursh, Sstan R? 199O "Quinine Pellets as       an Inferior Good and a Giffen Good is Rats." Journal of the         Experimental Ananalysis of Behavior Vol. 53. # 2. March 43 Williams, William D. Giffen Effect Batson News Letter 44 Williams, William D. Giffen Effect Advances in Psychology Springer Verlag 45 Williams, William D. 199O "The Giffen Effect" American Behavioral         Scientist Vol: 34 Issue # 1 Sep 1990 p: 106-109. 46 White, M. 199O "Invention in the Face of Necessity: Marshallian         Retoric and the Giffen Good." The Economic Record vol 66 # 192 March          p. 1-11. 47 Van Marrewijk, C. and Bergeijk. 199O "Giffen Goods and the Subsistence         Level." History of Political Economy vol 22 # 1 p. 145-48 48 Van Marrewijik, Charles; van Bergeijk, Peter A G 199O "Giffen goods         and the subsistence level." History of Political Economy               Vol: 22 Iss: 1 Date: Spring 1990 p: 145-148 49 Hebert, Robert F reviews: 199O \_Robert Giffen and the Giffen          Paradox\_ by Roger S. Mason Journal of Economic History               Vol: 5O Iss: 2 June 1990 p: 5O2-5O3 5O Battalio, Raymond C; Kagel, John H; Kogut, Carl A 1991        "Experimental Confirmation of the Existence of a Giffen Good"          American Economic Review Vol: 81 # 4 Sept p. 961-970 51 Gilley, Otis W. and Karels, Gordon V. 1991 "In Search of Giffen         Behavior" Economic Inquiry vol 29 January p. 182-89. 52 Dooley, Peter C 1992 "Why did Marshall introduce the Giffen paradox?"         History of Political Economy [PHPE] Vol: 24 # 3 Fall p. 749-752 53 Boland, Lawrence A. 1992 "Giffen Goods vs Market-Determined Prices" in        \_The Principles of Economics: Some Lies My Teachers told me\_            London: Routledge p. 196-233. 54 Rutherford, Donald., 1992 "Giffen good, Giffen paradox in       \_Dictionary of Economics\_ London and New York: Routledge         p. 19O-91. 55 Davies, John E. 1994 "Giffen Goods: The Survival Imperitive and        the Irish Potatoe Culture." Journal of Political Economy          p 547-65. 56 Wichers, Robert C. 1994 "In Search of Giffen Behavior: Comment."        Economic Inquiry vol 32 January p. 166-7 57 Spiegel, Uriel. 1994 "The Case of a "Giffen Good" Journal of Economic         Education Spring 1994 # 1 pp 137-47. 58 Yoram, Barzel, et. al. 1995 "The Demand Curves for Giffen Goods        are Downward Sloping." in \_Productivity, Change, Public          Goods and Transaction Costs: Essays at the Boundaries           of Microeconomics\_ Economists of the Twenieth Century              series Aldershot U.K. 59 Garratt, Rod 1997 Indivisibilities, inferior goods, and Giffen goods       Canadian Journal of Economics Vol: 30 # 1 Feb p. 246-251. 61 McDonough, Terrence; Eisenhauer, Joseph 1995 "Sir Robert Giffen        and the great potato famine: A Discussion of the role of a         Legend in neoclassical Economics" Journal of Economic Issues            Vol: 29 # 3 September p. 747-759 6O Weber, Christian E. 1997 "A Difficulty in the Search for Giffen         Behavior." Unpublished Working Paper Seattle University 62 Weber, Christian E. 1997 "The Case of a Giffen Good: Comment"        Journal of Economic Education Winter p. 37-44. 63 Spiegel, Uriel. 1997 "The Case of a Giffen Good: Reply"         Journal of Economic Education Winter p. 45-7. 64 Nachbar, John H. 1998 "The Last Word on Giffen Goods?"         Economic Theory vol 11 # 2 March p. 4O3-12. 65 Rosen, Sherwin. 1999 "Potato Paradoxes" The Journal of         Political Economy Vol 1O7 # 6 p. 294-313. ---
**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/a183cd/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers)\ **Post date:** [March 24, 2004, 2:28pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/8 "2004-03-24T14:28:14Z")
[From Bill Powers (2004.03.24.0628 MST(] > Michelle Ivers (2004.03.24. 0900 EST) -- > I actually said that we are designed to control our perceptions rather than > BE controlled by others. Michelle, I think there is some degree of misunderstanding here. The basic demonstration of counter-control was shown a couple of decades ago at some CSG meeting, I forget which, using the rubber-band demo. I think you know this but I'll describe it for anyone who doesn't. In this demo, a "controller" takes hold of one end of a pair of rubber bands knotted together, and an "experimenter" takes hold of the other end. The two participants agree to keep the rubber bands stretched in a plane just above a tabletop. The controller picks a spot on the table and moves his or her end of the rubber bands to bring the knot joining the rubber bands over that spot, and to keep it there. The experimenter moves the other end of the rubber bands around just over the tabletop so as to disturb the position of the knot (not too fast, so the controller can easily keep control). So far we have a demonstration of a controller keeping an environmental variable (distance between knot and spot) at a constant value (zero) despite unpredictable disturbances being generated by the experimenter. As long as the controller maintains control of the same variable in any constant reference condition, the experimenter can now control the position of the controller's hand -- that is, pick another spot on the tabletop, and move the controller's hand to that position. This is done by manipulating the experimenter's end of the rubber bands. If you try it, you'll see it's quite easy. This is "counter-control." It does not involve any conflict. Both parties can continue to control the variables each is interested in without preventing the other from doing the same. What makes it a bit unusual is that the variable one party is controlling is the other's means of control! Incidentally, if both parties are aware of this, each can try to control the other's means of control, but this will probably end in confusion since nobody is controlling the knot any more. So counter-control does not mean "getting even" or "controlling back in retaliation" or anything like that. It just means using the fact that one person is controlling for something as a way of controlling that person's means of control. It's true that if human beings are indeed hierarchies of negative feedback control systems, they are interested in controlling what they perceive. But this means only that they can, if they wish, control anything they can perceive and also affect. It puts no other limits on what they can control. Since they can perceive various aspects of other people's behavior, they can control those aspects that are not being controlled by the other people, if they can find a way to affect them. Of course they can also control the aspects of other people's behavior that the other people ARE controlling, if the controller is so much bigger and stronger that the controlee's resistance makes no difference. People can control other people, and they often do. They do it by applying, or somtimes just by threatening to apply, overwhelming physical force. That's not very nice, but PCT doesn't say anything about what's nice or not nice. It just says how things work. If we want a society free of brutality, killing, selfishness, greed, and other stupidities (I obviously do), we have to find some grounds other than PCT for persuading others to want the same thing. We have to construct attractive system concepts to which others may be inspired to subscribe, from which we can develop workable sets of principles with which to guide our reasoning and our procedures and our social interactions. We can't control what goals other people adopt at their highest levels; we might be able to control their actions, but that's not what they care about. They care about the perceptions they control by using actions, any actions that are required that don't conflict with the other things they control.. Controlling the behavior of others can lead to difficulties when the result is direct conflict. But this should not be taken to mean that PCT says we shouldn't try to control other people's behavior. All it says is "If you decide to control another person's behavior, expect difficulties." Who knows, you may enjoy avoiding or overcoming the difficulties. Think of people who play football, or chess. Best, Bill P. ---
**Author:** ![Michelle\_Ivers](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/ad7895/32.png) [@Michelle\_Ivers](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Michelle_Ivers)\ **Post date:** [March 25, 2004, 12:12am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/9 "2004-03-25T00:12:25Z")
Michelle Ivers (2004.03.25.1000 EST) [From Bill Powers (2004.03.24.0628 MST(] Thanks for this Bill. > Controlling the behavior of others can lead to difficulties when the result > is direct conflict. But this should not be taken to mean that PCT says we > shouldn't try to control other people's behavior. All it says is "If you > decide to control another person's behavior, expect difficulties." Who > knows, you may enjoy avoiding or overcoming the difficulties. Think of > people who play football, or chess. I believe I made in error in that I was looking at things differently. I was more referring to the fact that just because someone else is creating a disturbance for us doesn't give us an excuse for our own behaviour. As in the legal system, using the defence "he was doing something that disturbed my perceptions" would not be acceptable for murdering someone. Thank you for explaining things to me. Cheers Michelle. ---
**Author:** ![Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/p/d26b3c/32.png) [@Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Peter_Small)\ **Post date:** [March 25, 2004, 3:03pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/10 "2004-03-25T15:03:26Z")
[Peter Small 25 March 2004] It isn't worth countering Bill Williams' comments because it is clear to me he hasn't even bothered to read beyond the first few lines of Gintis's article. He rejects the paper on the basis of a complete misunderstanding of the way Gintis defines maximization. To have the gall to tell us that he realized Gintis's "error" when he was a student is just beyond the pale. Have a look at Gintis's Web site and decide for yourself Who's opinion you would rather trust: Bill's or Herber Ginis - Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts [http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/](http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/) While your on this web site, it may be worth looking at his articles: The Origins of Human Cooperation and The Evolution of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations It might provide some insight into the flames that occur in this forum. Peter Small Author of: Lingo Sorcery, Magical A-Life Avatars, The Entrepreneurial Web, The Ultimate Game of Strategy and Web Presence [http://www.stigmergicsystems.com](http://www.stigmergicsystems.com) > **···** > > > From[Bill Williams 24 March 2004 6:50 AM CST] > > > > > [Peter Small (2004.03.24) in commenting on > > > > > > Michelle Ivers (2004.03.24 1445 EST) wrote: > > > > > > The problem I'm having with PCT is that many people \> are > > > > seeing PCT as being at a higher level organization \> than I feel > > > > is warranted. > > > > This is Peter's perception, but it is a mistaken perception. > > > > > [Peter doesn't see control theory as] an overall > > > > > concept into which other concepts have to fit. I see it > > > > > more as a neat little concept that is useful to > > > incorporate into other concepts higher up the > > > > > hierarchy. > > > > > > This idea of concepts fitting into the hierarchy of other \> concepts is > > > > brought > > > > out nicely by Herbert Gintis in an \> article he wrote in February 2003 > > > > entitled "Towards a \> Unity of the Human Behavioral > > > > > Sciences" ([http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/unity\_abst.html](http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/unity_abst.html)) > > > > > > In this paper, Ginis put a strong case > > > > Don't believe this for a moment. Gintis's argument is fatally defective. > > > > And, it is easy to demonstrate the deficiency. As far as I know, the > > > > Santa Fe people have yet to make a fundamental contribution to > > > > economic theory. The Gintis paper is based upon a fundametnally > > > > mistaken premise-- maximization. > > > > > for putting Game Theory at the top of an organizing > > > > > conceptual framework. > > > > Not at all. Not even close. > > > > > This would put PCT into proper perspective. > > > > Peter's a bright guy, but he has got this all wrong. All wrong. > > > > Not only this, it gives a new > > > > > perspective to the current discussion between Bill \>Powers and Bill > > > > Williams on using PCT in economics. > > > > Peter is almost as fun to play with as Rick. > > > > First the discussion between Bill Powers and myself has had nothing at all > > to do with applying control theory to economics. So far at anyrate the only > > subject of discussion has been a review of an area of agreement regarding > > time and modeling, and the start of a discussion concerning macro economic > > principles. > > > > In the Gentis paper to which Peter provides a link there appears an > > assertion in the section 3: "The Universality of the Rational Actor Model" > > their appears an assertion: > > > > In the first sentence in this section Gentis says, > > > > "The rational actor model asserts that agents have \_preferences\_ reflecting > > their utilities and the trade-offs among these wants, and that agents > > maximize their utility...." > > > > The recent shift of mainstream economics to a game theoretic stance is often > > said, as Peter and Gentis are asserting that game theory provides the answer > > to everything, or at least a better answer to the question of how to provide > > a foundation for social theory. However, as my quotation from Gentis > > indicates, and I thank Peter for bringing the paper to my attention, the > > basis of the game theoretic analysis, and this goes back to Frank Knight in > > the 1920's, remains a conception of behavior that is based upon the > > principle of maximization. The difficulty presented by adopting > > maximization as your foundational principle is that it is a conception that > > can not provide reasonable answers to easily specified situations. Among > > these is the Giffen Paradox. The principle of maximization assumes that > > preferences always take the form such that applying the principle of > > maximization will identify an optimum pattern of behavior-- and when applied > > in economics it doesn't work. The maximization principle has been known not > > to work since Alfred Marshall introduced this problem into the mainstream of > > discussion in his Principles text in 1895. > > > > When I was a graduate student as a thesis I attempted to develop an > > alternative to the principle of maximization. I used the Giffen paradox as > > an > > > > anomalous case from which to make this attempt. But, I didn't get anywhere, > > so I bluffed my way into a Ph.D. As some people will tell you I > > > > am good at bluffing. Thirteen years later, and still trying to find a > > method that would explain the Giffen behavior I encountered Bill Powers. He > > > > was interested in economics, but didn't see a way to apply control theory to > > economic questions. Together we solved the paradox over a long > > > > weekend. > > > > The difficulty that I had, knowing the economic side of the issue, and the > > difficulty Powers had knowing modeling, was that to solve the problem > > > > you needed to know more than anyone single person at the time knew. > > Knowing modeling alone wasn't enough, and neither was knowing the > > > > economics. However, one the problem was solved by combining what we knew, I > > did a literature search and I found that the problem had > > > > been solved. See item 4 in the bibliography below. But, Beckman for some > > reason didn't go on to apply control theory to enough other > > > > problems in economics to demonstrate its applicability. If you happen to > > read the paper which I wrote and Marken edited for "American Behavioral > > > > Scientist" be warned that some parts are all fucked up. Marken thought, as > > usual, that he was smarter, knew more, and etc etc, and he > > > > attempted to improve the paper I'd written with consulting me. > > > > So, giving the principle of maximization a game theoretic gloss, ala Gentis > > doesn't explain the > > > > Giffen anomaly. However, control theory does explain the anomaly, and in > > addition provides the > > > > basis for asserting that no commensurable preference function can explain > > Giffenness. > > > > The bibliography is a bit out of date, however, as far as I know nothing of > > any significance has happened in the > > > > last year or two, or even threee. > > > > Bill Williams > > > > 1 Sigler, George J. 1947 "Notes on the History of the Giffen Paradox." > > > >        Journal of Political Economy Vol 55 April p. 152-6. > > > > 2 Prest, A. R. 1948 "Notes on the History of the Giffen Paradox: > > > >       Comment." Journal of Political Economy vol 56 p. 58-6O. > > > > 3 Sigler, George J. 1948 "A Reply." Journal of Political > > > >       Economy Vol 56 April p. 61-2. > > > > 4 Beckman, M. J. 1953. "Comparative Statics in Linear Programing > > > >      and the Giffen Paradox." Review of Economic Studies > > > >      vol. 22-23. # 61. > > > > 5 Alessi, De 1968 "A Methological Appraisal of Giffen's Paradox." > > > >       Weltsirtschalftliches Archive vol 1O1 p. 287-96. > > > > 6 Gates, J. K. & Pendleton, T. H. 1968. "Giffen's Paradox: An > > > >        Alternative Solution." Indian Economic Journal. Vol. 15. # 5. > > > >   Other Indian Journal Giffen papers > > > > 7 Dholaki, Ravindra H. & Dholaki Bakul H. ??? "Giffen's > > > >        A Comment on the Recent Controversy." Indian > > > >          Journal. Vol. 26. # 45. ??? > > > > 8 Debroy, B. 1982. "More on Giffen and Gates-Pendleton." Indian > > > >        Indian Economic Journal. Vol. 29. # 4. > > > > 9 Gram, W. P. 197O. "Giffen's Paradox and the Marshallian Demand > > > >        Curve." Manchester School Economics and Social Studies > > > >         March p. 65-71. > > > > 1O Lipsey R and Rosenbrluth G. 1971 "A contribution to the new theory > > > >       of demand: A rehabilitation of the Giffen Good" > > > >            Canadian Journal economics p. 131-63. > > > > 11 Welty, G. A. 1971 "Giffen's Paradox and Falsifiablity." > > > >       Weltwirtschalftliches Archivive vol 107 p 139-46. > > > > 12 Ng, Yew Kwang. 1972. "Step-Optimization, Secondary Costraints, and > > > >         Giffen Goods." Canadian Economic Journal. Vol. 5. # 4. > > > > 13 Vandermeulen, D. C. 1972 "Upward Sloping Demand Curves without > > > >         the Giffen paradox" American Economic Review 62 (June): 453-58. > > > > 14 Steindl, Frank G. 1973 "Money and Bonds as Giffen Goods." > > > >       Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies Vol 41 # 4 > > > >        December p. 418-24. > > > > 15 Henderson, J. P. 1973. "William Shewell's Mathematical Statement of > > > >         Price Flexiblity, Demand Elasticity and the Giffen's Paradox." > > > >          Manchester School Journal of Economics. > > > > 16 Goldfarb, Robert S. 1977 "The Demand Curve for an 'Otherwise-Normal' > > > >         Good can have an upward sloping Segment under Coupon or Time > > Rationing." > > > >          Atlantic Economic Journal December p. 68-7O. > > > > 17 Boland, L. A. 1977 "Giffen Goods, Market Prices and Testability." > > > >         Australian Economic Papers p. 1O4-9. > > > > 18 Koenker, Roger. 1977 "Was Bread Giffen? The Demand for Food > > > >       in England Circa 179O." Review of Economics and Statistics > > > >         vol 59 # 2 May p. 225-229. > > > > 19 Rashid, SAlim 1979 "THe Beeke good: a note on the origins of the > > "Giffen > > > >         Good" History of Political Economy vol 11 pp 6O6-7. > > > > 2O Hughes, Joseph P. 1981 "Giffen Inputs and the Theory of > > > >        Multiple Production [Substitution and Expansion Effects > > > >        in Production Theory: The Case of Joint Production] > > > >          Journal of Economic Theory Vol 25 # 2 October p. 287-3O1. > > > > 21 Masuda E. & Newman P. 1981. "Gray and Giffen Goods." Economic > > > >         Journal. Vol. 91. # 364. > > > > 22 Hoy, M. and Robson, A. J. 1981 "Insurance as a Giffen Good." > > > >         Economic Letters vol 8 p. 47-51. > > > > 23 Dougan, William R. 1982 "Giffen Goods and the Law of Demand." > > > >         Journal of Political Economy" vol 9O # 4 p. 8O9-15. > > > > 25 Battalio, Raymond C., Kagel, John H. and Kogut, Carl. 1983 > > > >         "Giffen Goods: They Really Exist." unpublished Paper Texas A & M > > > >            University > > > > 26 Ammer, Christine and Ammer, Dean S. 1977,84 \_Dictionary of Business > > > >       and Economics: Revised and Expanded Edition\_ New York: Macmillian > > > >          p. 196. and 229. > > > > 27 Dwyer, Gerald P. & Lindsay Cottan M. 1984. "Robert Giffen > > > >         and the Irish Potatoe." AER Vol. 74. # 1. p. 188-92. > > > > 28 Silverberg, Eugene and Walker, Donald A. 1984 "A Modern > > > >        Analysis of Giffen's Paradox." International Economic Review > > > >          vol 25 October p. 687-94 > > > > 29 Ulrich, Kohli. 1985 "Inverse Demand and Anti-Giffen Goods" > > > >         European Economic Review April vol 27 p. 397-4O4. > > > > 3O Dooley, P. C. 1985 "Giffen's Hint? " Austrialian Economic Papers > > > >         vol 28 p. 142-44. > > > > 31 Pearce, David W., 1986 \_The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics\_ > > > >          Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press p. 169. > > > > 32 Kohli, Ulrich 1986 "Robert Giffen and the Irish Potato: Note" > > > >         American Economic Review Vol: 76 # 3 June p. 539-542 > > > > 33 Hurwicz, Leonid., James, Jordan., Yakar, Kannai. 1987 > > > >       "On the Demand Generated by a Smooth Concavifiable Preference > > > >         Ordering." Journal of Mathematical Economics; Amsterdam > > > > 34 Walker, Donald A. 1987 "Giffen's paradox." in \_The New Palgrave > > > >       A Dictionary of Economics\_ edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate > > > >        and Peter Newman. volume 2 E to J London, United Kingdom: > > > >          MacMillian Press > > > > 35 Silberberg, A., F. F. Waren-Boulton, and T. Asana 1987. > > > >         Inferior-good and Giffen-good effects in Monkey Choice > > > >          Behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal > > > >           Behavior Processes 13 July: 292-3O1. > > > > 36 Berg, Morten. 1987 "Giffen's Paradox Revisited." Bulletin of > > > >         Economic Research vol 39 January p. 79-85. > > > > 37 Dooley, Peter C. 1988 "Porter's Hint and Alternative Theories > > > >         of the Giffen Paradox: A Reply." Australian Economic > > > >           Papers Vol. 27. # 5O. June p. 142-44. > > > > 38 White, Michael. 1988 "Porter's Hint and Alternative Theories > > > >         of the Giffen Paradox: A Rejoinder." Australian Economic > > > >           Papers Vol. 27. # 5O. June p. 145-46. > > > > 39 # Corcoran, Elizabeth 1989 "Science and Business: An Economic Animal" > > > >         Scientific American Vol: 260 # 3 March p: 73. > > > > 4O Mason, Roger S. 1989 \_Robert Giffen and the Giffen Paradox." Oxford: > > > >        Philip Allen > > > > 41 Briys. E. G. Dionne, and Eeckhoudt G., 1989 "More on Insurance as a > > > >        Giffen Good. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty vol 2 ( December > > > >          p. 415-2O. > > > > 42 Silberberg, JAlan, Hursh, Sstan R? 199O "Quinine Pellets as > > > >       an Inferior Good and a Giffen Good is Rats." Journal of the > > > >         Experimental Ananalysis of Behavior Vol. 53. # 2. March > > > > 43 Williams, William D. Giffen Effect Batson News Letter > > > > 44 Williams, William D. Giffen Effect Advances in Psychology Springer > > Verlag > > > > 45 Williams, William D. 199O "The Giffen Effect" American Behavioral > > > >         Scientist Vol: 34 Issue # 1 Sep 1990 p: 106-109. > > > > 46 White, M. 199O "Invention in the Face of Necessity: Marshallian > > > >         Retoric and the Giffen Good." The Economic Record vol 66 # 192 March > > > >          p. 1-11. > > > > 47 Van Marrewijk, C. and Bergeijk. 199O "Giffen Goods and the Subsistence > > > >         Level." History of Political Economy vol 22 # 1 p. 145-48 > > > > 48 Van Marrewijik, Charles; van Bergeijk, Peter A G 199O "Giffen goods > > > >         and the subsistence level." History of Political Economy > > > >               Vol: 22 Iss: 1 Date: Spring 1990 p: 145-148 > > > > 49 Hebert, Robert F reviews: 199O \_Robert Giffen and the Giffen > > > >          Paradox\_ by Roger S. Mason Journal of Economic History > > > >               Vol: 5O Iss: 2 June 1990 p: 5O2-5O3 > > > > 5O Battalio, Raymond C; Kagel, John H; Kogut, Carl A 1991 > > > >        "Experimental Confirmation of the Existence of a Giffen Good" > > > >          American Economic Review Vol: 81 # 4 Sept p. 961-970 > > > > 51 Gilley, Otis W. and Karels, Gordon V. 1991 "In Search of Giffen > > > >         Behavior" Economic Inquiry vol 29 January p. 182-89. > > > > 52 Dooley, Peter C 1992 "Why did Marshall introduce the Giffen paradox?" > > > >         History of Political Economy [PHPE] Vol: 24 # 3 Fall p. 749-752 > > > > 53 Boland, Lawrence A. 1992 "Giffen Goods vs Market-Determined Prices" in > > > >        \_The Principles of Economics: Some Lies My Teachers told me\_ > > > >            London: Routledge p. 196-233. > > > > 54 Rutherford, Donald., 1992 "Giffen good, Giffen paradox in > > > >       \_Dictionary of Economics\_ London and New York: Routledge > > > >         p. 19O-91. > > > > 55 Davies, John E. 1994 "Giffen Goods: The Survival Imperitive and > > > >        the Irish Potatoe Culture." Journal of Political Economy > > > >          p 547-65. > > > > 56 Wichers, Robert C. 1994 "In Search of Giffen Behavior: Comment." > > > >        Economic Inquiry vol 32 January p. 166-7 > > > > 57 Spiegel, Uriel. 1994 "The Case of a "Giffen Good" Journal of Economic > > > >         Education Spring 1994 # 1 pp 137-47. > > > > 58 Yoram, Barzel, et. al. 1995 "The Demand Curves for Giffen Goods > > > >        are Downward Sloping." in \_Productivity, Change, Public > > > >          Goods and Transaction Costs: Essays at the Boundaries > > > >           of Microeconomics\_ Economists of the Twenieth Century > > > >              series Aldershot U.K. > > > > 59 Garratt, Rod 1997 Indivisibilities, inferior goods, and Giffen goods > > > >       Canadian Journal of Economics Vol: 30 # 1 Feb p. 246-251. > > > > 61 McDonough, Terrence; Eisenhauer, Joseph 1995 "Sir Robert Giffen > > > >        and the great potato famine: A Discussion of the role of a > > > >         Legend in neoclassical Economics" Journal of Economic Issues > > > >            Vol: 29 # 3 September p. 747-759 > > > > 6O Weber, Christian E. 1997 "A Difficulty in the Search for Giffen > > > >         Behavior." Unpublished Working Paper Seattle University > > > > 62 Weber, Christian E. 1997 "The Case of a Giffen Good: Comment" > > > >        Journal of Economic Education Winter p. 37-44. > > > > 63 Spiegel, Uriel. 1997 "The Case of a Giffen Good: Reply" > > > >         Journal of Economic Education Winter p. 45-7. > > > > 64 Nachbar, John H. 1998 "The Last Word on Giffen Goods?" > > > >         Economic Theory vol 11 # 2 March p. 4O3-12. > > > > 65 Rosen, Sherwin. 1999 "Potato Paradoxes" The Journal of > > > >         Political Economy Vol 1O7 # 6 p. 294-313. > > -- ---
**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\ **Post date:** [March 25, 2004, 3:55pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/11 "2004-03-25T15:55:11Z")
[Martin Taylor 2004.03.25.10.44] > [Peter Small 25 March 2004] > > It isn't worth countering Bill Williams' comments because it is clear > to me he hasn't even bothered to read beyond the first few lines of > Gintis's article. I have read the paper, and was intending to provide a critique, but don't have time yet to do it properly. My main issue is in the notion of rational decision-making as being important in people's behaviour. Of course, it does happen, but I don't think it is central. I do appreciate the game-theoretic result--it fits with what happens in many ecological interactions with non-human species. But it seems to be an evolved rather than a thought-out pattern of behaviour based on decision-making of any kind more complex than is available to a bird or a bee. As an aside... > Have a look at Gintis's Web site and decide for yourself Who's > opinion you would rather trust: Bill's or Herber Ginis - Professor of > Economics at the University of Massachusetts One Professor of Economics against another? Horrors. Who would have thought it? > While your on this web site, it may be worth looking at his articles: > The Origins of Human Cooperation > and > The Evolution of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations Here's my second issue: To me it's clear that cooperation has been the ignored complement of competition ever since the first two cells found that the behaviour of each enhanced the survival of the other when they stuck together. The right question is to determine the environmental conditions under which cooperation gives way to competition, not to ask why cooperation occurs. Slime molds provide a beautiful example of how that balance can change over time and according to resource availability. And before you ask, I haven't looked at Gintis's work beyond the referenced paper, so maybe he already says all this. If so, it would differ from what he seems to say in his paper you referenced. Martin ---
**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/a183cd/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers)\ **Post date:** [March 25, 2004, 6:57pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/12 "2004-03-25T18:57:48Z")
[From Bill Powers (2004.03.25.1134 MST)] Peter Small 25 March 2004 -- > Have a look at Gintis's Web site and decide for yourself Who's > opinion you would rather trust: Bill's or Herber Ginis - Professor of > Economics at the University of Massachusetts I don't base my decisions about whom to trust on their affiliations or degrees, but on what they write or say. I would say that Gintis is a very powerful thinker, and I greatly admired some parts of his paper on the Unity of Sciences. The way he describes Rational Actor theory makes it seem similar to PCT, except that he never says what a goal is or how a person can act in such a way that the result is to satisfy a goal. I consider that a gap in his thinking. Also, "behavior" in his way of thinking seems to consist only of reaching a decision as to what action to take, but there is no explanation of how that decision gets converted into actually producing the action, or more to the point, assuring that the necessary consequence of the action takes place. The most interesting part of the paper was the series of studies on "self-interested actors," a basic assumption of economics which was refuted in every small culture studied. The actual behavior in the Ultimatum Game, moreover, conformed to patterns of behavior common in each culture. This is very much in line with HPCT, in which there is a "principles" level of organization that governs how detailed procedures and strategies are organized. It would make sense in the HPCT model that this level would determine behavior of all sorts, whether in games or in social interactions -- and of course these studies strongly support that idea. It is not specific behavior that is the hallmark of the culture, but general principles that apply to all sorts of behaviors of different kinds. If I have any overall fault to find in Gintis' approach, it is that abstract explanations are predominant, with the result that (in my opinion) the explanations of behavior offered are too complex. I think that much of the complexity of behavior interpreted in terms of game theory and evolutionary theory and other such notions may be in the eye of the beholder. One can always read complex reasoning and statistical relationships into behavior patterns even if those patterns are produced by much simpler processes. The result is what I call "overinterpretation" (borrowed from someone else), meaning that the descriptions and explanations are not at the simplest level that will actually provide a workable explanation. An example is a rule for describing how a raindrop falls: if the ground has not yet been encountered, keep the probability of descent greater than 0.5; if the ground has been encountered, set the probability of further descent to zero. Of course that rule would in fact produce the observed behavior of the raindrop if there were some agency in the raindrop that could understand and implement it, but I think it far more likely that the raindrop falls because of gravity, and stops falling because it hits the ground. At least I would try to verify that explanation before spending a lot of time on the other one. Best, Bill P. ---
**Author:** ![Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/73ab20/32.png) [@Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Williams1)\ **Post date:** [March 26, 2004, 7:12am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/13 "2004-03-26T07:12:38Z")
From[Bill Williams 25 March 2004 11:20 PM CST] > [Peter Small 25 March 2004] > > It isn't worth countering Bill Williams' comments because it is clear > to me he hasn't even bothered to read beyond the first few lines of > Gintis's article. I guess I missed Peter's magical apperance when he was watching over my shoulder while I read Gintis's article. Unfortunately there seem to be lots of things that are clear to Peter that unfortunately are not so. > He rejects the paper on the basis of a complete > misunderstanding of the way Gintis defines maximization. I think I understand maximization well enough. Maximization involves finding a maximum value in for a function or functions.. There are various techniques for doing so. But, find a maximium the numbers genrated by the functions or functions have to add up to a maximum. To do this the numbers have to be comensurate. If Gintis had genuinely found a new way to "define maximization" then he would not only be one of the really great economist. And, he would also be a very outstanding mathematician. And, Gintis is neither. Not only is the section I objected to defective, the whole paper takes the form of a promise for the future rather than any thing that Gintis delivers today. Let us consider just how, Gintis defines his conception of behavior. Gintis says, "The true power of each disciplines contribution to knowledge will only appear when suitably qualified and deepened by the contributions of the others." p. 20. Is there any theory here? Not really. What Gintis proposes is an eclectic fusion of various findings of social theory-- including economics. Are there any new insights? None that Gintis reveals, not yet at least. However, you can make a career out of this sort of stuff. This is the sort of thing that many people think of as making a contribution to social theory. I say it is puffed up version of jam tomorrow, but no jam today. > To have the gall to tell us that he realized Gintis's "error" when he > was a student is just beyond the pale. But, does this neccesarily mean that what I said is not true? In fact I did know of the problem that Gintis ignores in the paper that Peter suggests. My problem seems to be that I read the appendixes to books. The error Gintis makes is assuming the adaquacy of a conception of economic behavior that was adopted late in the 19th century-- the "neo-classical" tradition, a tradition that is based upon maximization. Control theory provides a better basis for a theory of economic behavior than does maximization. The Giffen paradox provides a test point. Orthodox economic theory based upon maximization does not explain the Giffen effect. Control theory does. Since I published the Giffen stuff the first time experiments have been conducted that have been reported as "confirming" the Gffen effect. > Have a look at Gintis's Web site and decide for yourself Who's > opinion you would rather trust: Bill's or Herber Ginis - Professor of > Economics at the University of Massachusetts OK. Why not look up the citations to B. F. Skinner and then look up the citations to W. T. Powers. Then decide for youself who's opinion you would rather trust-- Fredie Skinner or Bill Powers? I must say that Peter has a rather excentric approach to argumentation. Maybe Rick could explain to Peter how serial killers make good police officers. And, in turn Peter could explain to Rick how Gintis has generated a new method of maximization and that orthodox economics is really quite OK. Bill Williams ---
**Author:** ![Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/p/d26b3c/32.png) [@Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Peter_Small)\ **Post date:** [March 26, 2004, 7:26pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/14 "2004-03-26T19:26:13Z")
From[Peter Small 26 March 2004] Bill William's writes: > The error Gintis makes is assuming the adaquacy of a conception > of economic behavior that was adopted late in the 19th century-- the > "neo-classical" tradition, a tradition that is based upon maximization. > Control theory provides a better basis for a theory of economic > behavior than does maximization. The Giffen paradox provides a > test point. Orthodox economic theory based upon maximization does > not explain the Giffen effect. Control theory does. Since I published > the Giffen stuff the first time experiments have been conducted that > have been reported as "confirming" the Gffen effect. Bill, I think you are an accountant at heart, not an economist. Otherwise, I just don't know how you can equate Gintis's concept of maximization with numbers. When Gintis talks about maximization, he is talking about maximizing the chances of achieving a goal. He is not talking about maximizing the value of a goal. The Gintis concept of maximization would see Irishmen in the Irish Famine maximizing their chances of survival by buying more potatoes, even though the price increases. In other words, there is no Giffen paradox in terms of Game Theory maximization. I suggest you read up a little on Game Theory, before you make more of a fool of yourself. Peter Small Author of: Lingo Sorcery, Magical A-Life Avatars, The Entrepreneurial Web, The Ultimate Game of Strategy and Web Presence [http://www.stigmergicsystems.com](http://www.stigmergicsystems.com) > **···** > > -- ---
**Author:** ![Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/73ab20/32.png) [@Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Williams1)\ **Post date:** [March 26, 2004, 9:16pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/15 "2004-03-26T21:16:43Z")
From[Bill Williams 26 March 2004 2:20 PM CST] I think I've said it before, but Peter really is a lot of fun. And, one of, at least for me, fun-ist things about Peter is the way he says things that do such great things for my self-esteem. Not you understand that my self-esteem necessarily needs augmenting, but then every little bit can sometimes be handy- especially when ignorant sluts pop up and are mean spirited enough to remind me that I am virtually at the very end of my life. Like they say, life is a bitch and then you die. Welll the first part is certainly true enough. And, besides who does she think she is? Goddam hate filled monster! So, it is such a relief to receive to deal with Peter's post which, rather than remind me that death is on the way, restricts himself to saying, > Bill, I think you are an accountant at heart, Peter, for a guy (me that is) who has had difficulty keeping his checkbook somewhere short of commercial felonies, I wish even a little bit of what you say were true. Peter goes on to say, that Bill Williams, > not an economist. Otherwise, I just don't know how you can > equate Gintis's concept of maximization with numbers. Well, you ought not to try to create the misleading impression that I stand alone in equating the concept of "maximization" with a mathematical quantitative content. > From my 50 cent Standard College Dictionary \_c 1950 which says, p. 737. that, "Maximum 1: The greatest quantity, amount, degree, or magnitude that can be assigned. 2: A value of a varying quantity that is greater than any neighboring value. 3: The highest possible of all the values which a variable of a function can express; the point at a varying quantity ceases to increase and begins to decrease. 4 The moment of greatest brightness in a variable star, or its magnitude at such time. However, Peter goes on to say, that > When Gintis talks about maximization, he is talking about maximizing > the chances of achieving a goal. He is not talking about maximizing > the value of a goal. Whatever. Makes no difference at all. If Gntis is going to change the meaning of a term, which I doubt very much that he actually did, he would have an intellectual obligation to provide at least some notice that he is going to use a word in a way that is very different than the way the world ordinarily uses the word. For your information, Gentis is basically a muddle headed old Marxist, who in his declining years had the astonishing insight that the orthodox folks actually had it right. But, he never actually got to the point of ever understanding how the principle of maximization works in orthodox economic theory. He as the paper you provided the link to indicates, now he thinks that he can, or rather that someone in the future can, meld all sorts of stuff into a future comprehensive system. As a matter of logic, neither he nor anyone else, is every actually going to complete the program the way he describes it. Peter goes on to say tthat, > The Gintis concept of maximization would see Irishmen in the Irish > Famine maximizing their chances of survival by buying more potatoes, > even though the price increases. In other words, there is no Giffen > paradox in terms of Game Theory maximization. Does Gintis actually have a running model of how maximization would work in regard to the Giffen case. ( And, by the way the Giffen case doesn't have anything more to do with the Irish Famine than saying that Rick Marken called Michelle an "ignorant slut" has to do with slander. The potatoes story seems to have been a slur on the Irish thought up by Jews. ) In the references I supplied papers 27, 32, 40, 55, and 61 bear directly upon the misleading association of the Irish Potato Famine and the Giffen effect. I would in particular suggest that the McDonough and Eisenhauer paper ( # 61) provides a good but still relatively concise treatment of why the common but mistaken idea that there is any reality to the conjectural attribution of a Giffen effect to the case of the potatoes and the Irish Famine is entirely bogus. But McDonough and Eisenhauer make a mistake of their own by a weak argument that entire Giffen effect is a monstrous myth. Peter goes on to say, \> I suggest you read up a little on Game Theory, before you make more > of a fool of yourself. Peter thinks he is being sly, by the way he poses his argument. But, I have seen this trick before. What Peter is saying, is "Stop before you fuck another pig." the not too subtle premise of the statement is that I have already fucked a pig. Peter, when Rick gets back from his apparently much needed vacation, why don't you see if Rick falls for this argument? ---
**Author:** ![Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/73ab20/32.png) [@Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Williams1)\ **Post date:** [March 26, 2004, 9:37pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/16 "2004-03-26T21:37:17Z")
> From[Bill Williams 26 March 2004 2:20 PM CST] In replying to Peter just now, I neglected to mention that in my opinion Rick did a good job of explaining why Peter is mistaken about what he claims. See, [From Rick Marken (2004.03.26.1120)] Peter, you have managed to create a very rare phenomena on CSGnet. It seems that Rick Marken, Bill Powers, Martin Taylor, and myself are all in agreement, whatever other differences divide us, that you do not have a sufficient understanding of control theory to provide a plausible basis for the arguments you are making. If we thought you actually understood control theory, some of us might be more inclined to take what you claim more seriously. Bill Williams ---
**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\ **Post date:** [March 26, 2004, 9:57pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/17 "2004-03-26T21:57:36Z")
[Martin Taylor 2004.02.26.1646] > \> From[Bill Williams 26 March 2004 2:20 PM CST] > > Peter, you have managed to create a very rare phenomena on CSGnet. It > seems that Rick Marken, Bill Powers, Martin Taylor, and myself are all in > agreement, whatever other differences divide us, that you do not have a > sufficient understanding of control theory to provide a plausible basis for > the arguments you are making. > > If we thought you actually understood control theory, some of us might be > more inclined to take what you claim more seriously. I think this is quite likely to be unfair to Peter. What I think he lacks is not an understanding of "control theory" but an understanding that "perceptual control theory" is different. The two concepts are not the same. A lot of conventional control theory is based on the control of output to match some planned pattern in time and space. The \_design\_ of this output is supposed to counter whatever might be unfortunately influencing the thing to be stabilized. And Peter is quite right in saying that this won't work under the chaotic conditions that often prevail in the real world. Why I think Peter may have "standard" control theory in mind is that he started off by using the word "design" quite a lot, and that in that context, his comments do make sense. I prefer to think that someone of obvious intelligence and a good technical background is making sense in the context of his own perceptions. And I think Peter is such a person. A long time ago, I mentioned on CSG-L soem control theorist from (I think) Sweden (name long forgotten) who had written a strong critique of "standard" control theory, and favoured what appeared to be a rudimentary form of PCT. I tried to get him to join CSG-L, but I don't think he ever did. Anyway, if Peter is indeed thinking of "control theory" the way much of the world does, his criticisms are well taken. They just don't apply to "perceptual control theory". Martin ---
**Author:** ![Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/73ab20/32.png) [@Bill\_Williams1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Williams1)\ **Post date:** [March 26, 2004, 10:23pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/18 "2004-03-26T22:23:23Z")
Froom[Bill Williams 26 March 2004 4:15 PM CST] > [Martin Taylor 2004.02.26.1646] I stand corrected. I think what Martin says that perhaps I have been unfair to Peter might be true. I will rephrase what I said, and to make it simple I will say it this way-- if Peter understood control theory, or PCT, HPCT the way that Martin does, I don't think that he would be saying the things that Peter does. I don't insist that Peter agree with me. I would be satisfied if Peter agreed with Martin. Martin is, as everyone knows, much more of an irenist than-- well, I think you could say most of the rest of us. And, for that reason it is good to have Martin around. Bill Williams ---
**Author:** ![Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/p/d26b3c/32.png) [@Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Peter_Small)\ **Post date:** [March 26, 2004, 10:30pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/19 "2004-03-26T22:30:27Z")
From[Peter Small 26 March 2004] > From[Bill Williams 26 March 2004 2:20 PM CST] > Peter thinks he is being sly, by the way he poses his argument. But, I have > seen this trick before. What Peter is saying, is "Stop before you fuck > another pig." the not too subtle premise of the statement is that I have > already fucked a pig. Peter, when Rick gets back from his apparently > much needed vacation, why don't you see if Rick falls for this argument? I know you have a compelling desire to win at competitive games, Bill, but do you really feel the need to out-gross Nick on metaphors? Actually, I was quite sympathetic with Nick after he explained how he came to use that unfortunate phrase. I'm sure even Michelle will be inclined to forgive him? Peter Small Author of: Lingo Sorcery, Magical A-Life Avatars, The Entrepreneurial Web, The Ultimate Game of Strategy and Web Presence [http://www.stigmergicsystems.com](http://www.stigmergicsystems.com) > **···** > > -- ---
**Author:** ![Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/p/d26b3c/32.png) [@Peter\_Small](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Peter_Small)\ **Post date:** [March 26, 2004, 11:27pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192/20 "2004-03-26T23:27:12Z")
[Peter Small 2004.02.26] Martin wrote: > The \_design\_ of this output is supposed to counter > whatever might be unfortunately influencing the thing to be > stabilized. And Peter is quite right in saying that this won't work > under the chaotic conditions that often prevail in the real world. > > Anyway, if Peter is indeed thinking of "control theory" the way much > of the world does, his criticisms are well taken. They just don't > apply to "perceptual control theory". I think you may be misunderstanding my meaning of chaos. I am not applying chaos to the outside world. I'm applying chaos to the neural units that create the internal representations of the outside world that appear in the mind: the appraisals, the perceptions and the reference. To my understanding, these manifest as attractors. As I understand PCT, it is about trying to eliminate any errors that occur between the perceived world and a reference world in the mind that represents the world as you would like to perceive it. As I see the internal worlds as being created as attractor states, which are very much influenced by emotional states, I cannot see how you can eliminate emotions from the theory. In my way of looking at things, the error signal takes the form of emotions. These alert the cognitive system to the presence of an error. The cognitive side then assesses the situation (guided by the emotions) to discover the source of the error. This information is then used to promote corrective activity. As I'm understanding how this works in the brain, different solutions are tried out in the brain until emotions tell you that you may have found a way to correct for the error. Emotions then prompt you to take the actions to try out the solution. As an alternative, if a solution is not forthcoming, the brain restructures the internal model to change priorities until the emotional error signal subsides and is replaced with an emotion of contentment. Before reading Marc Lewis's paper, I was completely in the dark as to how this could be arranged neurologically. His paper provided sufficient information to explain \*exactly\* how these processes are carried out. It is as clear and as concise as any description one might provide to explain a computer system. If I am wrong here, perhaps you could explain to me how references are constructed and in which way the presence of an error is detected and then sent to the cognitive area of the brain to prompt corrective action? Explanations that include black boxes are not acceptable. Peter Small Author of: Lingo Sorcery, Magical A-Life Avatars, The Entrepreneurial Web, The Ultimate Game of Strategy and Web Presence [http://www.stigmergicsystems.com](http://www.stigmergicsystems.com) > **···** > > -- [Next page](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/counter-control-moderation-and-grand-guignol-was-re-what-is-csg-for/3192.md?page=2)