Bill – Thank you for your comments. You have indeed
pinpointed some confusion in my thinking. I hadn’t been thinking
much at all about how perceptions came about. I assumed that perceptual systems
were relatively fixed, that reference levels were relatively fixed, so all that
was left was changing behaviors to change the level of what is perceived to
better match the reference level. I see now this is an oversimplification
of PCT.
I have thought some about what you wrote, though I don’t
feel like I have it all clearly in my head yet. Let me surface some of
what I think I am learning, and I would appreciate any comments and corrections
you feel are worthwhile.
I apologize in advance that this is not all put together in a
neat linear bundle that is easy to follow. It is more in the order of my
realizations as I read and re-read your post.
-
BP: Other children (and parents) don’t see the world in
terms of right and wrong, so the question of how much rightess or wrongness is
wanted doesn’t apply.
a. FL:
So something has to be perceived (right and wrong) before there can be a
reference level set for it (how much rightness and wrongness wanted).
-
BP: On the other hand, we may be lucky enough to
reorganize and cease to perceive superiority as a human attribute, or as
existing at all. Superiority as an automatic way of perceiving then disappears,
taking with it any reference levels that may have been set for it, as well as
other causal relationships with it.
a. FL:
Again, something has to be perceived (superiority) for reference levels about
it to exist. But also, that reorganization changes how or what we
perceive, not just how much of something we perceive. Behavior changes how much
of something we perceive, but doesn’t affect the perceptual functions
themselves.
-
BP: What you mean here is perceptions, not reference
signals. Where do our ways of perceiving things come from? Some are
biologically based, some are acquired, some are modifications of
biologically-based ways of perceiving. The reference setting is a different
matter: that determines how much of a given perception is desired. Once
we get our perceptions organized they become semi-permanent as kinds of
perceptions. We may learn that being wealthy is a sign of some kind of
superiority, but that doesn’t mean we will forever want to be superior. We may
find that being superior is no fun – too much is expected of you – and
try to avoid being superior. So we set the reference level for superiority at a
low level.
On the other hand, we may be lucky enough to
reorganize and cease to perceive superiority as a human attribute, or as
existing at all. Superiority as an automatic way of perceiving then disappears,
taking with it any reference levels that may have been set for it, as well as
other causal relationships with it.
a. FL:
Lots going on here:
i.
Perceptions become relatively fixed (as they get organized), but
they don’t necessarily start that way.
ii.
Given fixed perceptions, higher level systems may vary reference
levels of lower systems to do a better job of approaching higher level goals
iii.
Therefore, higher level references are more stable than
lower level references.
iv.
If changing the lower level references doesn’t
sufficiently reduce the error perceived in those higher levels, (or if we are
“lucky”), we may reorganize our lower level perceptual systems
v.
Reorganization mainly affects perception- i.e.,
perceptual functions. (Actually, this doesn’t seem right –
maybe perceptual functions is just one of many things that reorganization can
affect. Can it also affect those higher level references that seem to be
governing any changes to the lower level references?)
b. FL:
So it might be possible to model a baby as undergoing reorganizations more
rapidly than an adult as it figures out what in its world is important to perceive.
-
(From original post) FL: Initially, a child
doesn’t know whether hitting another child is right or wrong. But
if the hitting elicits a scolding from mom, the child changes actions until
he/she finds a method of play that does not involve hitting. Eventually,
this alternative style of play becomes the child’s reference own internal
reference signals.
BP: I’d say that right
and wrong become perceptions and that the child learns to control them. Some
children choose a low setting for a perception of rightness, or a high setting
for perception of wrongness (deliciously bad). However, if the child chooses a
low reference level for the things perceived as a state of rightness, or tries
out how it feels to seek wronginess, the consequences may lead to enough
intrinsic error to cause reorganization. Other children (and parents) don’t see
the world in terms of right and wrong, so the question of how much rightess or
wrongness is wanted doesn’t apply.
a. FL:
So, a parent might be modeled as providing a signal the child can
perceive in such a way as to create an error in the child (as a scolding might)
that then starts a reorganization, which proceeds until the child perceives
what the parent wishes the child to perceive (right and wrong, for example)
b. Which,
in turn, could be modeled as the parents conducting tests for the controlled
variable with their children until they can conclude the children are, in fact,
controlling the variable the parents want them to be controlling.
c. One
thing a parent might want a child to perceive is the parent’s emotional
state.
d. A
child might become very attuned to a parent’s emotional state and use
this a substitute for an under-developed perceptual apparatus, though over time
we would expect the perceptions to become more internalized as the child
matures.
e. It
seems then that a parent can influence what is perceived (parent’s
emotional state), as well as the reference level for how much of that
perception is desired (happy, or at least not mad). Ultimately, though, a
high level system in the child chooses the reference level for parent emotional
state depending on the high level goal being pursued. (Choosing a lower
reference level for parent’s emotional state so that the child can set a
higher level for peers’ emotional state or the child’s own internal
emotional state seems to be what adolescence is about)
- BP: My advice is to model controlled
variables first, not reference levels. Decide what is being controlled
first, then let higher levels of control systems determine how much of it is
wanted by varying the reference signal. Once you have decided what is to be
controlled, figure out how it is to be controlled: what actions can affect it,
and what lower-level perceptions are used as a basis for perceiving it. And
finally, try to figure out why it is being controlled: what higher-level
perceptions depend on this perception and similar perceptions at the same
level.
You can also, less ambitiously, assume a reference level and simply try to
model one system at one level, as I do with tracking tasks. But I suspect that
in your application of PCT, hierarchical relationships will be of interest
a. FL:
Sounds like a plan. Thanks!
I’m sure I ‘m still getting lots of things wrong,
but I hope my wrestling with your words will help me reorganize my thinking enough
that I can begin to move in a direction that will ultimately bring me more
success.
Frank
···
From: Control Systems
Group Network (CSGnet) [mailto:CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU] On Behalf Of Bill
Powers
Sent: Thursday, March 04, 2010 11:12 AM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Re: [CSGNET] Creating PCT-based social-economic agents
[From Bill Powers (2010.03.04.0808 MST)]
Frank Lenk (2010.03.03.11.20 CST) –
FL: In my view, the atom of a social-economic analysis is
the family.
…
I think this helps explain why there is no concept of
“enough” in economics. The concept of enough applies to
families – when are they safe enough? When do my children have enough
opportunity? We can show that in general, kids who ride around in bigger
cars and live in bigger homes are safer, and also get to go to better schools
and have more options for better-paying jobs.
BP: Could it be that this is a recipe for positive (error-increasing) feedback?
Why is there such a concern for safety? Could it be that riding around in big
cars and living in big houses is an invitation to envy and resentment by others
(whether real or only imagined by the well-off) which lead to feeling even less
safe?
FL: It can be then be considered sensible to want more of
these things. If our reference signals are for perfect safety and
infinite opportunity, it may even be reasonable to want a lot more of them.
BP: Yes. It’s the nature of positive feedback that the goal recedes as one
approaches it, so what begins as a slight inclination ends as an all-out act of
desperation. The richer you get, the more you have to lose and the more you
fear losing it. Imagine being given a delicate eggshell beautifully painted and
gilded by Picasso or Matisse, one of a kind and worth a million dollars. Would
you dare walk around with it in your pocket or in your hand? Would you take it
to a bar with you and show it to other people? Would you advertise the place
where you keep it at night? Even hiring a guard would be self-defeating because
the presence of the guard would be a message that there is something highly
valuable here. You’d have to be terribly concerned about cracking the eggshell,
or dropping it, or dropping something else onto it, or having a pet step on it
or bump it off the table, or a child play roughly with it. In the end you might
have to build a secret room for it known only to you, where you can go to look
at the egg once in a while, all by yourself (when people won’t wonder where you
are and go looking for you). And you might hesitate to visit the egg yourself,
for fear of getting nervous and having an accident with it. Everything you do
to protect the eggshell only makes you worry about it more.
FL: Yet, even with these as reference signals, it is not
clear to me why we seem to think that “more stuff” is the surest
way to achieve them. One can imagine a hypothetical alternative society
that has the same references for ends, but not means – choosing instead
to focus on greater community cohesion, breaking up the concentrations of
poverty that create the high crime in the first place, conserving scarce
resources rather than rebuilding on new land what has been abandoned in urban
cores, and investing more adult time rather than adult money in their youth –
and finding that this yielded equally good outcomes.
BP: You may have put your finger on an important non-ideological reason to
avoid radical inequalities in a society: they don’t achieve what they are
supposed to achieve for or against either side. For any kind of goal, the
action you take to reach it could be moving you, or it, in the wrong direction.
If you don’t notice it’s doing that, you’ll think something is disturbing the
controlled variable and try to act even more strongly against the disturbance –
only your own action is the disturbance and is making the error worse.
FL: So, I am interested in where our reference signals come
from. Some are undoubtedly biologically based (which? I will need to come
back to this later). But some reference signals must be at least passed
from parent to child (hence the reason why I say my minimum number of PCT-based
agents is two). Some are also likely passed from the
“society” to the parents, but for now, I am leaving a discussion of
how to model that for another day (such influence might be modeled as arising
from the network of people with whom we interact, for example).
BP: This question keeps coming up, but it involves a false assumption. The
false assumption is that reference signals are set once and for all. They’re
not: they have to be adjustable, continually adjustable, to allow higher
systems to vary them as a means of achieving higher goals.
What you mean here is perceptions, not reference signals. Where do our ways of
perceiving things come from? Some are biologically based, some are acquired,
some are modifications of biologically-based ways of perceiving. The reference
setting is a different matter: that determines how much of a given
perception is desired. Once we get our perceptions organized they become
semi-permanent as kinds of perceptions. We may learn that being wealthy is a
sign of some kind of superiority, but that doesn’t mean we will forever want to
be superior. We may find that being superior is no fun – too much is expected
of you – and try to avoid being superior. So we set the reference level
for superiority at a low level.
On the other hand, we may be lucky enough to reorganize and cease to perceive
superiority as a human attribute, or as existing at all. Superiority as an
automatic way of perceiving then disappears, taking with it any reference
levels that may have been set for it, as well as other causal relationships
with it.
FL: George Herbert Mead has this idea of a “social
self” that intrigues me. I may not be getting this exactly right,
but in essence I believe this means that we learn to be ourselves not from
controlling our actions directly, but from controlling others’ reactions
to our actions. We change our actions until we get the desired reaction from
others.
BP: A lot of the confusion over things like a “social self” are
cleared up if you stop wondering if such things really exist and remember that
they are perceptions. Of course I can perceive a self that is adjusted to have
a certain appearance to others, as best I can judge. When that’s not a problem,
there are other selves which are more simply descriptive, and sometimes there’s
no self at all – just a concern with what’s going on.
And the observer of all these selves is something entirely different from a self.
It’s an Observer. Sometimes, in fact, there is no self until someone asks about
it. They say, “What do you think about Oprah?” The first
reaction may be “Who? Me? Well, I guess I think she’s a pretty good
person, though I don’t know that much about her …” You have to look and
see what thoughts are there, though when asked there was nobody, just then,
thinking them.
A self as a permanent identity is different from a self as a perceptual
construct.
FL: Initially, a child doesn’t know whether hitting
another child is right or wrong. But if the hitting elicits a scolding
from mom, the child changes actions until he/she finds a method of play that
does not involve hitting. Eventually, this alternative style of play becomes
the child’s reference own internal reference signals.
BP: I’d say that right and wrong become perceptions and that the child learns
to control them. Some children choose a low setting for a perception of
rightness, or a high setting for perception of wrongness (deliciously bad).
However, if the child chooses a low reference level for the things perceived as
a state of rightness, or tries out how it feels to seek wronginess, the
consequences may lead to enough intrinsic error to cause reorganization.
Other children (and parents) don’t see the world in terms of right and wrong,
so the question of how much rightess or wrongness is wanted doesn’t apply.
FL: It is as if we have a relatively higher gain for
others’ reactions than for the direct consequences of our actions, at
least for some of them (I suspect that “peer pressure” works at
least somewhat similarly). This was brought home to me in simple way not
long ago. I snore. So I as I fall asleep, I snore a little as I
relax. If I am not quite completely asleep, some part of me is aware that I am
snoring, but left to my own devices, I don’t react to it. My wife,
however, hates my snoring. So as I begin to snore, she moans in response.
THAT I react to and turn over – not my actions, but her
reaction to my actions. And gradually, I find myself more aware of my
snoring and (sometimes) I turn over before she moans.
BP: This is altruism, which puzzles some people. You have a high reference
level for your perception of your wife’s peace and comfort, which is part of
what loving her means. You have progressed beyond trying not to snore just to
keep her from complaining about it, and gone on to the stage of wanting her not
to be disturbed. A cynic might say that you just don’t like moaning, and I
suppose that’s possible, but it seems to me that a person who could believe
that explanation has never loved anyone.
FL: We seem exquisitely tuned to be sensitive to the
reactions of others. Even in the midst of a conversation, I can sense myself
changing what I say and how I say it in response to subtle clues about whether
someone agrees or disagrees with me.
BP: Being sensitive to – perceiving – the reactions of others and learning to
interpret them reasonably well does not say what reactions you want them to be
having. If you see that your actions are annoying someone else, that may be
exactly what you want. Kids do it to teachers quite often. We use the term
“being sensitive to” to imply that we have a kindly, protective
attitude toward the reaction, but that isn’t necessarily or even often the
case. The reference level for the person’s reaction depends on a lot of other
circumstances and your higher-order perceptions.
FL: So my question is how do I begin to model this kind of
thing? I am hoping the “old hand” at PCT modeling could give me
some suggestions. I plan to do my programming initially in the agent-based
modeling framework NetLogo. (For those who are interested, it is
available as a free download here: http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/.
But this shouldn’t constrain anyone from feeling free to offer me
whatever advice they see fit.
BP: I love being asked to give advice because I’m full of it and as a proponent
of the Method of Levels I’m not supposed to force it on people. Well, you asked
and this isn’t therapy.
My advice is to model controlled variables first, not reference levels. Decide what
is being controlled first, then let higher levels of control systems determine
how much of it is wanted by varying the reference signal. Once you have decided
what is to be controlled, figure out how it is to be controlled: what actions
can affect it, and what lower-level perceptions are used as a basis for
perceiving it. And finally, try to figure out why it is being controlled: what
higher-level perceptions depend on this perception and similar perceptions at
the same level.
You can also, less ambitiously, assume a reference level and simply try to
model one system at one level, as I do with tracking tasks. But I suspect that
in your application of PCT, hierarchical relationships will be of interest.
Best,
Bill P.