Cultures are not control systems nor are they rings in crowd

CSGnet Archive CSG1998
1

[From Bruce Gregory (980330.1220 EST)]

Bill Powers (980328.1243 MST)

As the program is set up, the user sets these reference levels
by filling in data on a parameter-adjustment screen. But if that process
were included in the program as another level of control, the adjustment of
proximity reference levels would be the behavior of a higher order of
control system, above the level of proximity control. The individuals would
adjust their own proximity reference levels, instead of the user's doing it.

The problem I have with this formulation is that it seems
to suggest that the individuals have some ability to reach in
and tweak their own proximity reference levels. I know this is
not what you are saying, but it represents a not unreasonable
interpretation of what you do say. The only elements of the
individual capable of adjusting the reference levels are
higher-order systems, as you say. From the perspective of the
individual (in real life, not in the model) it appears to me
that he or she can adjust what he or she attends to, but not the
reference level for that perception. What am I missing?

Bruce

2

[From Bruce Gregory (980330.1436 EST)]

Bruce Nevin (980330.1244 EST)

I believe this means that there is a control system in the person that
compares perceptions of one's own performance with (generalizations about)
perceptions of other people's performance and adjusts the above-mentioned
reference levels as means for controlling one's own performance.

Really? That seems unlikely to me. Sounds suspiciously like I
have a model of behavior inside my head and I compare my
behavior with the model to decide how to behave -- a version of
model-based control. I am sure this is not what you mean.

Individuals do not reach in and tweak their own reference levels. They
reach across or down within themselves, as it were. When they do this on
the basis of a comparison of other people's behavioral outputs with their
own behavioral outputs (behavioral outputs that result from their control
of the perceptions whose reference levels are being adjusted) it has an
effect as though "other people" or "society" were reaching in and tweaking
their reference levels. This is only an appearance, of course, but to the
extent that the person believes that one's perceptions of "other people" or
"society" etc. are actualities out there in the world it takes on a curious
kind of validity, granting to others a power over one that otherwise they
could not have.

Perhaps one is controlling for "don't stand out". People looking
at you would then constitute a disturbance. This would require
that you pay attention to what others are paying attention to.

Bruce

3

[From Bill Powers (980331.0525 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980330.1220 EST) --

The problem I have with this formulation is that it seems
to suggest that the individuals have some ability to reach in
and tweak their own proximity reference levels. I know this is
not what you are saying, but it represents a not unreasonable
interpretation of what you do say.

It is exactly what I'm saying; that's how hierarchical control works. How
did you think it works?

The only elements of the
individual capable of adjusting the reference levels are
higher-order systems, as you say. From the perspective of the
individual (in real life, not in the model) it appears to me
that he or she can adjust what he or she attends to, but not the
reference level for that perception. What am I missing?

"The person" is the entire collection of control systems at all levels.
Consciousness may reside at any level, although it never (apparently)
encompasses all levels or all systems at a given level at the same time.
But consciousness is not the issue here. Reference levels are _always_
being adjusted by higher-level systems. That's how we do things. Just watch
a basketball game, if you don't believe that proximity control (or
something like it) exists, or that proximity reference levels (or
equivalent) are continually being adjusted.

Time for some reorganization of your understanding of HPCT, I think.

Best,

Bill P.

4

[From Bill Powers (980331.0559 MST)]

Bruce Nevin (980330.1244 EST)]
writing to Bruce Gregory (980330.1220 EST)--

I believe this means that there is a control system in the person that
compares perceptions of one's own performance with (generalizations about)
perceptions of other people's performance and adjusts the above-mentioned
reference levels as means for controlling one's own performance.

This seems to place the comparator in the perceptual function, or even in
the environment. Try this:

There is an input function that creates a perception of the similarity of
our own performance to that of other people. We can adopt a reference
condition of completely unlike, mostly different, somewhat different,
somewhat similar, mostly similar, or identical. So the perceptual variable
is _degree of similarity-difference_. If the perceived degree of similarity
is too high or too low relative to the adopted reference level, we adjust
our performance to correct the error.

Some people want to be just like certain other people, especially in
adolescence. Of course they don't want to be like _all_ other people, and
they definitely want to be _completely unlike_ some kinds of others. Some
people judge their performance entirely in terms of similarity to the
performance of role-models; others use criteria that don't involve a
relationship to what others do. A person who judges his or her own behavior
entirely in terms of similarity to others is likely to find it hard to
believe that some people don't use the performance of others as a criterion
for their own behavior.

Best,

Bill P.

5

[From Bill Powers (980331.0634 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980330.1436 EST)--

Perhaps one is controlling for "don't stand out". People looking
at you would then constitute a disturbance. This would require
that you pay attention to what others are paying attention to.

Isn't that a rather special case? If you offer that as a general
explanation, then you have to come up with a different theory for everyone
who behaves differently, or you imply that there's something wrong with a
person who (in this case) actively seeks to be different from others and
"stand out."

Best,

Bill P.

6

[From Bruce Gregory (980331.1010 EST)]

Bill Powers (980331.0525 MST)]

Time for some reorganization of your understanding of HPCT, I think.

It would seem so.

Bruce

7

[From Bruce Gregory (980331.1617 EST)]

Bill Powers (980331.0525 MST)

Reference levels are _always_
being adjusted by higher-level systems. That's how we do things. Just watch
a basketball game, if you don't believe that proximity control (or
something like it) exists, or that proximity reference levels (or
equivalent) are continually being adjusted.

I can see that reference levels are changing. What I cannot see is that they
are being adjusted by higher-level systems. In fact, reference levels are
adjusted so rapidly that high-levels seem unlikely candidates. But I clearly
don't understand HPCT.

Bruce

Bruce

8

[From Bill Powers (980331.1838 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980331.1617 EST)--

I can see that reference levels are changing. What I cannot see is that they
are being adjusted by higher-level systems. In fact, reference levels are
adjusted so rapidly that high-levels seem unlikely candidates. But I clearly
don't understand HPCT.

A temporary setback -- don't worry.

Let's consider just one low-level control system being used by a higher
system. I ask you to reach out and put your finger on the 't' key. To do
this, you have to use a control system that can move your hand (already
configured to point) to any position anywhere in the reachable local space.

Actually there must be three reference signals involved, one for each
degree of freedom. Consider just the "vertical" dimension (and assume it
_is_ one of the dimensions). When you vary the reference signal for
vertical position, your finger moves up and down. If you vary it at the
normal rate (not as fast as possible), your perception of your finger stays
essentially AT the reference level; the error is never large enough to
matter. While the reference signal is increasing, your (perceived) finger
is rising; while it's decreasing your finger is falling. When the reference
signal becomes constant, your finger becomes motionless.

So how do you raise and lower your finger in order, say, to point at the
't'? By increasing and decreasing the reference signal for perceived
vertical position -- not, as you might have guessed, by changing your
muscle tensions. The muscle tensions are varied by the system that makes
the perceived position match the reference position; the higher system
doesn't know anything about muscle tensions. The higher system that does
the pointing perceives where the finger is and where the thing to be
pointed at is. It sees the relationship, the distance, between them. It is,
we assume, given a reference signal that means "distance of zero". If there
is an error, the error becomes, via the output function, a change in the
reference level for finger position. In three dimensions, there would be
three error signals and three reference signals. As the reference signals
change, the reference position for the finger changes and the finger moves
to keep the perceived position matching the reference position. The
higher-level error signal finally falls to zero when the finger is on the
target, and the position reference signals stop changing (the higher system
must use an integral output function to work this way).

Once the finger is on the 't', only a very small error signal is required
to make the higher system's output begin changing rapidly. If a disturbance
occurs, we would have to look closely to see that the higher system has any
error in it at all; the main effect we would see is that the output of that
system is changing at some rate. That, of course, means that the reference
signal for the position control system is changing at that same rate, and
that the finger is moving at the corresponding speed back toward the 't'.

In fact, the normal state of the whole hierarchy is for all errors at all
levels to remain close to zero, even when the system is acting very
energetically. Only if we could measure very closely would we see that the
perceptions in each system at each level didn't exactly match the reference
signals at all times. Due to the amplification in the output functions, a
small error signal is enough to drive the output through its whole possible
range, thus changing the reference signals at lower levels through their
whole possible range.

The only exceptions to this small-error condition occur when a system first
becomes active, or when a large fast disturbance occurs. Otherwise, the
entire hierarchy is maintaining a state of small error in all systems, and
it is doing so through higher systems varying the reference signals
entering lower systems.

Look at Fig. 6.1 in B:CP, p. 71. There are three levels of control shown.
The output of the third level sets the reference signal for the second
level; the output of the second level sets the reference signal for the
first level. Only the first level operates muscles with its output signals.
Did you look at this diagram and think "Oh, that's too complicated," and
skip it?

Best,

Bill P.

9

[From Bruce Gregory (980331.2200 EST)]

Bill Powers (980331.1838 MST)]

The only exceptions to this small-error condition occur when a system first
becomes active, or when a large fast disturbance occurs. Otherwise, the
entire hierarchy is maintaining a state of small error in all systems, and
it is doing so through higher systems varying the reference signals
entering lower systems.

Look at Fig. 6.1 in B:CP, p. 71. There are three levels of control shown.
The output of the third level sets the reference signal for the second
level; the output of the second level sets the reference signal for the
first level. Only the first level operates muscles with its output signals.
Did you look at this diagram and think "Oh, that's too complicated," and
skip it?

It is a bit "busy" isn't it? I follow your description, even if I don't
follow the diagram. It makes perfect sense, but doesn't address what I am
trying to address. A basketball player is guarding his man when out of "the
corner of his eye" he sees an opponent breaking for the basket. The first
player whirls to block the shot. Clearly the first player's proximity
reference changes dramatically and rapidly. What higher level system is
involved? What level is controlling "guarding A" and at what level is the
shift made to "blocking B's shot"? Is the second necessarily higher in the
HPCT system? How is it able to so fast given that it must be a very high
level system?

Bruce

10

[From Bill Powers (980401.0219 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (980331.2200 EST)--

Look at Fig. 6.1 in B:CP, p. 71.

It is a bit "busy" isn't it? I follow your description, even if I don't
follow the diagram.

Why not take the time to follow the diagram?

It makes perfect sense, but doesn't address what I am
trying to address. A basketball player is guarding his man when out of "the
corner of his eye" he sees an opponent breaking for the basket. The first
player whirls to block the shot. Clearly the first player's proximity
reference changes dramatically and rapidly. What higher level system is
involved? What level is controlling "guarding A" and at what level is the
shift made to "blocking B's shot"?

This is a case where only one of these activities can be going on at a
given moment, because the same physical systems have to be used
differently. Sometimes you see parallel operation; one arm being waved in
the opponent's face, and the other darting out to try to intercept a pass.

I can only guess what the higher system is: whatever it is, it can turn off
one relationship reference signal and turn on another one. You don't want
both systems acting at the same time; that would just lead to conflict.
Roughly speaking, it is probably a system at the sequence or logic levels.
The logic is fairly clear: the highest priority is to stop the shot;
guarding one's man becomes pointless when a different man is about to
shoot. Maybe there's even a principle involved: go for the ball when you can.

Is the second necessarily higher in the
HPCT system?

Yes, because it can change both systems' reference signals. If you don't
change the first system's reference signal, it will resist anything that
tends to change its perception of guarding the opponent -- even another
system that wants to block the shot.

How is it able to [act] so fast given that it must be a very high
level system?

It acts as fast as it acts. What is "fast?" Half a second? How long does it
take you to complete the sentence "Two plus seven is ..."? I estimate that
the minimum lag time at the system concept level is maybe a little more
than half a second. Of course that depends on the complexity of the
perception. Higher-level perceptions are not necessarily more complex --
taking more time to compute -- than lower-level ones. In basketball, the
principle "go for the ball" is pretty simple.

Were you thinking that "B is about to shoot, stop guarding A and block B"
would take a long time to execute? How long -- a minute? Half a minute? Two
seconds? Two tenths of a second?

I would guess that it takes about the length of time that passes between
the beginning of A's fast break and the start of the switch from A to B.
Somewhere between half a second and a second.

Best,

Bill P.