From Greg Williams (921207)
Robert K. Clark (921205)
Good to see you back on the net, Bob. Good timing, too -- maybe the
conversation will switch from "What do we call what Bill's model does?" to
"What evidence is there for Bill's and other models of perceptual control?" I
myself think the latter will probably be more enlightening, both to PCTers AND
nonPCTers.
The DME is able to direct attention to any group, sub-group, or
combination of available Memories and compare the projected
results with any other combination of available Memories as well
as to any related Intrinsic Levels.
Why might the DME direct attention to certain memories, rather than others, at
some particular time? Do you have a theory of attention "selection" other than
the broad viewpoint that the DME tries to (as you say later) "improve his
well-being"? Is there some calculus for tradeoffs among various possible ways
to "improve" (more or less)?
The DME acts, like any control system,
when it detects a difference between current perceptions and
reference perceptions. It examines available alternatives,
based on current data combined with projected results of
alternative actions. It selects and then applies its selections
as reference levels where needed throughout the Hierarchy. The
DME has no need to "know" anything about the details of the
control systems it is using. It merely applies its output
signal(s) where needed and the systems respond.
It seems to me that your proposal would require the DME to run "imagination
connection" trials on the alternative actions at a particular time to
"examine" and "select" some of them for actual performance. Maybe the DME
wouldn't need to "know" details about the parts of the hierarchy which would
then actually be used, but it appears that it would have to be able to "see"
the results of such use "in imagination," prior to actual performance, in
order to have a basis for decision-making. Or do you have different notions
about how the selection process occurs? I'm trying to understand the basics of
your model at this point, and perhaps I'm headed in the wrong direction.
Please clarify.
In fact, what seems to be needed is the DME as suggested here.
I find combining the DME approach with the Hierarchical view
provides some additional answers, and leads to some revisions of
the HIERARCHY.
It appears to me that the DME is basically directed (not completely random)
reorganization. Is that a fair characterization? In the past, I've been
attracted to the idea that there are BOTH random and directed types of
reorganization possible in humans -- the former can get you to A solution
(eventually, usually) when the latter has no clue on how to direct, but when
it works, the latter is usually quicker. The problem has been in figuring out
a working model for directing -- hence, my questions above. Fleshing out the
mechanism(s?) of your DME's decision making would be very helpful.
I'll let others carry forth the conversation with you on recasting the
hierarchy. Right now, my main interest is in models of reorganization. A
fellow here in Kentucky named Robert Blackburn recently sent us a huge ms. on
his theory of human decision making, and we're trying to understand that and
relate it to PCT ideas.
Best wishes,
Greg