Emotions

[From Bruce Abbott (2000.08.17.2110 EST)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.0815.0515) --

Why should I be aware of anything?

Good question. Do you have an answer?

All that is required under HPCT is faster reorganization.

Yes, that is what I said.

If you are old enough to wear reading glasses, try threading
a needle without them. Notice what emotions, if any, you experience. If you
are anything like me, you experience frustration. Possibly mounting
frustration.

O.K.

This emotional "message" seems to be associated with failure to exercise
control.

More precisely, with a failure to bring a perception to a desired
(reference) state. However, this seems rather specific to
anger/frustration. If so, it cannot provide a general account of emotions.

Some people do not experience as much frustration. We say they
are "patient". In an absence of emotional "coloring" we apparently simply
imagine alternatives, but never act. At least that is what limited
neurological studies of individuals in which the connection between the
prefrontal lobes and the hippocampus is severed suggest.

There are reports that those with high spinal-cord injuries, who do not
experience the physiological changes associated with emotions, perceive the
emotions as less intense -- e.g., a "cold" anger rather than a "hot" anger.

What is your source of information about the effect of severing the
connection between the prefrontal lobes and hippocampus?

Bruce A.

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0818.0536)]

Bruce Abbott (2000.08.17.2110 EST)

>Bruce Gregory (2000.0815.0515) --

>Why should I be aware of anything?

Good question. Do you have an answer?

Yes, but I'm keeping it a secret until my report appears in _Nature_ :wink:

>All that is required under HPCT is faster reorganization.

Yes, that is what I said.

I believe I was quoting you.

>If you are old enough to wear reading glasses, try threading
>a needle without them. Notice what emotions, if any, you experience. If

you

>are anything like me, you experience frustration. Possibly mounting
>frustration.

O.K.

>This emotional "message" seems to be associated with failure to exercise
>control.

More precisely, with a failure to bring a perception to a desired
(reference) state.

Yes, that's how we understand "control".

However, this seems rather specific to
anger/frustration. If so, it cannot provide a general account of

emotions.

True. Was my assignment to develop a general account of emotions? If so, I
apologize for my brevity.

>Some people do not experience as much frustration. We say they
>are "patient". In an absence of emotional "coloring" we apparently simply
>imagine alternatives, but never act. At least that is what limited
>neurological studies of individuals in which the connection between the
>prefrontal lobes and the hippocampus is severed suggest.

There are reports that those with high spinal-cord injuries, who do not
experience the physiological changes associated with emotions, perceive

the

emotions as less intense -- e.g., a "cold" anger rather than a "hot"

anger.

Interesting.

What is your source of information about the effect of severing the
connection between the prefrontal lobes and hippocampus?

Fair question. I'll try to recover the source.

BG

[From Bruce Abbott (2000.08.18.0910 EST)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.0818.0536) --

Bruce Abbott (2000.08.17.2110 EST)

Bruce Gregory (2000.0815.0515)

This emotional "message" seems to be associated with failure to exercise
control.

More precisely, with a failure to bring a perception to a desired
(reference) state.

Yes, that's how we understand "control".

I gathered as much. However, to my mind "failure to exercise control" is
ambiguous. It could mean failure to _achieve_ control, or failure to
_attempt_ control.

However, this seems rather specific to
anger/frustration. If so, it cannot provide a general account of

emotions.

True. Was my assignment to develop a general account of emotions? If so, I
apologize for my brevity.

You offered an explanation that relates control-system operation to the
appearance of one emotion (frustration/anger). That's fine as far as it
goes, but I thought it important to point out that this analysis will not
generalize to other emotions. It did not occur to me that you would take it
as a criticism for failing to do something you were not, after all,
intending to do.

What is your source of information about the effect of severing the
connection between the prefrontal lobes and hippocampus?

Fair question. I'll try to recover the source.

Excellent!

Bruce A.

[From Bill Powers (2000.08.18.0643 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (2000.08.17.2110 EST)--

Bruce Gregory (2000.0815.0515) --

Why should I be aware of anything?

Good question. Do you have an answer?

Perhaps one should start with a more basic question: _Am_ I aware of anything?
I'm almost convinced that not everyone has a specific experience of being
aware. If one's experience does not include a sense of being an
experiencer, then it must seem that the world exists Out There and one
simply reacts to it, directly. If this were the case, then certain ways of
talking about human experience would make more sense to me, and seem less
deliberately obtuse.

For example, B. F. Skinner spoke of _deducing_ what he was doing by
watching his own behavior. I forget just how he put it, but it was
something like this: if I see my hands raising a letter to the slot of a
mailbox and dropping it in, I can deduce that my purpose is to mail a letter.

Now that I write that, I see that it's not really an example of what I
mean. Skinner is clearly observing his own actions and reasoning about
them. On the other hand, maybe it is an example, for he seems not to notice
that he is observing and deducing. While he is doing the act, he seems
unaware that he is reporting thoughts of his own about experiences of his
own. The Reporter remains unmentioned and, apparently, invisible to
Skinner. The world is simply what he sees it to be, and he assumes that is
what any "objective observer" would see.

On the other hand, it may be that this is a case of theory dominating
obnservation. There isn't supposed to be any little (or big) man in the
head, and internal processes are not supposed to have any causal influence
on real physical phenomena. Therefore no matter what one experiences, one
should never accept as real any experience that goes against these
theoretical concepts. Or at least one should never _say_ anything that goes
against them.

···

-----------------------

If you are old enough to wear reading glasses, try threading
a needle without them. Notice what emotions, if any, you experience. If you
are anything like me, you experience frustration. Possibly mounting
frustration.

Are you saying that everyone who has trouble threading a needle because of
poor vision experiences the same emotion, an emotion called "frustration?"
I think that different people would give different names to the emotion; a
seamstress too poor to afford glasses might experience fear as she sees her
ability to make a living threatened; an aging grandmother might experience
sorrow as she realizes she may not be able to finish her gift to a
grandchild; a shild with a low opinion of himself might experience
depression at this latest evidence of his own incompetence. Depending on
circumstances and indivdiual organization, failure to thread a needle might
give rise to cognitions and sensations that are called by any emotion-name
at all.

It might be useful to examine this emotion you call frustration and say
what its components are. There is surely a somatic component that you can
feel, a set of sensations or possibly changes in sensations from the body.
And there is surely some goal involved that is not being matched by
perception, quite likely at more than one level (as I intended to indicate
by the above examples: the fact that the thread is not in the eye of the
needle is not necessarily the only error).

I think the term "frustration" is an example of naming an emotion after the
circumstance in which it is felt. Frustration is the circumstance of being
prevented from achieving some end. I just looked in my dictionary, in fact,
and found that the first meaning of "frustrate" is "to prevent from
attaining a purpose." So to say that you feel frustrated is to say that you
feel prevented from attaining some purpose -- but that leaves undescribed
what it is that you actually feel, and what your highest-level frustrated
desire actually is. If a person in an MOL session were to tell me "I feel
frustrated," I would ask "How does it feel to be frustrated? Are there any
thoughts about it? Any physical sensations?" I would ask similar questions
about any report that an emotion was occurring: simply naming the emotion
is not the end of the matter. "You say you feel angry with John. Do you
feel an urge to do something to John? Are there any physical feelings that
go with this anger?"

"Emotion," at least as I see it, is not a primitive term. It's an informal
way of referring to what people feel and think when they need to act but
are unable to act successfully -- without saying what it is they acdtually
feel and think.

Bewst,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.08.18.1048 EDT)]

Bill Powers (2000.08.18.0643 MDT)--

···

At 07:52 AM 08/18/2000 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:

"Emotion," at least as I see it, is not a primitive term. It's an informal
way of referring to what people feel and think when they need to act but
are unable to act successfully -- without saying what it is they acdtually
feel and think.

The proposal is clear, persuasive, well articulated, and well defended. One aspect is framed a bit too narrowly. The clause "but are unable to act successfully" entails that there are no emotions when one is controlling successfully.

         Bruce Nevin

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.08.18.1120)]

Bill Powers (2000.08.18.0643 MDT)

Bruce Abbott (2000.08.17.2110 EST)--

Bruce Gregory (2000.0815.0515) --

Why should I be aware of anything?

Good question. Do you have an answer?

Perhaps one should start with a more basic question: _Am_ I aware of anything?
I'm almost convinced that not everyone has a specific experience of being
aware.

It is not clear to me that this statement means anything. (Not a hostile comment.
I'm just trying to understand your position.)

If one's experience does not include a sense of being an
experiencer,

I don't think one necessarily experiences one self as an experiencer. One
realizes that one's experiences are unique (as far as one knows) and realizes
that there must be a "one who experiences". It may be that the "one who
experiences" is the same in all "sentient beings". This is the position, as I
understand it, at the heart of Mahayana Buddhism.

then it must seem that the world exists Out There and one
simply reacts to it, directly.

And unconsciously? As when one "loses track" of where one is because one's
attention is elsewhere?

If this were the case, then certain ways of
talking about human experience would make more sense to me, and seem less
deliberately obtuse.

For example, B. F. Skinner spoke of _deducing_ what he was doing by
watching his own behavior. I forget just how he put it, but it was
something like this: if I see my hands raising a letter to the slot of a
mailbox and dropping it in, I can deduce that my purpose is to mail a letter.

That point of view is consistent with some of the split-brain studies and studies
based on post hypnotic suggestion that I've alluded to in the past.

Now that I write that, I see that it's not really an example of what I
mean. Skinner is clearly observing his own actions and reasoning about
them. On the other hand, maybe it is an example, for he seems not to notice
that he is observing and deducing. While he is doing the act, he seems
unaware that he is reporting thoughts of his own about experiences of his
own. The Reporter remains unmentioned and, apparently, invisible to
Skinner. The world is simply what he sees it to be, and he assumes that is
what any "objective observer" would see.

It is always possible that everyone else experiences the world differently that
we do, but I'm not betting on it.

On the other hand, it may be that this is a case of theory dominating
obnservation.

I can get behind that! It sure wouldn't be the first time (or the last).

There isn't supposed to be any little (or big) man in the
head, and internal processes are not supposed to have any causal influence
on real physical phenomena. Therefore no matter what one experiences, one
should never accept as real any experience that goes against these
theoretical concepts. Or at least one should never _say_ anything that goes
against them.

If you hear voices, learn to keep it to yourself!

-----------------------

If you are old enough to wear reading glasses, try threading
a needle without them. Notice what emotions, if any, you experience. If you
are anything like me, you experience frustration. Possibly mounting
frustration.

Are you saying that everyone who has trouble threading a needle because of
poor vision experiences the same emotion, an emotion called "frustration?"

No. Just that many of us have similar reactions to the experience of being unable
to thread a needle.

I think that different people would give different names to the emotion; a
seamstress too poor to afford glasses might experience fear as she sees her
ability to make a living threatened; an aging grandmother might experience
sorrow as she realizes she may not be able to finish her gift to a
grandchild; a shild with a low opinion of himself might experience
depression at this latest evidence of his own incompetence. Depending on
circumstances and indivdiual organization, failure to thread a needle might
give rise to cognitions and sensations that are called by any emotion-name
at all.

Agreed.

It might be useful to examine this emotion you call frustration and say
what its components are. There is surely a somatic component that you can
feel, a set of sensations or possibly changes in sensations from the body.
And there is surely some goal involved that is not being matched by
perception, quite likely at more than one level (as I intended to indicate
by the above examples: the fact that the thread is not in the eye of the
needle is not necessarily the only error).

Agreed.

I think the term "frustration" is an example of naming an emotion after the
circumstance in which it is felt. Frustration is the circumstance of being
prevented from achieving some end. I just looked in my dictionary, in fact,
and found that the first meaning of "frustrate" is "to prevent from
attaining a purpose." So to say that you feel frustrated is to say that you
feel prevented from attaining some purpose -- but that leaves undescribed
what it is that you actually feel, and what your highest-level frustrated
desire actually is. If a person in an MOL session were to tell me "I feel
frustrated," I would ask "How does it feel to be frustrated? Are there any
thoughts about it? Any physical sensations?" I would ask similar questions
about any report that an emotion was occurring: simply naming the emotion
is not the end of the matter. "You say you feel angry with John. Do you
feel an urge to do something to John? Are there any physical feelings that
go with this anger?"

One can ceratainly take this approach, but it is not clear to me what one learns
from it. Nevertheless, clarity may be its own reward.

"Emotion," at least as I see it, is not a primitive term. It's an informal
way of referring to what people feel and think when they need to act but
are unable to act successfully -- without saying what it is they acdtually
feel and think.

I cried at my father's funeral, but I'm not sure that I needed to act and was
unable to act successfully. I think Gerard Manley Hopkins may be right in this
case:

Spring and Fall
(to a young child)

Margaret, are you grieving
Over Goldengrove unleaving?
Leaves, like the things of man, you
With your fresh thoughts care for, can you?
Ah! as the heart grows older
It will come to such sights colder
By and by, nor spare a sigh
Though worlds of wanwood leafmeal lie;
And yet you will weep and know why.
Now no matter, child, the name:
Sorrow's springs are the same.
Nor mouth had, no nor mind, expressed
What heart heard of, ghost guessed:
It is the blight man was born for,
It is Margaret you mourn for.

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0818.1125)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.08.18.1048 EDT)

Bill Powers (2000.08.18.0643 MDT)--

"Emotion," at least as I see it, is not a primitive term. It's an informal
way of referring to what people feel and think when they need to act but
are unable to act successfully -- without saying what it is they acdtually
feel and think.

The proposal is clear, persuasive, well articulated, and well defended. One
aspect is framed a bit too narrowly. The clause "but are unable to act
successfully" entails that there are no emotions when one is controlling
successfully.

This might be more than the result of framing "a bit too narrowly". It seems to
eliminate _all_ "positive" emotions.

BG

···

At 07:52 AM 08/18/2000 -0600, Bill Powers wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2000.08.18.1408 MDFT)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.08.18.1048 EDT)--

The proposal is clear, persuasive, well articulated, and well defended. One
aspect is framed a bit too narrowly. The clause "but are unable to act
successfully" entails that there are no emotions when one is controlling
successfully.

I won't say that is universally the case, but I think it is the usual case.
Of course one can always broaden the class of experiences that we call
"emotions" so much that in order not to feel an emotion we'd have to be
dead. In truth, that's more or less what I'd like to do. What's the big deal?

I think that when we're in the middle of controlling successfully, we don't
separate out the feeling (mostly somatic) component as something different
from the totality of perceptions we're controlling. Also, it seems to me
that there are states to which we give names like satisfaction,
contentment, confidence, and tranquillity which are quite different from
states like excitement, exhilaration, triumph, and jubilation. The latter
group, it seems to me, is concerned largely with negative emotions in
disguise -- exhilaration is the sort of thing you feel when you've overcome
great odds or escaped from danger (that's what I mean by the feeling of an
error going away being interpreted as a positive emotion). Excitement is
next door to fear, and triumph is clearly associated with prevailing in
some kind of conflict or other difficulty.

The "calmer" terms for pleasant states are, I think, attempts to
characterize how it feels to be alive and functioning while not actually
experiencing any emotion at all. Well, that's just a matter of definition,
I guess.

Perhaps I'm overreacting to others who seem to glorify and mysticize
emotions, or sneer at them ("emotional reactions") as if having an emotion
makes you unable to think.

The way I like to think of emotions, there are no such things. All there is
is the way we feel while doing, trying to do, or failing to do what we're
trying to do. The whole body and the whole mind are involved in everything.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0818.1655)]

Bruce Abbott (2000.08.18.0910 EST)

I gathered as much. However, to my mind "failure to exercise control" is
ambiguous. It could mean failure to _achieve_ control, or failure to
_attempt_ control.

Fair enough.

You offered an explanation that relates control-system operation to the
appearance of one emotion (frustration/anger). That's fine as far as it
goes, but I thought it important to point out that this analysis will not
generalize to other emotions. It did not occur to me that you would take it
as a criticism for failing to do something you were not, after all,
intending to do.

I never feel criticized by you :wink:

BG

[From Bill Powers (2000.08.18.1639 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.08.18.1120)--

Perhaps one should start with a more basic question: _Am_ I aware of

anything?

I'm almost convinced that not everyone has a specific experience of being
aware.

It is not clear to me that this statement means anything. (Not a hostile

comment.

I'm just trying to understand your position.)

It's the up-a-level experience. An analogy: When I look at the room around
me, mostly I just look at what I'm interested in (Tiger Woods, at the
moment). But I can also become aware of the periphery of my vision and my
glasses and nose, so the room is suddenly framed and I am reminded that it
is I who am looking at the room, rather than the room just being there. The
looker, or part of it, appears in the scene along with the looked-at.

And now I can be aware of trying to extend the analogy at the same time
that I try to extend it. The extension is in my first calling it an
analogy, and then realizing that as I do so I am looking for the extension
-- the extension is not creating itself.

To stay within the bounds of the analogy, I think there may be people who,
in looking at the room, are quite aware of everything in it but not of the
fact that they are looking at it. As I said, whether that's true or simply
the consequence of a belief, I don't know.

I don't think one necessarily experiences one self as an experiencer. One
realizes that one's experiences are unique (as far as one knows) and realizes
that there must be a "one who experiences". It may be that the "one who
experiences" is the same in all "sentient beings". This is the position, as I
understand it, at the heart of Mahayana Buddhism.

If the one who experiences is the same in all of us (I have always
wondered), why can't I experience your experiences? But yes, what I am
talking about is the sense of being the one who experiences. The
realization is a produict of the hierarchy, but when one looks where this
realization points, there is something there to ... well, be. First, I am
experiencing the deduction that there must be an experiencer. Then I am
experiencing myself making that deduction. It's like running around a house
looking out the windows, with the different scene out each window. Who's
doing all this running around and looking? It's the same I every time.

then it must seem that the world exists Out There and one
simply reacts to it, directly.

And unconsciously? As when one "loses track" of where one is because one's
attention is elsewhere?

Good example of the phenomenon. What's this "attention" stuff?

[Deducing my purpose]

That point of view is consistent with some of the split-brain studies and
studies based on post hypnotic suggestion that I've alluded to in the past.

In either case, an unusual set of cirumstances has interrupted the normal
relationship among systems at the same or different levels. Normally, at
least one's main purposes are known well before any attempt is made to
achieve them. In the situations you mention, if a person's view of his own
behavior were the same as it ordinarily is in anyone, then we wouldn't pick
it out as anything worth paying attention to. It's the situation of _not_
knowing what the purpose of one's own behavior is that is remarkable,
because it is so rare.

I cried at my father's funeral, but I'm not sure that I needed to act and was
unable to act successfully.

Did you not wish you could bring your father back? Did you not find it hard
to admit to yourself that he was gone forever? No reply necessary; this is
strictly your own private business.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0819.1727)]

Bill Powers (2000.08.18.1639 MDT)

To stay within the bounds of the analogy, I think there may be people who,
in looking at the room, are quite aware of everything in it but not of the
fact that they are looking at it. As I said, whether that's true or simply
the consequence of a belief, I don't know.

Suppose we were to ask them, "Is someone observing this room?" What do you
think they might say? My guess is, "Yes." To which I would respond, "Well
that's the person I'm talking aboot (oops I've acquired a Canadian
accent!)."

If the one who experiences is the same in all of us (I have always
wondered), why can't I experience your experiences?

You lack my perceptual inputs. If you had access to them, you could
experience my experiences.

But yes, what I am
talking about is the sense of being the one who experiences. The
realization is a produict of the hierarchy, but when one looks where this
realization points, there is something there to ... well, be. First, I am
experiencing the deduction that there must be an experiencer. Then I am
experiencing myself making that deduction. It's like running around a

house

looking out the windows, with the different scene out each window. Who's
doing all this running around and looking? It's the same I every time.

Yes, indeed. (It's comforting that we seem to have similar experiences!)

>>then it must seem that the world exists Out There and one
>>simply reacts to it, directly.
>
>And unconsciously? As when one "loses track" of where one is because

one's

>attention is elsewhere?

Good example of the phenomenon. What's this "attention" stuff?

Perceptual inputs that the Observer is aware of.

In either case, an unusual set of cirumstances has interrupted the normal
relationship among systems at the same or different levels. Normally, at
least one's main purposes are known well before any attempt is made to
achieve them. In the situations you mention, if a person's view of his own
behavior were the same as it ordinarily is in anyone, then we wouldn't

pick

it out as anything worth paying attention to. It's the situation of _not_
knowing what the purpose of one's own behavior is that is remarkable,
because it is so rare.

Yes. I've conjectured that since from the time we are children we are called
upon to explain why we did what we did, there is a higher order control
system charged with generating such explanations. For all I know, this
mechanism is _aways_ at work--creating plausible explanations for the
behavior the Observer sees.

>I cried at my father's funeral, but I'm not sure that I needed to act and

was

>unable to act successfully.

Did you not wish you could bring your father back? Did you not find it

hard

to admit to yourself that he was gone forever? No reply necessary; this is
strictly your own private business.

No, my experience seemed to me to be simply one of loss. I wrote the
following poem on that occassion:

"In Massachusetts, the first spring day
comes a month after the first day of spring.
In the garden, even when I do not close my eyes,
I see my father struggling, although he does not know it
admidst the tubes and needle of intensive care,
to see even one more day as beautiful as this.
Does time bring anything but loss?

Grieving, he once told me,
Is the only way to heal."

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0819.1739)]

Bill Powers (2000.08.18.1408 MDFT)

I think that when we're in the middle of controlling successfully, we

don't

separate out the feeling (mostly somatic) component as something different
from the totality of perceptions we're controlling.

You are standing on a beach (not easy to do, I admit, in Durango) watching a
magnificent sunset that turns the entire sky red and gold. I suspect that
your feelings will be unrelated to the success of the perceptions you are
controlling (standing upright, facing West, etc.) But I could be wrong.

Also, it seems to me
that there are states to which we give names like satisfaction,
contentment, confidence, and tranquillity which are quite different from
states like excitement, exhilaration, triumph, and jubilation. The latter
group, it seems to me, is concerned largely with negative emotions in
disguise -- exhilaration is the sort of thing you feel when you've

overcome

great odds or escaped from danger (that's what I mean by the feeling of an
error going away being interpreted as a positive emotion). Excitement is
next door to fear, and triumph is clearly associated with prevailing in
some kind of conflict or other difficulty.

I guess euphoria is something you never feel. Too bad. (It's kind of like
great sex, to give you some idea of what you are missing!)

The way I like to think of emotions, there are no such things. All there

is

is the way we feel while doing, trying to do, or failing to do what we're
trying to do. The whole body and the whole mind are involved in

everything.

I agree. Where does that leave us?

BG

[From Bill Powers (2000.08.19.1817 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.0819.1739)--

I guess euphoria is something you never feel. Too bad. (It's kind of like
great sex, to give you some idea of what you are missing!)

Can't say that I do, can't say that I don't. Can you give me some idea of
the feelings, thoughts, etc. that you mean by the term? As to "great" sex,
how is that different from regular sex? Is it something superior, or simply
a lack of the usual distractions, hesitations, uncertainties, and so forth?

The way I like to think of emotions, there are no such things. All there

is

is the way we feel while doing, trying to do, or failing to do what we're
trying to do. The whole body and the whole mind are involved in

everything.

I agree. Where does that leave us?

I think this leaves us in an ineffable agreement. My opinion about
explaining emotions is that the phenomenon itself is too individualistic
and too ill-defined to stand up under serious attempts to put it into a
systematic framework of understanding, even a good one. Maybe the most
useful conclusion we could reach is that we shouldn't expect others to
grasp what we mean when we describe our own emotions. It's always good to
stop taking something for granted.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2000.08.19.1828 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.0819.1727)--

Suppose we were to ask them, "Is someone observing this room?" What do you
think they might say? My guess is, "Yes." To which I would respond, "Well
that's the person I'm talking aboot (oops I've acquired a Canadian
accent!)."

That's the problem with analogies: if you take them seriously they don't
make sense. To put the analogy aside, the real question would be "Is
something in you aware that you are perceiving (X)?" where X is any aspect
of experience. If you answer yes, I can say, "Well, that's what I mean by
awareness."

If the one who experiences is the same in all of us (I have always
wondered), why can't I experience your experiences?

You lack my perceptual inputs. If you had access to them, you could
experience my experiences.

But _you_ experience your perceptual inputs, so if the one who experiences
your perceptual inputs in you is the same as the one who experiences my
perceptual inputs in me (meaning the same identical entity), why is your
experiencer (which is identically the same as mine) not aware of my
experiences as well as yours? Of course if you mean only that the one who
experiences your inputs is _similar to_ the one who experiences mine, there
is no problem. Your eyes are similar to my eyes, but they are not the same
in that they are physically distinct from mine and therefore cannot see
what mine see.

(It's comforting that we seem to have similar experiences!)

Yes, this is comforting -- it would be much worse if we disagreed about
such basic things. Unfortunately, we can't prove that we're talking about
the same thing. Unfortunately, the universe is a lot bigger than we are (I
think), so there is a very large number of ways in which we can reach
apparent agreement without actually being in agreement.

>>then it must seem that the world exists Out There and one
>>simply reacts to it, directly.
>
>And unconsciously? As when one "loses track" of where one is because

one's

>attention is elsewhere?

No, I was talking about "reactions" of which we are conscious. For me, the
normal mode of operation is not to see everything as a perception, but
simply to assume it's really there the way it appears to be, not as if I
were inside a brain seeing the outputs of perceptual functions, but as if I
were "looking" through an open window "at" what is actually there. It
doesn't come naturally to me to keep realizing that I am experiencing
neural signals. I don't know if that's because I'd need a lifetime of
retraining to see it as PCT describes it, or if that sort of
reinterpretation is simply not a practical point of view.

It's the situation of _not_
knowing what the purpose of one's own behavior is that is remarkable,
because it is so rare.

Yes. I've conjectured that since from the time we are children we are called
upon to explain why we did what we did, there is a higher order control
system charged with generating such explanations. For all I know, this
mechanism is _aways_ at work--creating plausible explanations for the
behavior the Observer sees.

Could be, but on the other hand there are clearly many cases in which we
can state quite clearly what it is we intend to do before we do it: "I'm
taking the next bus downtown." So we are not in the slightest surprised
when we find ourselves climbing aboard the next bus. You seem to be talking
more about explaining what we have already done after the fact, which I
agree can be much less reliable.

Grieving, he once told me,
Is the only way to heal."

Well, that puts me in a rather tough position if I don't agree with what
your late father said, doesn't it? I think I'll leave that alone.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Richard Kennaway (2000.09.01.0949 BST)]

Bill Powers (2000.08.18.0643 MDT):

Perhaps one should start with a more basic question: _Am_ I aware of anything?
I'm almost convinced that not everyone has a specific experience of being
aware. If one's experience does not include a sense of being an
experiencer, then it must seem that the world exists Out There and one
simply reacts to it, directly.

I had an experience of not being aware of myself this morning, as I was
waking up. The following description is written entirely in hindsight: for
reasons that will become obvious, it could not be written any other way.

I don't remember waking up, but I was awake, lying in bed with my eyes
still closed, just daydreaming about this and that. I was aware of lying
in bed and hearing the occasional car go by outside. This was not a
sleeping or dreaming state. There was no experience of any inner "self".
This lasted for I guess around five or ten minutes. Then my wristwatch
alarm went off, and suddenly my "self" came online. Curious experience,
never happened before.

Perhaps there are people who go through their whole life in that state?

-- Richard Kennaway, jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk, http://www.sys.uea.ac.uk/~jrk/
   School of Information Systems, Univ. of East Anglia, Norwich, U.K.

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0901.0952)]

Bill Powers (2000.09.01.0704 MDT)

Evidently, what the Observer observes can somehow be represented as
descriptions and perceptions of the sort that are associated with the
hierarchy; for example, your descriptions are given in
English. It's as if
the Observer can also manipulate the hierarchy to make it
produce things
like descriptions. That implies output as well as input. So maybe this
Observer is, or acts like, a very high level in the hierarchy. But
obviously it doesn't act only through the level just below it.

An alternative model is one in which the Observer cannot manipulate the
hierarchy, but simply observes it. In this model, the descriptions
associated with the hierarchy are outputs of the hierarchy. One way to
think of this is that the hierarchy incorporates a "voice over" that
comments on the actions of the hierarchy. This voice over has no outputs
except verbal ones. The voice over is developed by reorganization to
enable us to use language as an output to control other perceptions.
Beginning meditators discover how little control they exercise over the
voice over. (The voice over is the voice in your head saying, "Voice
over? What the hell is he talking about? I don't have any voice over.")

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0901.1132)]

Bill Powers (2000.09.01.0818 MDT)

If the Observer as I conceive it can't have any effects on
the hierarchy,
then the so-called Observer is simply another part of the
hierarchy -- it
has to have effects on the hierarchy; otherwise, how would
anything in the
hierarchy know anything about it?

I think of the hierarchy as a mechanism for solving problems. If its a
problem, the hierarchy will try to solve it. The hierarchy solves
problems by controlling perceptions. Strictly speaking, the hierarchy
does know anything at all. It's a doer, not a knower. We talk about
knowledge, but knowledge for the hierarchy is simply part of some
solution to a problem. (That's why its so hard to "learn" things you are
not interested in. If there is no problem to be solved, the hierarchy
isn't "interested".) So in my view, the Observer simply watches what
happens as the hierarchy solves problems.

Well, yes, by definition. But it also has to have inputs, in order to
comment on anything in a way that actually has something to
do with what is
going on.

Yes, the voice- over has inputs. But it doesn't control those inputs as
far as I can tell. In my experience, the voice-over follows the Observer
around and provides a running commentary on whatever the Observer
observes.

And the Observer is what knows that the latter thought is
just a thought,
which you can think or not think as you please.

I'm not so sure that I have that much control over my thoughts. I do
recall one particularly vivid example of exercising such control,
however. My wife and I were going through a very difficult period in our
relationship. Every day as I proceeded on my lengthy commute I would
have the same conversation inside my head about our relationship. One
day I got fed up. I remember thinking, "I'm not going to have this
conversation again." And I didn't.

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0902.2117)]

Bill Powers (2000.09.01.1850 MDT)

And it's hard for me to
view the spinal reflexes as problem solvers at all: they're just control
systems, as far as I can see. I'm not a big fan of "everything is X" sorts
of ideas.

Except when it comes to control of perceptions?

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0904.0850)]

Bill Powers (2000.09.03.0827 MDT)]

I will be happy to agree that control systems that operate in terms of
symbols, rules, and principles (including reorganization when it works at
those levels) do what we commonly think of a solving problems (the Seven
Bridges of Koenigsburg, the Prisoner's Dilemma, how to feed six guests

with

three hamburgers, and so on).

That is the only point I was making. If you want to answer the question
_why_ an organism is controlling a particular perception, the answer can
often be found by asking what problem the organism is trying to solve. This
is an approach I often find useful.

But at lower levels, few people would call the control processes

problem-solving.

Few people would call behavior the control of perception. I don't see what's
wrong with viewing learning to ride a bicycle as solving a problem, even
though the control loops do not involve systems, rules, and principles.
Watch a baby learning to walk. Is it unreasonable to say she is solving a
series of problems? Perhaps so, but I'll probably go on doing it any way.

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0904.1113)]

Bill Powers (2000.09.04.0820 MDT)

Bruce Gregory (2000.0904.0850)--

>I don't see what's
>wrong with viewing learning to ride a bicycle as solving a problem, even
>though the control loops do not involve systems, rules, and principles.
>Watch a baby learning to walk. Is it unreasonable to say she is solving a
>series of problems? Perhaps so, but I'll probably go on doing it any way.

According to these examples, you're not saying that _control_ is
problem-solving; only that reorganization is problem-solving (learning to
control).

Not quite. I can solve many problems without reorganising. Reorganising
produces the tools we can then deploy to solve other problems. I can solve
the problem of getting to the store by riding my bike because I solved the
problem of how to ride a bike many years ago.

For my own part, I can see that not being able to walk might, in an

adult's

eyes, constitute a "problem" for a baby, and that learning to walk might,
in the same terms, be describable as "solving" the problem. But I doubt
that there's really any special activity called "problem-solving" going on
that isn't the same was what we already call reorganizing.

We disagree, I see. In my experience, we often solve most problems by
calling on solutions we developed in the process of solving earlier
problems. The system had to reorganize to solve the problem of riding a
bike, but it can call on that solution in many circumstances without further
reorganization.

BG