Emotions

[From Kenny Kitzke (2002.10.24)]

<Bill Williams UMKC 23 September 2002 3:00 AM CST>

<When I said I thought internal conflict was the source of most of the
un-wanted
emotions that we experience, what I had in mind was unneccesary unpleasant
emotions that are generated as a result of our having contradictory goals.>

I can understand that having contradictory goals/reference perceptions
(especially mutually exclusive references at the same level of perception)
results in Internal Conflict and perhaps dynamic loop instability. This
would have a person in a state of unresolvable error, where no amount of
action on the environment (externally observable behavior) can eliminate
error in both control loops.

It appears we are giving a name to such experienced Internal Conflict:
Emotion. Further, we have many different names for different kinds of
Emotions. Apparently, they are different because of the magnitude of the
unresolvable error, the perceptual level, the specific reference variable,
etc.

You have classified some emotions as "unwanted." Further, some emotions are
unpleasant and you claim, or hope, are also unnecessary. Thus, you desire
that PCT would help us control our emotions. And, in this construct, if we
can eliminate incompatible goals, say by "going up a level," we could reduce
or eliminate these unwanted emotions.

Bravo, Bill! I think I understand you better and this makes some good PCT
sense. Contrary to <<Byran Thalhammer's>> initial sharp disagreement with
your desire to control our unwanted emotions.

<<Sadly, I cannot disagree more. We have said that PCT is not about the
control of behavior. Emotions are behavioral outputs of systems that are
experiencing error. They may be at first internal, but we identify them
most when they are observed externally, from our own outputs or someone
else's. Both are disturbances to our perceptions, after all is said and
down. So, PCT is not about the control of emotions, but the perception of
them.>>

The fallacy in this reasoning is, according to the PCT Master, Bill Powers,
that emotions are not behavior; at least they are not outputs or actions in
the PCT loop model. Yet, these emotions do seem to have observable actions
and certain physiological phenomena closely associated with them. I
purposely avoid saying that emotions cause such measurable phenomena or
certainly such observable actions.

Yet, it is easy to understand why people do conclude that emotions cause and
precede behavior in sequence. An example is Adele B. Lynn, a highly praised
and successful consultant and trainer, whose Emotional Intelligence Seminar I
attended and commented upon on CSGNet.

Emotion driving behavior seems like another behavioral illusion that can only
be corrected by putting on PCT glasses. Or, is it possible that PCT/HPCT
does not adequately deal with emotions and how they fit into human nature and
behavior?

<<So, emotions are NOT what is unwanted, rather, we are controlling a
perception of ourselves in action, let's say, where the reference is a
certain result of our inputs to a discussion, interaction, or other
activity.>>

Bryan makes another point here that may not be so easily refuted. Is anxiety
or fear or anger really unwanted emotions? He adds a concept about our
emotions being relevant to seemingly helping us control a [reference]
perception of ourselves. I can see some sense and science in that idea as
well.

You too make what seems to be a similar observation.

<In your example below you use the example of a tornado as an example of an
_external_ source of emotion of fear. But, I don't think of the fear
potentially associated with a tornado as being "un-wanted." If one doesn't
experience fear when confronted with a tornado then maybe something is
functionally wrong with the way one's emotions are being geneated. A tornado
it seems to me _ought_ to be experienced as a threat to one's intrinsic
reference levels, and fear therefore seems to me in this context to be a good
thing.>

Here, you seem to imply a link between the emotion of fear and
self-preservation. This is closer to my concept of the phenomena of
emotions. Emotions seem to always relate to one's self interest, their
reference purposes for being themselves.

<But, most, it seems to me, of the distressing emotions we experience
are not the result of some disturbance to our intrinsic reference levels.
Instead they have there source in internal conflict and thus can potentially
be
eliminated by changing our internal, non-intrinsic goals.>

Here we begin leaning on Bill Power's concepts of Intrinsic quantities,
states, signals, errors, etc., and their relationship to the mysterious
"reorganization system." The speculative fuzziness here has never been
convicting for me here as the basics of PCT for explaining observable
behavior and internal human mechanisms.

<There is a current best selling novel Jonathan Franzen's 2001 _The
Corrections_
which I think illustrates my point. The family in the corrections experiences
a
lot of unpleasnt feelings, such as a "revenge dinner" in which the mother, on
purpose fixes a loathsome meal "to get back at" the husband who has been away
because his job requires it. And, the husband because he is a "real man" eats
the dinner without complaint. ANd, the wife is furious-- furious because he
won't fight. Almost none of the bad stuff that happens, and lots does, is
because of external circumstance.

But, they are consistently doing their "best"
to humiliate each other. And, sometimes it appears that they are sufficiently
confused that they are intentionally doing stuff to themselves that will be
humiliating. But, they do so by using other people, and then they blame the
other people for humiliating them. Tornados are not a big item in the list of
problems these folks have-- almost all of which they create for themselves.>

In the case of a tornado, or a husband who is away from home, or a wife who
serves a loathsome meal, I see them as quite the same phenomena. External
perceptions related to internal conflict, related to emotions, related to
actions. Here again, this has that apparent PCT loathsome linear
cause-effect illusion included. In the closed loop, our actions on the
environment certainly can create unwanted problems for ourselves.

<But, even in your case of the funnel cloud, it seems to me that the emotion
of
fear _is_ internally generated rather than created by an external source.>

Yes, I think we agree that emotions are always internal, sensed phenomena and
not behavior; certainly not outputs of a control loop. And, you seem to
acknowledge that at least some emotions may come about without conflicting
goals? Is that correct?

I can conceive that the perceptions leading to internal conflict can come
from the external environment or our internal imagination. Is this
reasonable?

<There may well be some fundamental defect in control theory, but I don't see
as
yet any evidence for thinking that there is. And, it seems obvious to me that
many of the problems experienced in applying control theory to social problems
have the source in people attempting to use control theory to achive some
extraneous goal.>

My perception is not that PCT has some fundamental defect; as in being
inaccurate. It seems to me that it is still a rather incomplete theory of
human behavior and certainly an incomplete theory of human nature. I think
even Bill Power's humbly admits there are many unexplored and undocumented
aspects of human behavior not yet explained or modeled by PCT and especially
HPCT.

Because it remains incomplete, I think PCT is not picked up by those who
think they can explain human behavior with their own pet theory, like Adele
using here Emotional Intelligence theory. People *buy* her theory in part
because it more explicitly, and apparently more plausibly, addresses such
aspects of the human condition as emotions and how they relate to human
behavior.

I find this sad. Oops, there goes one of those unwanted emotions. Now what?
Do I have two conflicting goals?

[From Bill Williams UMKC 25 September 2002 8:00 AM CST]

[From Kenny Kitzke (2002.10.24)]

..... I think we agree that emotions are always internal, sensed phenomena and
not behavior; certainly not outputs of a control loop. And, you seem to
acknowledge that at least some emotions may come about without conflicting
goals? Is that correct?

I think so. If you accidentally hit your thumb with a hammer, the result may be
mainly simple unconflicted pain. So, Yes. However, it seems to me that many
such "accidents" may be due to a person being distracted by on-going turmoil
associated with internal conflicts. I seems to me that most problems in
economics have their source in either internal conflicts such as the desired
level of consumption exceeding the budget, or a desired level of consumption
being defined as being greater than my neighbor's consumption-- what ever that
happens to be. So, while I would acknowledge that _in principle_ there are
errors pure and simple ( errors which do not involve conflict ) most of the
errors that are cronic in some way involve conflicts.

To claim that _all_ our emotion pain has it source in interal conflict would be
to deny that there is any need for medicine, engineers, plumbers and what not.
I'm not making such a claim, only that much or most of our difficulties are
internally generated. Some are internal to the person, and some are internal to
the society. You may not have much in the way of internal conflict personally,
but if you lived in Norther Ireland during the "troubles" it would have been
difficult to avoid becoming involved in a conflict.

I can conceive that the perceptions leading to internal conflict can come
from the external environment or our internal imagination. Is this
reasonable?

Maybe this depends upon what causal role you assign to "perceptions leading."
The context in which we are located limits the perceptions which are possible.
But within this context we select the perceptions which we pay attention to. I
suppose there are some contexts which could in a sense "generate conflicts
between inherent reference levels" if this is the case then the solution would
be to change the situation.

In regard to imagination, the we may also select which imaginative perceptions
we are going to pay attention to. But, usually I would think that what ever the
source of the internal conflict, there is likely to be a possiblity of
disposing of it by going up a level, or by what other non-PCT people talk about
in terms of values clarification, or re-evaluation in which inconsistent goals
are identified and sorted out.

So, we're in aggrement?

Best

Bill Williams

···

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[From Bill Powers (2002.10.25.1005 MDT)]

Bill Williams UMKC 25 September 2002 8:00 AM CST --

> [From Kenny Kitzke (2002.10.24)]
>
> ..... I think we agree that emotions are always internal, sensed
phenomena and
> not behavior; certainly not outputs of a control loop. And, you seem to
> acknowledge that at least some emotions may come about without conflicting
> goals? Is that correct?

I think so. If you accidentally hit your thumb with a hammer, the result
may be
mainly simple unconflicted pain. So, Yes. However, it seems to me that many
such "accidents" may be due to a person being distracted by on-going turmoil
associated with internal conflicts. I seems to me that most problems in
economics have their source in either internal conflicts such as the desired
level of consumption exceeding the budget, or a desired level of consumption
being defined as being greater than my neighbor's consumption-- what ever that
happens to be. So, while I would acknowledge that _in principle_ there are
errors pure and simple ( errors which do not involve conflict ) most of the
errors that are cronic in some way involve conflicts.

I think this is the right track. My effort in defining emotions the way I
do was to demystify the subject -- if the feeling part of emotions is
simply a bodily state set up as part of an error-correcting process, then
we don't need to worry about mysterious modes of perceiving and acting that
don't seem to involve ordinary perceptions. With that picture in mind, I'm
not even sure that we should call the pain that comes from hitting one's
thumb with a hammer an emotion. Why not just say it's a pain signal? Of
course for some people, the pain is quickly followed by a desire to strike
back to remove the cause of the pain, which of course is impossible if you
did it to yourself and if it's already done. So an inner conflict results
and might well involve emotion in terms of my definitions. But just
stubbing your toe or hitting your thumb or dropping a vase doesn't _have_
to result in emotion. A strong feeling without a goal isn't an emotion. At
most it's a disturbance.

To claim that _all_ our emotion pain has it source in interal conflict
would be
to deny that there is any need for medicine, engineers, plumbers and what not.
I'm not making such a claim,

Right, and neither am I.

Best,

Bill P.
'

From:
Kenneth Kitzke Value
Creation Systems

To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu

Sent: Monday, October 21, 2002 9:12
AM

Subject: Re: Emotions

Emotion seems to be 100% internally experienced. Let’s consider
the emotion of fear. I experience unwanted fear when I see a tornado
approaching. If I understand your comment, you would see the source of
this fear coming from an internal conflict and not from the funnel cloud
itself, at least not directly.

I can understand that it is the
perception of the tornado, not the funnel cloud itself, that is relevant to us
internally and in the PCT model we would describe it as a perceptual signal,
p.

I can also understand that we could have a reference signal,
r, for not perceiving a tornado approaching us. And, an error signal, e,
would be generated upon comparison. I could understand that a name for
this error signal could be “fear.”

Now, if so, is this error what you
portrayed as an internal conflict? If not, could you expand on just what
the internal conflict you had in mind might be? It is not my
understanding that error signals are called conflicts in PCT.

<So,
potentially at least we can remove this source of emotional turmoil, by
internal reorganization.>

Now, I think I could act to reduce or even eliminate this error signal.
I could go down in my basement so I can no longer see/perceive the
funnel cloud. Would my fear also be simultaneously reduced or
eliminated? It would not seem so. Would the internal conflict you
propose be changed or reduced by my going in the basement?

David Wolsk 25 October, 2002 16:35 PST

Ken, a few years ago, on this listserv, I explained my own view:
whenever we feel the need to make a decision that involves doing something,
but feel there is insufficient information on which to act, the brain
automatically generates fear or anxiety.

I think your tornado example fits well with
this.

···

----- Original Message -----

[From Bill Williams UMKC 25 September 2002 8:45 PM CST]

  David Wolsk 25 October, 2002 16:35 PST

  Ken, a few years ago, on this listserv, I explained my own view: whenever

we feel the need to make a decision that involves doing something, but feel
there is insufficient information on which to act, the brain automatically
generates fear or anxiety.

  I think your tornado example fits well with this.

There might be, as you say, an inherent disposition to experience fear when it
is perceived that there is insufficient information upon which to act, And/Or
realizing that this is the case might geneate an intense error (fear) because
of a acquired reference level for knowing what to do in any given situation.

Bill Williams

···

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[From Rick Marken (2002.10.25.2030)]

Bill Williams (UMKC 25 September 2002 8:45 PM CST) to David Wolsk (25
October, 2002 16:35 PST)

There might be, as you say, an inherent disposition to experience fear when it
is perceived that there is insufficient information upon which to act, And/Or
realizing that this is the case might geneate an intense error (fear) because
of a acquired reference level for knowing what to do in any given situation.

I think we should wait on introducing explanatory concepts like "insufficient
information on which to act" until we find that the PCT explanation of emotion
fails to account for what is observed.

The PCT explanation of emotion is very simple: emotion is the perceived
physiological consequences of chronic error and these perceived consequences are
classified as a particular type of emotion based on the type of perceptual goal
that is not being achieved.

Error of any significance results from failure to control. Failure to control can
result from conflict (intra and interpersonal), lack of skill or insuperable
disturbance to a controlled variable. The reason for the lack of control,
however, doesn't really matter to the PCT theory of emotion; we perceive
particular emotions (according to PCT) when we fail to control variables we want
to control. So the reason for the emotion felt when we see a tornado is the same
as the reason for the emotion we feel when someone insults us -- lack of control.
In the case of the tornado, the lack of control is the result of an insuperable
disturbance to the perception of safety (or whatever); in the case of the insult
the lack of control results from internal conflict with systems that prevent you
from, say, hitting the source of insult. In both cases a control system acts
(because of error) but cannot act effectively to bring a perception to its
reference state. Hence the error remains, physiological results of the error
(the ineffective action) are produced and perceived, and these perceptions are
interpreted in terms of the goals that they failed to achieve. So the perceived
physiological consequences of error are interpreted as "fear" in the case of the
tornado and "anger" in the case of the insult.

I think what would be most interesting would be to try to think of cases of
emotional experience where the PCT explanation of emotion doesn't seem to fit.
Or, even better, let's try to think of ways to _test_ the PCT theory of emotion
experimentally.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[From Bill Powers (2002.10.26.0838 MDT)]

Bill Williams UMKC 25 September 2002 8:45 PM CST --

> And/Or realizing that this is the case might geneate an intense error
(fear) >because of a acquired reference level for knowing what to do in any
given >situation.

This sounds (inadvertently) as though it's the intensity that makes the
emotion into "fear." I think that the feeling-state has far less to do with
what we call an emotion than the cognitive part of the experience -- the
goal and what we are trying to do to reach it. We can be intensely afraid,
yes, but the same physiological sensations can also be interpreted as being
intensely angry, if the goal is to do something to the environment rather
than escape from the environment, or as being intensely depressed if
conflicting goals so completely nullify each other that all action is
perceived as futile before it's even attempted.

I was put onto this idea long ago, by the way, by reading about the
"general adaptation syndrome," also called the "fight or flight"
syndrome, a discovery by someone whose name I can't remember. The actual
physiological state of organisms, human I suppose, was measured during
episodes of various emotions, and was found to be exactly the same whether
the person claimed to be feeling fear or anger, wanting to flee or wanting
to attack. There's a long list of symptoms, all of which can be experienced
as feelings, such as increased adrenaline in the bloodstream,
vasoconstriction of capillaries, elevated heart rate and respiration rate,
increased blood pressure, and probably more that I can't recall.

Actors are taught that to simulate grief, if they can't produce the genuine
emotion they should think of something funny and laugh. The facial
expressions, breathing, and sounds are very similar to those involved in
sobbing-out-loud grief, requiring only minor adjustments to turn the
appearance of hilarity into the appearance of anguish. This has nothing to
do with the recent stuff about "real" versus "simulated" emotions -- good
actors can actually experience vast amusement (including physiological
changes) rather than just moving their facial muscles, so the muscle
movements become quite spontaneous (autonomic). I think I learned this in a
course called "Plays and Play Production" in high school,

Which reminds me of something else: the outward displays that often
accompany feelings of emotion can also be means of communication: --
threating expressions and movements, piteous weeping and crying out, sullen
rejection of comfort, and so forth. There could be evolutionary reasons for
such outward displays, which would not appear to do anything in themselves
toward helping a person achieve a frustrated goal. If a display of fear
often elicits help, or a display of anger often frightens off an attacker,
such things could become part of a built-in (or learned) repertoire of
actions used to achieve internal ends. And it goes without saying that such
displays are not necessarily accompanied by the actual changes of inner
state that go with "real"
  emotions -- a tiger snarling fiercely at an annoying cub probably is not
actually, physiologically, preparing to devour the cub, however the facial
configuration and teeth look. Many children learn practically from the
cradle how to put on convincing displays of despair or outrage, which turn
off instantly when they get what they want. "Crocodile tears" is a phrase
that acknowledges just how much control of mind over matter there really is
in some emotional displays.

Best,

Bill P.

David Wolsk 25 October, 2002 16:35 PST

Ken, a few years ago, on this listserv, I explained my own view: whenever we feel the need to make a decision that involves doing something, but feel there is insufficient information on which to act, the brain automatically generates fear or anxiety.

I think your tornado example fits well with this.

[From Kenny Kitzke (2002.10.260]

I am sorry that I don’t recall much about your previous posts and I am too lazy to look them up. :sunglasses:

Based upon what you wrote, I think we might be pretty close. Would you see the need to make a decision as being equivalent as the need to act to control your perceptions and reduce a perceived error?

Would you also broaden the base of why an emotion appears to be the action of the brain to when you “know” that there is nothing you can do to reduce the error? For example, you can’t do anything to stop the tornado from attacking your house. Or, you can’t do anything about the company closing your plant. Here it is the uncertainty of the future consequences of the perceived (feared) event that seems to well up fear. Perhaps it is just semantics as this is also a lack of sufficient information, I suppose.

Thanks for your comment and if you can dredge up other posts or positions of yours on emotions, please send them to me privately.

from David Wolsk (2002.10.27.13.30 WST)

···

----- Original Message -----
From: "Bill Powers" <powers_w@FRONTIER.NET>
To: <CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Friday, October 25, 2002 8:15 AM
Subject: Re: Emotions

I think this is the right track. My effort in defining emotions the way I
do was to demystify the subject -- if the feeling part of emotions is
simply a bodily state set up as part of an error-correcting process, then
we don't need to worry about mysterious modes of perceiving and acting

that

don't seem to involve ordinary perceptions.

My question about this relates to the added involvement of the autonomic
nervous system and its production of adrenalin and cortisol that seems to
sharacterise situation with emotional overlays. These are slow processes.
I have a vague memory of research by an old Univ Michigan psych dept
colleague whose fame rested on finding out that we identify an emotion
before the related brain circuits are activated.

[From Bill Williams 27 September 2002 8:00 PM CST]

[From Rick Marken (2002.10.25.2030)]

Bill Williams (UMKC 25 September 2002 8:45 PM CST) to David Wolsk (25
October, 2002 16:35 PST)

> There might be, as you say, an inherent disposition to experience fear when

it

> is perceived that there is insufficient information upon which to act,

And/Or

> realizing that this is the case might geneate an intense error (fear)

because

> of a acquired reference level for knowing what to do in any given situation.

I think we should wait on introducing explanatory concepts like "insufficient
information on which to act" until we find that the PCT explanation of emotion
fails to account for what is observed.

Rick, there is no "we" involved in this discussion. Neither is there any agreed
upon "simple" version of "PCT" to which an appeal can be made. Nearly everyone
involved either introduces or excludes some conception which someone else
either insists upon or strenously objects to. At this point some people seem to
have an interest in the scope of the phenomena which might be of interest. My
initial
suggestion was that "conflict" was a principle source of emotion. David Wolsk
25 October] suggested that "insufficient information" could also be a source of
fear (or error). I hadn't been thinking of this, but now that it has been
suggested it does seem, to me, to be an important source of error/emotion. And,
I seems to me to be an important source of error. One reason it is important is
that people often resort to immaginary constructs and immaginary certainties to
reduce this type of error. There is an extensive literature that makes some
sense of this-- for example Karen Armstrong's _History of God_ is a recent
example. JOhn Dewey's _The Quest for Certainty_ is a classic work. Eric
Hoffer's _THe True Believer_ is another. But, the issue can also be approached
experimentally. People have a tendency to find patterns in random data.
Variations in the strength of this "tendency" can be and have been explored by
varying the context in which people are placed. THere has also been a recent
study in which the tendency for people to find patterns in random data was
studied while manipulating hormone levels. Hormone levels were reported to have
a significant effect upon this tendency. ( I've forgotten the details, but I
thought that such a relationship is (if true) interesting and significant. If
someone has an interest in replicating such work involving "insufficient
information" or ambiguity, I can't see why they shouldn't entirely feel free to
do so. Research programs ought to faciltate rather than constrain inquiry.

best

Bill Williams

···

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[From Rick Marken (2002.10.28.0900)]

Bill Williams (27 September 2002 8:00 PM CST)--

> [From Rick Marken (2002.10.25.2030)]

> I think we should wait on introducing explanatory concepts like "insufficient
> information on which to act" until we find that the PCT explanation of emotion
> fails to account for what is observed.

Rick, there is no "we" involved in this discussion.

By "we" I meant those of us who are interested in developing an understanding of
human nature from a PCT perspective and are participating in these discussions on
CSGNet for that reason.

Neither is there any agreed
upon "simple" version of "PCT" to which an appeal can be made.

When I talk about PCT and "PCT explanations" I am referring to the model described
by Bill Powers in several books and papers and implemented as a working model in
several demonstrations. A model of emotion is part of PCT and is described in the
chapter on "Emotion" that never made it into B:CP but that is now published in LCS
II.

Nearly everyone
involved either introduces or excludes some conception which someone else
either insists upon or strenously objects to.

Yes. And that's why I said what you quote above: I think we should wait on
introducing explanatory concepts until we have found an exception that cannot be
handled by the PCT model of emotion.

At this point some people seem to
have an interest in the scope of the phenomena which might be of interest.

That's basically what I am interested in, too: the scope of emotional phenomena
that can be explained by the PCT model of emotion.

My initial
suggestion was that "conflict" was a principle source of emotion.

Yes. That was an excellent suggestion. And the PCT model can certainly explain why
this would be the case: conflict eliminates control, resulting in error generated
physiological reactions that are the basis of emotional experience, that experience
being categorized as "anger", "fear" etc in terms of the goal that is not being
achieved.

David Wolsk
25 October] suggested that "insufficient information" could also be a source of
fear (or error). I hadn't been thinking of this, but now that it has been

suggested it does seem, to me, to be an important source of error/emotion.

This is what seemed like a new theoretical proposal to me. It sounds like what is
being suggested is that emotion results when there is insufficient information
regarding what to do in a situation. I agree that failures to control can be
_conceived of_ in this way; but this is not how control is conceived of in PCT. How
well one controls is not a function of the sufficiency of the information one
receives in a particular situation. How well one controls in any particular
situation is a function of having developed a control organization (hierarchy of
input and output functions) that can keep the perceptions to be controlled under
control.

And,
I seems to me to be an important source of error. One reason it is important is
that people often resort to immaginary constructs and immaginary certainties to
reduce this type of error.

I agree that when people have not developed the ability to control certain
perceptions they do resort to "controlling" these perceptions in imagination.

If someone has an interest in replicating such work involving "insufficient
information" or ambiguity, I can't see why they shouldn't entirely feel free to
do so. Research programs ought to faciltate rather than constrain inquiry.

I completely agree. But I do think that research should always be based on models.
So it would help if those who want to replicate work on "insufficient information"
would develop a model to show what "insufficient information" is and how it
contributes to emotion. That model would be quite different from the PCT model of
emotion, which says that "insufficient information" has nothing to do with it.

But even without a model, I can think of a case that seems to eliminate
"insufficient information" (as I understand that term) as a contributor to
emotion. When my son was about 7 he was at the Y with a friend of mine and his
son. There is a large glass window next to the pool, facing south. My son and my
friend both saw a very rare event: tornado touched down right outside the window of
the Y in downtown Minneapolis. My friend knew exactly what to do in case of
tornado: go to the north east corner of the basement. My son didn't know what to
do. But both my son and my friend reported being equally terrified by the sight of
the tornado. So my friend experienced fear with "sufficient information" about what
to do in case of tornado and my son experienced fear with "insufficient
information" about what to do.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bill Powers (2002.10.28.0819 MDT)]

David Wolsk (2002.10.27.13.30 WST) --

>My question about this relates to the added involvement of the autonomic

nervous system and its production of adrenalin and cortisol that seems to
sharacterise situation with emotional overlays. These are slow processes.

Well, not all _that_ slow.How long does it take for you to feel a jolt of
energy when something unexpected happens, like a car whizzing past you one
foot from your elbow? One second? Less? How about when the bottom drops out
from under you on a roller-coaster?

I have a vague memory of research by an old Univ Michigan psych dept
colleague whose fame rested on finding out that we identify an emotion
before the related brain circuits are activated.

The catch there is to identify the "revelevant brain circuits." Are we
talking here about conscious cognitive evaluation of an experience, which
could be quite slow, or low-level reaction to a disturbance, which can take
place before the cognitive (program-level and above) systems wake up to the
fact that something has happened? The theory that says the feeling part of
emotion arises from error signals would apply to any level of organization
in the hierarchy, though my guess is that the third level, in the midbrain
as I count, may be the lowest one that acts through the hypothalamus and
neurohypophysis to reset reference levels for organ systems.

Consciousness is usually engaged with higher-level systems, program level
and up, so it could easily take longer for a disturbance to produce effects
in consciousness than it does for lower-order control systems to begin
acting to correct errors. In fact, lower systems commonly correct errors so
quickly and accurately that higher systems never experience any
disturbance. The first that a higher-level system involved in consciousness
might know about a disturbance is the flood of adrenaline and the other
effects that arise when the body prepares for strenuous efforts. So it
might well seem to the conscious person that the emotion arose _before_ any
conscious call to action. But it could still work just the way I think it
does. If you widen the scope of consciousness so you also pay attention to
lower-level perceptions, I think you may come to agree with me.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2002.10.28.1340)]

[From Bill Powers (2002.10.28.1304 MST)]

Rick Marken (2002.10.28.0900), David Wolsk (2002.10.27) --

I suggest that "insufficient information" can cause error signals if:

1. There is a perception of how much information is being received.

2. The perceived amount of information being received is less than the
amount desired to be received.

Whether this will lead to emotion depends on how large the error is, how
long it persists, the kind of action one uses to correct the error, and the
presence of circumstances that prevent this action from being taken.

The same analysis can be applied to anything one proposes as a source of
emotion, such as "insufficient money" or "insufficient confidence."

Excellent point!

Of course, if this is what is meant by "insufficient information" then
"insufficient information" is already part of the PCT model of emotion.
"Insufficient information" is just a perception (of information) that doesn't
match the reference for that perception (it is "insufficient"). But from the PCT
"theory of emotion" point of view it's the _insufficiency_ that matters, not the
fact that it is "information" that is insufficient. As you note, an insufficiency
of any perception that is under control (money, confidence, etc.) could be the
basis for an emotional experience.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bill Powers (2002.10.28.1304 MST)]

Rick Marken (2002.10.28.0900), David Wolsk (2002.10.27) --

I suggest that "insufficient information" can cause error signals if:

1. There is a perception of how much information is being received.

2. The perceived amount of information being received is less than the
amount desired to be received.

Whether this will lead to emotion depends on how large the error is, how
long it persists, the kind of action one uses to correct the error, and the
presence of circumstances that prevent this action from being taken.

The same analysis can be applied to anything one proposes as a source of
emotion, such as "insufficient money" or "insufficient confidence."

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2002.10.28.1520)]

Bill Williams (UMKC 28 October 2002 3:00 PM CST) --

People who participate on the CSGnet do so for mixed reasons. Not all of these
reasons have to do with "developing an understanding of human nature" from
whatever perspective. Any designation of any person or persons as a "we" is
therefore speculative.

Of course. My use of "we" is hopeful, not authoritative.

Dan Palmer made a suggestion concerning a source of error.

I think it was David Wolsk, not Dan Palmer.

AS far as I'm concerned, a "lack of information" seems rather
obviously to be a situation which potentially may result in errors. ANd,
control theory quite obviously tells me this should be the case.

Yes. As Bill noted in a previous post, if one is _controlling_ for a certain amount
of information then a lack of information will result in error. When you and David
talked about "lack of information" it sounded to me like you were talking about
lacking the information necessary to take the action needed to restore control. I
didn't think you were talking about controlling for a certain amount of
information. But if you were, then you are absolutely right: lack of information
(when you are controlling for information) will produce error.

Obviously if you cut the wire
leading from the environment to the comparator ( creating an insufficiency of
information ) then effective control is going to cease and the error is going
to be uncontrolled and probably vry large.

Yes. But this applied to all perceptions, not just the perception of information.
If the perception you are controlling for goes to zero and you can do nothing
about it (and you are not controlling for the perception being at zero) then you
are going to have a very intense emotional experience.

How well one controls in any particular
> situation is a function of having developed a control organization (hierarchy
of
> input and output functions) that can keep the perceptions to be controlled
under
> control.

I had all of the above and everything was fine untill the oil went everywhere.
So, if you have all of the above, the oil covering the windsheild shouldn't
have made any difference? If this is what PCT tell us, then it is nonsense.

Fortunately, this is not what PCT tells us. What PCT tells us is that the oil on
the windshield was a huge disturbance to perceptions you ordinarily were able to
control quite well (using the "controls" in the cockpit). You probably had to take
emergency action that was not guaranteed to fix the situation so while the
situation lasted you were experiencing error (a difference between what you were
perceiving and what you wanted to perceive).

> I agree that when people have not developed the ability to control certain
> perceptions they do resort to "controlling" these perceptions in imagination.

On second thought, I'm not sure what they are actually doing is "controlling."
And, neither do you as indicated by your use of "" quotation marks.

That's true. It's not really controlling because the perception is not a function
of variables in the environment and is, thus, not subject to disturbances. I'm not
sure that the term "control" with all its technical meaning, apples to imagination.

When Dan Palmer suggested that a "lack of information"
might be source of error he was suggesting a source of error that is entirely
consistent with a control theory model of behavior.

Again, I think it was David Wolsk and it's certainly possible that he was
suggesting a source of error that is entirely consistent with PCT. As Bill Powers
noted, lack of information is definitely a source of error in a control system that
is controlling for having information.

And, I can't see that my "response" to Dan Palmer isn't part of
the sort of discussion that is characteristic of the normal functioning of
inquiry.

Your response to David Wolsk was fine. I just thought you guys were introducing a
new theoretical concept to explain emotion (the idea that lack of information
results in lack of control and hence emotion). If I had known that you were saying
that "lack of information" causes error when people are controlling for having
information then I would not have thought you were introducing a new concept.

After thinking about it, it appears to me you are making a very basic mistake.
It should be obvious that a lack of information is likely to genrate large
errors. How could it be otherwise?

It could be otherwise if the system is not controlling for "information". In that
case, a lack of the perception of information would be a matter of indifference to
the system.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[from Bill Williams UMKC 28 October 2002 3:00 PM CST]

[From Rick Marken (2002.10.28.0900)]

> Bill Williams (27 September 2002 8:00 PM CST)--
>
> > [From Rick Marken (2002.10.25.2030)]
>
> > I think we should wait on introducing explanatory concepts like

"insufficient

> > information on which to act" until we find that the PCT explanation of

emotion

> > fails to account for what is observed.
>
> Rick, there is no "we" involved in this discussion.

By "we" I meant those of us who are interested in developing an understanding

of

human nature from a PCT perspective and are participating in these

discussions on

CSGNet for that reason.

People who participate on the CSGnet do so for mixed reasons. Not all of these
reasons have to do with "developing an understanding of human nature" from
whatever perspective. Any designation of any person or persons as a "we" is
therefore speculative. I can't know why you do what you do. If people only
participated on the CSGnet because of an unmixed motive to better understand
human behavior, it is unlikely that anthing like the problems which have been
experienced would have been generated.

Dan Palmer made a suggestion concerning a source of error. I found the
suggestion valuable because it suggested, or reminded me of what seems to me to
be a disfunctional way that people sometimes use to cope with errors. People
sometimes invent immaginary entities such as your "we" and this can be the
source of still further problems. A recognition of this difficulty, because it
has been the source of such extensive problems, seems to me to be a possiblity
that is worth keeping in mind. It is a worthwhile part of a larger attempt to
construct an understanding of human nature.

> Neither is there any agreed
> upon "simple" version of "PCT" to which an appeal can be made.

When I talk about PCT and "PCT explanations" I am referring to the model

described

by Bill Powers in several books and papers and implemented as a working model

in

several demonstrations. A model of emotion is part of PCT and is described in

the

chapter on "Emotion" that never made it into B:CP but that is now published

in LCS

II.

No one consistently adheres to what is contained in this documentation. You for
example insist that some ragged Arabs on the West Bank have the power to ruin
your life by gloating over the success of the attack upon the US. I've yet to
see you document where in this literature this assertion has a foundation.
There is the extensive example of the extensive economics thread devoted to
Powers Senior's "Leakages" which not based on a control theory model.
ANd, as I understand it the "Leakage" concept may not have been internally
consistent. But, whatever the ultimate status of "leakeages" You won't find
this stuff in B:CP or any of the documentation you mention. No body, however
said it shouldn't be discussed. Other people have other concerns which may or
may not be internally consistent let alone compatible with a control theory
model. Yet they have also been the subject of discussion, sometimes extensive
discussion. There is no basis now for you suddenly assuming the role of the
"thought police" for the CSGnet. You are free to criticize all you wish, but I
don't at this point feel any neccesity to conform to your opinions which appear
to me to be internally contradictory and misinformed.

> Nearly everyone
> involved either introduces or excludes some conception which someone else
> either insists upon or strenously objects to.

Yes. And that's why I said what you quote above: I think we should wait on
introducing explanatory concepts until we have found an exception that

cannot be

handled by the PCT model of emotion.

Actually, neither I nor Dan Palmer said anything about not conforming with
anything, PCT or otherwise. We were considering "a lack of information" as a
source of error. AS far as I'm concerned, a "lack of information" seems rather
obviously to be a situation which potentially may result in errors. ANd,
control theory quite obviously tells me this should be the case.

> At this point some people seem to
> have an interest in the scope of the phenomena which might be of interest.

That's basically what I am interested in, too: the scope of emotional

phenomena

that can be explained by the PCT model of emotion.

> My initial
> suggestion was that "conflict" was a principle source of emotion.

Yes. That was an excellent suggestion. And the PCT model can certainly

explain why

this would be the case: conflict eliminates control, resulting in error

generated

physiological reactions that are the basis of emotional experience, that

experience

being categorized as "anger", "fear" etc in terms of the goal that is not

being

achieved.

> David Wolsk
> 25 October] suggested that "insufficient information" could also be a

source of

> fear (or error). I hadn't been thinking of this, but now that it has been

> suggested it does seem, to me, to be an important source of error/emotion.

This is what seemed like a new theoretical proposal to me. It sounds like

what is

being suggested is that emotion results when there is insufficient information
regarding what to do in a situation. I agree that failures to control can be
_conceived of_ in this way; but this is not how control is conceived of in

PCT. How

well one controls is not a function of the sufficiency of the information one
receives in a particular situation.

ON the contrary, a lack of "information" is clearly a potential source of error.
I had an oil system failure once in a single engine airplane. As a result oil
covered the windsheild. I felt somewhat deprived of the information I (
according to you) didn't really need. I can't see that what you said in the
preceeding sentence makes any sense at all. Obviously if you cut the wire
leading from the environment to the comparator ( creating an insufficiency of
information ) then effective control is going to cease and the error is going
to be uncontrolled and probably vry large.

How well one controls in any particular

situation is a function of having developed a control organization (hierarchy

of

input and output functions) that can keep the perceptions to be controlled

under

control.

I had all of the above and everything was fine untill the oil went everywhere.
So, if you have all of the above, the oil covering the windsheild shouldn't
have made any difference? If this is what PCT tell us, then it is nonsense. I
don't believe a word of it. As far as I know, it doesn't say anything of the
kind. ANd, if it does it needs to be corrected right away.

> And,
> I seems to me to be an important source of error. One reason it is

important is

> that people often resort to immaginary constructs and immaginary

certainties to

> reduce this type of error.

I agree that when people have not developed the ability to control certain
perceptions they do resort to "controlling" these perceptions in imagination.

On second thought, I'm not sure what they are actually doing is "controlling."
And, neither do you as indicated by your use of "" quotation marks. Maybe we
need some other name for it besides "controlling" -- like "makebelieve." But,
this capacity on the part of human beings is a good thing to keep in mind,
whether we make models of the process or not. THe net after all isn't called
the "Modelling Net" and there's no "we" as far as I know that believes it
should be entirely a modeling net. Nor, is there as far as I know any consense
that Dan Palmer and I were engaging in an illigitmate use of the CSG bandwidth.

> If someone has an interest in replicating such work involving "insufficient
> information" or ambiguity, I can't see why they shouldn't entirely feel

free to

> do so. Research programs ought to faciltate rather than constrain inquiry.

I completely agree. But I do think that research should always be based on

models.

FIne. wire up a 741 and then cut the line from the environment and see what
happens. BAsed upon control theory there's no question what should happen. In
the case of a human being maybe something similiar also happens. Based upon my
experience a lack of information can generate big errors. If someone wants to
call this emotion-- fine.

You talk a lot on the net about stuff that has nothing to do with a
presentation of models. When Dan Palmer suggested that a "lack of information"
might be source of error he was suggesting a source of error that is entirely
consistent with a control theory model of behavior. The issue, if there is an
issue, regards how this might apply to more complex, higher levels of
organization. Before attempting to do experiements, it is entirely reasonable
to discuss accidents and anything else that might bear upon the problem that
appears relevant. But, and of course, this is the typically sort of problem
that has been repeatedly considered on the CSGnet.

Sometimes these discussion have led to models, often they haven't. Take the
example of the discusison of conflict some months ago. It could have ended
without generating a model, often such discussions have ended without
generating a model. But this particular time it resulted in an updated model of
Buridan's Ass. I didn't when that discussion began have any idea that it would
eventuate in a running program.

There is a
sense in which all behavior, research included is based upon models because
that's the way human function. But, there are different kinds of inquiry and if
all that's going to be discussed on the CSGnet is model based research, there
isn't going to be much said. And, even "Research programs" are also based upon
discussion. And, I can't see that my "response" to Dan Palmer isn't part of
the sort of discussion that is characteristic of the normal functioning of
inquiry. It may result in the creation of a model, it may not. I may result in
a realization that what initially seemed to be a novel phenomen is actually
only a superficially novel example of a phenomen which is already quit well
understood. But, such issues usually are resolved only after the fact-- that
is following discussion.

So it would help if those who want to replicate work on "insufficient

information"

would develop a model to show what "insufficient information" is and how it
contributes to emotion.

Obviously if you cut the input to the comparator, the error terms is going to
become very large. Like me when the oil covered my windshield.

That model would be quite different from the PCT
model of

emotion, which says that "insufficient information" has nothing to do with it.

It says nothing of the kind. What your are saying is that the input wire to the
comparator "has nothing to do with it (control)" which is obviously not the
case. You may not regard it as "experimental evidence" but when the oil covered
my windsheild ( PCT or not ) there was a resulting or at least accompanying
error/emotion involved. The problem was resolved-- first by not reorganizing (
Panic ? ) and generating an output, and then -- well its a long story.

But even without a model, I can think of a case that seems to eliminate
"insufficient information" (as I understand that term) as a contributor to
emotion. When my son was about 7 he was at the Y with a friend of mine and

his

son. There is a large glass window next to the pool, facing south. My son and

my

friend both saw a very rare event: tornado touched down right outside the

window of

the Y in downtown Minneapolis. My friend knew exactly what to do in case of
tornado: go to the north east corner of the basement. My son didn't know what

to

do. But both my son and my friend reported being equally terrified by the

sight of

the tornado. So my friend experienced fear with "sufficient information"

about what

to do in case of tornado and my son experienced fear with "insufficient
information" about what to do.

You say your son and his friend were "equally terrified." What were the units
you used to measure this equality? You are resorting to a verbal assertion in
support of your argument, but there isn't really any evidence for what you say.
There's no way of determining whether your son and his friend were "equally
terrified."

After thinking about it, it appears to me you are making a very basic mistake.
It should be obvious that a lack of information is likely to genrate large
errors. How could it be otherwise?

cordially yours

  Bill Williams

···

______________________________________________________________________
Do you want a free e-mail for life ? Get it at http://www.email.ro/

[From Billo Powers (2002.10.28.1704 MST)]

Bill Williams UMKC 28 October 2002 3:00 PM CST --

>There is no basis now for you suddenly assuming the role of the

"thought police" for the CSGnet. You are free to criticize all you wish,
but I
don't at this point feel any neccesity to conform to your opinions which
appear
to me to be internally contradictory and misinformed.

This aspect of the conversation is leading steadily downward. The next
stage is to object to the thought police police. Let's try to stick to the
point.

>We were considering "a lack of information" as a

source of error. AS far as I'm concerned, a "lack of information" seems rather
obviously to be a situation which potentially may result in errors. ANd,
control theory quite obviously tells me this should be the case.

Yes. If lack of information means simply the absence of _any_ particular
perception that is wanted (for which a nonzero reference level exists),
then obviously the result will be the maximum possible error signal unless
the reference level for that particular perception (information) is zero.

I think the term "lack of information" is being used in a somewhat fuzzy
way. Couldn't someone say more clearly what it's intended to mean? Perhaps
it wasn't originally meant to refer to a perception of information per se,
but to a defect that results in the control system's not knowing certain
facts that it needs for good control, whether or not it knows it lacks
those facts.

Best,

Bill P.

from David Wolsk (2002, 10.28.23.00, PST)

> > [From Rick Marken (2002.10.25.2030)]
>
> > I think we should wait on introducing explanatory concepts like

"insufficient

> > information on which to act" until we find that the PCT explanation of

emotion

> > fails to account for what is observed.

I'm very happy with the PCT explanation as just reiterated by Bill. But,
I'm stubbornly holding on to my additional concept of "insufficient
information on which to act." What comes to mind is the difference between
passively watching an athletic event and being one of the athletes involved.
Both obviously have emotions but the subsets are likely to differ
significently.

[From Rick Marken (2002.10.29.0747)]

Bill Powers (2002.10.29.0622 MST)

David Wolsk (2002, 10.28.23.00, PST) --

I'm very happy with the PCT explanation as just reiterated by Bill. But,
>I'm stubbornly holding on to my additional concept of "insufficient
>information on which to act."

Exactly how does not having sufficient information on which to act lead to
experiencing emotions?

Good question. I'd like to know too.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bill Powers (2002.10.29.0622 MST)]

David Wolsk (2002, 10.28.23.00, PST) --

I'm very happy with the PCT explanation as just reiterated by Bill. But,

I'm stubbornly holding on to my additional concept of "insufficient
information on which to act."

Exactly how does not having sufficient information on which to act lead to
experiencing emotions? I'm not doubting you, but I have insufficient
information from which to understand what you mean. Doesn't bother me, but
I'd sort of like to know.

Best,

Bill P.