[From Rick Marken (960126.1000)]
Hans Blom, 960125 --
This is, for me, the basis of the eternal misunderstanding in many
discussions: what _I_ control is determined by the outside world as
much as by me myself.
Bill Powers (960125.0600 MST) --
the question you raise so simply and clearly is important enough that
everyone in PCT ought to try to come up with an independent answer.
As you wish, though I can't think of how I could possibly add anything to
your wonderful comments. I particularly liked this point:
In fact, most of our goals, particularly at the higher levels, are of
such a nature that even in a disturbance-free world we would have to set
lower-level goals and ultimately act.
This is easy to see in my hierarchical spreadsheet model with all
disturbances set to 0.
My answer to Hans will relate to my original comment:
But the real significance of PCT is its emphasis on the fact that
organisms _control_ their experience rather than being controlled by
it.
Hans is uncomfortable with PCT because he feels that what he controls is
partially _determined_ by the outside world (or his experience of that
world). I think PCT actually supports this feeling (to some extent); what we
control (do) is partially determined by the outside world (disturbances). Of
course, PCT would say that what we do is _also_ determined by the setting of
our reference signals. But, given a particular reference setting for
a controlled perception, the means we use (the lower level goals) to keep
that perception under control _are_ determined by the outside world. This
fact is captured in the PCT equation for the relationship between disturbance
(d) and action (o):
o = r-1/g(d)
where g() is the feedback function (another property of the real world) and
r is the reference signal. When r is constant than o is determined by
properties of the outside world (d and g()). If o is viewed as the reference
input to a lower level system, then we can say that the outside world
determines what lower level perception is controlled in order to control a
higher order perception. This fits Hans' experience (and my own) that "what
_I_ control is determined by the outside world as much as by me myself"
What the outside world (or the experience thereof) does NOT do is _control_
what what we do. This was the point of my comment. Psychologists often speak
of "the environment controlling behavior" or "the controlling stimuli". The
psychologists who say this may be using poor word selection (using "control"
to mean what is actually meant by "determine" or "influence"). But I think
psychologists (like Skinner), in their efforts to remove purpose from the
organism, do place "control" (in the PCT sense of "producing prespecified
results on purpose") in the environment.
I think we (PCTers and quasi-PCTers) all agree that the environment (or our
experience thereof) does _not_ control our behavior. When the nature of
control is explained to psychologists, I think most of them would agree that
the environment does not control behavior. So then the question becomes "does
anything control anything else? Is there purpose in the universe?" This is
the question that I believe PCT answers with a resounding "yes" and that
conventional psychology answers with a resounding "huh?". PCT says that there
_is_ purpose in the universe and that it exists in the form of closed-loop,
negative feedback control systems -- mainly living organisms. Conventional
psychology says either that there is _no_ purpose in the universe or it says
nothing at all.
Me:
So Killeen's theory can not only be criticized for the inclusion of a
mechanism by which keypecks become differentially "incited" by incentive; it
can be rejected on this basis as well.
Bruce Abbott (960126.1210 EST) --
I think Killeen would disagree on theoretical grounds. If you begin to
offer "free" incentives, you "strengthen" the linkage between the incentives
and the behaviors that immediately preceded those incentives, so that the
incentives begin to "incite" these other activities rather than lever-
pressing. But keypecks continue to be followed on occasion by incentive
delivery as well, so they continue to be "incited," although to a lesser
degree because much of the incited activity is now being expended in
behaviors other than keypecking.
Sorry to burst your bubble.
Hardly. This explanation of why decreased behavior can be expected from
increased incentives was a crack up. It confirms my faith in the creativity
of S- R theorists, who seem to have an inexhaustable supply of delightfully
preposterous ad hoc causal explanations of purposeful behavior.
Having S-R theorists around is like having one's own portable bubble machine.
Wunnaful. Wunnaful.
Best
Champaign Rick