environmental correlate

[rsmarken]

Oops. I meant LCS III, not LCS II.Â

···

On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 12:05 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:

–

[Rick Marken 2018-06-14_12:05:07]

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-14_08:57:24 UTC]

 Â

EP: …When we see this we cannot say that humans can construct their perceptual environment in their own whatever ways they happen to do it, but
instead the perceptual environment must be constructed just in such a way that it can be effectively affected by action (behavior) so that these perceptions are controllable. Thus the form of constructivism I accept could be called “control constrained constructivismâ€?.

RM: That is an excellent way of describing the PCT view of perception: control constrained constructivism.  An example of control constrained construction of perceptual functions can be found in the “3-D Reorganization” section of LCS II (pp. 116- 126).  Here we see perceptual functions being constructed via reorganization under the constraint that these constructed functions all good control of the resulting perceptual signals. Control constrained constructivism in action.

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. MarkenÂ

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rupert]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.14 21.15)]

(

Yes, I agree with that.
Control of honesty is done in the perceiver not the environment, in
my view. Though the bases in the environment that contribute to the
formation of that perception may be manipulated.
I don’t see the need for that at all. We are talking about the
result of a perceptual function, which is dependent upon many
inputs. If there were an environmental correlate we wouldn’t need a
function. I think it is sufficient that the inputs to the function can be
manipulated for the perception to be controlled without the need for
an environmental correlate. Regards,
Rupert

···

Eetu
Pikkarainen 2018-06-14_08:57:24 UTC]

      RY:
        The bit in the middle is a billion

years of evolution.

        EP: Yes, evolution and day to day lifetime

reorganization. I think many (radical) constructivists
dismiss this mediation. It is there just to warrant that our
perceptions will correspond our environment with sufficient
precisions and suitable manner. The reason for this
dismissal is that they differentiate the human input
(perception, knowledge) and output (action) as independent
processes – they are pre-Powersian open loop theorists. In a
realistic epistemology we must see input and output as parts
of one and same control process. When we see this we cannot
say that humans can construct their perceptual environment
in their own whatever ways they happen to do it, but instead
the perceptual environment must be constructed just in such
a way that it can be effectively affected by action
(behavior) so that these perceptions are controllable. Thus
the form of constructivism I accept could be called “control
constrained constructivism”.

        EP: To explain the effective control we need

not only a theory of a control system. In the case of
“honesty” we need not only a theory of the hierarchical
control system which constructs the perception of “honesty”
from the lowest levels to at least principles. We also need
a theory of the environment where the
control of honesty is possible.

        There must be something in the environment

which make it possible, functional and useful for humans to
perceive and differentiate honesty and dishonesty. These are
perceptions where we can make errors and those errors can be
harmful for the perceiver.

      RY:             The properties of the environment are entirely

raw physical variables.

        EP: I agree if you mean that our environment is

a physical reality. Here we should beware of the
“physics-alism” (by G. Stawson) according to which the
results and variables of physics is the right and only
description of physical reality. They are just perceptions
like all other perceptions. All what we can show and name as
properties of environment are perceptions, not only honesty
and democracy but also speed, forces, distances etc.

        EP: So I did not claim that “honesty” situates

in the physical environment but I claimed that there must
exist some kind of environmental correlate of it.

      RY:
        Perceptions are not properties of

the environment, but are functions of environment
properties.
Perception is not about extracting properties
from the environment, but about creating new properties; that
would not exist without the perceptual functions. Perceptions
are only properties of perceptual systems.

        EP: Just so, perceptions are properties of the

perceiver. And it is no use to assume any strict isomorphism
between perceptions and their environmental correlates. But
if some perception is controllable by affecting the
environment then there must be some kind of correlation
between the perception (effect of environment in the
perceiver) and its object or cause in the environment (which
is affected by the perceiver/controller). That is why I
think that “environmental correlate” is a reasonable term.

[bleach]

Rupert, I am reading what Eetu wrote as a statement about what is
necessary to discuss or analyze how achievement of control of
honesty could be or is achieved and not that such a theory must
exist in order that such control can actually occur.

···

On 06/14/2018 02:15 PM, Rupert Young
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

rupert@perceptualrobots.com

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.14 21.15)]

( Eetu
Pikkarainen 2018-06-14_08:57:24 UTC]

RY: The bit in the middle is a billion years of
evolution.

          EP: Yes, evolution and day to day lifetime

reorganization. I think many (radical) constructivists
dismiss this mediation. It is there just to warrant that
our perceptions will correspond our environment with
sufficient precisions and suitable manner. The reason for
this dismissal is that they differentiate the human input
(perception, knowledge) and output (action) as independent
processes – they are pre-Powersian open loop theorists. In
a realistic epistemology we must see input and output as
parts of one and same control process. When we see this we
cannot say that humans can construct their perceptual
environment in their own whatever ways they happen to do
it, but instead the perceptual environment must be
constructed just in such a way that it can be effectively
affected by action (behavior) so that these perceptions
are controllable. Thus the form of constructivism I accept
could be called “control constrained constructivism”.

  Yes, I agree with that.

          EP: To explain the effective control we need

not only a theory of a control system. In the case of
“honesty” we need not only a theory of the hierarchical
control system which constructs the perception of
“honesty” from the lowest levels to at least principles.
We also need a theory of the environment where the * control
of honesty* is possible.

  Control of honesty is done in the perceiver not the environment,

in my view. Though the bases in the environment that contribute to
the formation of that perception may be manipulated.

          There must be something in the environment

which make it possible, functional and useful for humans
to perceive and differentiate honesty and dishonesty.
These are perceptions where we can make errors and those
errors can be harmful for the perceiver.

        RY:               The properties of the environment are

entirely raw physical variables.

          EP: I agree if you mean that our environment

is a physical reality. Here we should beware of the
“physics-alism” (by G. Stawson) according to which the
results and variables of physics is the right and only
description of physical reality. They are just perceptions
like all other perceptions. All what we can show and name
as properties of environment are perceptions, not only
honesty and democracy but also speed, forces, distances
etc.

          EP: So I did not claim that “honesty”

situates in the physical environment but I claimed that
there must exist some kind of environmental correlate of
it.

  I don't see the need for that at all. We are talking about the

result of a perceptual function, which is dependent upon many
inputs. If there were an environmental correlate we wouldn’t need
a function.

RY: Perceptions are not properties of the
environment, but are functions of environment properties.
Perception is not about extracting properties
from the environment, but about creating new properties;
that would not exist without the perceptual functions.
Perceptions are only properties of perceptual systems.

          EP: Just so, perceptions are properties of

the perceiver. And it is no use to assume any strict
isomorphism between perceptions and their environmental
correlates. But if some perception is controllable by
affecting the environment then there must be some kind of
correlation between the perception (effect of environment
in the perceiver) and its object or cause in the
environment (which is affected by the
perceiver/controller). That is why I think that
“environmental correlate” is a reasonable term.

  I think it is sufficient that the inputs to the function can be

manipulated for the perception to be controlled without the need
for an environmental correlate.

  Regards,

  Rupert

[EetuP]

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-15_06:55:17 UTC]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.14 21.15)]

RY: Control of honesty is done in the perceiver not the environment, in my view. Though the bases in the environment that contribute to the formation of that perception may be manipulated.

EP: Say you educate your child and want that she will become an honest person. That is one case where you try to control “honesty” and which cannot take place independently of the environment. Of course the control of perceptual signal
takes place in the perceiver and of course it could happen (as it often seems to happen in parents) so that the input function reorganizes to perceive honesty in spite of what ever cheats or pilferages the other person does. But I would not call this a very
good or even normal control of perception.

EP: In epistemology there should always be a possibility (explanation or definition) of an error (Errare humanum est). Here “error” is in different meaning than in the control diagram. Here it means that we perceive wrongly and that
will be unveiled as an error usually by continuing or surprisingly big. (For example an old parent must finally admit that her child has become a criminal.)

EP: A simpler and not so dramatic imagined example: In your culture if you turn the tap to left you get warmer water. Then you travel to an other culture where this is in an other way round but you do not know it. You want warmer water
and turn tap to left and get colder. Here you soon find out that you committed an error.

EP: This kind of epistemological error is in practice a discrepancy between input and output functions. For working control there must a certain congruence between input and output functions. Now the question is why there must be that?
The simplest answer is that the environment which we perceive and affect is structured so that only certain kind of output effect will cause certain kind of input effect. This means that the environment does not consist of a collection of separate and independent
“raw variables” but of certain kind of structured wholes.

BL: Rupert, I am reading what Eetu wrote as a statement about what is necessary to discuss or analyze how achievement of control of honesty could be or is achieved and not that such a theory must exist in order
that such control can actually occur.

EP: Yes that is true. First there must be the control quite independently of any theories, be they theories of control systems or theories of the structure of the environment. But why we do have theories? I think that we are evolved
and reorganized to create theories because they can often help us control better.

Eetu

• Please, regard all my statements as questions,

no matter how they are formulated.

[rupert]

EP: In epistemology there should always
be a possibility (explanation or definition) of an error
(Errare humanum est). Here “error” is in different meaning
than in the control diagram. Here it means that we perceive
wrongly and that will be unveiled as an error usually by
continuing or surprisingly big. (For example an old parent
must finally admit that her child has become a criminal.)

[MartinT]

EP: In epistemology there should
always be a possibility (explanation or definition) of an
error (Errare humanum est). Here “error” is in different
meaning than in the control diagram. Here it means that we
perceive wrongly and that will be unveiled as an error
usually by continuing or surprisingly big. (For example an
old parent must finally admit that her child has become a
criminal.)

[PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO]

philip 6/17 23:00

Let's establish these answers on a secure footing, as Martin suggests.

Q: Are the properties of the objects you assign to the world also in
the world (e.g. conductivity that is high for round pieces of metal
but not for flat bits of plastic, spectral reflectance, roughness,
...?
the properties of living organisms.

Q: How do you know where and why to draw the line between what exists
in the real environment and what does not?
say the word "dog". The picture is a representation of the dog. But
the word "dog" is not a representation at all. Nor can the word "dog"
itself be represented. This is where we draw the line. And we draw the
line because the word "dog" is not a property of the dog.

We should now be able to ask about abstract quantities such as
honesty, etc. Can we represent honesty? Suppose we drew a picture of
honesty starting from the bottom. Moving up from the world of shapes
and colors, we must somehow represent honesty. You would need to
represent the following:
(1) A believes X
(2) B believes A believes !X
(3) A believes B believes A believes !X (error free condition)
Notice I have listed a set of relations. I was not, so to speak,
drawing a picture of my observation. These relations are like the word
"dog". They do not represent a dog. They are not properties of the
dog. But they are the word. As such, I have simply rewritten the word
"honesty" as a set of relations. And so I am forced to conclude that
honesty is not a property, because it is a word. And it is only a word
because it is not a representation. Thus, honesty exists only insomuch
as the word "honesty" exists. It doesn't matter if its spelled
conventionally or in terms of relations (1)-(3). Honesty will always
have a constant meaning because it does not represent anything. In
contrast, a physical variable such as conductivity may one day be
called something different and have a different meaning if our
theories change and we refer to metals with different properties. This
is because conductivity is a representation of a metal.

···

A: No. These properties are part of our theories. The same goes for
A: Suppose you look at a dog and (1) draw a picture of the dog, or (2)

On 6/17/18, Martin Taylor <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2018.06.18.00.30]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.17 20.45)]

(Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-15_06:55:17 UTC]

EP: In epistemology there should always be a possibility (explanation
or definition) of an error (Errare humanum est). Here “error�? is in
different meaning than in the control diagram. Here it means that we
perceive wrongly and that will be unveiled as an error usually by
continuing or surprisingly big. (For example an old parent must
finally admit that her child has become a criminal.)

...In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round bits
of metal, bits of paper with the Queen's face on it, flat bits of
plastic etc.

Rupert, on what basis do you assert that these things are in the real
world? Are you sure?

Do machines belong to the class of physical variables that are "in the
world"? If not, why not, if you assert that the others are? Are the
properties of the objects you assign to the world also in the world
(e.g. conductivity that is high for round pieces of metal but not for
flat bits of plastic, spectral reflectance, roughness, ...? Is the
ability of a machine to control something such as its distance from a
wall a property of the machine that exists in the real world?

Are living organisms in the environment? Are their properties, such as
their abilities to control some perceptions?

Once we establish these answers on a secure footing, we can ask about
abstract quantities, such as honesty, languages, beauty, and so forth.

All my questions come down to one: How do you know where and why to draw
the line between what exists in the real environment and what does not?

Martin

[EetuP]

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-18_08:21:14 UTC]

Philip,

philip 6/17 23:00

Q: Are the properties of the objects you assign to the world also in the world (e.g. conductivity that is high for round pieces of metal but not for flat bits of plastic, spectral reflectance, roughness, …?

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2018.06.18.10.23]

Philip, for you, is the word prior to the concept or can you have a concept without having a word for it? Could an elephant have a concept of a dog or a nice mud wallow? Or would the elephant have to learn English before it knew it would enjoy a mud bath on a hot dry day?

Martin

···

philip 6/17 23:00

Let's establish these answers on a secure footing, as Martin suggests.

Q: Are the properties of the objects you assign to the world also in
the world (e.g. conductivity that is high for round pieces of metal
but not for flat bits of plastic, spectral reflectance, roughness,
...?
A: No. These properties are part of our theories. The same goes for
the properties of living organisms.

Q: How do you know where and why to draw the line between what exists
in the real environment and what does not?
A: Suppose you look at a dog and (1) draw a picture of the dog, or (2)
say the word "dog". The picture is a representation of the dog. But
the word "dog" is not a representation at all. Nor can the word "dog"
itself be represented. This is where we draw the line. And we draw the
line because the word "dog" is not a property of the dog.

We should now be able to ask about abstract quantities such as
honesty, etc. Can we represent honesty? Suppose we drew a picture of
honesty starting from the bottom. Moving up from the world of shapes
and colors, we must somehow represent honesty. You would need to
represent the following:
(1) A believes X
(2) B believes A believes !X
(3) A believes B believes A believes !X (error free condition)
Notice I have listed a set of relations. I was not, so to speak,
drawing a picture of my observation. These relations are like the word
"dog". They do not represent a dog. They are not properties of the
dog. But they are the word. As such, I have simply rewritten the word
"honesty" as a set of relations. And so I am forced to conclude that
honesty is not a property, because it is a word. And it is only a word
because it is not a representation. Thus, honesty exists only insomuch
as the word "honesty" exists. It doesn't matter if its spelled
conventionally or in terms of relations (1)-(3). Honesty will always
have a constant meaning because it does not represent anything. In
contrast, a physical variable such as conductivity may one day be
called something different and have a different meaning if our
theories change and we refer to metals with different properties. This
is because conductivity is a representation of a metal.

On 6/17/18, Martin Taylor <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2018.06.18.00.30]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.17 20.45)]

(Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-15_06:55:17 UTC]

EP: In epistemology there should always be a possibility (explanation
or definition) of an error (Errare humanum est). Here “error�? is in
different meaning than in the control diagram. Here it means that we
perceive wrongly and that will be unveiled as an error usually by
continuing or surprisingly big. (For example an old parent must
finally admit that her child has become a criminal.)

...In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round bits
of metal, bits of paper with the Queen's face on it, flat bits of
plastic etc.

Rupert, on what basis do you assert that these things are in the real
world? Are you sure?

Do machines belong to the class of physical variables that are "in the
world"? If not, why not, if you assert that the others are? Are the
properties of the objects you assign to the world also in the world
(e.g. conductivity that is high for round pieces of metal but not for
flat bits of plastic, spectral reflectance, roughness, ...? Is the
ability of a machine to control something such as its distance from a
wall a property of the machine that exists in the real world?

Are living organisms in the environment? Are their properties, such as
their abilities to control some perceptions?

Once we establish these answers on a secure footing, we can ask about
abstract quantities, such as honesty, languages, beauty, and so forth.

All my questions come down to one: How do you know where and why to draw
the line between what exists in the real environment and what does not?

Martin

[rsmarken]

[Rick Marken 2018-06-18_09:34:46]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.17 20.45)]

RY:Â In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round bits of metal, bits of paper with the Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic etc.

RM: Those are perceptions. Actually, from a PCT perspective, those are the states of several different types of perceptual variables: intensities (eg. brightness), sensations (eg. colors), configurations (eg. shapes), etc. The physical variables that are the basis of those perceptions are an array of photons stimulating the rods and cones.
Â

RY: Where is the environmental correlate of "honesty"?

RM: Again, I prefer to think of it as an environmental basis rather then environmental correlate of a variable that we call "honesty". This basis consists of physical variables in the environment -- the light and acoustic waves that stimulate the sensors. "Honesty" refers to a high level perceptual that is constructed from lower level perceptions (body position, intonation pattern, etc) that are ultimately constructed from the sensory effects of physical variables in the environment.Â
RM: As Powers says at the beginning of the "Higher Levels" chapter of B:CP, PCT makes no special distinction between perceptions that we see as being exterior to ourselves -- that make up the world of "physical reality", such as "objects, round bits of metal, bits of paper with the Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic" -- and perceptions that seem to be inside ourselves -- that make up the would of "subjective reality", such as "honesty".Â
RM: As Powers said in that introduction to higher level perceptions "All levels are "inside"; of what lies outside our sensory endings we know next to nothing". But, as can be seen in any diagram of the hierarchical PCT model, perceptions at all levels -- from intensities to system concepts -- are ultimately a function of those variables that are "outside our sensory endings" -- environmental or physical variables -- that we know of only via the models of physics and chemistry.
BestÂ
Rick
Best
Rick

···

--
Richard S. MarkenÂ
"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�
                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO]

Q: Not sure where you drew the line, between a dog and a picture?
"dog". Alternatively, the line is drawn between "wording" something
and representing it. If something is to be represented, it must exist
in our theories. If something is to be worded, it entails something
else.

Q: If properties do not exist then of course honesty does not exist.
because it can be written as a set of relations.
(1) A believes X
(2) B believes A believes !X
(3) A believes B believes A believes !X (error free condition)
For example, I think that (the ball went left). You think that (I
think that the ball went right). I think that (you think that I think
the ball went right). If I tell you the ball went left, you think that
I am lying.
I don't think that honesty can, as Rick and PCT suggest, be
represented as lower level perceptions such as lights and sounds etc.
Describing these perceptions would simply amount to the set of
relations above. I suppose then that words not only stand for
properties such as conductance but also stand for relations such as
honesty. And this is where we drew the line above, between properties
and relations. I don't know how to word a dog as a set of relations,
because that would mean describing how dog DNA produces a dog.

Q: Is the word prior to the concept or can you have a concept without
having a word for it? Could an elephant have a concept of a dog or a
nice mud wallow?
that an animal should represent something or have a theory of it. I
suppose if one develops a theory, then it will find itself in need of
a word for the new properties. But the animal will never use words to
stand for relations.

In conclusion, I don't think it's possible to continuously traverse a
path from the PCT level "relation" to the lower levels. There seems to
be a dissociation between properties and words. The perception of a
word may decompose into its sounds etc. But these sounds do not do
proper justice to the higher levels. Somehow, the physics of our
speech does not reverberate inside the atom as would be necessary for
this continuity. But there are legends that implicate a direct
connection between speech and chemistry in exotic civilizations.

···

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN <pyeranos@ucla.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 10:56:39 -0700
Subject: Re: environmental correlate
To: rsmarken@gmail.com

philip 6/18 10:00

Q: If you perceive say a dog, do you perceive an object without
properties (sc. “bare object�?)?
A: A property of something belongs to its representation.

A: The line is drawn between a representation of a dog and the word
A: Honesty is not a property, because it is a word. It is a word
A: A concept is a representation, a theory. I find it inconceivable

On 6/18/18, Richard Marken <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-18_09:34:46]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.17 20.45)]
RY: In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round bits
of
metal, bits of paper with the Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic
etc.

RM: Those are perceptions. Actually, from a PCT perspective, those are the
states of several different types of perceptual variables: intensities (eg.
brightness), sensations (eg. colors), configurations (eg. shapes), etc. The
physical variables that are the basis of those perceptions are an array of
photons stimulating the rods and cones.

RY: Where is the environmental correlate of "honesty"?

RM: Again, I prefer to think of it as an environmental *basis* rather then
environmental *correlate* of a variable that we call "honesty". This basis
consists of physical variables in the environment -- the light and acoustic
waves that stimulate the sensors. "Honesty" refers to a high level
perceptual that is constructed from lower level perceptions (body position,
intonation pattern, etc) that are ultimately constructed from the sensory
effects of physical variables in the environment.

RM: As Powers says at the beginning of the "Higher Levels" chapter of
B:CP, PCT makes no special distinction between perceptions that we see as
being exterior to ourselves -- that make up the world of "physical
reality", such as "objects, round bits of metal, bits of paper with the
Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic" -- and perceptions that seem to
be inside ourselves -- that make up the would of "subjective reality",
such as "honesty".

RM: As Powers said in that introduction to higher level perceptions "All
levels are "inside"; of what lies outside our sensory endings we know next
to nothing". But, as can be seen in any diagram of the hierarchical PCT
model, perceptions at all levels -- from intensities to system concepts --
are ultimately a function of those variables that are "outside our sensory
endings" -- environmental or physical variables -- that we know of only via
the models of physics and chemistry.

Best

Rick

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.�?
                                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO]

philip 6/18 10:00

Q: If you perceive say a dog, do you perceive an object without
properties (sc. “bare object�?)?

Q: Not sure where you drew the line, between a dog and a picture?
"dog". Alternatively, the line is drawn between "wording" something
and representing it. If something is to be represented, it must exist
in our theories. If something is to be worded, it entails something
else.

Q: If properties do not exist then of course honesty does not exist.
because it can be written as a set of relations.
(1) A believes X
(2) B believes A believes !X
(3) A believes B believes A believes !X (error free condition)
For example, I think that (the ball went left). You think that (I
think that the ball went right). I think that (you think that I think
the ball went right). If I tell you the ball went left, you think that
I am lying.
I don't think that honesty can, as Rick and PCT suggest, be
represented as lower level perceptions such as lights and sounds etc.
Describing these perceptions would simply amount to the set of
relations above. I suppose then that words not only stand for
properties such as conductance but also stand for relations such as
honesty. And this is where we drew the line above, between properties
and relations. I don't know how to word a dog as a set of relations,
because that would mean describing how dog DNA produces a dog.

Q: Is the word prior to the concept or can you have a concept without
having a word for it? Could an elephant have a concept of a dog or a
nice mud wallow?
that an animal should represent something or have a theory of it. I
suppose if one develops a theory, then it will find itself in need of
a word for the new properties. But the animal will never use words to
stand for relations.

In conclusion, I don't think it's possible to continuously traverse a
path from the PCT level "relation" to the lower levels. There seems to
be a dissociation between properties and words. The perception of a
word may decompose into its sounds etc. But these sounds do not do
proper justice to the higher levels. Somehow, the physics of our
speech does not reverberate inside the atom as would be necessary for
this continuity. But there are legends that implicate a direct
connection between speech and chemistry in exotic civilizations.

···

A: A property of something belongs to its representation.
A: The line is drawn between a representation of a dog and the word
A: Honesty is not a property, because it is a word. It is a word
A: A concept is a representation, a theory. I find it inconceivable

On 6/18/18, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN <pyeranos@ucla.edu> wrote:

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN <pyeranos@ucla.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 10:56:39 -0700
Subject: Re: environmental correlate
To: rsmarken@gmail.com

philip 6/18 10:00

Q: If you perceive say a dog, do you perceive an object without
properties (sc. “bare object�?)?
A: A property of something belongs to its representation.

Q: Not sure where you drew the line, between a dog and a picture?
A: The line is drawn between a representation of a dog and the word
"dog". Alternatively, the line is drawn between "wording" something
and representing it. If something is to be represented, it must exist
in our theories. If something is to be worded, it entails something
else.

Q: If properties do not exist then of course honesty does not exist.
A: Honesty is not a property, because it is a word. It is a word
because it can be written as a set of relations.
(1) A believes X
(2) B believes A believes !X
(3) A believes B believes A believes !X (error free condition)
For example, I think that (the ball went left). You think that (I
think that the ball went right). I think that (you think that I think
the ball went right). If I tell you the ball went left, you think that
I am lying.
I don't think that honesty can, as Rick and PCT suggest, be
represented as lower level perceptions such as lights and sounds etc.
Describing these perceptions would simply amount to the set of
relations above. I suppose then that words not only stand for
properties such as conductance but also stand for relations such as
honesty. And this is where we drew the line above, between properties
and relations. I don't know how to word a dog as a set of relations,
because that would mean describing how dog DNA produces a dog.

Q: Is the word prior to the concept or can you have a concept without
having a word for it? Could an elephant have a concept of a dog or a
nice mud wallow?
A: A concept is a representation, a theory. I find it inconceivable
that an animal should represent something or have a theory of it. I
suppose if one develops a theory, then it will find itself in need of
a word for the new properties. But the animal will never use words to
stand for relations.

In conclusion, I don't think it's possible to continuously traverse a
path from the PCT level "relation" to the lower levels. There seems to
be a dissociation between properties and words. The perception of a
word may decompose into its sounds etc. But these sounds do not do
proper justice to the higher levels. Somehow, the physics of our
speech does not reverberate inside the atom as would be necessary for
this continuity. But there are legends that implicate a direct
connection between speech and chemistry in exotic civilizations.

On 6/18/18, Richard Marken <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-18_09:34:46]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.17 20.45)]
RY: In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round bits
of
metal, bits of paper with the Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic
etc.

RM: Those are perceptions. Actually, from a PCT perspective, those are
the
states of several different types of perceptual variables: intensities
(eg.
brightness), sensations (eg. colors), configurations (eg. shapes), etc.
The
physical variables that are the basis of those perceptions are an array
of
photons stimulating the rods and cones.

RY: Where is the environmental correlate of "honesty"?

RM: Again, I prefer to think of it as an environmental *basis* rather
then
environmental *correlate* of a variable that we call "honesty". This
basis
consists of physical variables in the environment -- the light and
acoustic
waves that stimulate the sensors. "Honesty" refers to a high level
perceptual that is constructed from lower level perceptions (body
position,
intonation pattern, etc) that are ultimately constructed from the sensory
effects of physical variables in the environment.

RM: As Powers says at the beginning of the "Higher Levels" chapter of
B:CP, PCT makes no special distinction between perceptions that we see
as
being exterior to ourselves -- that make up the world of "physical
reality", such as "objects, round bits of metal, bits of paper with the
Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic" -- and perceptions that seem to
be inside ourselves -- that make up the would of "subjective reality",
such as "honesty".

RM: As Powers said in that introduction to higher level perceptions "All
levels are "inside"; of what lies outside our sensory endings we know
next
to nothing". But, as can be seen in any diagram of the hierarchical PCT
model, perceptions at all levels -- from intensities to system concepts
--
are ultimately a function of those variables that are "outside our
sensory
endings" -- environmental or physical variables -- that we know of only
via
the models of physics and chemistry.

Best

Rick

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when
you
have nothing left to take away.�?
                                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO]

I accidentally sent that last message only to rick. Don't know if
it'll be available

···

On 6/18/18, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN <pyeranos@ucla.edu> wrote:

philip 6/18 10:00

Q: If you perceive say a dog, do you perceive an object without
properties (sc. “bare object�?)?
A: A property of something belongs to its representation.

Q: Not sure where you drew the line, between a dog and a picture?
A: The line is drawn between a representation of a dog and the word
"dog". Alternatively, the line is drawn between "wording" something
and representing it. If something is to be represented, it must exist
in our theories. If something is to be worded, it entails something
else.

Q: If properties do not exist then of course honesty does not exist.
A: Honesty is not a property, because it is a word. It is a word
because it can be written as a set of relations.
(1) A believes X
(2) B believes A believes !X
(3) A believes B believes A believes !X (error free condition)
For example, I think that (the ball went left). You think that (I
think that the ball went right). I think that (you think that I think
the ball went right). If I tell you the ball went left, you think that
I am lying.
I don't think that honesty can, as Rick and PCT suggest, be
represented as lower level perceptions such as lights and sounds etc.
Describing these perceptions would simply amount to the set of
relations above. I suppose then that words not only stand for
properties such as conductance but also stand for relations such as
honesty. And this is where we drew the line above, between properties
and relations. I don't know how to word a dog as a set of relations,
because that would mean describing how dog DNA produces a dog.

Q: Is the word prior to the concept or can you have a concept without
having a word for it? Could an elephant have a concept of a dog or a
nice mud wallow?
A: A concept is a representation, a theory. I find it inconceivable
that an animal should represent something or have a theory of it. I
suppose if one develops a theory, then it will find itself in need of
a word for the new properties. But the animal will never use words to
stand for relations.

In conclusion, I don't think it's possible to continuously traverse a
path from the PCT level "relation" to the lower levels. There seems to
be a dissociation between properties and words. The perception of a
word may decompose into its sounds etc. But these sounds do not do
proper justice to the higher levels. Somehow, the physics of our
speech does not reverberate inside the atom as would be necessary for
this continuity. But there are legends that implicate a direct
connection between speech and chemistry in exotic civilizations.

On 6/18/18, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN <pyeranos@ucla.edu> wrote:

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN <pyeranos@ucla.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 10:56:39 -0700
Subject: Re: environmental correlate
To: rsmarken@gmail.com

philip 6/18 10:00

Q: If you perceive say a dog, do you perceive an object without
properties (sc. “bare object�?)?
A: A property of something belongs to its representation.

Q: Not sure where you drew the line, between a dog and a picture?
A: The line is drawn between a representation of a dog and the word
"dog". Alternatively, the line is drawn between "wording" something
and representing it. If something is to be represented, it must exist
in our theories. If something is to be worded, it entails something
else.

Q: If properties do not exist then of course honesty does not exist.
A: Honesty is not a property, because it is a word. It is a word
because it can be written as a set of relations.
(1) A believes X
(2) B believes A believes !X
(3) A believes B believes A believes !X (error free condition)
For example, I think that (the ball went left). You think that (I
think that the ball went right). I think that (you think that I think
the ball went right). If I tell you the ball went left, you think that
I am lying.
I don't think that honesty can, as Rick and PCT suggest, be
represented as lower level perceptions such as lights and sounds etc.
Describing these perceptions would simply amount to the set of
relations above. I suppose then that words not only stand for
properties such as conductance but also stand for relations such as
honesty. And this is where we drew the line above, between properties
and relations. I don't know how to word a dog as a set of relations,
because that would mean describing how dog DNA produces a dog.

Q: Is the word prior to the concept or can you have a concept without
having a word for it? Could an elephant have a concept of a dog or a
nice mud wallow?
A: A concept is a representation, a theory. I find it inconceivable
that an animal should represent something or have a theory of it. I
suppose if one develops a theory, then it will find itself in need of
a word for the new properties. But the animal will never use words to
stand for relations.

In conclusion, I don't think it's possible to continuously traverse a
path from the PCT level "relation" to the lower levels. There seems to
be a dissociation between properties and words. The perception of a
word may decompose into its sounds etc. But these sounds do not do
proper justice to the higher levels. Somehow, the physics of our
speech does not reverberate inside the atom as would be necessary for
this continuity. But there are legends that implicate a direct
connection between speech and chemistry in exotic civilizations.

On 6/18/18, Richard Marken <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-18_09:34:46]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.17 20.45)]
RY: In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round bits
of
metal, bits of paper with the Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic
etc.

RM: Those are perceptions. Actually, from a PCT perspective, those are
the
states of several different types of perceptual variables: intensities
(eg.
brightness), sensations (eg. colors), configurations (eg. shapes), etc.
The
physical variables that are the basis of those perceptions are an array
of
photons stimulating the rods and cones.

RY: Where is the environmental correlate of "honesty"?

RM: Again, I prefer to think of it as an environmental *basis* rather
then
environmental *correlate* of a variable that we call "honesty". This
basis
consists of physical variables in the environment -- the light and
acoustic
waves that stimulate the sensors. "Honesty" refers to a high level
perceptual that is constructed from lower level perceptions (body
position,
intonation pattern, etc) that are ultimately constructed from the
sensory
effects of physical variables in the environment.

RM: As Powers says at the beginning of the "Higher Levels" chapter of
B:CP, PCT makes no special distinction between perceptions that we see
as
being exterior to ourselves -- that make up the world of "physical
reality", such as "objects, round bits of metal, bits of paper with the
Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic" -- and perceptions that seem
to
be inside ourselves -- that make up the would of "subjective reality",
such as "honesty".

RM: As Powers said in that introduction to higher level perceptions "All
levels are "inside"; of what lies outside our sensory endings we know
next
to nothing". But, as can be seen in any diagram of the hierarchical PCT
model, perceptions at all levels -- from intensities to system concepts
--
are ultimately a function of those variables that are "outside our
sensory
endings" -- environmental or physical variables -- that we know of only
via
the models of physics and chemistry.

Best

Rick

Best

Rick

--
Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when
you
have nothing left to take away.�?
                                --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO]

Q: If you perceive say
a dog, do you perceive an object without

properties (sc. “bare objectâ€?)?

···

On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 10:59 AM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:

I accidentally sent that last message only to rick. Don’t know if

it’ll be available

On 6/18/18, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:

philip 6/18 10:00

Q: If you perceive say a dog, do you perceive an object without

properties (sc. “bare objectâ€?)?

A: A property of something belongs to its representation.

Q: Not sure where you drew the line, between a dog and a picture?

A: The line is drawn between a representation of a dog and the word

“dog”. Alternatively, the line is drawn between “wording” something

and representing it. If something is to be represented, it must exist

in our theories. If something is to be worded, it entails something

else.

Q: If properties do not exist then of course honesty does not exist.

A: Honesty is not a property, because it is a word. It is a word

because it can be written as a set of relations.

(1) A believes X

(2) B believes A believes !X

(3) A believes B believes A believes !X (error free condition)

For example, I think that (the ball went left). You think that (I

think that the ball went right). I think that (you think that I think

the ball went right). If I tell you the ball went left, you think that

I am lying.

I don’t think that honesty can, as Rick and PCT suggest, be

represented as lower level perceptions such as lights and sounds etc.

Describing these perceptions would simply amount to the set of

relations above. I suppose then that words not only stand for

properties such as conductance but also stand for relations such as

honesty. And this is where we drew the line above, between properties

and relations. I don’t know how to word a dog as a set of relations,

because that would mean describing how dog DNA produces a dog.

Q: Is the word prior to the concept or can you have a concept without

having a word for it? Could an elephant have a concept of a dog or a

nice mud wallow?

A: A concept is a representation, a theory. I find it inconceivable

that an animal should represent something or have a theory of it. I

suppose if one develops a theory, then it will find itself in need of

a word for the new properties. But the animal will never use words to

stand for relations.

In conclusion, I don’t think it’s possible to continuously traverse a

path from the PCT level “relation” to the lower levels. There seems to

be a dissociation between properties and words. The perception of a

word may decompose into its sounds etc. But these sounds do not do

proper justice to the higher levels. Somehow, the physics of our

speech does not reverberate inside the atom as would be necessary for

this continuity. But there are legends that implicate a direct

connection between speech and chemistry in exotic civilizations.

On 6/18/18, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:

---------- Forwarded message ----------

From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu

Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 10:56:39 -0700

Subject: Re: environmental correlate

To: rsmarken@gmail.com

philip 6/18 10:00

Q: If you perceive say a dog, do you perceive an object without

properties (sc. “bare objectâ€?)?

A: A property of something belongs to its representation.

Q: Not sure where you drew the line, between a dog and a picture?

A: The line is drawn between a representation of a dog and the word

“dog”. Alternatively, the line is drawn between “wording” something

and representing it. If something is to be represented, it must exist

in our theories. If something is to be worded, it entails something

else.

Q: If properties do not exist then of course honesty does not exist.

A: Honesty is not a property, because it is a word. It is a word

because it can be written as a set of relations.

(1) A believes X

(2) B believes A believes !X

(3) A believes B believes A believes !X (error free condition)

For example, I think that (the ball went left). You think that (I

think that the ball went right). I think that (you think that I think

the ball went right). If I tell you the ball went left, you think that

I am lying.

I don’t think that honesty can, as Rick and PCT suggest, be

represented as lower level perceptions such as lights and sounds etc.

Describing these perceptions would simply amount to the set of

relations above. I suppose then that words not only stand for

properties such as conductance but also stand for relations such as

honesty. And this is where we drew the line above, between properties

and relations. I don’t know how to word a dog as a set of relations,

because that would mean describing how dog DNA produces a dog.

Q: Is the word prior to the concept or can you have a concept without

having a word for it? Could an elephant have a concept of a dog or a

nice mud wallow?

A: A concept is a representation, a theory. I find it inconceivable

that an animal should represent something or have a theory of it. I

suppose if one develops a theory, then it will find itself in need of

a word for the new properties. But the animal will never use words to

stand for relations.

In conclusion, I don’t think it’s possible to continuously traverse a

path from the PCT level “relation” to the lower levels. There seems to

be a dissociation between properties and words. The perception of a

word may decompose into its sounds etc. But these sounds do not do

proper justice to the higher levels. Somehow, the physics of our

speech does not reverberate inside the atom as would be necessary for

this continuity. But there are legends that implicate a direct

connection between speech and chemistry in exotic civilizations.

On 6/18/18, Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Rick Marken 2018-06-18_09:34:46]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.17 20.45)]

RY:Â In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round bits

of

metal, bits of paper with the Queen’s face on it, flat bits of plastic

etc.

RM: Those are perceptions. Actually, from a PCT perspective, those are

the

states of several different types of perceptual variables: intensities

(eg.

brightness), sensations (eg. colors), configurations (eg. shapes), etc.

The

physical variables that are the basis of those perceptions are an array

of

photons stimulating the rods and cones.

RY: Where is the environmental correlate of “honesty”?

RM: Again, I prefer to think of it as an environmental basis rather

then

environmental correlate of a variable that we call “honesty”. This

basis

consists of physical variables in the environment – the light and

acoustic

waves that stimulate the sensors. “Honesty” refers to a high level

perceptual that is constructed from lower level perceptions (body

position,

intonation pattern, etc) that are ultimately constructed from the

sensory

effects of physical variables in the environment.

RM: As Powers says at the beginning of the “Higher Levels” chapter of

B:CP, PCT makes no special distinction between perceptions that we see

as

being exterior to ourselves – that make up the world of "physical

reality", such as "objects, round bits of metal, bits of paper with the

Queen’s face on it, flat bits of plastic" – and perceptions that seem

to

be inside ourselves – that make up the would of “subjective reality”,

such as “honesty”.

RM: As Powers said in that introduction to higher level perceptions "All

levels are “inside”; of what lies outside our sensory endings we know

next

to nothing". But, as can be seen in any diagram of the hierarchical PCT

model, perceptions at all levels – from intensities to system concepts

–

are ultimately a function of those variables that are "outside our

sensory

endings" – environmental or physical variables – that we know of only

via

the models of physics and chemistry.

Best

Rick

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when

you

have nothing left to take away.�

                 --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

[rupert]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.19 15.10)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.06.18.00.30]

We have to assume we are not hallucinating or in the Matrix, as if
either were the case then all bets are off.
Yes, machines are in the world; the inputs to our perceptions from
the machines consist of raw physical variables.
Are they physical properties (rather than perceptions)? As we can’t
perceive conductivity I guess it is a physical property and not a
property inside the head.
Yes, though is “ability” a perceptual property (of the machine)?
Yes. Though I think you are using “property” in a different sense
than I am.
It’s easy, they are either physical world properties, or perceptual
properties. The latter are inside the nervous system of perceivers;
a perceiver may be in the environment of another perceiver. Regards,
Rupert

···

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.17 20.45)]

(Eetu Pikkarainen 2018-06-15_06:55:17 UTC]

          EP: In epistemology there should

always be a possibility (explanation or definition) of an
error (Errare humanum est). Here “error” is in different
meaning than in the control diagram. Here it means that we
perceive wrongly and that will be unveiled as an error
usually by continuing or surprisingly big. (For example an
old parent must finally admit that her child has become a
criminal.)

    ...In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round

bits of metal, bits of paper with the Queen’s face on it, flat
bits of plastic etc.

  Rupert, on what basis do you assert that these things are in the

real world? Are you sure?

  Do

machines belong to the class of physical variables that are “in
the world”? If not, why not, if you assert that the others are?

  Are

the properties of the objects you assign to the world also in the
world (e.g. conductivity that is high for round pieces of metal
but not for flat bits of plastic, spectral reflectance, roughness,
…?

  Is

the ability of a machine to control something such as its distance
from a wall a property of the machine that exists in the real
world?

  Are

living organisms in the environment? Are their properties, such as
their abilities to control some perceptions?

  Once

we establish these answers on a secure footing, we can ask about
abstract quantities, such as honesty, languages, beauty, and so
forth.

  All my questions come down to one: How do you know where and why

to draw the line between what exists in the real environment and
what does not?

[rupert]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.19 17.15)]

(Rick Marken 2018-06-18_09:34:46]

Absolutely.

A reader of your response may think, wrongly, that I was actually
asking where the environmental correlate of “honesty” was, as you
omitted the most crucial point of my post, “Why do you think this is
a meaningful question?”
Regards,
Rupert

···

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.17 20.45)]

            RY:  In the world there is only physical variables;

objects, round bits of metal, bits of paper with the
Queen’s face on it, flat bits of plastic etc.

          RM: Those are perceptions. Actually, from a PCT

perspective, those are the states of several different
types of perceptual variables: intensities (eg.
brightness), sensations (eg. colors), configurations (eg.
shapes), etc. The physical variables that are the basis of
those perceptions are an array of photons stimulating the
rods and cones.

            RY: Where is the

environmental correlate of “honesty”?

          RM: Again, I prefer to think of it as an environmental

basis rather then environmental correlate
of a variable that we call “honesty”. This basis consists
of physical variables in the environment – the light and
acoustic waves that stimulate the sensors. “Honesty”
refers to a high level perceptual that is constructed from
lower level perceptions (body position, intonation
pattern, etc) that are ultimately constructed from the
sensory effects of physical variables in the environment.

[MartinT]

EP: In epistemology there should
always be a possibility (explanation or definition) of
an error (Errare humanum est). Here “error” is in
different meaning than in the control diagram. Here it
means that we perceive wrongly and that will be unveiled
as an error usually by continuing or surprisingly big.
(For example an old parent must finally admit that her
child has become a criminal.)

[rupert]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.21 21.40)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.06.19.13.46]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.19 15.10)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.06.18.00.30]

...In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round bits of metal, bits of paper with the Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic etc.

Rupert, on what basis do you assert that these things are in the real world? Are you sure?

We have to assume we are not hallucinating or in the Matrix, as if either were the case then all bets are off.

I don't think that answer is responsive to the question, since it applies not only to the things you assert to be in the real world but also to some at least of the things you say are not. The most I can make out of your answer is that you are not sure ("we have to assume") but that your personal set of assumptions are sufficient to apply in general.

I don't see the relevance of the question to the discussion. What difference does it make to the reality of the world whether I am sure or not?

I tried to phrase my question in a way that allowed a lot of freedom for your explanation of why those things, and of why you might be sure of them but not of other things. Let me try to rephrase to address what was in the back of my mind when asking initially.

Is it coincidence that all the items selected as examples of what is in the world are accessible to the sense of touch? Or is the sense of touch essential to determine whether something is or is not in the real world?

If it was no coincidence and the second answer is "yes", why do you privilege one sense over the others? If it was coincidence and you do not privilege the sense of touch, could you give examples of things that are in the real world but cannot be touched?

Yes, it was a coincidence (if I understand your question). Photons.

I don't think there's much point in commenting on your other answers until we clarify this point.

I think it would save a lot of time if you just stated your position rather than ask lots of questions, as I don't know how they should be answered unless I know the context from which you ask them.

But, can we at least agree that there is a real world out there, independent of perceivers? In other words, in the time before life existed there was a an actual real world, of physical variables and properties.

Regards,
Rupert

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2018.06.22.01.13]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.21 21.40)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.06.19.13.46]

[From Rupert Young (2018.06.19 15.10)]

(Martin Taylor 2018.06.18.00.30]

...In the world there is only physical variables; objects, round bits of metal, bits of paper with the Queen's face on it, flat bits of plastic etc.

Rupert, on what basis do you assert that these things are in the real world? Are you sure?

We have to assume we are not hallucinating or in the Matrix, as if either were the case then all bets are off.

I don't think that answer is responsive to the question, since it applies not only to the things you assert to be in the real world but also to some at least of the things you say are not. The most I can make out of your answer is that you are not sure ("we have to assume") but that your personal set of assumptions are sufficient to apply in general.

I don't see the relevance of the question to the discussion. What difference does it make to the reality of the world whether I am sure or not?

It may make no difference to the reality of the world, but it makes a big difference to the quality of the discussion. You asserted as a fact that there were certain things in the real world (all of which were things that could be touched). I wanted to know on what grounds you considered the real reality of those things as existing in the real world, so I asked, and also asked whether the grounds you would provide in your answer were in your view sufficient to make you sure of the truth of your assertion. It had occurred to me that maybe the tactile nature of the objects might be the reason, but I did not want to bias your response by suggesting that possibility. I think it is an important point, because the most immediate damage that can be caused by real reality is usually done by things one can feel at one's skin surface.

I tried to phrase my question in a way that allowed a lot of freedom for your explanation of why those things, and of why you might be sure of them but not of other things. Let me try to rephrase to address what was in the back of my mind when asking initially.

Is it coincidence that all the items selected as examples of what is in the world are accessible to the sense of touch? Or is the sense of touch essential to determine whether something is or is not in the real world?

If it was no coincidence and the second answer is "yes", why do you privilege one sense over the others? If it was coincidence and you do not privilege the sense of touch, could you give examples of things that are in the real world but cannot be touched?

Yes, it was a coincidence (if I understand your question). Photons.

What do photons have to do with touch sensation? Could you give examples of things in the real world that cannot be touched?

I don't think there's much point in commenting on your other answers until we clarify this point.

I think it would save a lot of time if you just stated your position rather than ask lots of questions, as I don't know how they should be answered unless I know the context from which you ask them.

I guess I'm not as good as Bill Powers or Socrates at asking the questions that lead to new insights, but I do believe that they were right that the ideas one produces for oneself are more likely to be accepted than ideas presented by others. Besides, I don't care whether you believe what I believe at this moment. What I care about is to improve my understanding, which I find to be much helped by a dialogue with a thoughtful other. If that involves reversing my own belief, so much the better. I can't do that by telling you what I think you ought to believe, or by criticizing what I think you believe. I hoped I could do it by observing the process of you criticizing what you believe in the process of answering the questions.

As it happens, Bruce Abbott [From Bruce Abbott (2018.06.21.1010 EDT)] has described quite a bit of what I now believe. The underlying theme can be given a motto "Don't trust coincidences", or "Two's company, three's a crowd". What you can see and touch (and taste and smell and hear) is much more likely to be real than something accessible to only one sense, and a pattern in one sense that recurs is much more likely to be real than one that passes and is gone. A pattern you can influence once may be coincidence but one you can influence consistently is likely to be real, etc. etc. A lightning strike that I perceive first as a jagged linear flash of light, followed by a distinctive pattern of sound was probably a real event in real reality, because I have experienced this bisensory pattern in time many times. Any one of them might have been a hallucination, but probably not most of them.

But, can we at least agree that there is a real world out there, independent of perceivers? In other words, in the time before life existed there was a an actual real world, of physical variables and properties.

Yes. That has to be a bedrock assumption, I think. The issue is what is in the world among all those things we perceive. The criterion "Don't trust coincidences" would lead to the conclusion that the level of honesty of a particular person is indeed a property in the real world. If you disagree, on what other criteria would you rely?

Martin

[PHILIP_JERAIR_YERANO]

philip 6/22 10:00

This discussion was meant to answer the following question: What is
the environmental correlate of honesty? It was supposed to be done by
defining the level of perception: general principle. Then defining the
level below: program/relationship. Then describing a quantitative
relationship between the level below and that above. And finally
deducing that there is something in the environment that corresponds
to the perception of honesty.

Let's define honesty as the set of relations:
A believes X
A outputs X

Inasmuch as there is no environmental correlate of what A believes,
one can never be sure that A believes X. Therefore, there is no
environmental correlate of honesty. And so, if a variable is a
function of time, such that it's there one moment and not there the
next, then sometimes it might not be seen. And if someone believes
they saw it, you may not be sure if they are lying, because you can't
always check for yourself.

But let's suppose that a controlled perception is not a function of
time. Thus we may have a belief about what is controlled. So if A
believes X, then there is indeed an environmental correlate of what A
believes.

Now, can one control a perception of honesty? We have assumed that
honesty means outputting what you believe. And also that there is an
environmental correlate of belief if it is not a function of time. If
a perception of honesty has an environmental correlate, then it can
only pertain to a belief of something that is not a function of time
(i.e. a controlled perception). This simply amounts to a definition of
honesty as: someone controlling a perception and saying so. But can
you control a perception of honesty? It would seem you need to have a
belief about what someone said. But one's words are a function of time
- they are heard one moment and not the next. So you cannot have a
belief about what someone said. You can, however, have a belief about
why they said it. They said it to control a variable. Obviously, this
variable isn't a physical variable. Let's suppose the variable is
honesty itself. The person said something to control a perception of
honesty. Can we believe this? What is the environmental correlate?
It's not a physical variable. Can it be perceived? By definition, a
non physical variable cannot enter through our senses. It is therefore
not a perception.

A paradox occurred when we filtered our definition of belief. We did
not allow belief to pertain to the states of variables; we no longer
believe the apple is red or the door is open. We allowed belief to
pertain only to what is controlled. We thus arrived at the conclusion
that honesty cannot be believed.