Epistemology and regularities

[Martin Taylot 950227 14:15]

Bill Powers (950225.1105 MST) to Martin Taylor (950224 13:30)

You are right that in our agreements, there may well remain
disagreements that depend on how the words are being understood.

In your long posting, I find only one item with which to disagree, and that
relates not to what you think about reality and our understanding of it, but
to your interpretation of what I think. You seem to think my (1) means
what I intended my (2) to mean, below:

Me:

    I assert: (1) There is no way I can determine whether anything
    exists outside of my own perceptions--including myself. (1a)
    Position (1) is no fun, and should be disregarded for the sake of
    further argument. Therefore substitute (2) there is a reality
    outside my perceptions, and (2a) all I know about it is what my
    perceptions tell me--and that includes my perceptions of myself, as
    well as all rules and regularities that I "discover" about that
    reality. They are all perceptions.

The danger in (2) is that in saying that all I know about reality is
what my perceptions tell me, I may tacitly assume that my perceptions
are telling me correctly, without any need for interpretation on my
part.

People often do exactly that. But it isn't part of my (2) or (2a), and
I think that my 3, 4... argue that people have no reason to assume that
what they perceive is a mirror of reality (even a distorting mirror).

I think it is much safer to stay with (1), even though it's not as
much fun, provided it's reworded a little.

(1) Asserts that there is NO way I can determine whether anything exists
outside of my own perceptions. You argue that there is a way, and describe it:

... we do quite
often experience changes in our perceptions that we didn't intend to
happen. That is evidence of something existing independently of us.

I don't think it is evidence at all. A solipsist would be quite happy to
assert that these "unexpected" happenings are just the way our inventiveness
allows us to believe that there is something out there. Personally, I find
that I cannot imagine any kind of evidence that would make "out there"
as opposed to "in here" a more probable source of perceptions. The evidence
is itself a perception, and could readily be generated "in here." The
problem is that the solipsist position, like the instantaneous creationist
position, is an intellectual dead end. By accounting for everything one
could possibly observe, it accounts for nothing. Hence, my comment that
(2) and (2a) are more fun, and that being more fun is the only reason for
asserting them. The choice cannot be argued rationally.

I think it is important to stay with your choice (1), modified to admit
that we can infer existence without knowing form, because doing so
forces us to be clear about the distinction between perception and
imagination, between observation and inference.

That contradicts my (1), but I see no difference between it and my (2).

From here on, in your posting, I heartily endorse everything you say. But

nevertheless,

···

...there may well remain
disagreements that depend on how the words are being understood.

==================
Bill Powers (950225.0830 MST) to Bill Leach 950224.19:24 EST

    What you [Martin] and I were both doing (intentionally or otherwise
    -- and I think otherwise) is "justifying" "conventions."

You got it.

I'm afraid I didn't understand Bill L's comment, and neither do I understand
Bill P's agreement with it.

To me, "convention" is a matter between control systems. It is what happens
when two (or preferably more) reorganizing systems interact over a longish
time. Some conventions have to do with communication, but all have to do
with the interactions of control systems. They are a fact of life. Do they
need "justifying" more than does the fact of control?

To "justify" is an interesting concept, within PCT. As far as I can see,
it has to imply that some perceptual transform is altered so that a perception
that would normally differ from its reference no longer does so. I'm not
at all sure how that is done. "Justify" seems to mean that something is
perceived to be other than most people would see it, and that in some way
that perception is to be exported to another control system...in some magical
way. The "exporter" has to provide sensory stimuli that might lead the
"importer" to obtain some perception at a value desired by the "exporter."
Usually this is done in language, and therefore above the category level.

It's an interesting digression, but I don't see what it has to do with any
prior discussion.

Martin