From Greg Williams (921024)
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Ed, Bill, Tom, et al.: Bill Williams, Apt. 6, 519 North Gate, Pendleton, OR
97801 (no phone)
Ed, I sent the other address to Mary.
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CHUCK TUCKER 921023
I am clearly in support of such a dialogue and encourage as many
people that can enter into it to do so. I am not willing to
enter into the conversation in the same fashion as others on the
NET; I choose to gather many posts, read through them, take notes
on them, think about them, talk to some of my students and
colleagues about what is being stated and then (if I think I can
write something useful) write a note.
I appreciate your comments.
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Bill Powers (921023.1030)
There's a problem with insisting too steadfastly on referring to
control strictly in terms of perception (even though all we can
control is perception). In order to talk about control that involves
other people, we have to assume that in controlling our own
perceptions we are causing things to happen in the outside world that
others can see, feel, etc.. In short, we have to include the physics-
model in the discussion. This is necessary even to suppose that other
people exist, for any observer.
This "problem" isn't limited to "social interactions": it is the same for
control that involves "inanimate objects." Yes, it's all perception --
including the faith that we aren't solipsists (always a possibility, but one
I don't take very seriously -- that's my ideology).
I can control my perception of your action simply by moving myself so
I see the action from a different point of view -- you're pushing the
lawnmower away from me instead of toward me. This alters my
perception, but does not change your output. On the other hand, if
you're watching me I can control the direction in which you're looking
by moving myself, and now the change in my perception (of the
direction in which you're looking) DOES have a boss-reality
counterpart, a physical change in your direction of looking. Both of
these cases can be described by saying that I'm controlling my
perception of your action, yet only one case is a social interaction.
On the basis of the PCT model only -- no ideology -- both examples simply
count as instances of a party controlling some of their own perceptions which
depend on some of another's actions. The first example corresponds to #1 in my
summary (NOT disturbing another's controlled variables, but altering the
environment so as to perceive what you want which depends on the other). The
second example corresponds to #2 in my summary (disturbing another's
controlled variables so as to perceive what you want which depends on the
other). The PCT model (which I thought we were trying to get back to) doesn't
require any talk of "social interactions," as it doesn't need any talk of
"importance."
It looks as though in order to talk about social interactions at all,
we have to take an epistemological position -- a practical position if
not a philosophical one.
Talking about control of one's perceptions which depend on another's actions
requires taking no more nor less of an epistemological position than does
talking about control of one's perceptions which depend on the "motion" of a
"rock."
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Bill Powers (921023.1100)
If the controller is not around at the finish, where is the control?
Don't confuse prediction with control.
The controller WAS around at the finish (of control -- of getting what he/she
wanted), but is NOT around at the time the other party begins to perceive a
problem (and is not controlling, then, for what he/she was controlling
before). And, after the finish of control, the controller needn't care whether
the other party EVER perceives a problem, since he (the controller) got what
he wanted and split. (Note that the same sort of analysis holds for
nonproblematic "beneficial" (to the "controlled") future consequences: the
"teacher" can be controlling all along for his/her perceptions of certain
types of actions by the "student" and be long gone -- maybe even dead -- by
the time the student realizes the benefits of the exercises done so long ago.)
When we introduce the time dimension, we can't arbitrarily cut it off
after a single time-spanning experience. Over time, people learn from
experiences, mostly from doing things or having things done to them
that create error for themselves.
And if you lose your life savings in the first scam you've ever been hooked
by, that you will learn to be wary next time is woefully miniscule
consolation. That's one reason why many folks are interested in understanding
control of one's perceptions which depend on others' actions: to help PREVENT
such catastrophes. (Many folks are also interested so they can improve
counseling/teaching techniques, too.)
I'd like to see the empirical evidence you have.
It doesn't matter to me that people who claim to be "controlling others" are
wrong about that claim. Even if they are controlling some of their perceptions
which depend on others' actions, they certainly can delude themselves about
what they are doing. That's beside the point (although it might make an
interesting sociological study) that such control is possible (according to
PCT) and of interest to many people. However it is interpreted, rightly or
wrongly, by whomever, the PCT model says that it is POSSIBLE to control some
of one's perceptions which depend on some of others' actions, and the PCT
model says that there are LIMITS on this, having to do with the controller
having an adequate model of the others' wants and with what the others' wants
are. Such control CANNOT be arbitrarily accomplished.
There are ubiquitous examples (look around!) of most everyone controlling for
some of their perceptions which depend on others' actions. Analyze your own
successful controlling in social interactions over the course of a single day,
or sit in on an elementary school class and ask the teacher and students about
their successful controlling in classroom situations, or go to an office, or a
store. I predict that you will hear some pretty wild hypotheses about who/what
is controlling who/what, but you'll also see and hear plenty of evidence of
control of individuals' perceptions which depend on others' actions.
CHUCK TUCKER>>what happens
between people (excuse spelling errors) is coercing, forcing,
physically or cognitively manipulating, influencing, persuading,
pleading, bribing, requesting, asking. begging, conning,
convincing, rationalizing, indirect manipulating ("rubber
banding"), agreeing, committing, taking for granted, assuming,
"of coursing," "why notting," promising, pledging, contracting,
willing, buying, selling, envisioning, respecting, loving,
threating, entraping and the like BUT NOT CONTROLLING.
I agree.
So do I. But let's be careful to note what we're agreeing about. Chuck was
trying to make the point that a person CANNOT control ANYTHING except (some
of) his/her OWN PERCEPTIONS. He was NOT trying to claim that a person can
never control (some of) his/her own perceptions which depend on (some) others'
actions. Chuck's listed activities CAN, at least sometimes, amount to folk
descriptions of instances of such control; what he meant by "BUT NOT
CONTROLLING" is that they are NEVER instances of controlling ANYTHING OTHER
THAN A CONTROLLER'S OWN PERCEPTIONS (specifically, they are never instances of
controlling others).
To carry this debate much further than it has gone until now,
I think we have to start looking at all these other kinds of
interactions that people often CALL control of others and HOPE is
control of others and see what is really going on.
Let's start looking at instances of control of one's own perceptions which
depend on others' actions, REGARDLESS of what ANYONE calls it. I'm sure we can
come up with MANY instances of what some people WRONGLY call control (such as
"Plato, through his writings, CONTROLS that philosopher's world-view" -- give
me a break, Plato is long dead and cannot control ANYTHING!), but I think
(ideology, again!) that we will attract more nonPCTers to the PCT model if we
focus on what the model has to say about the nature and limits of true control
in social situations.
Anyway, partisan activism on this publicly-supported net is, I
believe, a no-no. Couldn't it cost some not-for-profit institutions
who help support bitnet and internet their charters?
Last week on National Public Radio, I heard about some folks having a mock
"buy-sell votes" national "election" on Internet, so it needn't be as non-
partisan as you think. I'm voting AGAINST Quayle, who once said, "I stand by
all the misstatements I've made."
Best,
Greg