Experience and reality

[From Bruce Buchanan 940911.01:15 EDT]

[Bill Powers (940910.1100 MDT)] has written -

I am increasingly hesitant to pursue this discussion intensively at this
time, partly because I hope that there may yet be some expression of other
views from readers who may have found some of my arguments relevant to
conceptual problems of some interest to the csg-l. Also, I do not know how
to go about trying to explain my position any more clearly than I already
have in previous posts to Bill and Tom.

Bill writes:

I completely agree with you that the basis of everything is experience;
that is what is real.. . . . . . . But this
leaves experience itself unaccounted for: it is a phenomenon without an
explanation.

Agreed. But the phenomena of experience are what we seek to account for by
analyzing patterns and relationships, and conceptualizing theories,
scientific and otherwise (e.g. some cultures draw upon magical
explanations.) We seek explanations, and my contention is that theories
are different categories of things (viz. they are abstract concepts) than
the phenomena we experience directly.

In making sense of experiences like "an apple" we have more to account
for than just the apple. We also have experiences relating to the lens
of the eye and lenses in general, [etc.] . . .These
are all experiences, just as real as any other kind.

Agreed. We assemble various possibly relevant experiences. We draw these
into hypothetical relationships, and try to validate our theories by
predicting logical implications and possible consequences to be observed.
But we make a careful distinction between empirical observations on the one
hand and theories and/or hypotheses on the other.

Clearly, conscious perception requires that the
chain be intact all the way to the occurrance of neural signals in the
brain. . . . We therefore know that presence of a neural signal is both
necessary and sufficient to create conscious perception, _in every
sensory modality_.

O.K. let me accept this theory, regarding it as established in principle
(leaving aside for purposes of this argument possible equivocations around
the question of whether the presence of _a neural signal_ is always a
_sufficient_ condition for consiousness.) My point would be that what is
being described is not direct experience but a scientific theory. The chain
of neural signals is an abstract representation at several removes from the
primary experiences that gives it meaning and validity.

Having determined that this is true for other people, we must conclude
rationally that it is true of ourselves as well.

Agreed. We accept a degree of unavoidable uncertainty in some of the
assumptions and inferences we make about others, as well as the world in
which we live. We ascribe minds to other people. In ordinary life we
ascribe existence to external objects also, and we conduct our lives on
such observations and assumptions.

every attempt to explain an experience comes up
against one special kind of experience: what we have learned about
nervous systems.

Here we come to the core issue. We obviously mean somewhat different things
by the term Experience. In my terms, and the way I understand the
philosophy of science, what we know about nervous systems is not a special
kind of experience. It is not an experience at all. Our knowledge is
abstracted indirectly from observations, made in the light of and
interpreted in terms of theories of neurology, as developed through a long
line of patient investigators (cf. Jackson, Cajal, Penfield, and so many
others). Our understanding of human nervous system functioning is a kind of
human construct, some combination of invention and discovery. I think Bill
knows all this, and I do not understand why he includes these abstractions
in the same category as he used to describe direct experience e.g. of an
apple.

This is not a philosophical problem. It is a simple problem of reasoning
about our experiences, considering all of them instead of one at a time.

Well, in my view it is subject matter of the philosophy of science. At the
least a clear distinction should be drawn between observation/experience
and theories. I do not understand how it can be said that questions of
perception, theory and reality are not fraught with philosophical problems,
including those of the relation of experience to the ideas by means of
which we represent experiences.

. . In fact, about the only use that a philosophical
discussion of these matters might have is to find a way around the basic
problem, so we could continue to believe that experience was something
other than the occurrance of neural signals in spite of the evidence.

I am not at all sure that I understand this statement. It seems to imply an
understanding of the role and contribution of philosophy that would include
its use as an instrument of rationalization and psychological denial. This,
of course, would not be philosophy. If anyone thinks these processes are at
work in this discussion it would be helpful to be more explicit. The issues
are important enough.

In terms of the evidence of direct experience alone, there is only one
honest way around the problem, and that is to accept the most obvious
and simplest explanation: what we experience is a set of neural signals.

I guess that I can only infer that the point of view which I have tried to
express has not been communicated . I do have an honest point of view but I
honestly do not know how else to state it!

All the arguments against this simple conclusion begin, in effect, by
saying "But if that is true, then [some unacceptable conclusion would
follow]". .

This is not the basis of my argument at all (see above).

If we can't trust our most simple and straightforward
processes of reasoning about direct experiences, how can we possibly
trust anything more complex?

What we can trust is the reality of direct experiences - and be that I mean
the kind of reality which a very small child experiences before he knows
anything about science, etc. What we cannot trust unreservedly are
apparently simple processes of reasoning be adults who have aquired all
sorts of feelings and ideas - unless we check them against direct
experience by observation and experiment at every step. I know that every
reader of csg-l knows this. No one can rely unreservedly on assumptions
about experience and the powers of reason - the history of scholastic
philosophy and witchcraft, etc. and contrariwise the success of science
demonstrates this. The value of philosophy may be found, at least in
part,in the elucidation of unanalyzed assumptions. Here again I seem to be
stating the obvious, and perhaps I should apologize for doing so, but I am
at a loss as to how else to respond.

Where would you take the argument from here? Is there anyplace else to
go?

My suggestion was that CGS discussions give more emphasis to the notion
that control systems do operate in the real external world, to control What
is perceived. Philosophical considerations indicate to me that that is the
existential function of living control systems, although they depend upon
internal representations and mechanisms as the means by which to do this.
(My own views have also been informed by Whitehead, Popper, Margenau and
Adler ("Ten Philosophical Mistakes"), among others.)

It seems that this suggestion may not intelligible to every person who may
have an interest or stake in the work of CGS. So the question of the
meaning or intelligibility of the suggestion itself must obviously be
considered if there is indeed anywhere to go. I have no personal stake in
this all all, but I am interested because I do think the ideas and
potential of CGS work is very great indeed.

I think there are a great many very bright people working in
communications, government and industry who need and want new and useful
ideas about how to better understand and manage problems that involve human
perception. PCT has ideas to offer, and Bill has written about the social
implications of some of these, but the tasks involved are
multidisciplinary. Philosophy is one of the disciplines with perspective on
the larger dimensions involved.

So at this point I would back off and be interested in the views of others,
particularly those who have their own ideas of the methodological and
strategic issues at stake in the longer term for the CSG.

Cheers!

Bruce B.

<[Bill Leach 940911.09:18 EST(EDT)]

[Bruce Buchanan 940911.01:15 EDT]

My suggestion was that CGS discussions give more emphasis to the notion
that control systems do operate in the real external world, to control
What is perceived. ...

Bruce it may be that I am "reading into" what (in particular) the
"seasoned" PCTers have to say but that PCT deals with how an organism
interacts in a "real" environment seems to me to be so much of a central
concept that "it goes without saying". In many of my earliest
"conversations" on the net, my own confusion between the real external
world and the perception of it (indeed either my own or the assumed
perception) has often been the root cause of my misunderstanding.

Obviously I can not speak for PCT but it seems clear to me that several
foundational principles are central to PCT and that these are relevant to
what you are saying:

1. An organisms perception of the external world IS the external world
    to that organism (even if the organism is aware of the potential
    inaccuracies and the existence of the abstraction).

That means that while a particular organism may or may not have a
"realistic view" of the world around it, perception is ultimately all
there is to that organism. The organism may indeed have a perception
that its own perception of the "real world" is faulty but such a
perception is still the organism's perception of the real world
(including the doubt as to the accuracy).

2. Control action is restrained by the physical reality of the external
    world regardless of the state of awareness of the organism itself.

I would say that this is best expressed as "wishing doesn't make it so".

3. A control loop can not itself determine any effects from a
    disturbance to a controlled perception.

As a practical matter, a control loop can not extract ANY information
concerning the nature of the effects of a disturbance upon a perception
that is in a state of "good control". This does not mean that the
organism can not "know" anything about the "source" of a disturbance as
there are potentially other perceptions in addition to the controlled
perception.

However, it is of vital importance to recognize that such "independent"
perceptions can easily be quite incorrect.

It seems that this suggestion may not intelligible to every person who
may have an interest or stake in the work of CGS. So the question of
the meaning or intelligibility of the suggestion itself must obviously
be considered if there is indeed anywhere to go. I have no personal
stake in this all all, but I am interested because I do think the ideas
and potential of CGS work is very great indeed.

I suppose you will have to make your own determination of intelligibility
based upon how you see others interpreting what you have said. As far as
I know, as a science, PCT makes a far "tighter" tie to the real world
than any prior branch of psychology. We can, and do, surmise, muse,
cogitate and otherwise dream and postulate about behaviour and it's
causes but in PCT the acid test is that none of that sort of behaviour on
our part is actually significant until tested against the real world. In
addition ALL results at variance ARE significant and not to be dismissed.

PCT does not accept any premise that considers real behaviour to be "an
anomoly". When behaviour occurs it is behaviour. The experimenter may
well be "far off target" in whatever is being studied but unexplainable
observed behaviour can not be dismissed "as normal variance or whatever."

To me, this is essential in any "real science". Correlations of 60 and
70% may be useful and even valuable outside of science but they all they
say about theory is that it is wrong!

Am I completely "off base" for what you are trying to address?

-bill

[From Bruce Buchanan 940911.22:30 EDT]

[Bill Leach 940911.09:18 EST(EDT)] writes:

1. An organism's perception of the external world IS the external world
   to that organism . . .

2. Control action is restrained by the physical reality of the external
   world regardless of the state of awareness of the organism itself. . . .

Am I completely "off base" for what you are trying to address?

No, you are not off base. These points are very relevant to the
difficulties which I have tried to express. Notes by Bill and Tom have also
been great sources of clarification. Perhaps in further reading I will also
be able to better understand some questions that still remain for me.

For example I still find some ambiguity in the description above, that the
external world is both (#1) the organism's perception and (#2) the physical
reality independent of the organism's awareness. I should make clear that I
do not disagree with either of these, for they both seem to me to be true
observations in their own contexts. But I am not sure, within PCT, of how
to think about the larger context which there must be to include them both.

What also is still a problem for me is to understand the status of the
organism that is observing and describing this total situation, i.e. the
PCT perceiver and investigator.

Bill Powers says, as I understand him, that "the world" consists entirely
of neural representations. On the other hand, it is still my belief that,
while all experiences are _based_ in neural representations, these
representations cannot _in themselves_ be what we perceive but can only
really be _the means_ or _mediating structures and functions_ through which
perceptual processes inform us of the external world. I know that this is
not PCT teaching, although as far as I can see it does not have any special
implications pro or con for neural mechanism as perceptual control agencies
i.e. for the thesis of PCT. The ascription of veridicality or not to the
distal end of the neural causal chain would be, as I see it, a key
function of the representational mechanisms. The notion that
representations are only self-referential I still see as problematic, but,
of course, the problem may only be with the way I see it!

(Bill Leach) -

However, it is of vital importance to recognize that such "independent"
perceptions can easily be quite incorrect.

I fully recognize the many constraints on what must always involve a kind
of triangulation and cross-checking of varied experiences, and spiralling
assymptotic approach, to any human understanding of the world. To make this
premise even more explicit, I see the world as a kind of organic
interconnected manifold, i.e. no matter if we see them as independent
isolated entities, things in the world are actually interdependent in many
various ways.

Bill Powers distrusts philosophical methods, and I think with good reason.
However there also remain for me additional problems related to
self-referential levels of logic, the implications of Goedel's theorem,
i.e. the question of the logical and/or existential status of the mind
propounding ideas about experiences and brain representations.

Do these guiding theories have any kind of status other than as control
systems within the mind and experience of the proponent? If so, what would
that special status be? It seems to me it might be inconsistent with the
theory itself to claim a more general validity or truth, i.e. that one is
describing not a theory about nature but Nature somehow as it is. I am not
really worried about this, for I would see it as an avoidable difficulty.
My uncertainty is that of how it may best be understood within PCT.

These are just questions that remain unresolved in my mind as yet, not
intended as challenges at all. Perhaps some further reflection on my part
will help. On the other hand, if there is still anyone out there in
csg-land that wants to set me straight, and thinks further comment may be
of general interest, it may be that I will need all the help I can get!

Thank you, bill, for your note.

Cheers.

B ruce B.

<[Bill Leach 940912.06:49 EST(EDT)]

[Bruce Buchanan 940911.22:30 EDT]

For example I still find some ambiguity in the description above, ...
           ...
But I am not sure, within PCT, of how to think about the larger context
which there must be to include them both.

Bruce, I may not be keeping up with you an this but let me try anyway...
I really don't think that I follow your meaning in term of an "ambiguity".
It doesn't follow for me that there should be a problem. There is
nothing that we can "know" about our world that is not perception. The
world exists mostly independently of what we think of it. We influence
the world so we it's existance is influenced some by our actions but that
is the limit of the dependence.

What also is still a problem for me is to understand the status of the
organism that is observing and describing this total situation, i.e. the
PCT perceiver and investigator.

The observer is in the same situation as the subject. The observer does
not have direct access to the perceptions of the subject (even if the
subject is "telling" the observer "what is going on") and has no special
understanding of either the observers or the subject's environment,
different? undoubtedly but not special. Thus, the observers perceptions
are rather limited in that he can not presume a causal link but must
always prove the existance of one in the same fashion that we do so for
physics or other physical sciences. A major point that I see as a "step
in the right direction" is that PCT asserts that this proof is both
necessary and possible.

The PCT "view" as I see it, is to always attempt to understand behaviour
from the subject's perceptual view as opposed to one's own. Obviously
this is practically an oxymoron (and really is in conventional
psychology) but PCT provides two advantages. The first is the honest
recognition of the necessity step beyond "it's obvious" or "everyone
knows that people do 'so and so when ...' and measure for behavioural
change against a monitored disturbance. The second is to recognize that
even after determining what perception that the subject is controlling,
one can not assume that one now knows the hiearchy and therefor the
"superior" reference.

That is, when one knows a perception that a subject is controlling, then
one knows ONE perception that a subject is controlling and NOTHING else.
You (per PCT) can not assume that subject Y is controlling a particular
higher level goal in the same manner as did subject X when subject Y is
observed to be controlling the same lower level goal as subject X did
under similar circumstances.

Bill Powers says, as I understand him, that "the world" consists entirely

of neural representations. On the other hand, it is still my belief
that, while all experiences are _based_ in neural representations, these
representations cannot _in themselves_ be what we perceive but can only
really be _the means_ or _mediating structures and functions_ through
which perceptual processes inform us of the external world. I know that
this is not PCT teaching, although as far as I can see it does not have
any special implications pro or con for neural mechanism as perceptual
control agencies i.e. for the thesis of PCT. The ascription of
veridicality or not to the distal end of the neural causal chain would
be, as I see it, a key function of the representational mechanisms. The
notion that representations are only self-referential I still see as
problematic, but, of course, the problem may only be with the way I see
it!

I guess that I might not be understanding you exactly but again, I get
this feeling that you are narrowing the definition of what "perception"
can mean.

I guess, I am almost at a loss here. The neural "representations" are
the perceptions. It is not that they become, are related to or "cause"
but rather ARE themselves the perceptions. Maybe I see this in an overly
simplistic manner or maybe I just plain do not know enough to "appreciate
the problem" but I really don't have any difficulty believing that this
could be "sufficient".

In particular since learning a little about PCT, everytime I see an
infant, this seems more and more probable as the real answer...

Bill Powers distrusts philosophical methods, and I think with good
reason. However there also remain for me additional problems related to
self-referential levels of logic, the implications of Goedel's theorem,
i.e. the question of the logical and/or existential status of the mind
propounding ideas about experiences and brain representations.

I don't think that Goedel applies here. If anything, PCT tends "to
assert" that formal logic is pretty much an "after the fact" sort of
thing. That is, negative feedback control system can accomplish their
goals without the "assistance" of logic. Indeed, it is probably a lot
more accurate to say that they do inspite of efforts with formal logic
systems.

In another way, one can consider that "reality" forces it way upon a
person. One may for whatever reasons, ignore reality but doing so does
not actually change reality. I am thinking of the "classic" example
where someone really believes that they can "flap" their arms and fly
that then jumps off of a 20 story building. No matter how they came to
the conclusion that they could fly, some formal logic system or insanity,
the "real world" still functions as it should.

Do these guiding theories have any kind of status other than as control
systems within the mind and experience of the proponent? If so, what
would that special status be? It seems to me it might be inconsistent
with the theory itself to claim a more general validity or truth, i.e.
that one is describing not a theory about nature but Nature ...

I don't know that I have see any discussion in this specific area before
so I am just guessing but my guess is that NO they do not have any
special status. Control systems control no matter what their beliefs
might be. Their beliefs may well influence "how well they control" in
the sense of "how successful" compared to some "human created standard"
is concerned but not that they do control nor the essence of the fact
that everything that they think and do is a result of control action.

These are just questions that remain unresolved in my mind as yet, not
intended as challenges at all. ...

It's a challenge... at least for me as you don't ask questions that are
easy to answer. I will be most interested to hear other responses as
well as comments on what I have tried say.

-bill

[From Bruce Buchanan 940913.21:58]

[Bill Leach 940912.06:49 EST(EDT) writes:

The PCT "view" as I see it, is to always attempt to understand behaviour
from the subject's perceptual view as opposed to one's own. . . .

   . .even after determining what perception that the subject is controlling,
one can not assume that one now knows the hiearchy and therefor the
"superior" reference.

That is, when one knows a perception that a subject is controlling, then
one knows ONE perception that a subject is controlling and NOTHING else.

O.K., but by the same token the study of the control of perception is the
result, highly legitimate in terms of productive usefulness, of an an
analytic process, i.e. a focus designed to isolate for study the control
mechanism at work. Yet control mechanisms must still operate within a
context of events and assumptions, not all of which are ordinarily, or
perhaps can ever be, spelled out.

My understanding is that any specific control system has a reaction to
disturbances which depends upon the deviations introduced as the
disturbance, not on its origins and nature. But the nature of the problem,
while outside the purview of the individual control system can affect the
system in other ways that I has no inkling of. This might be important to
the life of the system but not register with it as a control mechanism.
Perhaps from a control system point of view that would simply be one of the
class of events which may impact upon it but which are out of its control.
In biological or ideational or management systems, of course, higher levels
may be created to cope.
It is part of the appeal of HPCT that it tries to address such factors, as
you know.

I tend to see PCT as a theoretical construction within the framework of
language and the abstractions it represents to us, and language as verbal
behavior, only one aspect of that overall or total behavior (which exhibits
mind.) I am beginning to think many (all?) PCTers see perception in the
PCT framework as in the overall driber's seat for controlling all behavior.
While this is perfectly valid within a given framework it remains
problematic for me at the level of total behavior and its integration.
(This might have implications, for instance, for mental illness, but I have
not thought this through at all.)

I don't think that Goedel applies here. If anything, PCT tends "to
assert" that formal logic is pretty much an "after the fact" sort of
thing. That is, negative feedback control system can accomplish their
goals without the "assistance" of logic.

What I understand by any science is a set of propositions and theories
connected to real world happenings by specified observation. So, as I see
it, logical relations are the sine qua non of any science. But for control
systems themselves, a fortiori, I think, i.e. the relationships are even
stronger. Feedback control systems are somewhat unique in the way in which
they themselves actually embody logical relationships in physical forms.
What in logic is "if - - then" is in the machine "cause - - effect". This
may be too brief as statement, and I am sure would not pass muster for a
logician, but it roughly the way I would respond. In any case I would think
a more decisive argument would be needed to fully dispose of Goedel!

In any case, thanks to all for your comments, I think I am beginning to see
more light than before (maybe the train coming the other way :-).)

Cheers!

Bruce B.