[From Bruce Buchanan 940911.01:15 EDT]
[Bill Powers (940910.1100 MDT)] has written -
I am increasingly hesitant to pursue this discussion intensively at this
time, partly because I hope that there may yet be some expression of other
views from readers who may have found some of my arguments relevant to
conceptual problems of some interest to the csg-l. Also, I do not know how
to go about trying to explain my position any more clearly than I already
have in previous posts to Bill and Tom.
Bill writes:
I completely agree with you that the basis of everything is experience;
that is what is real.. . . . . . . But this
leaves experience itself unaccounted for: it is a phenomenon without an
explanation.
Agreed. But the phenomena of experience are what we seek to account for by
analyzing patterns and relationships, and conceptualizing theories,
scientific and otherwise (e.g. some cultures draw upon magical
explanations.) We seek explanations, and my contention is that theories
are different categories of things (viz. they are abstract concepts) than
the phenomena we experience directly.
In making sense of experiences like "an apple" we have more to account
for than just the apple. We also have experiences relating to the lens
of the eye and lenses in general, [etc.] . . .These
are all experiences, just as real as any other kind.
Agreed. We assemble various possibly relevant experiences. We draw these
into hypothetical relationships, and try to validate our theories by
predicting logical implications and possible consequences to be observed.
But we make a careful distinction between empirical observations on the one
hand and theories and/or hypotheses on the other.
Clearly, conscious perception requires that the
chain be intact all the way to the occurrance of neural signals in the
brain. . . . We therefore know that presence of a neural signal is both
necessary and sufficient to create conscious perception, _in every
sensory modality_.
O.K. let me accept this theory, regarding it as established in principle
(leaving aside for purposes of this argument possible equivocations around
the question of whether the presence of _a neural signal_ is always a
_sufficient_ condition for consiousness.) My point would be that what is
being described is not direct experience but a scientific theory. The chain
of neural signals is an abstract representation at several removes from the
primary experiences that gives it meaning and validity.
Having determined that this is true for other people, we must conclude
rationally that it is true of ourselves as well.
Agreed. We accept a degree of unavoidable uncertainty in some of the
assumptions and inferences we make about others, as well as the world in
which we live. We ascribe minds to other people. In ordinary life we
ascribe existence to external objects also, and we conduct our lives on
such observations and assumptions.
every attempt to explain an experience comes up
against one special kind of experience: what we have learned about
nervous systems.
Here we come to the core issue. We obviously mean somewhat different things
by the term Experience. In my terms, and the way I understand the
philosophy of science, what we know about nervous systems is not a special
kind of experience. It is not an experience at all. Our knowledge is
abstracted indirectly from observations, made in the light of and
interpreted in terms of theories of neurology, as developed through a long
line of patient investigators (cf. Jackson, Cajal, Penfield, and so many
others). Our understanding of human nervous system functioning is a kind of
human construct, some combination of invention and discovery. I think Bill
knows all this, and I do not understand why he includes these abstractions
in the same category as he used to describe direct experience e.g. of an
apple.
This is not a philosophical problem. It is a simple problem of reasoning
about our experiences, considering all of them instead of one at a time.
Well, in my view it is subject matter of the philosophy of science. At the
least a clear distinction should be drawn between observation/experience
and theories. I do not understand how it can be said that questions of
perception, theory and reality are not fraught with philosophical problems,
including those of the relation of experience to the ideas by means of
which we represent experiences.
. . In fact, about the only use that a philosophical
discussion of these matters might have is to find a way around the basic
problem, so we could continue to believe that experience was something
other than the occurrance of neural signals in spite of the evidence.
I am not at all sure that I understand this statement. It seems to imply an
understanding of the role and contribution of philosophy that would include
its use as an instrument of rationalization and psychological denial. This,
of course, would not be philosophy. If anyone thinks these processes are at
work in this discussion it would be helpful to be more explicit. The issues
are important enough.
In terms of the evidence of direct experience alone, there is only one
honest way around the problem, and that is to accept the most obvious
and simplest explanation: what we experience is a set of neural signals.
I guess that I can only infer that the point of view which I have tried to
express has not been communicated . I do have an honest point of view but I
honestly do not know how else to state it!
All the arguments against this simple conclusion begin, in effect, by
saying "But if that is true, then [some unacceptable conclusion would
follow]". .
This is not the basis of my argument at all (see above).
If we can't trust our most simple and straightforward
processes of reasoning about direct experiences, how can we possibly
trust anything more complex?
What we can trust is the reality of direct experiences - and be that I mean
the kind of reality which a very small child experiences before he knows
anything about science, etc. What we cannot trust unreservedly are
apparently simple processes of reasoning be adults who have aquired all
sorts of feelings and ideas - unless we check them against direct
experience by observation and experiment at every step. I know that every
reader of csg-l knows this. No one can rely unreservedly on assumptions
about experience and the powers of reason - the history of scholastic
philosophy and witchcraft, etc. and contrariwise the success of science
demonstrates this. The value of philosophy may be found, at least in
part,in the elucidation of unanalyzed assumptions. Here again I seem to be
stating the obvious, and perhaps I should apologize for doing so, but I am
at a loss as to how else to respond.
Where would you take the argument from here? Is there anyplace else to
go?
My suggestion was that CGS discussions give more emphasis to the notion
that control systems do operate in the real external world, to control What
is perceived. Philosophical considerations indicate to me that that is the
existential function of living control systems, although they depend upon
internal representations and mechanisms as the means by which to do this.
(My own views have also been informed by Whitehead, Popper, Margenau and
Adler ("Ten Philosophical Mistakes"), among others.)
It seems that this suggestion may not intelligible to every person who may
have an interest or stake in the work of CGS. So the question of the
meaning or intelligibility of the suggestion itself must obviously be
considered if there is indeed anywhere to go. I have no personal stake in
this all all, but I am interested because I do think the ideas and
potential of CGS work is very great indeed.
I think there are a great many very bright people working in
communications, government and industry who need and want new and useful
ideas about how to better understand and manage problems that involve human
perception. PCT has ideas to offer, and Bill has written about the social
implications of some of these, but the tasks involved are
multidisciplinary. Philosophy is one of the disciplines with perspective on
the larger dimensions involved.
So at this point I would back off and be interested in the views of others,
particularly those who have their own ideas of the methodological and
strategic issues at stake in the longer term for the CSG.
Cheers!
Bruce B.