Fed up with objections

[William_T_Powers2]

[From Bill Powers (930514.1215 MDT)]

Chuck Tucker, Rick Marken, Oded Maler, etc. (930514)

I'm somewhat inclined to agree with Bob Stewart when he says
"When are they going to get off of these silly ideas and begin
to do something important." And I'm inclined to agree with Rick
Marken when he says we might as well treat the world as if it's
really there. All this epistemology stuff is an interesting
puzzle, but unless it makes some difference in the way we build
and test models, it just leads us off into sidetracks that never
go anywhere. I'm as prone to temptation as anyone when it
comes to the seductions of verbal philosophy, but there's a lot
of other stuff I'd like to be doing.

I don't think there's any real problem among us about the basic
principles of PCT or HPCT. When we get to the level of
describing how behavior is supposed to work according to the
model, we all say it the same way and apparently mean the same
things. All the trouble begins when extraneous subjects start to
get into the conversation, like What is Scientific Truth? Who,
basically, cares? Sometimes I think I care, but when I get back,
as Chuck would say, to the actual problems of modeling, I find
that the answers I've been so intellectually defending and
setting forth make remarkably little difference in what I do
next.

···

------------------------------------------------------------
Oded Maler (930514 etc), Ken Hacker (various) --

As to how we can apply control theory to dealing with large
social phenomena, long discussions of what PCT or HPCT can or
can't do are really a lot of hot air. We won't know what can be
done until we try to do it. I don't see any point in trying to
anticipate how it will all come out -- if anyone thinks that PCT
will fail in the end, fine, but there's no current reason to
stop trying to apply it and see how far we can get. The only
reason I can see for claiming that PCT won't be able to handle
this or that problem is to discourage anyone from making the
attempt. That's just conservatism for the sake of conservatism.

Apparently, when proponents of PCT suggest that it might be
applied to certain problems this simply irritates people who
think they are already on the way to solving those problems, or
already have a solution and don't want to hear a different one.
I get sucked into those arguments because I want to defend my
approach, but when you come right down to it, I don't have to
defend my approach to anyone. If I want to see PCT applied to
social phenomenon, I'll either do it myself or keep shopping
around for someone willing to do it. Who's going to tell me I
can't do that?

All this foofaraw arises from wanting too much for the
scientific establishment to approve of what we're doing. As soon
as it becomes important to influence the establishment, we find
ourselves trying to answer objections framed in another way of
thinking, and fall into the same games that have been holding up
the sciences of behavior just about forever. And all the things
we'd like to be working on just stop dead.

Just in terms of what I think I know about behavior, brains, and
environments, it seems to me that the brain (including my brain)
has to work with perceptions, and deal with whatever the senses
can tell a brain about the world outside it. You can tell me
about 200 years of philosophical history, or go on and on about
what a lot of dead people have had to say on that subject, or
cite mathematical abstractions up the yin yang, but it still
looks that way to me. Nobody is saying anything to make it look
any different, that I can see. I think that human interactions
come out of a lot of individuals trying to deal with the world
around them, including the other people, and I don't see any
reason why one can't model societies given good enough models of
the people in them, at enough levels. Nobody has yet said
anything to make this seem like an unreasonable idea. It seems
worth a try.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Now that Wolfgang Zocher has completed Simcon version 4.5, I'm
going to get it set up for distribution, and go on with Primer
3. Anybody who wants to learn more about PCT and start applying
it is welcome to come along. I am experiencing a distinct lull
in my enthusiasm for doing anything but getting on with the
work.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Best,

Bill P.

[CHARLES_W_TUCKER5]

%%%%%%%%%%%% FROM CHUCK TUCKER 930514A %%%%%%%%%%%

     As you might not be surprised to learn I too agree with Bob in
     that there are more important things to do than to discuss
     epistemology and ontology; modelling human interaction and testing
     such models. As part of the model I hope that a way will be
     figured out as to how persons involved in such interaction can
     tell themselves what to perceive as part of their internal
     conversation, imagination, and/or verbal statements. I use all
     of these ways to give myself instructions as to what to perceive.
     Self is just another name for a living system which uses negative
     feedback for self-controlling.

[_Maler]

[From Oded Maler (930517 1000 ET)]

[Rick Marken, Bill Powers ..]

(The computer responsible for mailing has been burned last
Sunday, so this message will arrive sometime in the future).

Sorry for abusing the net for a futile epistempological discussion.
It is surely not the most efficient route to advance PCT. Just to
summarize the point, which originated my criticism of "opinions":
When you tell me "if you go around that corner, you will find an
apple" although "corner" and "apple" are perception of yours,
and perceptions of mine, there is some more or less clear CEV,
such that if I (subjectively) experience walking around the corner,
I (subjectively) experience the perception of an apple. Thus, unless
you are a cheater I can believe you and trust what you say.
On the other hand when you tell me "if this and that is done the
socio-economical situation in the US will improve" then both the
action and the perception involved are subjective entities such
that the agreement between us upon their meaning is not mediated
by the "real" world and the reasons for me to believe in such
a statement of yours are less grounded than in the case of the apple.

--Oded

···

--

Oded Maler, LGI-IMAG, Bat D, B.P. 53x, 38041 Grenoble, France
Phone: 76635846 Fax: 76446675 e-mail: maler@imag.fr

[Tom_BOURBON3]

From Tom Bourbon (930518.1202)

[From Oded Maler (930517 1000 ET)]

[Rick Marken, Bill Powers ..]

Sorry for abusing the net for a futile epistempological discussion.
It is surely not the most efficient route to advance PCT. Just to
summarize the point, which originated my criticism of "opinions":
When you tell me "if you go around that corner, you will find an
apple" although "corner" and "apple" are perception of yours,
and perceptions of mine, there is some more or less clear CEV,
such that if I (subjectively) experience walking around the corner,
I (subjectively) experience the perception of an apple. Thus, unless
you are a cheater I can believe you and trust what you say.
On the other hand when you tell me "if this and that is done the
socio-economical situation in the US will improve" then both the
action and the perception involved are subjective entities such
that the agreement between us upon their meaning is not mediated
by the "real" world and the reasons for me to believe in such
a statement of yours are less grounded than in the case of the apple.

I have not been part of the discussions on epistemology, but as an observer
I have noticed how often some of the participants stumble into a confusion
between the various meanings of "objective" and "subjective." Hugh Petrie,
long an observer on CSG-L (are you still out there, Hugh?) wrote an
excellent chapter that included a discussion of that confusion. I do not
have the book with me, but I believe his title was, "The case against
objective testing." It was in Mark Ozer's book, A cybernetic approach to
the assessment of children, 1979, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (The book
also contained Bill Powers' chapter, "A cybernetic model for research in
human development," reprinted in Living Control Systems, Vol. 1.)

In short, Hugh distinguished between two sets of meanings for subjective and
objective; in use, we often conflate the sets:

A. Meanings with regard to interpersonal agreement:

    1. Objective = relatively high degree of interpersonal agreement
                (period -- nothing else implied)

    2. Subjective = relatively low degree of interpersonal agreement
                (period -- nothing else implied)

        Examples (from Hugh) -- objective grading of tests, meaning anyone
who uses the prepared key to judge correct and incorrect answers will connt
the same number of correct and incorrect true and false responses, where
correct and incorrect are judged entirely according to the prepared key
and with no regard to any other criterion of legitimacy, goodness, etc.

                             -- subjective grading of tests, meaning each
grader devises or employs her or his own criteria, or understanding of
criteria described by another party -- nothing implied concerning legitimacy,
goodness, etc.

B. Meanings that usually imply value judgments, or assessments of veracity:

    1. Objective = relatively more precise, desirable, rigorous, truthful,
       dependable, meaningful, useful, etc.

    2. Subjective = relatively less precise, desirable, rigorous, truthful,
       dependable, meaningful, useful, etc.

Where an item is located in the Category A definitions is independent of its
location in the Category B definitions.

···

***************************

When words like "corner", "apple" "go around" are assigned to perceptions,
there is often relatively high interperesonal agreement, as in the Category
A definition of "objective."

When words like "if this and that is done the socio-economical situation in
the US will improve" are assigned to perceptions, there is often relatively
low interperesonal agreement, as in the Category A definition of
"subjective."

In neither case can we say anything about the "utimate, real-world veracity"
of the assignments of wprds to perceptions.

By the way, Hugh's chapter is a nice example of how a person might use old
methods (answers to true-false and multiple-choice questions) to learn
things about a specific person who is considered to be a living control
system.
Until later,
  Tom Bourbon

[_Maler]

[From Oded Maler (930521 - 1000-ET)]

[Tom Bourbon]:

···

*
* In short, Hugh distinguished between two sets of meanings for subjective and
* objective; in use, we often conflate the sets:
*
* A. Meanings with regard to interpersonal agreement:
*
* 1. Objective = relatively high degree of interpersonal agreement
* (period -- nothing else implied)
*
* 2. Subjective = relatively low degree of interpersonal agreement
* (period -- nothing else implied)
*
*
* B. Meanings that usually imply value judgments, or assessments of veracity:
*
* 1. Objective = relatively more precise, desirable, rigorous, truthful,
* dependable, meaningful, useful, etc.
*
* 2. Subjective = relatively less precise, desirable, rigorous, truthful,
* dependable, meaningful, useful, etc.
*
*
* Where an item is located in the Category A definitions is independent of its
* location in the Category B definitions.

It is not completely independent because the "real" world underlies
the social/verbal world. The fact that applehood is more or less
agreed upon among different members of a society, suggestes that there
are invariants in the perceptions of "apples" among different persons.

* ***************************
*
* When words like "corner", "apple" "go around" are assigned to perceptions,
* there is often relatively high interperesonal agreement, as in the Category
* A definition of "objective."
*
* When words like "if this and that is done the socio-economical situation in
* the US will improve" are assigned to perceptions, there is often relatively
* low interperesonal agreement, as in the Category A definition of
* "subjective."
*
* In neither case can we say anything about the "utimate, real-world veracity"
* of the assignments of words to perceptions.

We can`t say anything that will stand rigorous criticism, but
there is, I think, a matter of degree.

Sometimes there is inter-personal agreement on the more abstract
matters, but this agreement is based on invariants in the imagined
and the verbal perceptions. Some class of people might like this
or that president, just because he speaks like them, and not necessarilty
because he is guaranteed to improve the "objective" state-of-affairs.

To summarize, the agreement on lower-level categories, is based
on some more fundamental properties of the world and of our perceptions.
The agreement on higher-level objects is based more on the specific
organization of of the higher levels of the hierarchies of the individual
invloved.

Until the beginning of June

--Oded

--

Oded Maler, LGI-IMAG, Bat D, B.P. 53x, 38041 Grenoble, France
Phone: 76635846 Fax: 76446675 e-mail: maler@imag.fr

[Tom_BOURBON3]

From Tom Bourbon (930521.0915)

[From Oded Maler (930521 - 1000-ET)]

[Tom Bourbon]:

*
* In short, Hugh distinguished between two sets of meanings for subjective and
* objective; in use, we often conflate the sets:
*
* A. Meanings with regard to interpersonal agreement:
*
* 1. Objective = relatively high degree of interpersonal agreement
* (period -- nothing else implied)
*
* 2. Subjective = relatively low degree of interpersonal agreement
* (period -- nothing else implied)
*
*
* B. Meanings that usually imply value judgments, or assessments of veracity:
*
* 1. Objective = relatively more precise, desirable, rigorous, truthful,
* dependable, meaningful, useful, etc.
*
* 2. Subjective = relatively less precise, desirable, rigorous, truthful,
* dependable, meaningful, useful, etc.
*
*
* Where an item is located in the Category A definitions is independent of its
* location in the Category B definitions.

It is not completely independent because the "real" world underlies
the social/verbal world.

Or so we believe, but I still haven't figured out how to peek around the
edges of these perceptions to discover what is on the other side. I only
have my perceptions that I call "the physical world," some of which I
further catagorize as "the social/verbal world." Even when it ocurs on a
large scale, objectivity-as-consensus does not assure objectivity-as-part-
of-Boss-Reality. Think of all of the objective data used to justify the
purges, exterminations, expulsions, manuscript rejections, and holocausts in
history. In each case, there was wide agreement, in a large social/verbal
community, that certain easily-identified parts of reality were objectively
bad, defective, or on some real way, inferior, and that they should be
eliminated. It seems there really were other people "out there" in Boss
Reality, but those bent on purging and purifying knew only their own
perceptions.

The fact that applehood is more or less
agreed upon among different members of a society, suggestes that there
are invariants in the perceptions of "apples" among different persons.

Agreed, on the idea that applehood is a perception (more likely a barrel
full of perceptions), and that many of us seem to use the label in a similar
way. So far, when I have bought what the local greengrocer labeled as an
apple, I have not later discovered myself biting into a turnip, or a beet.
That is the kind of experience on which I seem to build my faith in Boss
Reality -- but faith it remains.

* ***************************
*
* When words like "corner", "apple" "go around" are assigned to perceptions,
* there is often relatively high interperesonal agreement, as in the Category
* A definition of "objective."
*
* When words like "if this and that is done the socio-economical situation in
* the US will improve" are assigned to perceptions, there is often relatively
* low interperesonal agreement, as in the Category A definition of
* "subjective."
*
* In neither case can we say anything about the "utimate, real-world veracity"
* of the assignments of words to perceptions.

We can`t say anything that will stand rigorous criticism, but
there is, I think, a matter of degree.

Sometimes there is inter-personal agreement on the more abstract
matters, but this agreement is based on invariants in the imagined
and the verbal perceptions.

Agreed, just as in the case of apples, turnips, and beets.

Some class of people might like this
or that president, just because he speaks like them, and not necessarilty
because he is guaranteed to improve the"objective" state-of-affairs.

Agreed, just as some people like the fruiting body of this or that plant,
just because they like the smell, taste, texture, or appearance (all
perceptions), rather than because it is guaranteed to improve an
"objective" state-of-affairs.

To summarize, the agreement on lower-level categories, is based
on some more fundamental properties of the world and of our perceptions.
The agreement on higher-level objects is based more on the specific
organization of of the higher levels of the hierarchies of the individual
invloved.

I would paraphrase that as: Two or more of us seem to agree more often
about the external reality of some of our perceptions than we do about
others. The ones on which we agree the most, we often label as
corresponding to features of the "real" world; those on which we agree the
least, as part of the "social/verbal" world. Whether we agree, or
disagree, they are all perceptions.

Until later,
  Tom Bourbon

[Marken_Richard_S1]

[From Rick Marken (930521.0800)]

Oded Maler (930521 - 1000-ET) --

To summarize, the agreement on lower-level categories, is based
on some more fundamental properties of the world and of our perceptions.

Maybe. Maybe not. First, I'm not sure that there is really any
more agreement about "lower" than "higher" level perceptions.
And, even if there is, this could be the result of some-
thing other than there being "more fundemental properties
of the world" that correspond to the lower level perceptions.
When all we have to agree or disagree with is language,
it seems possible that people will disagree more about
perceptions that are difficult to describe than about those
that are easy to describe-- even when the parties to the
discussion are, in fact, having the same perceptions
(higher and lower level).

But you have still not answered my question. What does all
this speculation about "objectivity" have to do with the
application of PCT to political behavior? Notice that your
subject line refer's to Bill's post in which he explained why
he was "fed up" with objections to the application of PCT
to complex social problems. His (and my) reason for
being fed up, in case you don't recall, is that people
seemed to object to applying PCT to these problems
for no other reason than that is just hasn't been done
before -- and because PCT doesn't come to the conclusions
that are expected. In other words, the objections
seemed to be based on little more than conservatism --
the idea that political analysis "just isn't done that way".

I would not be fed up with substantive objections to
the application of PCT to political problems. But the
only objections to PCT that I recall are things like
"it's naive" or "it doesn't take history into account"
or "lines are more objective than political positions",
etc. What would be a lot better is for those who find
PCT wanting as a model of political behavior to describe
the theory or theories that they find to be the one's
that explain political behavior best. Then we could
get a better idea of where PCT fails as a model of
"real world" behavior.

Best

Rick

[_Maler]

From Oded Maler (930521 - 1900-ET) --

* [Rick Marken (930521.0800)]

I don't have now time for a substantial answer. Just recall again that
I'm not another incarnation of the prototypical anonymous
social-science referee, rejecting your paper as naive while believing
(or pretending) that his own particular bullshit theory is science.
I agree with you that 99% of the social sciences is a meaningless
gibberish, and the fact that you implicitly perceive me as a
one of those guys, just shows how perception of abstract entities
depends more on your internal hierarchy than on the observables.

On my way to the promised land

--Oded

···

--

Oded Maler, LGI-IMAG, Bat D, B.P. 53x, 38041 Grenoble, France
Phone: 76635846 Fax: 76446675 e-mail: maler@imag.fr