# Feedback Functions

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328>\
**Category:** CSG2007\
**Created:** [September 6, 2007, 5:32pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328 "2007-09-06T17:32:12Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [September 6, 2007, 5:32pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/1 "2007-09-06T17:32:12Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2007.09.06.1030)]

It just struck me that one of the most mathematically precise  
demonstrations of the effect of a person's purpose on the results of  
an experiment is the difference between the Fechner's and Steven's  
laws of psychophysics. According to Fechner, the relationship between  
stimulus intensity (I) and sensation magnitude (R) is R = k log I.  
According to Steven's the relationship is R = I^k. I refer to  
sensation as R because the measure of sensation is based on the  
subject's response. In Steven's case R is an actual numerical response  
to a stimulus presentation; in Fechner's case R is derived from the  
proportion of times the subject correctly reports the more intense  
stimulus as being more intense.

What's interesting is that these two different laws -- which can be  
viewer as disturbance-output functions from a control theory  
perspective -- are obtained when subjects have different purposes  
(different variables they control). In the Fechner studies what is  
controlled is the relationship between a binary response ("more" vs  
"less" intense) and the relative intensity of pairs of stimuli  
presented on each trial. In the Stevens studies what is controlled is  
the relationship between a numerical response and the intensity of  
single stimuli presented on each trial.

Since, according to control theory, the functional relationship  
between disturbance and output is the inverse of the feedback function  
connecting output to controlled variable, the difference in the  
Fechner and Stevens laws is a reflection of the difference in the  
feedback functions in these two cases. And the feedback function is  
different in the two cases because the controlled variables and the  
outputs that affect the states of these variables are different in the  
two cases.

I would love to be able to describe, quantitatively, the controlled  
variables and the feedback functions in the Fechner and Stevens  
experiments so I could show how control theory explains the difference  
in the relationships found between input (I, which is actually a  
disturbance variable) and output (R) found in the two cases. But I'm  
finding this a difficult task. So that's why I'm posting this. I'd  
love to get some help on this. I guess the first thing is to get  
confirmation that my basic premise is true -- that Fechner's log law  
and Steven;s power law are just the inverse of the different feedback  
functions that exist in Fechner's discrimination approach to measuring  
R versus Stevens' numerical judgment (he called it magnitude  
estimation) approach.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> [rsmarken@gmail.com](mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [September 6, 2007, 10:54pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/2 "2007-09-06T22:54:38Z")

</div>

> It just struck me that one of  
> the most mathematically precise
> 
> demonstrations of the effect of a person’s purpose on the results of
> 
> an experiment is the difference between the Fechner’s and Steven’s
> 
> laws of psychophysics. According to Fechner, the relationship  
> between
> 
> stimulus intensity (I) and sensation magnitude (R) is R = k log I.
> 
> According to Steven’s the relationship is R = I^k. I refer to
> 
> sensation as R because the measure of sensation is based on the
> 
> subject’s response. In Steven’s case R is an actual numerical  
> response
> 
> to a stimulus presentation; in Fechner’s case R is derived from the
> 
> proportion of times the subject correctly reports the more intense
> 
> stimulus as being more intense.  
> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.06.1525 MDT)]

From Rick Marken (2007.09.06.1030) –

Long ago, I wrote a paper on this (not what you’re doing, just the  
relationship between the two hypotheses) and sent it to Science.

Fechner: Rf = k log(I)

Stevens: Rs = I^k

Take the log of both sides of Stevens’ law:

```
     log(Rs) = k

```

log(I)

So Fechner is saying the response is k log(I), and Stevens is saying the  
log of the (numerical) response is k log(I). From this we get

log(Rs) = Rf.

I pointed out in the submitted article that this relationship between Rs  
and Rf could be completely accounted for if subjects perceived the sizes  
of numbers in the same way they perceive the intensities of stimuli. I  
didn’t carry it any farther than that.

I got a very snippy reply relayed by Science from Stevens saying that  
“Logarithms have nothing to do with the power law” and the  
paper was rejected. So the moral is, ignorance is its own justification,  
if the ignorant person is famous enough.

Here is my present analysis, which seems to be irrefutable given the  
premises:

Let Pi be the perception of stimulus intensity, and Pn be the perception  
of the size of a number.

Suppose that Fechner is right in saying that the perceptual signal is  
proportional to the log of the stimulus intensity.

Pi = k1 log(I).

Suppose, too, that the magnitudes of numbers are perceived in the same  
way:

Pn = k2 log(N).

In Stevens’ experiments, the task is to generate a response N such that  
Pn = Pi. The perceived size of the number is adjusted to match the  
perceived size of the stimulus.

When Pn = Pi, we have k2 log(N) = k1 log(I), or

Log(N) = (k1/k2)Log(I).

The right side is equivalent to Log(I^(k1/k2)).

Using both sides for powers of 10, we have

10^Log(I^(k1/k2)) = I^(k1/k2) on the right, and

10^log(N) = N on the left, leading to

N = I^(k1/k2) (N is Stevens’ Rs)

Thus the exponent in Stevens’ power law is the ratio of the perception of  
the stimulus to the perception of the number when the number is said to  
be equal to the stimulus.

This can obviously be extended to all the other applications of the power  
law, in which one stimulus is evaluated as N times the magnitude of  
another stimulus. So Stevens was simply repeating Fechner’s law in a  
disguised form. His law is the same law. The power law is Fechner’s  
law.

Why don’t you write an article titled “Stevens’ Power Law is  
Fechner’s logarithmic law of perception.”?

Perhaps you can see how this would relate to your larger project – I  
don’t quite see the connection, but there is probably one.

Best,

Bill P.

I presume Stevens is dead by now (yes, I see he died in 1973), so perhaps  
it will be true that “the advance of science is maintained by  
waiting for the right funerals.”

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 12:38am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/3 "2007-09-07T00:38:57Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2007.09.06.1740)]

> Bill Powers (2007.09.06.1525 MDT)--

> Fechner: Rf = k log(I)
> 
> Stevens: Rs = I^k
> 
> Take the log of both sides of Stevens' law:
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;log(Rs) = k log(I)
> 
> So Fechner is saying the response is k log(I), and Stevens is saying the  
> log of the (numerical) response is k log(I). From this we get
> 
> log(Rs) = Rf.
> 
> I pointed out in the submitted article that this relationship between Rs  
> and Rf could be completely accounted for if subjects perceived the sizes of  
> numbers in the same way they perceive the intensities of stimuli. I didn't  
> carry it any farther than that.

> Perhaps you can see how this would relate to your larger project -- I don't  
> quite see the connection, but there is probably one.

Yes, I see the connection quite clearly!! Thanks.

Basically, we just assume that, in both cases, the controlled variable  
is Pn - Pi, that it's reference is 0, (so the subjects goal or purpose  
is to keep Pn = Pi, as you say) and that Pi is a log function of I.  
The feedback function from the output (the number N) to controlled  
variable (Pn-Pi, say) is Pn = k log (N) as you say. But in Fechner's  
case the log relation between N and Pn doesn't effect the result  
because the subject is only asked to use the numbers to classify the  
Pi; 0 = no perceived difference between Pi1 and Pi2 and 1 = a just  
noticeable difference between Pi1 and Pi2. Presumably, the is a  
constant difference between Pi's -- that is, a critical difference, c,  
between log(I[n]) and log (I[n+1] -- that leads to a 1 rather than a  
0. So equal log differences of a particular size between intensities  
result in a 1 (different) response rather than a 0. Accumulating the  
unit responses over these log differences gives the log function R = k  
log (I) where R is the value that result of adding up just noticeable  
differences (jnds), each of which I am setting to 1, which is how  
Fechner got his log law.

Your derivation above gives the results for Stevens power law, which  
results from the fact that subjects controlled for Pn-Pi by saying a  
number, N, resulting in a Pn which is a log function of N. So the  
observed relationship between N and I is the inverse of the  
logarithmic feedback connection between N and Pn -- the power  
function: N = I^(k1/k2).

Does that seem right?

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> rsmarken@gmail.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 12:51am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/4 "2007-09-07T00:51:32Z")

</div>

> Yes, I see the connection quite  
> clearly!! Thanks.  
> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.06.1850 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2007.09.06.1740) –

And so you do! This is wonderful. Your analysis has nothing wrong with it  
that I can see, and I’m very relieved to see that you understood what I  
said and agree with it, as shown by your paraphrases. Your review of how  
Fechner reached his conclusion using Just Noticeable Differences  
completes the picture. I think this is eminently publishable.

Do we get Richard Kennaway’s blessing?

Best.

Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 1:19am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/5 "2007-09-07T01:19:48Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2007.09.06.19.466]

> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.06.1525 MDT)]  
> Long ago, I wrote a paper on this (not what you're doing, just the relationship between the two hypotheses) and sent it to Science.
> 
> Fechner: Rf = k log(I)
> 
> Stevens: Rs = I^k
> 
> Take the log of both sides of Stevens' law:
> 
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;log(Rs) = k log(I)
> 
> So Fechner is saying the response is k log(I), and Stevens is saying the log of the (numerical) response is k log(I). From this we get
> 
> log(Rs) = Rf.
> 
> I pointed out in the submitted article that this relationship between Rs and Rf could be completely accounted for if subjects perceived the sizes of numbers in the same way they perceive the intensities of stimuli. I didn't carry it any farther than that.
> 
> I got a very snippy reply relayed by Science from Stevens saying that "Logarithms have nothing to do with the power law" and the paper was rejected. So the moral is, ignorance is its own justification, if the ignorant person is famous enough.

Interesting. My first submission to Science, on the PEST psychophysical method we developed, was also rejected. One reviewer said it was too trivial, and any scientist would know it with with a couple of minutes thought, the other said it was too complex, and nobody would understand it or use it. Both said no, so it was rejected.

My very first presentation at a scientific meeting was on the kind of topic under discussion. It was a summer student project, while I was working on my thesis in the winter. I had Stevens in the audience, and he didn't like it one bit. I remember his comment on my answers to his questions: "It's like trying to pin a jellyfish to the wall". But he was nice afterwards, and invited me to tea with him and his wife.

My work had to do with the matching of different perceptual scales, including the magnitude of numbers. As part of my thesis work I had theorised that the magnitude of extents was non-linear, first increasing more than linearly near an anchor point (such as zero), and then less than linearly (possibly logarithmically). I used a whole range of perceptual dimensions as stimuli and as responses (the task was to set an amount of one extent that the subject felt corresponded to a presented amount of another). The dimensions I remember included visual length, orientation over a 90 degree arc, position of a nonsense word in a partly learned word list, hue (adjusted by changing the voltage on an electroluminescent panel), grey-scale value, time between light flashes, and one or two more.

I used most of the perceptual dimensions both as stimuli and as responses, because in the "stimulus" arrangement there is an extra anchor point, and the idea was to compare dimension A with dimension B when both were stimuli (responses being dimensions X, Y, Z) and when both were responses (stimuli being X, Y, Z).

The point was that the perceptual scales would be different for things viewed as stimuli and things being set as responses, becasue in the response case the subject had control over something that was fixed when viewed as a stimulus. Being fixed allowed the point to act as an anchor. Having control over it (I thought) changed the perception of it. And so it proved.

I never published this work, because the summer turned out to be too short. For the thesis, I used only the two-dimensional placement of a dot on an index card (and the most difficult part of the work was to persuade them to buy me clean 3 x 5 index cards without little blemishes which could act as anchor points -- I showed that having one extra dot on the card made a huge difference to where people placed their responses).

I was working on the principle that the perceived extent was a function not of the physical magnitude of the extent, but of its discriminability (d' for those who know what that means). I didn't and don't buy Fechner's proposal that discriminability can be determined by summing just noticeable differences (jnds). (Actually, I once published a study showing that it simply could not be correct). Theory and practice suggest a slower than linear growth of perceived magnitude as a function of physical magnitude after the near-zero acceleration. I never did buy into Stevens' power law, either.

So my work of a half-century ago probably isn't relevant to this discussion, since it amounts to saying "A plague on both your houses!" And it was never completed in any case.

You might like to look at the Wikipedia article "Stevens Power Law".

Martin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 9:10am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/6 "2007-09-07T09:10:46Z")

</div>

> > [From Bill Powers  
> > (2007.09.06.1525 MDT)]
> > 
> > Long ago, I wrote a paper on this (not what you’re doing, just the  
> > relationship between the two hypotheses) and sent it to Science.
> > 
> > Fechner: Rf = k log(I)
> > 
> > Stevens: Rs = I^k
> > 
> > Take the log of both sides of Stevens’ law:
> > 
> > ```
> > log(Rs) = k
> > 
> > ```
> > 
> > log(I)
> > 
> > So Fechner is saying the response is k log(I), and Stevens is saying the  
> > log of the (numerical) response is k log(I). From this we get
> > 
> > log(Rs) = Rf.
> > 
> > I pointed out in the submitted article that this relationship between Rs  
> > and Rf could be completely accounted for if subjects perceived the sizes  
> > of numbers in the same way they perceive the intensities of stimuli. I  
> > didn’t carry it any farther than that.
> > 
> > I got a very snippy reply relayed by Science from Stevens saying that  
> > “Logarithms have nothing to do with the power law” and the  
> > paper was rejected. So the moral is, ignorance is its own justification,  
> > if the ignorant person is famous enough.
> 
> Interesting. My first submission to Science, on the PEST psychophysical  
> method we developed, was also rejected. One reviewer said it was too  
> trivial, and any scientist would know it with with a couple of minutes  
> thought, the other said it was too complex, and nobody would understand  
> it or use it. Both said no, so it was rejected.
> 
> My very first presentation at a scientific meeting was on the kind of  
> topic under discussion. It was a summer student project, while I was  
> working on my thesis in the winter. I had Stevens in the audience, and he  
> didn’t like it one bit. I remember his comment on my answers to his  
> questions: “It’s like trying to pin a jellyfish to the wall”.  
> But he was nice afterwards, and invited me to tea with him and his  
> wife.
> 
> My work had to do with the matching of different perceptual scales,  
> including the magnitude of numbers. As part of my thesis work I had  
> theorised that the magnitude of extents was non-linear, first increasing  
> more than linearly near an anchor point (such as zero), and then less  
> than linearly (possibly logarithmically). I used a whole range of  
> perceptual dimensions as stimuli and as responses (the task was to set an  
> amount of one extent that the subject felt corresponded to a presented  
> amount of another). The dimensions I remember included visual length,  
> orientation over a 90 degree arc, position of a nonsense word in a partly  
> learned word list, hue (adjusted by changing the voltage on an  
> electroluminescent panel), grey-scale value, time between light flashes,  
> and one or two more.
> 
> I used most of the perceptual dimensions both as stimuli and as  
> responses, because in the “stimulus” arrangement there is an  
> extra anchor point, and the idea was to compare dimension A with  
> dimension B when both were stimuli (responses being dimensions X, Y, Z)  
> and when both were responses (stimuli being X, Y, Z).
> 
> The point was that the perceptual scales would be different for things  
> viewed as stimuli and things being set as responses, becasue in the  
> response case the subject had control over something that was fixed when  
> viewed as a stimulus. Being fixed allowed the point to act as an anchor.  
> Having control over it (I thought) changed the perception of it. And so  
> it proved.
> 
> I never published this work, because the summer turned out to be too  
> short. For the thesis, I used only the two-dimensional placement of a dot  
> on an index card (and the most difficult part of the work was to persuade  
> them to buy me clean 3 x 5 index cards without little blemishes which  
> could act as anchor points – I showed that having one extra dot on the  
> card made a huge difference to where people placed their  
> responses).
> 
> I was working on the principle that the perceived extent was a function  
> not of the physical magnitude of the extent, but of its discriminability  
> (d’ for those who know what that means). I didn’t and don’t buy Fechner’s  
> proposal that discriminability can be determined by summing just  
> noticeable differences (jnds). (Actually, I once published a study  
> showing that it simply could not be correct). Theory and practice suggest  
> a slower than linear growth of perceived magnitude as a function of  
> physical magnitude after the near-zero acceleration. I never did buy into  
> Stevens’ power law, either.
> 
> So my work of a half-century ago probably isn’t relevant to this  
> discussion, since it amounts to saying “A plague on both your  
> houses!” And it was never completed in any case.
> 
> You might like to look at the Wikipedia article “Stevens Power  
> Law”.
> 
> Martin
> 
> –
> 
> No virus found in this incoming message.
> 
> Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.476 / Virus Database:  
> 269.13.5/988 - Release Date: 9/4/2007 9:14 AM  
> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.07.0245 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2007.09.06.19.466 –

I think our experiences with referees and famous people are part of a  
good education. Hero worship and submission to authority are never a good  
idea in science, and probably not anywhere else, either.

My discussion of the relation between Fechner’s law and Stevens’ law is  
mainly an examination of the independence of these laws, showing that if  
numbers are perceived according to Fechner’s law, then Stevens’ way of  
measuring perception is entirely equivalent to the simple logarithmic  
hypothesis. But I agree with your view of perception, which is that it is  
probably nonlinear relative to any external counterparts, with pure  
mathematical forms being only approximations of limited usefulness. And  
if there is any common transformation between ALL senses and external  
variables, we will never discover it this way.

I think this makes even clearer the fact that it is the environment that  
is hypothetical, not our perceptions of it. One must never forget to ask  
how the “true” state of a stimulus is measured. That  
measurement is also a perception. When we compare subjective perceptions  
with objective measurements, we are still comparing one perception with  
another, and never are comparing a perception with reality. I wish  
physicists were more aware of this.

The Wiki article you cite is a good reminder that these “laws”  
are really just curve-fitting. It would be interesting to see the raw  
data behind those tables of Stevens’ in the wiki article. How many  
different curves would fit the same data just as well? One possible curve  
would be a simple square root: if the just noticeable difference or JND  
is assumed to depend on signal-to-noise ratio, and if noise is considered  
to rise as the square root of the mean signal amplitude, then the noise  
is proportional to the square root of the signal (Poisson distribution)  
and the JND increases with the signal – not linearly, but the square  
root might fit as well as the log over some range since it bends the  
right way.

If you took the mean of all those exponents in Stevens’ table, I’ll bet  
it would come out pretty close to 1. (OK, I did it and it’s 1.06 if I did  
it right – may have skipped or duplicated one or two, but that would’nt  
make too much difference in 33 entries). I wonder what the standard  
deviation of the measured exponents was.

Best.

Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 5:39pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/7 "2007-09-07T17:39:01Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2007.09.07.1040)]

> Bill Powers (2007.09.06.1850 MDT)--
> 
> \> Rick Marken (2007.09.06.1740) --

> \> Yes, I see the connection quite clearly!! Thanks.

> And so you do! This is wonderful. Your analysis has nothing wrong with it  
> that I can see, and I'm very relieved to see that you understood what I said  
> and agree with it, as shown by your paraphrases. Your review of how  
> Fechner reached his conclusion using Just Noticeable Differences  
> completes the picture. I think this is eminently publishable.

Actually, I want this to be just one components of the paper I'm  
planning to write (with the help of a student who will be going  
through the literature with me and identifying CV, disturbance and  
output in a sample of psycholofy experiments) on the role of purpose  
in experimental research. A paper just on reconciling the log and  
power "laws" would be nice but I think you (we?) would have to wade  
through a lot of scholarship on this, much of which is mathematical in  
the most set theoretic way that is incomprehensible to me (perhaps  
Richard Kennaway could, indeed, help with this). An example of the  
kind of paper we would have to deal with is

[http://aris.ss.uci.edu/~lnarens/1996/Narens\_JMP\_1996.pdf](http://aris.ss.uci.edu/~lnarens/1996/Narens_JMP_1996.pdf)

This is a Journal of Math Psych article by Louis Narens, who I met  
when I was doing some of my thesis work back in the 1970s at UC  
Irvine. What I can understand of it suggests that he misses the  
possibility of a log function for numbers but it's so set theoretic  
that I just can't make it past the first page. Other articles in this  
area are of the same character. But we really have to do the  
scholarship on this because I can't believe that no one else has  
realized that a log function relating N to Pn would account for the  
power law assuming a log relation between I and Pi.

I will use the idea of a log feedback function from N to Pn as one  
example of how understanding the subjects's purpose in an experiment  
can explain the nature of the observed relationship between S  
(external disturbance variable) and R (the output that influences the  
controlled input that is affected by both S and R). My point will not  
be a psychophysical one -- I don't want to get involved with that  
group again -- but a methodological one, showing where the concept of  
purpose fits in to existing experimental research and how to  
incorporate it properly into future research.

> Do we get Richard Kennaway's blessing?

I think it would be great of you and Richard would write the paper on  
how a log relationship between N and Pn would explain the power law  
relationship between N and I if Fechner's log law of the relationship  
between Pi and I is correct. Then I would have something to reference.  
I might be able to help you find the papers you should reference but I  
think only Richard could understand them!

Best regards

Rick

> **···**
>
> > Best.
> > 
> > Bill P.
> 
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> rsmarken@gmail.com

---

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**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 6:02pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/8 "2007-09-07T18:02:49Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2007.09.07.13.57]

> [From Rick Marken (2007.09.07.1040)]

> But we really have to do the  
> scholarship on this because I can't believe that no one else has  
> realized that a log function relating N to Pn would account for the  
> power law assuming a log relation between I and Pi.

Nor can I, not because I can put my finger on such a paper, but because it gave me such a strong feeling of Deja Vu, from the deep past. Maybe Green and Luce said it. Maybe I read it when I was doing my summer student work. Maybe I just figured it out for myself. Maybe my professor (W.R.Garner) told me. Wherever it came from, I'm sure it's something I've known for a long time, just brought back into memory by Bill's posting. I thnk you would have to search the literature from the 50s and early 60s, if not before.

Martin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Kennaway](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/6a8cbe/32.png) [@Richard\_Kennaway](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Kennaway)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 7:36pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/9 "2007-09-07T19:36:55Z")

</div>

[From Richard Kennaway (2007.09.07.2036 BST)]

> [From Rick Marken (2007.09.07.1040)]
> 
> An example of the  
> kind of paper we would have to deal with is
> 
> [http://aris.ss.uci.edu/~lnarens/1996/Narens\_JMP\_1996.pdf](http://aris.ss.uci.edu/~lnarens/1996/Narens_JMP_1996.pdf)

My eyes glaze over at this as well, but I'll have a go and see what it says.

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard Kennaway, jrk@cmp.uea.ac.uk, [Richard Kennaway](http://www.cmp.uea.ac.uk/~jrk/)  
> School of Computing Sciences,  
> University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 8:48pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/10 "2007-09-07T20:48:56Z")

</div>

> Nor can I, not because I can put  
> my finger on such a paper, but because it gave me such a strong feeling  
> of Deja Vu, from the deep past. Maybe Green and Luce said it. Maybe I  
> read it when I was doing my summer student work. Maybe I just figured it  
> out for myself. Maybe my professor (W.R.Garner) told me. Wherever it came  
> from, I’m sure it’s something I’ve known for a long time, just brought  
> back into memory by Bill’s posting. I think you would have to search the  
> literature from the 50s and early 60s, if not before.  
> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.07.1255 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2007.09.07.13.57 –

My hunch would be that if “log perception of N” had been  
published, nobody would have taken the power law seriously after that.  
Since people still talk about it, I doubt that any refutation was ever  
published. It was in the 60s that I submitted that paper to Science, and  
neither the editors nor Stevens mentioned that anyone else had already  
said it all. Stevens himself said that logs had nothing to do with the  
power law, which convinced me that he wasn’t all that sure what a  
logarithm is.

Anyway, despite the pretentious mathematicizing in that article Rick  
cited, I think there’s a place for a nice simple little note, hardly  
longer than my post, just laying out the logic of the argument. We don’t  
have to compete with the mathematical show-offs.

Best,

Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 8:51pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/11 "2007-09-07T20:51:35Z")

</div>

> My eyes glaze over at this as  
> well, but I’ll have a go and see what it says.  
> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.07.1450 MDT)]

Richard Kennaway (2007.09.07.2036 BST) –

Our hero. You don’t really have to, but I would be curious whether they  
are saying anything at all in that article.

Best,

Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 9:39pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/12 "2007-09-07T21:39:42Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2007.09.07.1440)]

> Bill Powers (2007.09.07.1255 MDT)--

> My hunch would be that if "log perception of N" had been published, nobody  
> would have taken the power law seriously after that. Since people still talk  
> about it, I doubt that any refutation was ever published.

You know, I bet you're right! In order to get the Pn = log N  
explanatoin one would have to accept the idea that it is the  
relationship between Pi and Pn that is controlled in magnitude  
estimation. And it seems very unlikely that anyone would get that  
since psychologists are so firmly comitted to the idea that N is a  
response to Pi.

> Anyway, despite the pretentious mathematicizing in that article Rick cited,  
> I think there's a place for a nice simple little note, hardly longer than my  
> post, just laying out the logic of the argument. We don't have to compete  
> with the mathematical show-offs.

I agree. Perhaps the four of us (you, me Martin and Richard) should  
write it, submit it to a relevant journal and when it's published I'll  
refer to it in my more general paper! Why don't you write the note,  
I'll figure out where to submit and handle the submission details,  
Martin will get a list of the relevant references and RIchard can make  
it look good mathematically.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> rsmarken@gmail.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 10:09pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/13 "2007-09-07T22:09:06Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2007.09.07.17.54]

> [From Rick Marken (2007.09.07.1440)]
> 
> > Bill Powers (2007.09.07.1255 MDT)--
> 
> > &nbsp;&nbsp;My hunch would be that if "log perception of N" had been published, nobody  
> > would have taken the power law seriously after that. Since people still talk  
> > about it, I doubt that any refutation was ever published.
> 
> You know, I bet you're right! In order to get the Pn = log N  
> explanatoin one would have to accept the idea that it is the  
> relationship between Pi and Pn that is controlled in magnitude  
> estimation. And it seems very unlikely that anyone would get that  
> since psychologists are so firmly comitted to the idea that N is a  
> response to Pi.

I don't see why. The reason I did the multidimensional study as a summer student was the notion that all the perceptual scales were not only nonlinear but also dependent on what the subject was doing with the perception. That applied to ALL the dimensions, not only the numbers or the positions of nonsense syllables in a partially learned list.

Obviously I didn't have any ideas about controlled perception, but the idea that the perceived magnitude of a number was roughly a logarithmic function of its numerical magnitude isn't a long step, any more than it's a long step to suggest that discrimination jnds are often logarithmic with the magnitude of the quantity.

Anyway, I'm afraid I can't do better right now than say I had this feeling of Deja Vu when reading Bill's analysis. It seemed like something I had known, but not thought about for decades.

As for not taking the power law seriously after that, you have to remember that lots of people didn't take it very seriously anyway. Other people did, an do. Not everyone reads everything.

> > &nbsp;&nbsp;Anyway, despite the pretentious mathematicizing in that article Rick cited,  
> > I think there's a place for a nice simple little note, hardly longer than my  
> > post, just laying out the logic of the argument. We don't have to compete  
> > with the mathematical show-offs.
> 
> I agree. Perhaps the four of us (you, me Martin and Richard) should  
> write it, submit it to a relevant journal and when it's published I'll  
> refer to it in my more general paper! Why don't you write the note,  
> I'll figure out where to submit and handle the submission details,  
> Martin will get a list of the relevant references and RIchard can make  
> it look good mathematically.

References are, scientifically, my worst point. I tend to remember the facts, not who found them or where they were published.

Martin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [September 7, 2007, 10:43pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/14 "2007-09-07T22:43:33Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2007.09.07.1545)]

> Martin Taylor (2007.09.07.17.54) --
> 
> \>Rick Marken (2007.09.07.1440)]  
> \>  
> \>You know, I bet you're right! In order to get the Pn = log N  
> \>explanatoin one would have to accept the idea that it is the  
> \>relationship between Pi and Pn that is controlled in magnitude  
> \>estimation. And it seems very unlikely that anyone would get that  
> \>since psychologists are so firmly committed to the idea that N is a  
> \>response to Pi.
> 
> I don't see why.

Because otherwise it makes no sense at all. It's just a bunch of equations.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> rsmarken@gmail.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2007, 2:02pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/15 "2007-09-08T14:02:28Z")

</div>

> > > [Bill] My hunch would be  
> > > that if “log perception of N” had been published, nobody
> > > 
> > > would have taken the power law seriously after that. Since people  
> > > still talk
> > > 
> > > about it, I doubt that any refutation was ever  
> > > published.
> > 
> > [Rick] You know, I bet you’re right! In order to get the Pn = log N
> > 
> > explanatoin one would have to accept the idea that it is the
> > 
> > relationship between Pi and Pn that is controlled in magnitude
> > 
> > estimation. And it seems very unlikely that anyone would get that
> > 
> > since psychologists are so firmly comitted to the idea that N is  
> > a
> > 
> > response to Pi.
> 
> [Martin] I don’t see why. The reason I did the multidimensional study as  
> a summer student was the notion that all the perceptual scales were not  
> only nonlinear but also dependent on what the subject was doing with the  
> perception. That applied to ALL the dimensions, not only the numbers or  
> the positions of nonsense syllables in a partially learned  
> list.  
> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.08.0659 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2007.09.07.17.54 –

But as you say in the next sentence, you weren’t thinking that behavior  
was produced to control perception. Most psychologists, I think, would  
have assumed that when the subject uttered the name of a number –  
“2” – that this was a response, an output rather than an  
input. And the idea that the response was selected and produced to  
control a perception of the meaning of that utterance, to make it match  
another perception, does not seem ever to have been part of psychology  
prior to PCT. You don’t seem to be saying it was:

> Obviously I didn’t  
> have any ideas about controlled perception, but the idea that the  
> perceived magnitude of a number was roughly a logarithmic function of its  
> numerical magnitude isn’t a long step, any more than it’s a long step to  
> suggest that discrimination jnds are often logarithmic with the magnitude  
> of the quantity.

It’s not a long step, but it has to be taken before you can claim to have  
taken it. It was a tiny step in the 1960s, but at least I tried to take  
it. It may not be a big important discovery, but leave me  
_something_ to brag about, at least.  
The wiki article says:  
The principal methods used by Stevens to measure the  
perceived intensity of a stimulus were _magnitude estimation_ and  
_magnitude production_. In magnitude estimation with a standard, the  
experimenter presents a stimulus called a _standard_ and assigns it  
a number called the _modulus_. For subsequent stimuli, subjects  
report numerically their perceived intensity relative to the standard so  
as to preserve the ratio between the sensations and the numerical  
estimates (e.g., a sound perceived twice as loud as the standard should  
be given a number twice the modulus).

I take this to mean that a subject was given a standard stimulus  
and told to consider it as having, for example, a magnitude of 1. Then a  
different amount of the stimulus would be given, and the subject would  
give a numerical estimate of its magnitude relative to the first  
magnitude, say 2. This was taken to mean that the perceived magnitude of  
the second stimulus was twice the magnitude of the first. And indeed it  
was – but the perception of “twice as large” is not what  
arithmetic would suggest. “Twice as large” is perceived as a  
perceptual ratio of k\*log(2). Steps of “twice as large” in  
intensity are perceived as (roughly, over some range) equal in size, as  
the frequency of octaves on a piano is perceived. A piano has eight  
equally-spaced octaves, plotted neatly on a logarithmic scale of  
frequency as a row of keys.

> Anyway, I’m afraid  
> I can’t do better right now than say I had this feeling of Deja Vu when  
> reading Bill’s analysis. It seemed like something I had known, but not  
> thought about for decades.

And you kept it to yourself, despite the big to-do over Stevens’  
discovery of the first new law of psychophysics in 100 years? Come on.  
What you’re saying is that this analysis is so simple and obvious that  
you’re embarrased for not having seen it. I admit that it’s simple and  
obvious,

> As for not taking  
> the power law seriously after that, you have to remember that lots of  
> people didn’t take it very seriously anyway. Other people did, an do. Not  
> everyone reads everything.

Logical, but probably not true. I doubt that any professional  
psychologist hadn’t heard of Stevens’ Famous Power Law. It received  
prominent play in his 1950 Handbook of Psychology, and my article was  
written in response to an article about the power law by Stevens in  
Science (I think it was a technical comment). I doubt that very many  
psychologists had any grounds for thinking it untrue – only the ones  
with some serious committment to Weber-Fechner. When psychologists say  
“nobody believes that” or “everybody believes that”,  
I have found that what they usually mean is that everybody or nobody in  
their own tiny school of thought does. Like “modern control  
theory,” which sounds like a huge new movement, but isn’t. A bunch  
of little frogs in a small pond always try to sound larger than they  
are.

> References are,  
> scientifically, my worst point. I tend to remember the facts, not who  
> found them or where they were published.

OK, then, we’ll go ahead and do it with three of us, if  
Richard comes aboard. Three little frogs can probably make k\*log(3/4) as  
much noise as four little frogs.

Best,

Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2007, 4:33pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/16 "2007-09-08T16:33:03Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2007.09.08.0935)]

> Bill Powers (2007.09.08.0659 MDT)--

> \> Martin Taylor --  
> \>  
> \>Obviously I didn't have any ideas about controlled perception, but the idea  
> \> that the perceived magnitude of a number was roughly a logarithmic function  
> \> of its numerical magnitude isn't a long step,

> It's not a long step, but it has to be taken before you can claim to have  
> taken it. It was a tiny step in the 1960s, but at least I tried to take it.  
> It may not be a big important discovery, but leave me something to brag  
> about, at least.

You have lots to brag about. But this little gem is one of the best!

> OK, then, we'll go ahead and do it with three of us, if Richard comes  
> aboard. Three little frogs can probably make k\*log(3/4) as much noise as  
> four little frogs.

I agree. Why don't you write up the paper. I'll do the scholarship and  
the submission paperwork. Richard can check the math. I would also  
suggest that it be framed in terms of the behavioral illusion. It's a  
perfect illustration thereof. The title could be "The Power Law: A  
Behavioral Illusion". That way we don't have to frame it as an  
argument with these mathematical psycho physicists and we won't be  
"poaching" on their territory. Why not write up a first draft and I  
can make some suggestions/ changes and eventually we can get to a  
finished product off line. I'll also be in touch with you off line  
with my suggestions for where it should be submitted. Probably a  
theoretical note in \_Psych Review\_.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> rsmarken@gmail.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2007, 6:08pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/17 "2007-09-08T18:08:54Z")

</div>

Re: Feedback Functions  
[Martin Taylor 2007.09.08.12.51]

> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.08.0659  
> MDT)]

OK, I’ll concede that you are the first person with an interest  
in perception to notice that if p_log(x) = q_log(y) then x =  
y^(q/p).

> > Anyway, I’m afraid I can’t do better  
> > right now than say I had this feeling of Deja Vu when reading Bill’s  
> > analysis. It seemed like something I had known, but not thought about  
> > for decades.
> 
> And you kept it to yourself, despite the  
> big to-do over Stevens’ discovery of the first new law of  
> psychophysics in 100 years? Come on. What you’re saying is that this  
> analysis is so simple and obvious that you’re embarrased for not  
> having seen it. I admit that it’s simple and obvious,

I didn’t claim to have invented it, just that I remember knowing  
about it, and that it was possible this memory might have come from my  
own observation. Apparently I must not have had that memory. I  
apologise for saying that I had, simply because I believed that I  
had.

In any case, the existence of the logarithmic relationship in no  
way disproves the power law. It simply says that you can’t prove the  
power law from the data at hand, because not only is it true that if  
p_log(x) = q_log(y) then x = y^(q/p), but it is also true that if  
f(p_log(x)) = f(q_log(y)) then x = y^(q/p), at least if f is an  
invertible function (such as a power law). So, even if everyone had  
known that the logarithmic relation holds, they would have had no  
reason to deny that the power law holds. And on what basis could you  
be more jsutified in asserting that the perceived magnitude of numbers  
is a logarithmic function of their value than Stevens was in asserting  
that the perceived magnitude of numbers is a linear function of their  
magnitude?

All that the logarithmic relationship demonstrates is that the  
apparent perceptual function depends on how the subject perceived the  
response dimension. And THAT was the subject of my summer work and  
thesis work.

As to whether rational arguments are sufficient to alter the  
zeitgeist, you have only to look at the penetration of PCT into  
mainstream psychology to see why a mention of the logarithmic  
relationship would be insufficient to dispel the rather seductive  
notion of the power law. The necessity of PCT is provable on physical  
grounds, but what kind of effect does that have on the  
mainstream?

Power laws are all over the place in comparative physiology, and  
had been for a century or so. Can you reasonably argue that the main  
body of psychophysiscists should have been expected to dismiss it  
because of a logarithmic relationship which does not disprove it, but  
merely offers a plausible alternative?

> **···**
>
> * * *
> 
> In my thesis work, I wasn’t at all concerned with the power law,  
> because I had already determined from the reversible cross-modality  
> matching summer experiments that if it was ever true it was very  
> context-dependent, which made it uninteresting. What I was concerned  
> with was the apparent curvature-reversal of the function relating  
> physical to perceived distance near an anchor (which neither a power  
> law nor a logarithmic law could accommodate). That reversal apparently  
> accounted for a consistent pattern of what were thought to be memory  
> errors in re-placing a dot on an index card, but which I argued to be  
> perceptual differences between the stimulus situation and the response  
> situation. (Effects of anchoring and distance  
> perception on the reproduction of forms. Percep. Mot. Skills, 1961,  
> 12, 203-239)
> 
> To my mind, in 2007 all we can say is that we assume the subject  
> has the purpose of peceiving the experimenter to be pleased with  
> his/her performance in the experiment. Some subjects may try to cheat,  
> not having that purpose, or may misinterpret the instructions; but  
> many experimenters are aware of that possibility and try to design the  
> experiments so that it is hard for the subjects to get consistent  
> results if they do try to cheat. So we maintain the assumption that  
> the subjects try to perceive the experimenter to be pleased – to  
> cooperate.
> 
> Assuming the subject understands the instructions in the way the  
> experimenter intended them to be understood in a perceptual magnitude  
> matching experiment, if the subject reports a value on the response  
> dimension, then that value truly is perceived as matching the  
> magnitude of the stimulus (disturbance, if you like) that is presented  
> (allowing for random error). The subject can control the response, but  
> cannot affect the presentation that was to be matched.
> 
> To this point, I see no difference between a PCT approach and the  
> conventional approach. All that is asserted is that somewhere inside  
> the subject there is the possibility of comparing the magnitudes of  
> two perceptions of different kinds. Again, that’s conventional  
> psychophysics.
> 
> The problem arises when there is some assertion about an ABSOLUTE  
> scale or function, in particular the notion that the perception of the  
> magnitude of a number is given by a linear function of the number  
> itself. That’s Stevens’ assumption, and using it, the data lead to the  
> power law. Another plausible assumption is that the perceived  
> magnitude of a number is proportional to the logarithm of the number.  
> That assumption leads to a logarithmic law for other perceptual  
> dimensions matched against numbers, using the same data. In each case,  
> it’s an unsupported assumption about how numbers are perceived.
> 
> In order for the logarithmic assertion to have some impact, one  
> has to show some different kind of data that would discriminate  
> between the two hypotheses. It makes intuitive sense that the  
> perceived difference between 1,000,005 and 1,000,010 is less than  
> between 5 and 10, but intuition is only a guide in science. Perhaps  
> differentials might work, but given the effects of local anchors the  
> analysis would be quite subtle, and probably not persuasive. For  
> example, to me the difference between 99 and 101 is substantially  
> larger than the difference between 66 and 68. You would have to do  
> something to handle that kind of effect.
> 
> For myself, I’m reasonably happy with the notion that the  
> perceived magnitude of an extent in most perceptual dimensions is a  
> function for which the slope increases from zero and then decreases  
> gradually as a function of distance from an anchor. If the anchor is  
> itself non-zero in that dimension, this function modulates whatever  
> other functions apply inthe neighbourhood. Such a function does seem  
> to explain some perceptual effects, but there’s no way I’d assert it  
> to be a universal truth along the lines of the assertions that the  
> perceived magnitude of a number is a linear or alternatively a  
> logarithmic function of its numerical magnitude.
> 
> Martin

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/8e7dd6/32.png) [@Bill\_Powers1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bill_Powers1)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2007, 6:53pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/18 "2007-09-08T18:53:17Z")

</div>

> In any case, the existence of  
> the logarithmic relationship in no way disproves the power law. It simply  
> says that you can’t prove the power law from the data at hand, because  
> not only is it true that if p_log(x) = q_log(y) then x = y^(q/p), but it  
> is also true that if f(p_log(x)) = f(q_log(y)) then x = y^(q/p), at least  
> if f is an invertible function (such as a power  
> law).  
> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.08.1240 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2007.09.08.12.51 –

You misunderstood the import of my derivation. If we say that Weber’s  
logarithmic law applies to the perception of the sizes of numbers, then  
Weber’s law predicts Stevens’ power law. It doesn’t “disprove”  
it.

> So, even if  
> everyone had known that the logarithmic relation holds, they would have  
> had no reason to deny that the power law holds. And on what basis could  
> you be more jsutified in asserting that the perceived magnitude of  
> numbers is a logarithmic function of their value than Stevens was in  
> asserting that the perceived magnitude of numbers is a linear function of  
> their magnitude?

I have no reason to deny it, either. Stevens’ law IS Weber’s law under  
the assumption that number magnitudes are also perceived  
logarithmically.

> To my mind, in 2007  
> all we can say is that we assume the subject has the purpose of peceiving  
> the experimenter to be pleased with his/her performance in the  
> experiment.

I don’t think that’s all we can say. We can say that if subjects are  
asked to produce numbers indicating the relative magnitudes of two  
perceptions, and if all size perceptions including perceptions of number  
sizes follow Weber’s law, then they will produce numbers that also follow  
Stevens’ law. Whether either law is correct or even good enough to  
predict other data is irrelevant.

> In order for  
> the logarithmic assertion to have some impact, one has to show some  
> different kind of data that would discriminate between the two  
> hypotheses.

There are not two hypotheses: the two hypotheses are the same, given  
Weber’s law applying to numbers.

As to the effect of your “anchors,” I think that brings in new  
perceptions, perhaps at a different level. Interesting, though.

Best,

Bill P.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/user_avatar/discourse.iapct.org/rsmarken/32/3553_2.png) [@rsmarken](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/rsmarken)\
**Post date:** [September 8, 2007, 10:18pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/19 "2007-09-08T22:18:41Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2007.09.08.1520)]

> Martin Taylor (2007.09.08.12.51)
> 
> OK, I'll concede that you [WTP] are the first person with an  
> interest in perception to notice that if p\*log(x) = q\*log(y)  
> then x = y^(q/p).

But that's not what Bill noticed. What Bill noticed is that, in  
magnitude estimation, people control a perception of Pn = Pi and that  
if (as per Weber/Fechner) Pn = k log N and Pi = m log I then N will be  
a power function of I.

> To my mind, in 2007 all we can say is that we assume the  
> subject has the purpose of peceiving the experimenter to be  
> pleased with his/her performance in the experiment.

The subject is asked to have the purpose of keeping N proportional to  
I (N = a\*I). We control theorists know that the subject's purpose must  
have been to keep Pn proportional to Pi. But psychophysicists ignored  
the subjects' purpose and assumed that N is a behavioral output caused  
by I: N = f(I). That's why they never saw what Bill pointed out: that  
the power relationship between N and I predicts the power law because  
both Pi and Pn would be log functions of the environmental variables,  
I and N, respectively.

> Assuming the subject understands the instructions in the way the  
> experimenter intended them to be understood in a perceptual  
> magnitude matching experiment, if the subject reports a value  
> on the response dimension, then that value truly is perceived as  
> matching the magnitude of the stimulus (disturbance, if you like)  
> that is presented (allowing for random error). The subject can  
> control the response, but cannot affect the presentation that  
> was to be matched.
> 
> To this point, I see no difference between a PCT approach and the  
> conventional approach.

The difference is the assumption that it is the value on the response  
dimension -- N in this case -- that is perceived as matching the  
magnitude of the stimulus. What we are saying is that it is the  
\_perceived\_ value of N -- Pn -- that is perceived as matching the  
perceived value of the stimulus. The difference between the PCT and  
conventional approach is that, in PCT, it is assumed that the subject  
is controlling for Pn = Pi; in the conventional approach it is assumed  
that the subject responds with N = Pi.

> All that is asserted is that somewhere inside the  
> subject there is the possibility of comparing the magnitudes of two  
> perceptions of different kinds. Again, that's conventional  
> psychophysics.

I don't believe that conventional psychophysics treats the subjects'  
"responses" as a perception, let alone one that is part of a  
controlled perception.

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> --  
> Richard S. Marken PhD  
> rsmarken@gmail.com

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/m/b4bc9f/32.png) [@Martin\_Taylor2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Martin_Taylor2)\
**Post date:** [September 9, 2007, 4:11am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback-functions/4328/20 "2007-09-09T04:11:34Z")

</div>

[Martin Taylor 2007.09.08.22.13]

> [From Bill Powers (2007.09.08.1240 MDT)]
> 
> Martin Taylor 2007.09.08.12.51 --
> 
> > In any case, the existence of the logarithmic relationship in no way disproves the power law. It simply says that you can't prove the power law from the data at hand, because not only is it true that if p\*log(x) = q\*log(y) then x = y^(q/p), but it is also true that if f(p\*log(x)) = f(q\*log(y)) then x = y^(q/p), at least if f is an invertible function (such as a power law).
> 
> You misunderstood the import of my derivation. If we say that Weber's logarithmic law applies to the perception of the sizes of numbers, then Weber's law predicts Stevens' power law. It doesn't "disprove" it.
> 
> ...
> 
> > In order for the logarithmic assertion to have some impact, one has to show some different kind of data that would discriminate between the two hypotheses.
> 
> There are not two hypotheses: the two hypotheses are the same, given Weber's law applying to numbers.

Sorry. I've been misreading, or perhaps reading too much into your intentions. I know you said it, that all you were doing was to show that Weber-Fechner implies Stevens if number magnitude is perceived logarithmically. I read into that a dismissal of the power law, wrongly.

The Deja Vu still is there, though. Unfortunately, Ina and I have discarded most of the books we had in graduate school, so I can't check whether it was in them. I do know that the logarithm to power law relation was part of my undergraduate engineering education, if not before. Maybe the Deja Vu feeling comes from there rather than from a direct application to the two laws.

Martin

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