# Feedback

**URL:** <http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322>\
**Category:** CSG1994\
**Created:** [February 17, 1994, 8:08pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322 "1994-02-17T20:08:31Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 10\
**Page:** 2

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**Author:** ![Dick\_Robertson](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/d/2acd7d/32.png) [@Dick\_Robertson](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Dick_Robertson)\
**Post date:** [December 17, 2005, 12:02am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/21 "2005-12-17T00:02:56Z")

</div>

Rick Marken wrote:

> [From Rick Marken (2005.12.16.0810)]
> 
> > Rick Marken (2005.12.15.2120)  
> > [From Dick Robertson.2005.12.16.1752CST]

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Fred Nickols (2005.12.15.0910 ET)-

> > > The piece of research related above offers a clue to one of the reasons I am not yet ready to completely pitch my behaviorist \> leanings.
> > 
> > Those behaviorists were sure able to capitalize on the purposive nature of living organisms.
> 
> By the way, the most obvious example of behaviorists capitalizing on the purposive nature of organisms (and the one that virtually defines Skinner's version of behaviorism) is \_operant conditioning\_, which works by taking advantage of the fact that it is the organism's purpose to \_eat\_. You can do operant conditioning on a satiated organism -- one that does not currently have the purpose of eating .

Right, Rick, but don't you mean you can NOT do operant conditioning on a satiated organism?  
And while I'm at it, I'd like to comment on the previous discussion on this thread, abount the findings that memorizing serial lists shows early and late members of the list are recalled more readily than thouse in the middle. This is one of the many "repeatable observations" that traditional psychology has in its armamentarium. However, what they have been calling the explanation for such phenomena seems to amount to "fire works by the incediary principle," or whatever that old saw was. I do think that PCT will eventually--in the hands of the new crop of psychological scientists--will eventually lead to some testable hypotheses about how that works. I guess we will first need some speculations from which the hypotheses will eventually grow. Like: What is S controlling in repeating a just-heard serial list of words? Obviously control in this case involves the biology of memory too. S in building the control system that we might call, "reciting the list" comes up against the proverbial 7-item limit for instantaneous rote memory. Has anyone ever tested out 5 or 6 item lists to see if they show the early/late phenomena? I don't know of any, and I thihnk it is because just about everybody gets through up to seven items on the first recital. So what is actually happening with longer lists? Thanks in advance for any intelligent answers.

Dick R

> **···**
>
> > Best
> > 
> > Rick  
> > ---  
> > Richard S. Marken Consulting  
> > marken@mindreadings.com  
> > Home 310 474-0313  
> > Cell 310 729-1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [December 17, 2005, 1:06am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/22 "2005-12-17T01:06:04Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2005.12.16.1705)]

> Dick Robertson (2005.12.16.1752CST)

> > Rick Marken (2005.12.16.0810)]

> > You can do operant conditioning on a satiated organism -- one that does not currently have the purpose of eating .
> 
> Right, Rick, but don't you mean you can NOT do operant conditioning on a satiated organism?

Good catch. I forgot a rather crucial \_'t\_. That's right. I meant that you \_can't\_ do operant conditioning on a satiated organism. I should also note that operant conditioning is a great example of what we used to call counter-control and now call reciprocal control because Tim Carey, who is the expert in counter-control, prefers to use the term "counter-control" only to describe control of an organism (usually a person) that is trying to control you. The organisms in operant operant conditioning experiments can be controlled because they are controlling (for food, usually) but they are not controlling the experimenter.

I'll think about your questions about the serial position effect. You make some very good points. It would be nice if we can come up with a PCT-based approach to studying memory.

Best regards

Rick

> **···**
>
> ---  
> Richard S. Marken Consulting  
> marken@mindreadings.com  
> Home 310 474-0313  
> Cell 310 729-1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bj\_rn\_Simonsen](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/46a35a/32.png) [@Bj\_rn\_Simonsen](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bj_rn_Simonsen)\
**Post date:** [December 18, 2005, 5:11pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/23 "2005-12-18T17:11:42Z")

</div>

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.12.18,18:15 EUST)]

> From [Marc Abrams (2005.12.15.0715)]
> 
> > R.Llinas and other has a theory saying "the olivio-cerebellar system, one

of

> > the key neuronal circuits in the brain, has been shown ................".  
> > You have a proposition, "I do not believe the human nervous system is a  
> > circuit board".  
> > So? I do not believe our nervous system is one circuit  
> > board that has been reproduced by PCT. How's that?

I didn't talk about PCT.

> > Karl Popper says: " For a proposition to be falsifiable, it must be at

least

> > in principle possible to make an observation that would show the

proposition

> > to be false, even if that observation had not been made.

> Again, you keep on using parts of the definition  
> and explanation. This does not represent the  
> concept of falsifiability. This represents a concept  
> of falsifying. Not the same thing.

It isn't my statement you analyse, it is the statement you presented from  
Wikipedia, word for word.  
If you re-read, "For a proposition to be \_falsifiable\_, ... ", I can't  
understand when you say "This does not represent the concept  
falsifiability". To be falsifiable must say the same as falsifiability. If  
not, I have go for a vacation.

> Whether or not PCT is or is not isomorphic  
> with our nervous system(S), not just system,  
> is an open question that has not yet been  
> answered. Do you understand that?

I prefer not to use the concept isomorphic. PCT is a theory that describes  
the behavior of living organisms. The theory is developed as a model. This  
model, as Bill senses it, is a description of subsystems within the brain.  
These subsystems have their own properties and those subsystems are  
responsible for observed appearances. They have their individual properties.  
When Bill chose the subsystems he chose subsystems that interacted together  
according their properties. They were also chosen to fit what he called  
anatomical hints about the nervous system and more.  
The anatomy and the physiology is of course important, particular for them  
who are interested in anatomy and physiology. But Bill limited his theory to  
be a description of his model of the brain and handed over the subsystems to  
them who wanted to study them.  
His model is the loop you often have seen. And they who will model human  
behavior using his loops will succeed with most. It depends on their  
programming ability.  
Bill has never invoked that the PCT model is isomorphic to the brain, he say  
that PCT is able to model brain phenomena underlying behavior.  
I don't think Bill primarily is interested in how the brain explains human  
behavior , I think he is interested in modelling different brain phenomena  
underlying behavior.  
I understand you are more interested in how the brain is described by  
physiologists. And that is OK. But don't compare with PCT. PCT is what it is  
and it is a fantastic theory if anybody asks me.

> From my personal research I do not believe PCT  
> is representative of our nervous systems. It might  
> very well be representative of our cortex, or some  
> other sub-system, but I do not believe it is  
> representative of the ENTIRE nervous system. Got it?

Yes, I got it. And that is OK. Look above.

> So frankly, I will take the speculations of a  
> physiologist about matters concerning  
> physiology over someone who got his  
> physiological info out of a 1948 textbook.

You should have written something else in your last part of your statement.  
But I agree with your first part. Maybe I have misunderstood R. Llinas. Is  
it OK if I say that R. Llinas has never indicated that the olivio-cerebellar  
system is a neuronal circuit?

> BTW, I love my wife dearly but there are tings  
> I don't agree with her on as well. Should I toss  
> her out of the house?

No why should you do that. When you say one thing is correct and she says  
something else is correct, you just change your mind and say what she says.

> No Bjorn, if you have read my posts over the  
> last several days you would have read that I  
> am not doing science and never claimed to  
> be doing so. I aspire one day to do so.. But  
> then again neither is CSGnet, and PCT is not  
> yet a scientific theory. Get over it.

Remember what Karl Popper said.  
Falsifiability is an important concept in the philosophy of science that  
amounts to the apparently paradoxical idea that a proposition or a theory  
cannot be scientific if it does not admit the possibility of being shown  
false.  
You explain PCT is false, therefore you admit the possibility of PCT being  
shown false. And if that is correct, it is scientific.  
I would explain how PCT is scientific in other ways.  
I have to stop this thread with this mail. I am travelling away fro mails  
and Internet for a fortnight.  
I wish you all a happy holyday or a merry Christmas or what you will be  
wished. I thank many of you for many interesting threads in 2005. It has  
been an instructiveness year and I understand much I didn't understand a  
year ago. Special thanks to Bill.

Bjorn

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Bozo\_the\_Clown](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/b/f07891/32.png) [@Bozo\_the\_Clown](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Bozo_the_Clown)\
**Post date:** [December 18, 2005, 6:45pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/24 "2005-12-18T18:45:34Z")

</div>

From [Marc Abrams (2005.12.1229)]

In a message dated 12/18/2005 12:17:35 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, bjornsi@BROADPARK.NO writes:

 ![Untitled4.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/c6b416b6c65a93428e4822933a9da739349b83cd.jpeg)

 ![Untitled5.jpg](http://discourse.iapct.org/uploads/default/original/1X/5bf7c3f8f536713c7da30bdd4c75639b466957e1.jpeg)

> **···**
>
> > > [From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.12.18,18:15 EUST)]
> 
> > > I didn’t talk about PCT.
> 
> > > It isn’t my statement you analyse, it is the statement you presented from  
> > > Wikipedia, word for word.  
> > > If you re-read, "For a proposition to be _falsifiable_, … ", I can’t  
> > > understand when you say “This does not represent the concept  
> > > falsifiability”. To be falsifiable must say the same as falsifiability. If  
> > > not, I have go for a vacation.
> 
> > No, the concept of falsify_ **ing** _ is different then Poppers concept of falsifiability.
> 
> > Then what were you talking about? Is it a secret or might you fill me in so we can start talking about the same things.  
> > The best and easiest example of this is with religion. The reason most folks do not believe the study of religion is ‘scientific’ is because of the concept of falsifiability, and that is you can never show (by any test) that god _ **does not** _  
> > exist. This does not mean that if I ‘test’ for god and do not ‘see’ him then that is ‘falsification’. No, the 'falsification is due to the fact that there exists no test that can show that god does not exist.
> 
> > If I told you there was no god, you would ask me to ‘prove’ it and I could not show you that my belief was a correct one.
> 
> > Indeed, in doing empirical science you can never ‘prove’ anything to be so, nor can you ‘prove’ anything not to be so. What distinguishes science from non-science is the notion of falsifiability.
> 
> > Now, falsifying a theory as you and Rick keep on alluding to does not necessarily make a theory ‘false’ either. Newton’s ‘laws’ were found to be good up until a certain point. The same with Einstein.
> 
> > Einstein did not completely erase Newton’s work and he did not show Newton to be ‘false’. He did show that Newton was lacking and incomplete.
> 
> > But none of this is surprising because science is never ‘completed’ and every theory ever devised by man is in fact ‘incomplete’ and will always be so.
> 
> > > I prefer not to use the concept isomorphic.
> 
> > You may not but Bill does.
> 
> > > PCT is a theory that describes  
> > > the behavior of living organisms. The theory is developed as a model. This  
> > > model, as Bill senses it, is a description of subsystems within the brain.
> 
> > No, as Bill describes it PCT is a _ **blueprint** _ of our nervous system.
> 
> > > These subsystems have their own properties and those subsystems are  
> > > responsible for observed appearances. They have their individual properties.  
> > > When Bill chose the subsystems he chose subsystems that interacted together  
> > > according their properties. They were also chosen to fit what he called  
> > > anatomical hints about the nervous system and more.
> 
> > Not just 'sub-systems my friend, but sub-systems with very explicit dependencies. To this day I have no idea whether those dependencies are functional or anatomical.
> 
> > > The anatomy and the physiology is of course important, particular for them  
> > > who are interested in anatomy and physiology.
> 
> > No, these things are important because they will one day provide the empirical evidence needed to justify whatever beliefs we might have about the actual mechanism’s involved.
> 
> > > But Bill limited his theory to be a description of his model of the brain and \>handed over the subsystems to them who wanted to study them.
> 
> > Again, this is your imagined PCT. This is not the PCT Bill has been advocating. PCT is not simply a metaphor for the brain.
> 
> > > His model is the loop you often have seen. And they who will model human  
> > > behavior using his loops will succeed with most. It depends on their  
> > > programming ability.
> 
> > They are not his ‘loops’. Cybernetics was alive and well long before Bill dreamt up PCT. Before making these kinds of statements and assertions you should read up a bit on the history of feedback thought in social systems.
> 
> > > Bill has never invoked that the PCT model is isomorphic to the brain, he say  
> > > that PCT is able to model brain phenomena underlying behavior.
> 
> > B:CP pgs 17 - 18
> 
> > You might have other ideas about what PCT is or is not.  
> > ![]()
> 
> > ![]()
> 
> > Bill has also stated many times that PCT is supposed to be the blueprint for the nervous system.
> 
> > > I don’t think Bill primarily is interested in how the brain explains human  
> > > behavior , I think he is interested in modelling different brain phenomena  
> > > underlying behavior.
> 
> > Bjorn, I think you are _ **way** _ off the mark here. Maybe Bill would like to help clear this matter up?
> 
> > > I understand you are more interested in how the brain is described by  
> > > physiologists. And that is OK. But don’t compare with PCT. PCT is what it is  
> > > and it is a fantastic theory if anybody asks me.
> 
> > Actually I am not interested in the ‘physiology’, as I have told you both privately and here on CSGnet, but why kill a good belief when it helps keep your understanding of someone else where you want it to be.
> > 
> > > Yes, I got it. And that is OK. Look above.
> 
> > I did and you did not get it, maybe you do now.
> > 
> > > You should have written something else in your last part of your statement.  
> > > But I agree with your first part. Maybe I have misunderstood R. Llinas. Is  
> > > it OK if I say that R. Llinas has never indicated that the olivio-cerebellar  
> > > system is a neuronal circuit?
> 
> > Yes, he has indicated such, but I don’t understand what this has to do with PCT, PCT being isomorphic and a blueprint of our nervous system , or the validity of any of Llinas’ speculations.
> 
> > > No why should you do that. When you say one thing is correct and she says  
> > > something else is correct, you just change your mind and say what she says.
> 
> > You should be either a marriage counselor or a comedian.
> > 
> > > Remember what Karl Popper said.  
> > > Falsifiability is an important concept in the philosophy of science that  
> > > amounts to the apparently paradoxical idea that a proposition or a theory  
> > > cannot be scientific if it does not admit the possibility of being shown  
> > > false.
> 
> > You still have no clue as to what he meant by this last statement but so be it. I’m done with falsifiability, believe what you will.
> 
> > > You explain PCT is false, therefore you admit the possibility of PCT being  
> > > shown false. And if that is correct, it is scientific.
> 
> > What wonderful logic. It is nice to see that you and Rick share the same ideas. If it makes you feel any better, ok, PCT is a false scientific theory. Feel better?
> 
> > > I would explain how PCT is scientific in other ways.
> 
> > I’m sure you could.
> 
> > > I have to stop this thread with this mail. I am travelling away fro mails  
> > > and Internet for a fortnight.
> 
> > Have a wonderful time and a happy holiday.
> 
> > Who cares about various parts of the brain? Not me.  
> > Regards,
> 
> > Marc
> 
> >

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Fred\_Nickols1](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/f/ad7895/32.png) [@Fred\_Nickols1](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Fred_Nickols1)\
**Post date:** [December 18, 2005, 9:11pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/25 "2005-12-18T21:11:43Z")

</div>

[From Fred Nickols (2005.12.18.1557 ET)] -

> From Rick Marken (2005.12.16.0810)]
> 
> \> Rick Marken (2005.12.15.2120)  
> \>  
> \>\> Fred Nickols (2005.12.15.0910 ET)-  
> \>  
> \>\> The piece of research related above offers a clue to one of the  
> \>\> reasons I am not yet ready to completely pitch my behaviorist \>  
> \>\> leanings.  
> \>  
> \> Those behaviorists were sure able to capitalize on the purposive  
> \> nature of living organisms.
> 
> By the way, the most obvious example of behaviorists capitalizing on  
> the purposive nature of organisms (and the one that virtually defines  
> Skinner's version of behaviorism) is \_operant conditioning\_, which  
> works by taking advantage of the fact that it is the organism's purpose  
> to \_eat\_. You can do operant conditioning on a satiated organism -- one  
> that does not currently have the purpose of eating .

Hmm. I'm confused again. Didn't I see this earlier? Also, I frequently see Rick's responses to others' posts before I see those posts from others. Is there some kind of timing issue at work here?

In any event, allow me to nitpick the wording above. First, however, I'll agree with but also elaborate upon the assertion Rick makes: you can't do operant conditioning when what you're using as a reinforcer isn't reinforcing - as would be the case when using food as a reinforcer if the organism has no interest in food. That said, I don't think many (if any) behaviorists would agree that they were capitializing on or taking advantage of the organism's "purpose to eat." If memory serves, most of them would deny the existence of purpose or at least claim that it is unknowable.

Even from my limited PCT perspective, I don't see an organism as having the purpose to eat. I can see where a reference value (don't know what to call it) might be out of whack and restoring it to its desired level entails an activity called "eating." Further, there might be lower level signals tied to hunger or something like that and higher level signals linked to dinner time or breakfast or somesuch. But, for me, at least, having "the purpose to eat" is a fleeting, transitory state - unless, of course, someone keeps me locked in a cage and also keeps me in a hungry state. At that point, my "purpose" becomes one of killing and eating my captor.

Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to all...and my apologies to any of you on this list who find a controlled variable of theirs disturbed by those wishes.

> **···**
>
> --  
> Regards,
> 
> Fred Nickols, CPT  
> Senior Consultant  
> Distance Consulting  
> "Assistance at A Distance"  
> nickols@att.net  
> www.nickols.us

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [December 18, 2005, 11:07pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/26 "2005-12-18T23:07:41Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2005.12.18.1510)]

> Fred Nickols (2005.12.18.1557 ET) -
> 
> > From Rick Marken (2005.12.16.0810)--

> > By the way, the most obvious example of behaviorists capitalizing on  
> > the purposive nature of organisms (and the one that virtually defines  
> > Skinner's version of behaviorism) is \_operant conditioning\_, which  
> > works by taking advantage of the fact that it is the organism's purpose  
> > to \_eat\_. You can do operant conditioning on a satiated organism -- one  
> > that does not currently have the purpose of eating .
> 
> In any event, allow me to nitpick the wording above. First, however, I'll agree with but also elaborate upon the assertion Rick makes: you can't do operant conditioning when what you're using as a reinforcer isn't reinforcing - as would be the case when using food as a reinforcer if the organism has no interest in food. That said, I don't think many (if any) behaviorists would agree that they were capitializing on or taking advantage of the organism's "purpose to eat." If memory serves, most of them would deny the existence of purpose or at least claim that it is unknowable.

Yes, of course. When I say that behaviorists capitalize on the purposive nature of organisms in order to control them I don't mean to imply that the behaviorists are doing this consciously. They say things like what you said: operant conditioning only works when what you are using as a reinforcer is reinforcing. But we know (from PCT as well as everyday experience) that a reinforcer is reinforcing because it is \_wanted\_. Food works as a reinforcer only when an animal is hungry (which is, as you say, not all the time; that's why behaviorists keep the organisms to be operantly conditioned in a cage at 80% of their normal body weight -- to insure that that organisms want the food). Water works as a reinforcer only when an animal is thirsty. Access to females works as a reinforcer only when an animal is horny. The behaviorist idea that a reinforcer works only when it is reinforcing is just a way for these folks to avoid saying what is obvious: a reinforcer is reinforcing when it is wanted; when it is the animal's purpose to get it. But there is no such thing as purpose in behaviorism so they make believe that external events -- like reinforcers -- can pull behavior out of an organism.

> Even from my limited PCT perspective, I don't see an organism as having the purpose to eat.

Really? Don't you ever want to eat (have the purpose of consuming food) and go seek out food to satisfy this want? I think all organisms are pretty much the same in this regard. All of them have (at some time(s) during their life) the purpose of consuming food.

> But, for me, at least, having "the purpose to eat" is a fleeting, transitory state - unless, of course, someone keeps me locked in a cage and also keeps me in a hungry state. At that point, my "purpose" becomes one of killing and eating my captor.

Ah, so you do have the purpose of eating every so often. I thought so;-) You're lucky that that purpose is fleeting; it's not fleeting for the children in Darfur or the animals in operant conditioning experiments, whose main purpose in live, all the time, is to get food.

> Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to all...and my apologies to any of you on this list who find a controlled variable of theirs disturbed by those wishes.

And a Merry Solstice to you and yours.

Best regards

Rick

> **···**
>
> ---  
> Richard S. Marken Consulting  
> marken@mindreadings.com  
> Home 310 474-0313  
> Cell 310 729-1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Samuel\_Saunders](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/s/9de053/32.png) [@Samuel\_Saunders](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Samuel_Saunders)\
**Post date:** [December 19, 2005, 12:30am UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/27 "2005-12-19T00:30:32Z")

</div>

[From Samuel Saunders (205.12.18.1654 MST)]

> Rick Marken (2005.12.18.1510)
> 
> \>Fred Nickols (2005.12.18.1557 ET) -  
> \>  
> \>\>From Rick Marken (2005.12.16.0810)--
> 
> \>\>By the way, the most obvious example of behaviorists capitalizing on  
> \>\>the purposive nature of organisms (and the one that virtually defines  
> \>\>Skinner's version of behaviorism) is \_operant conditioning\_, which  
> \>\>works by taking advantage of the fact that it is the organism's  
> \>\>purpose  
> \>\>to \_eat\_. You can do operant conditioning on a satiated organism --  
> \>\>one  
> \>\>that does not currently have the purpose of eating .  
> \>  
> \>In any event, allow me to nitpick the wording above. First, however,  
> \>I'll agree with but also elaborate upon the assertion Rick makes: you  
> \>can't do operant conditioning when what you're using as a reinforcer  
> \>isn't reinforcing - as would be the case when using food as a  
> \>reinforcer if the organism has no interest in food. That said, I  
> \>don't think many (if any) behaviorists would agree that they were  
> \>capitializing on or taking advantage of the organism's "purpose to  
> \>eat." If memory serves, most of them would deny the existence of  
> \>purpose or at least claim that it is unknowable.
> 
> Yes, of course. When I say that behaviorists capitalize on the  
> purposive nature of organisms in order to control them I don't mean to  
> imply that the behaviorists are doing this consciously. They say things  
> like what you said: operant conditioning only works when what you are  
> using as a reinforcer is reinforcing. But we know (from PCT as well as  
> everyday experience) that a reinforcer is reinforcing because it is  
> \_wanted\_. Food works as a reinforcer only when an animal is hungry  
> (which is, as you say, not all the time; that's why behaviorists keep  
> the organisms to be operantly conditioned in a cage at 80% of their  
> normal body weight -- to insure that that organisms want the food).  
> Water works as a reinforcer only when an animal is thirsty. Access to  
> females works as a reinforcer only when an animal is horny. The  
> behaviorist idea that a reinforcer works only when it is reinforcing is  
> just a way for these folks to avoid saying what is obvious: a  
> reinforcer is reinforcing when it is wanted; when it is the animal's  
> purpose to get it. But there is no such thing as purpose in  
> behaviorism so they make believe that external events -- like  
> reinforcers -- can pull behavior out of an organism.

We had a long discussion on this about 7-8 years ago on CSG-L, even getting to a little modeling. This is not as hidden in the behaviorist literature as Rick and Bill sometimes like to claim (straw men are easier to attack, and this straw man has been being beaten since the early days of the "cognitive revolution", so they are really just joining the crowd). The Hull and Spence models which were popular as "neobehaviorist" models both had terms for incentives, which were specified as resulting from specific operations (like food deprivation). There was of course a famous debate as to the necessity of these for learning, as opposed to performance, but some where in there they were known to be important. Skinner and his close "radical behaviorist" colleagues talked about "establishing operations" as being required for reinforcement to be effective. David Premack suggested that one could describe the conditions for reinforcement by knowning the relative probability of vario!  
us behaviors. Premack's approach was to observe in a baseline condition, where no contingency was imposed between various activities, and note the relative frequency with which the behaviors occurred (relative frequency then becomes an estimate of relative p[robability), and Premack argued that if a contingency were then established such that engaging in a lower probability behavior were required to obtain the opportunity to engage in a higher probability behavior, reinforcment of the lower probability behavior would be observed (e.g. for a rat, eating occurs more often than pressing bars protruding from cage walls, so if bar pressing is required to gain an opportunity to eat, bar pressing will increase above the baseline level (and eating will drop below the baseline level, but that is another story)). Allison and others later extended Premack's idea by noting that any contingency which requires engaging in one behavior more often than in a baseling conditon in order to!  
&nbsp;&nbsp;have the oppotunity to engage in another behavior at something approa  
ching baseline frequency is suffiecient for reinforcement regardless of the relative probabilities of the two behaviors, producing the "relative deprivation". This all starts to get difficult when one tries to identify relevant "baseline" conditions to measure frequency of behavior. This is a good point to consider PCT and something like the test for controlled variables, and it was in fact a reference to B:CP and Power's work that originally lead me to CSG.

While it is a bit out of date now, "Introduction to modern psychology" by Robertson and Powers does a great job of putting PCT into the context of general psychology, and demonstrating how PCT can address issues of concern in the broader psychology community. Anyone who is interested in "how HPCT can address problem X" should take the time to read the book, or at least the first two chapters plus the specific chapters adressing X. (I used this book as a text for a General Psychology course as recently as last year, and have also assigned chapters for other courses, such as Developmental Psychology).

> \>Even from my limited PCT perspective, I don't see an organism as  
> \>having the purpose to eat.
> 
> Really? Don't you ever want to eat (have the purpose of consuming food)  
> and go seek out food to satisfy this want? I think all organisms are  
> pretty much the same in this regard. All of them have (at some time(s)  
> during their life) the purpose of consuming food.
> 
> \>But, for me, at least, having "the purpose to eat" is a fleeting,  
> \>transitory state - unless, of course, someone keeps me locked in a  
> \>cage and also keeps me in a hungry state. At that point, my "purpose"  
> \>becomes one of killing and eating my captor.
> 
> Ah, so you do have the purpose of eating every so often. I thought  
> so;-) You're lucky that that purpose is fleeting; it's not fleeting for  
> the children in Darfur or the animals in operant conditioning  
> experiments, whose main purpose in live, all the time, is to get food.
> 
> \>Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to all...and my apologies to any  
> \>of you on this list who find a controlled variable of theirs disturbed  
> \>by those wishes.
> 
> And a Merry Solstice to you and yours.
> 
> Best regards
> 
> Rick  
> ---  
> Richard S. Marken Consulting  
> marken@mindreadings.com  
> Home 310 474-0313  
> Cell 310 729-1400

Samuel

> **···**
>
> On Sun, Dec 18, 2005 at 03:07:41PM -0800, Rick Marken wrote:  
> --  
> Samuel Spence Saunders, Ph.D.  
> saunders@westriverresearch.com  
> Partner, West River Research Associates

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [December 20, 2005, 6:04pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/28 "2005-12-20T18:04:17Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2005.12.20.1000)]

> Samuel Saunders (205.12.18.1654 MST)--
> 
> > Rick Marken (2005.12.18.1510)
> > 
> > But there is no such thing as purpose in  
> > behaviorism so they make believe that external events -- like  
> > reinforcers -- can pull behavior out of an organism.
> 
> We had a long discussion on this about 7-8 years ago on CSG-L, even getting to a little modeling. This is not as hidden in the behaviorist literature as Rick and Bill sometimes like to claim (straw men are easier to attack, and this straw man has been being beaten since the early days of the "cognitive revolution", so they are really just joining the crowd).

Hi Samuel. Nice to hear from you.

I guess I don't quite understand you post. What is it that is not hidden in the behaviorist literature that I claim is hidden? What's the straw man?

Best

Rick

> **···**
>
> ---  
> Richard S. Marken Consulting  
> marken@mindreadings.com  
> Home 310 474-0313  
> Cell 310 729-1400

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Samuel\_Saunders](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/s/9de053/32.png) [@Samuel\_Saunders](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Samuel_Saunders)\
**Post date:** [December 20, 2005, 6:31pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/29 "2005-12-20T18:31:10Z")

</div>

[From Samuel Saunders (2005.12.20.1118 MST)]

> **···**
>
> On Tue, Dec 20, 2005 at 10:04:17AM -0800, Rick Marken wrote:
> 
> > Rick Marken (2005.12.20.1000)
> > 
> > \>Samuel Saunders (205.12.18.1654 MST)--  
> > \>  
> > \>\>Rick Marken (2005.12.18.1510)  
> > \>\>  
> > \>\>But there is no such thing as purpose in  
> > \>\>behaviorism so they make believe that external events -- like  
> > \>\>reinforcers -- can pull behavior out of an organism.  
> > \>  
> > \>We had a long discussion on this about 7-8 years ago on CSG-L, even  
> > \>getting to a little modeling. This is not as hidden in the  
> > \>behaviorist literature as Rick and Bill sometimes like to claim (straw  
> > \>men are easier to attack, and this straw man has been being beaten  
> > \>since the early days of the "cognitive revolution", so they are really  
> > \>just joining the crowd).
> > 
> > Hi Samuel. Nice to hear from you.
> > 
> > I guess I don't quite understand you post. What is it that is not  
> > hidden in the behaviorist literature that I claim is hidden? What's the  
> > straw man?
> > 
> > Best
> > 
> > Rick  
> > ---  
> > Richard S. Marken Consulting  
> > marken@mindreadings.com  
> > Home 310 474-0313  
> > Cell 310 729-1400
> 
> I just meant that behaviorists were and are aware of the need for "establishing operations" or some other means to make "reinforcers" reinforcing. They didn't really attribute magical properties to reinforcers, they just tried to tie them directly to external operations instead of linking those operations to references. If they had understood the test for controlled variables, they would have had a more elegant way of addressing the problem. I think suggesting that behaviorists and their relevant literature doesn't struggle with this problem and to suggest that they ignore it is to miss the chance for a good dialogue. It was certainly what got me interested in PCT, and as a recall it was an important attraction of PCT for Bruce Abott as well.
> 
> Samuel  
> --  
> Samuel Spence Saunders, Ph.D.  
> saunders@westriverresearch.com  
> Partner, West River Research Associates

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/letter_avatar_proxy/v4/letter/r/edb3f5/32.png) [@Richard\_Marken2](http://discourse.iapct.org/u/Richard_Marken2)\
**Post date:** [December 20, 2005, 8:29pm UTC](http://discourse.iapct.org/t/feedback/4322/30 "2005-12-20T20:29:30Z")

</div>

[From Rick Marken (2005.12.20.1230)

> Samuel Saunders (2005.12.20.1118 MST)--

> I just meant that behaviorists were and are aware of the need for "establishing operations" or some other means to make "reinforcers" reinforcing.

Yes, I know. I guess I just don't consider "establishing operations" the same as inner purpose.

> They didn't really attribute magical properties to reinforcers, they just tried to tie them directly to external operations instead of linking those operations to references.

I know behaviorists don't consciously attribute such properties to reinforcers, but, as you say, they are trying to tie the apparent behavior strengthening properties of reinforcement to external operations rather than to internal references. In other words, the reason for the effect of reinforcement is "out there" in those external operations rather than "in here" in the reference for (purpose of consuming) food. I still don't see the straw man.

> If they had understood the test for controlled variables, they would have had a more elegant way of addressing the problem.

To say the least. But to understand the test they would have to had to understand what a controlled variable is (a purposefully produced result), so they really can't do the test without doing a complete transition from behaviorism to PCT.

> I think suggesting that behaviorists and their relevant literature doesn't struggle with this problem and to suggest that they ignore it is to miss the chance for a good dialogue. It was certainly what got me interested in PCT, and as a recall it was an important attraction of PCT for Bruce Abott as well.

We have assumed that behaviorists \_do\_ struggle with this problem (of the apparent purposive nature of behavior) and we have had several dialogues with behaviorists that basically went nowhere. Apparently, they don't struggle all that hard with whatever you think they are struggling with. A public example of a dialog with behaviorists is the one that followed the publication of Bill Powers' 1973 \_Science\_ paper, "Feedback: Beyond behaviorism". I've had several dialogs with behaviorists following the publication of my 1985 "Selection of consequences" paper in Psychological Reports. I love to dialog about this stuff but, probably because the personal stakes are so high (someone has to change their understanding of behavior in a significant way) these always comes to naught. I'm not changing my perspective (I've already done my changing) and neither are they.

You and Bruce Abbott, like me, went to PCT without any prodding. For whatever reason, you, Bruce and me saw merit in what Bill was doing and embraced PCT because it made sense to us, not because someone coaxed us into it. Indeed, now that I think of it, I might have resisted PCT if someone had tried to coax me into looking into it. I don't like being "sold" things and if someone had said to me something like "Try this PCT thing. It's similar to what you already believe, only better" I probably would have blown them off and never read B:CP (which might not have been such a bad thing from the point of view of many on this list;-).

Best regards

Rick

> **···**
>
> ----  
> Richard S. Marken Consulting  
> marken@mindreadings.com  
> Home 310 474-0313  
> Cell 310 729-1400

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