Finding the will

[From Rick Marken (2000.06.09.1430)]

Bjoern Simonsen (2000.06.09. 21:00 GMT +1) --

I have been at the CSG home page and searched for the concept
"Will" with no results. But I am still untrained in PCT.

Try "volition". It's a synonym for "will" and it's the term
Bill uses in B:CP in his discussion of conscious "willing".

I think "will" (or "volition") is a consciousness phenomenon.
It certainly makes no sense to associate it with the "difference
between a perception and a reference level" (error signal), as
Martin does. Will is like an _independent variable_; to will is to
try to cause something to happen. The error signal is a variable
in a control loop; it is both an independent and a dependent
variable _at the same time_. The size of the error signal, in
other words, is both a cause and a result of actions of the
control system. This feature of the error signal doesn't
capture the "independent variable" sense of "will" or
"volition" for me.

The only variable in a control loop that functions as an
independent variable _and_ (unlike disturbance variables, the
other independent variable in a control loop) is inside the
system itself (which is presumably doing the "willing") is the
reference signal. But in a hierarchy of control systems,
even the reference signal is not a true independent variable
because it is part of a higher level control loop. This is
why I think of "will" (or "volition") as phenomena outside the
control hierarchy -- where consciousness dwells.

Again, I think these things are dealt with very nicely by Powers
in B:CP (the chapter on Memory or Learning, I forget). Check it
out!

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.06.09.1950)]

Rick Marken (2000.06.09.1430)

The only variable in a control loop that functions as an
independent variable _and_ (unlike disturbance variables, the
other independent variable in a control loop) is inside the
system itself (which is presumably doing the "willing") is the
reference signal. But in a hierarchy of control systems,
even the reference signal is not a true independent variable
because it is part of a higher level control loop. This is
why I think of "will" (or "volition") as phenomena outside the
control hierarchy -- where consciousness dwells.

How is this "volition" realized? Or is it an illusion?

BG

"Many people are convinced they are thinking when they are simply having
thoughts."

[From Rick Marken (2000.06.09.2030)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.06.09.1950)

How is this "volition" realized? Or is it an illusion?

I don't know how it is realized. But it is not an illusion;
it is a phenomenon that I have observed in myself. And I
have talked to other people who have experienced what seems
to be the same thing -- the phenomenon of willing an arbitrary
result (arbitrary in that it isn't done to satisfy some other
purpose). Bill (in B:CP) suggests that this phenomenon may be
explained by the activities of the reorganizing system. That
sounds good to me. Now all we need is a model and some
experimental research to test it.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.06.10.0650)]

Rick Marken (2000.06.09.2030)

I don't know how it is realized. But it is not an illusion;
it is a phenomenon that I have observed in myself. And I
have talked to other people who have experienced what seems
to be the same thing -- the phenomenon of willing an arbitrary
result (arbitrary in that it isn't done to satisfy some other
purpose). Bill (in B:CP) suggests that this phenomenon may be
explained by the activities of the reorganizing system. That
sounds good to me. Now all we need is a model and some
experimental research to test it.

It seems to me that it would be difficult to rule out the possibility that
such "arbitrary" results are in fact the result of controlling the higher
order perception that you _are_ capable of carrying out arbitrary
actions--capable of exercising your "will".

BG

Best

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

"Many people are convinced they are thinking when they are simply having
thoughts."

[From Rick Marken (2000.06.10.0800)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.06.10.0650)--

It seems to me that it would be difficult to rule out the
possibility that such "arbitrary" results are in fact the
result of controlling the higher order perception that you
_are_ capable of carrying out arbitrary actions--capable of
exercising your "will".

Yes. It seems so to me, too. Difficult, but not impossible.
In fact, it should be rather straight-forward once you have
the model in place.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
mindreadings.com

[From Rick Marken (2000.06.10.0800)]

Yes. It seems so to me, too. Difficult, but not impossible.
In fact, it should be rather straight-forward once you have
the model in place.

Since "will" plays no role in the HPCT model, I'm afraid I don't understand
what model you are referring to.

BG
"Many people are convinced they are thinking when they are simply having
thoughts."

[From Rick Marken (2000.06.10.1130)]

Bruce Gregory --

Since "will" plays no role in the HPCT model, I'm afraid I
don't understand what model you are referring to.

As I said, will (volition) does play a role in the HPCT
model; it is the output of the reorganizing system (see
B:CP, pp. 197-201).

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0610.1835)]

Rick Marken (2000.06.10.1130)

As I said, will (volition) does play a role in the HPCT
model; it is the output of the reorganizing system (see
B:CP, pp. 197-201).

Most extraordinary. Like you, I await with interest a testable model.
Until then, I'll stick with random reorganization confined to the least
effective control system(s) in the hierarchy.

BG
"Many people are convinced they are thinking when they are simply having
thoughts."

[From Bill Powers (200610.1944 MDT)]

Most extraordinary. Like you, I await with interest a testable model.
Until then, I'll stick with random reorganization confined to the least
effective control system(s) in the hierarchy.

Hard to see what confines it there, unless something directs it to work
where the problem is and not elsewhere. That part of the model remains
incomplete. I have guessed that awareness (which seems drawn to problems)
quides reorganization to the place where it is needed. Just a guess.

As to the phenomenon of will or volition, I think the way to approach it is
to ask what people have been referring to by that word. It's probably the
sense of selecting what is to happen (be experienced) before we act to make
it happen (so it's connected with reference signals). Of course in any
given case of willing, we then have to account for why we willed that
particular outcome rather than another. That requires going up a level to
see what is accomplished once the willed outcome occurs. I don't know that
a "reasonless" choice of reference signals ever really occurs, though it's
not hard to make up an example where no reason is evident (I just reached
down and put my finger on the clip of my glasses case, for the sake of
doing something with no purpose other than to demonstrate doing something
for no logical purpose).

There are those who claim that every action must be caused somehow, but
that claim is as empty as the claim that we can do things causelessly. The
truth is independent of any mere claims we may make.

Best.

Bill P.

[From Kenny Kitzke (2000.06.11)]

<Bill Powers (200610.1944 MDT)>

<That part of the model remains incomplete. I have guessed that awareness
(which seems drawn to problems) quides reorganization to the place where it
is needed. Just a guess.>

Yes, indeed. As marvelous as PCT is in explaining certain aspects of
behavior in living things, there is much work left to do to fully model and
describe behavior in human beings who have something inside them (their human
nature or spirit) not evident in other living things-like a will, or some
other descriptive term like volition, care, concern, longing, etc.

<As to the phenomenon of will or volition, I think the way to approach it is
to ask what people have been referring to by that word. It's probably the
sense of selecting what is to happen (be experienced) before we act to make
it happen (so it's connected with reference signals).>

This has moved me to theorize there are clearly higher levels of perceptions
in the human hierarchy than what you describe as principles or systems. To
me, self is definitely higher than a systems reference and may be a 12th
level. Could be where will is to be found, i.e., self-will?

<Of course in any given case of willing, we then have to account for why we
willed that particular outcome rather than another. That requires going up a
level to
see what is accomplished once the willed outcome occurs.>

I can only wonder if there are still higher levels of reference perception
where self-will may be found, or levels above self-will?

Lastly, the human will, the human spirit, or whatever it is, may be more
related to what you theorize to be the reorganization system, perhaps the
human comparator, that deals with high level perceptions not learned from
experience.

I wish someone smarter than myself had the time and ability to do the
research to better understand PCT regarding human behavior and their nature.

Hoping to see the CSG-gang at the Conference in about a month.

Kenny

[Bill Curry (2000.06.11.1000 EST)]

Martin Taylor (2000.06.0200)
Rick Marken (2000.06.09.1430)
Bill Powers (200610.1944 MDT)

I think "will" and "volition" and "self control" are slippery subjective terms
we use to describe conflict situations wherein controlling for a selected
perception creates side-effect disturbances and persistent high error in other
well-entrenched systems that are often not in awareness. I also agree with
Martin's observation, "that for some purpose higher in the hierarchy the state
of that perception matters".

These terms frequently come to mind when trying to introduce a new control
system into the hierarchy, say a program perception that will reduce error in
a revised principle reference. To attain this new perception, we ratchet up
the gain on that loop, and try to loosen control in the conflicting systems by
whatever means available. Maintaining control of the selected variable, in
the absence of immediate fundamental reorganization, requires an abnormally
high allocation of attentional bandwidth. I think it is this difficult process
of close focusing in the face of persistent collateral error that gives rise
to descriptors like 'will" or "volition" or "self-control".

The unusually high attentional requirement, makes such situations
experientially _appear_ unique in some way -- as if the Observer suddenly
grabs the reins to overpower the hierarchy, but it's most likely just the
hierarchy at work managing the interplay of a galaxy of variables as they are
disturbed from moment to moment, and, as Bill suggests, guiding the
reorganizing system to where it is needed.

Rick, on what grounds can you assert that volitional consciousness is a
phenonmena that exists outside of the hierarchy? My understanding is that
living organisms have an organizing system and a learned hierarchy of control
systems. The organizing system is a "dumb" system not a little man in the
head tweaking knobs to set references. Why can't consciousness be simply
explained as the felt experience of perceptual control.

In the absence of collateral system error, our purposeful control of
intentions like hitting a tennis ball, writing a paper, touching a finger to
an object or attending a concert appear totally unremarkable? Do we say,
"Gee, I really had to use a lot of willpower to sit there and listen to
Pavarotti"? No, but this same statement might be appropriate if we
desperately needed to use the restroom.

Control on!

Bill

···

--
William J. Curry
Capticom, Inc.
capticom@landmarknet.net

[From Rick Marken (2000.06.09.1430)]

I am not quite sure I understand you completely. I will appreciate
if you will look at my comments.

I think "will" (or "volition") is a consciousness phenomenon.

As long as I don't have a definition for the concept "will"/"volition"
it is a problem for me to have a point of view about "will" as a
consciousness phenomena or an unconsciousness phenomena.
I will comment this later.
I agree with Bill [From Bill Powers (200610.1944 MDT)]

As to the phenomenon of will or volition, I think the way to approach it is
to ask what people have been referring to by that word.

It certainly makes no sense to associate it with the "difference
between a perception and a reference level" (error signal), as
Martin does. Will is like an _independent variable_; to will is to
try to cause something to happen.

I don't understand why this is so certainly. I have re-read B:CP.

As I said, will (volition) does play a role in the HPCT
model; it is the output of the reorganizing system (see
B:CP, pp. 197-201).

As I understand PCT, a disturbance starts a control loop. If there
is no reference that co-operates with the perception,
reorganization will happen. After reorganization there will be a
reference. This reference will co-operate with an input and an
error will create an output and so on.

Memory may also start a control loop.

If "to will is to try to cause something happen" (as you write), and
[From Rick Marken (2000.06.10.1130)]

As I said, will (volition) does play a role in the HPCT
model; it is the output of the reorganizing system (see
B:CP, pp. 197-201).

Will this output next time or next next time establish a reference
in the HPCT? If so there is a chance to

associate it with the "difference
between a perception and a reference level" (error signal)

I guess this is a possibility.

The error signal is a variable
in a control loop; it is both an independent and a dependent
variable _at the same time_.

Is it correct that it is a dependent variable when we associate
it with the "difference between a perception and a reference level"
(error signal) and an independent variable when it is an intrinsic
error after the comparator where the intrinsic reference signal
is compared with an intrinsic perceptual signal.

The size of the error signal, in
other words, is both a cause and a result of actions of the
control system. This feature of the error signal doesn't
capture the "independent variable" sense of "will" or
"volition" for me.

It still does for me and I will comment it later.

The only variable in a control loop that functions as an
independent variable _and_ (unlike disturbance variables, the
other independent variable in a control loop) is inside the
system itself (which is presumably doing the "willing") is the
reference signal.

Am I wrong when I say a perception or an input in a control loop
is an independent variable?

But in a hierarchy of control systems,
even the reference signal is not a true independent variable
because it is part of a higher level control loop. This is
why I think of "will" (or "volition") as phenomena outside the
control hierarchy -- where consciousness dwells.

An independent variable in a system is an independent variable.
It doesn't matter if the same variable is a dependent variable
in an other system.
I am not sure if I care for the concept "true variable".

I will give an account of a practical situation back in 1992.
This is not research report it is more like a story. At that
time I didn't know about PCT, but I had read Norbert Wieners
et al's essay "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology"

At that time I did smoke. I did smoke after breakfast, after
the car was in motion, when I stepped out of a bus, when I met
other people who smoked, after lunch, when I had a problem with
a subject and more.
In this situations (and still more often) I lightened a cigarette.

Then I decided to stop smoking.

I made a formula saying " Earlier I had a smoke after breakfast (or
an other situation). Now I don't smoke any more. Therefore I shall not
have a smoke now. This time I remembered that I earlier had a
smoke after breakfast. Next time I shall not remember "my smoke after
breakfast" as well as I did this time. And next time I will not hook up
"end of breakfast" and the thought of a smoke""
This was the essence I told myself in different situations 20, 30, 40
times a day.

At that time my fundament for changing my behavior was a sentence
in Wiener et all's essay:
(I still remember the sentence) "The basis of the concept of purpose is
awareness of "voluntary activity". Now the purpose of voluntary acts
is not a matter of arbitrary interpretation but a physiological fact....."

At that time I understood it as I made a thought track which were steering
my behavior.

To day I think I understand PCT. And today I don't talk about "thought
tracks", I talk about references or intrinsic references.

End of the story. Back to "finding the will".

I think people who stop smoking have "a will". I think they have a lot
of references that co-operate with different perceptions.
They get more references for every day they stop smoking.

The more relevant references they have, the greater chance they have
to stop smoking.

And here is my point: The more relevant references a human being has,
the better chance he has to choose his own behavior. And he and other
people watching him will say he has "a will".

In the beginning of this letter I wrote:
"As long as I don't have a definition for the concept "will"/"volition"
its a problem for me to have a point of view about "will" if it
is a consciousness phenomena or also an unconsciousness phenomena.
I will comment this later."

Now I will say: I don't think the concept "will" is a necessary concept in
PCT.
I think it is better to talk about enough relevant references.

I will also say that the control loops function unconsciously.

Other people may say that I have a strong will not smoking when other
people smoke. To day I don't think about smoking. And I don't smoke.
Something happens unconsciously.

best

Bjoen Simonsen

[From Bill Powers (2000.06.11.1427 MDT)]

I can only wonder if there are still higher levels of reference perception
where self-will may be found, or levels above self-will?

Kenny, I can't trust anything you propose on this subject because I know
you think you already know the answer: God. You are not in a position to
approach any subject of this nature in the spirit of true enquiry. It is
simply not possible to have faith and to be a scientist at the same time.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2000.06.11.1439 MDT)]

[Bill Curry (2000.06.11.1000 EST)]

I think your association of "will" with conflict is probably right. When
we're operating without conflict, we don't feel that doing things is
effortful; we just do them. As you say (and I think Bjorn says), there's no
special sense of willing unless there's some sort of problem.

Interesting. But not as interesting to me as trying to figure out how the
tendon reflex works! There's a real answer to that problem, and I think we
can find it.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.06.11.1847)]

Bill Powers (2000.06.11.1427 MDT)

>I can only wonder if there are still higher levels of reference perception
>where self-will may be found, or levels above self-will?

Kenny, I can't trust anything you propose on this subject because I know
you think you already know the answer: God. You are not in a position to
approach any subject of this nature in the spirit of true enquiry. It is
simply not possible to have faith and to be a scientist at the same time.

Your last statement is on shaky grounds historically. To take one example,
Newton was a believer and by most standards a scientist. Problems only seem
to arise when divine intervention plays a role in your scientific models.

BG

"Either the wallpaper goes, or I do."
--Oscar Wilde, last words

[From Rick Marken (2000.06.11.1740)]

Bill Curry (2000.06.11.1000 EST)

Rick, on what grounds can you assert that volitional
consciousness is a phenonmena that exists outside of the
hierarchy?

On subjective grounds: My conscious volitional activity
seems to be _about_ the controlling being done by my
control hierarchy.

On modeling grounds: The reorganizing system operates
on the control hierarchy. The reorganizing system is
itself a control system which senses the state of the
hierarchy (how well it is controlling, for example)
and acts (probably by randomly changing characteristics
of perceptual and output functions in the hierarchy) to
bring the sensed state of the hierarchy to the reorganizing
system's _intrinsic_ reference level.

Me:

It certainly makes no sense to associate it [volition] with
the "difference between a perception and a reference level"
(error signal), as Martin does.

Bj�rn Simonsen (2000.06.11) --

I don't understand why this is so certainly.

I guess I don't know how to explain it then.

As I understand PCT, a disturbance starts a control loop

A control loop is operating continuously; it has no
start or end. A disturbance will typically be associated
with the initiation of action that protects the controlled
variable from that disturbance; but the same thing happens
when the reference signal changes.

I think the best way to think about the operation of a control
loop is in terms of control of perception. That is, think of
the reference signal as determining the value of the perceptual
signal in a well functioning control loop. When the reference
signal changes, the perceptual signal (the perception) changes
right along with it. This happens becuase the control system is
_continuously_ doing whatever it must to keep the perception
"on target" (at the reference value). In a well functioning
control system (like you) the error signal is always near
zero while the perceptual signal is being forced to follow the
reference signal. This is another reason why the reference
signal seems to act more like what I think of as "will" than
does the error signal.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
mindreadings.com

[From Bill Powers (2000.06.11.2017 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.06.11.1847)--

Your last statement is on shaky grounds historically. To take one example,
Newton was a believer and by most standards a scientist. Problems only seem
to arise when divine intervention plays a role in your scientific models.

Newton did not have beliefs about the colors of the spectrum, or the law of
universal gravitation, or his developments in the calculus -- as far as I
know. Remember also the grave risks attending upon being publically known
as an unbeliever in those days. If I had been writing in the 17th Century,
you can be sure that B:CP would have been studded with pious sentiments,
with control theory being a revelation showing the perfection of God's
works. This probably would have misled later readers about my actual
religious beliefs.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory(2000.06.12.10270]

Bill Powers (2000.06.11.2017 MDT)

Bruce Gregory (2000.06.11.1847)--

>Your last statement is on shaky grounds historically. To take one example,
>Newton was a believer and by most standards a scientist. Problems only seem
>to arise when divine intervention plays a role in your scientific models.

Newton did not have beliefs about the colors of the spectrum, or the law of
universal gravitation, or his developments in the calculus -- as far as I
know.

Indeed. That's why I said the mistake was to include the Divinity in one's
scientific models.

Remember also the grave risks attending upon being publically known
as an unbeliever in those days. If I had been writing in the 17th Century,
you can be sure that B:CP would have been studded with pious sentiments,
with control theory being a revelation showing the perfection of God's
works. This probably would have misled later readers about my actual
religious beliefs.

Quite so. However, in Newton's case we have his extensive writings on the
Apocrypha. These are largely unpublished, but are said to exceed by a good
amount his scientific writings. What Newton did hide, for the reasons you
state, were his Unitarian convictions. It would have been most unwise to
voice any doubts about the Trinity.

BG

Rick Marken (2000.06.11.1740)
Bill Curry (2000.06.11.1000 EST)

> Rick, on what grounds can you assert that volitional
> consciousness is a phenonmena that exists outside of the
> hierarchy?

On subjective grounds: My conscious volitional activity
seems to be _about_ the controlling being done by my
control hierarchy.

Do you mean that any conscious thoughts having to do with volition or
self assessments of control activity are outside the hierarchy? Why
aren't these thoughts just the passive felt experience of observing the
control systems at work. As WTP said in MSOB, "Perception is simply the
world of experience". When we see, we are actual seeing the visual
perceptual signals of our brain/eye mechanisms, and when we think we are
also directly experiencing other perceptual signals that represent our
view of the world. Bruce's quote: "Many people are convinced they are
thinking when they are simply having thoughts." is right on point here.

In response to Bj�rn Simonsen (2000.06.11), you said:

In a well functioning
control system (like you) the error signal is always near
zero while the perceptual signal is being forced to follow the
reference signal. This is another reason why the reference
signal seems to act more like what I think of as "will" than
does the error signal.

If the "will" phenomena is associated with the reference signal in a
hierarchical control loop, it must either be within that loop, or
according to the HPCT model, it must enter the hierarchy in the form of
a dumb, arbitrary reorganization signal inserted at a higher level.
"Will" in my experience does not conform to attributes such as arbitrary
or dumb--rather, it appears to be an term applied in instances involving
application of the learned hierarchy in the face of high level
conflict. Moreover, the concept of "will" is not dichotomous: It is
arises along a continuum of error intensity running from zero
(unconflicted automatic mode or "flow") to extreme levels of conflict.

Given these arguments, would you consider revising your position?

Best,

Bill

···

--
William J. Curry
Capticom, Inc.
capticom@landmarknet.net

[From Rick Marken (2000.06.12.0930)]

Bill Curry (2000.06.11.1000 EST)--

Do you mean that any conscious thoughts having to do
with volition or self assessments of control activity
are outside the hierarchy?

I mean that consciousness in general (awareness and volition)
must be functionally (not necessarily structurally) outside
the hierarchy.

Why aren't these thoughts just the passive felt experience
of observing the control systems at work.

That's what awareness is. The aspect of us that can become
aware of perceptions controlled by the hierarchy is separate
from the perceptions in the hierarchy. Consciousness is the
aspect of us that can _perceive_ (become aware of) what we
are perceiving. I think of the process of perceiving perception
as conscious awareness.

The fact that conscious awareness of perception is not the
same as perception itself is proved by the fact that
perceptions can enter and disappear from awareness somewhat
voluntarily. You can make yourself aware of the perception of
your posture, for example -- a variable you control all the
time == and then become unaware of it. When you are unaware
of a controlled perception (like posture) you don't stop
controlling (and, thus, having) that perception. Your
consciousness is just no longer perceiving (aware of) that
particular perception.

If the "will" phenomena is associated with the reference
signal in a hierarchical control loop, it must either be
within that loop, or...

Given these arguments, would you consider revising your
position?

No. "Will" is just a word. If it points to the production
of an intended result then I would say that the reference
signal was responsible for the fact that that result (and
not some other) was "willed" (and produced); so the reference
signal corresponds to "will" in the sense of "intend". But
if "will" refers to the rather mysterious process that
allows us to revise how the hierarchy works (which is what
happens when we "will" our awareness "up a level") than I
would not agree that will is part of the operation of the
hierarchy -- because it is operating _on_ the hierarchy.

At the moment, PCT research and modeling is aimed mainly at
understanding purposeful behavior (controlling), whether it's
done consciously or unconsciously. There have been some clinical
investigations of consciousness phenomena (the work on "levels"
being the best example) but this has not been formal, model
testing type research. It's certainly _related_ to the PCT
model -- it is based on the notion that there are levels of
perception and control -- but it is not really part of the
PCT model because the PCT model currently doesn't include a
mechanism that allows it to go "up a level".

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com