[From Bill Powers (2000.06.12.1047 MDT)]
Quite so. However, in Newton's case we have his extensive writings on the
Apocrypha. These are largely unpublished, but are said to exceed by a good
amount his scientific writings. What Newton did hide, for the reasons you
state, were his Unitarian convictions. It would have been most unwise to
voice any doubts about the Trinity.
Interesting. Thanks for the info.
Best,
Bill P.
[Bill Curry (2000.06.12.1315 EST)]
Rick Marken (2000.06.12.0930)]
Bill Curry (2000.06.11.1000 EST)--
> Do you mean that any conscious thoughts having to do
> with volition or self assessments of control activity
> are outside the hierarchy?I mean that consciousness in general (awareness and volition)
must be functionally (not necessarily structurally) outside
the hierarchy.
Interesting post. This implies that the perceptual hierarchy is
structurally nested within a monitoring control system perceived as
consciousness. This further infers that consciousness is an
interactive meta-system that can intervene to set reference signals
signals within the hierarchy. Being an outer shell around the hierarchy
kernel would also put it a structural position to intermediate
(interface) with the reorganizing system. This structure is consistent
with the observation that reorganization seems to track awareness.
At the moment, PCT research and modeling is aimed mainly at
understanding purposeful behavior (controlling), whether it's
done consciously or unconsciously. There have been some clinical
investigations of consciousness phenomena (the work on "levels"
being the best example) but this has not been formal, model
testing type research. It's certainly _related_ to the PCT
model -- it is based on the notion that there are levels of
perception and control -- but it is not really part of the
PCT model because the PCT model currently doesn't include a
mechanism that allows it to go "up a level".
A formal hypothesis for the phenomena of consciousness seems a crucially
important missing link in a theory describing living control systems. I
understand the reluctance to take speculative leaps, when so much basic
modeling of control processes needs to be done. What I don't understand
is how making such a hypothesis about awareness (or other missing links
such as memory) is distinguished from advancing a hypothesis that
specific control levels exist.
Best,
Bill
--
William J. Curry
Capticom, Inc.
capticom@landmarknet.net
[From Rick Marken (2000.06.12.1430)]
Bill Curry (2000.06.12.1315 EST)]
Interesting post. This implies that the perceptual
hierarchy is structurally nested within a monitoring
control system perceived as consciousness...
Yes. This is basically how I view it. The hierarchy is
continuously and simultaneously controlling 12 or so types
of perceptual representations of the external environment,
from sensory intensities to system concepts. Consciousness
is perceiving this whole "hierarchy" show, comparing various
aspects of the performance of the hierarchy to built-in
(intrinsic) specifications (references) for this performance
and acting to make things "right" when these performance
perceptions deviate from their reference states.
I think the book "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance"
by Robert Pirsig was really a discussion of consciousness
from a PCT perspective (I've always thought it should be one
of the basic readings in PCT). The "motorcycle" being maintained
is the PCT hierarchy. What does the maintaining is that
mysterious, meta-control system called consciousness (Zen). It
maintains the "motorcycle" relative to some built in specifications
of "quality" which are the intrinsic reference specifications
for "motorcycle" performance.
The old "motorcycle" maintenance manual (model) was S-R; the new,
improved "motorcycle" maintenance manual is PCT. I don't think
anyone has produced a coherent manual (model) of the motorcycle
maintainer (consciousness), with the possible exception of Powers
in the B:CP Learning chapter.
A formal hypothesis for the phenomena of consciousness seems
a crucially important missing link in a theory describing living
control systems...
I agree. But I think there is a pretty good start at a formal
hypothesis in B:CP. What we _really_ need, though, is research
to test the model. But we can barely get anyone to do research
on the "motorcycle", let alone on the "motorcycle" maintainer. I
think the first (and most doable) task is to study the "motorcycle".
Once the PCT model of the "motorcycle" is well established by
research then it will be time to try working to understand the
maintainer (consciousness).
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (2000.06.13.0634)]
Rick Marken (2000.06.12.1430)
Bill Curry (2000.06.12.1315 EST)]
> Interesting post. This implies that the perceptual
> hierarchy is structurally nested within a monitoring
> control system perceived as consciousness...Yes. This is basically how I view it. The hierarchy is
continuously and simultaneously controlling 12 or so types
of perceptual representations of the external environment,
from sensory intensities to system concepts. Consciousness
is perceiving this whole "hierarchy" show, comparing various
aspects of the performance of the hierarchy to built-in
(intrinsic) specifications (references) for this performance
and acting to make things "right" when these performance
perceptions deviate from their reference states.
If Bill shares this view, I have misunderstood B:CP (a not unlikely
outcome). I understood consciousness ("the observer") to lack any ability
to influence the hierarchy. Nor can it, in my understanding, perceive the
entire hierarchy. Rather it can be aware of perceptions in the hierarchy
including memories. Consciousness can only infer the existence of reference
levels. It cannot perceive them directly or alter them. Reorganization
sometimes seems to follow consciousness, but consciousness has no control
over reorganization--that is, reorganization can be modeled without
invoking consciousness.
My interpretation happens to be consistent with Buddhism as I understand
it, but it casts no light on motorcycle maintenance.
BG
"Either the wallpaper goes, or I do."
--Oscar Wilde, last words
[Bill Curry (2000. 06.13.0830 EST)]
Bruce Gregory wrote:
Bruce Gregory (2000.06.13.0634)
.... I understood consciousness ("the observer") to lack any ability
to influence the hierarchy....Reorganization sometimes seems to follow
consciousness, but consciousness has no control over reorganization--that
is, reorganization can be modeled without invoking consciousness.
The observation that reorganization seems to follow consciousness implies a
structural linkage of some sort, does it not?
Your other points concerning conscious perception of the hierarch are well
taken.
Regards,
Bill
--
William J. Curry
Capticom, Inc.
capticom@landmarknet.net
[From Rick Marken (2000.06.13.0830)]
Bruce Gregory (2000.06.13.0634)--
If Bill shares this view, I have misunderstood B:CP...
I understood consciousness ("the observer") to lack any
ability to influence the hierarchy.
The only data we have to test these ideas is subjective
observation of our own mental processes. That means we're
in philosophy mode and, based on my reading of his last
few posts, I think Bill has no more patience for philosophy.
So my guess is that we're unlikely to find out whether or
not Bill shares this view. But if you re-read the B:CP
Learning chapter, you will see that Bill discusses two
aspects of consciousness: awareness and volition. Volition
involves "tweaking" control systems in the hierarchy (see
the discussion of Wiener's model); to do this, consciousness
must be able to influence the behavior of signals in the
hierarchy.
I think there is subjective evidence for an influence of
consciousness on the hierarchy during learning or creativity.
For example, I have consciously (volitionally) tried various
new strategies for moving on the court when I've found myself
in the (rare;-)) position of losing at racquetball to someone
I have never played before.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Kenny Kitzke (2000.06.11.30 EDT)]
<Bill Powers (2000.06.11.1427 MDT)]>
<It is simply not possible to have faith and to be a scientist at the same
time.>
According to Bill's perceived world. But, as others have already pointed
out, there are some pretty famous and respected scientists who happened to
have faith in a supreme, almighty, being (often called God) who created and
controls all we perceive, including what we call human beings.
I don't perceive an a priori impossibility for people of faith doing science
or being respected as scientists. So, I guess we differ. Big deal.
<Kenny, I can't trust anything you propose on this subject because I know
you think you already know the answer: God.>
I am sorry to disturb you, but having your trust is not something I need at a
high level. I would like your trust, of course, but recognize that I must
earn that trust *scientifically* in your world. Nor, do you have much grasp
of what I think about anything, much less God.
Unfortunately, you have not earned my trust either when it comes to
explaining human nature. And, I doubt that you care any more about what I
think about that than what I do about what you think about God.
<You are not in a position to approach any subject of this nature in the
spirit of true enquiry.>
So you say.
IMO, you have barely touched the surface of explaining human nature unless
you think that the only aspect that defines human nature is that human beings
control perceptions when they behave. You have done a marvelous job of that.
I respect your findings there and trust you a great deal in humbly sharing
your knowledge of behavior.
As this thread seems to demonstrate, PCT and HPCT, as you have developed
them, leave a lot of issues surrounding even human behavior rather fuzzy and
speculative. These are opportunities to grow knowledge and science. I hope
you, and others (perhaps even me) will continue to build on the solid
foundation you have built.
Best human regards,
Kenny
[From Bruce Gregory (2000.06.13.1206)]
Rick Marken (2000.06.13.0830)
I think there is subjective evidence for an influence of
consciousness on the hierarchy during learning or creativity.
For example, I have consciously (volitionally) tried various
new strategies for moving on the court when I've found myself
in the (rare;-)) position of losing at racquetball to someone
I have never played before.
I have do doubt that you have tried various new strategies for moving on
the court. Such behavior sounds like the result of reorganization. I also
have no doubt that you had thoughts about those strategies. What I doubt is
that those thoughts caused the change in strategies. That is, it is not
clear to me that I need to model your thoughts in order to model your
behavior on court. You no doubt have thoughts while tracking a moving
target, but you don't need to model those thoughts in order to model your
tracking behavior with extraordinary precision.
BG
[From Rick Marken (2000.06.13.1120)]
Bruce Gregory (2000.06.13.1206)--
I have do doubt that you have tried various new strategies
for moving on the court. Such behavior sounds like the result
of reorganization.
Right! I think the reorganizing system _is_ consciousness.
Awareness is the perceptual input to the reorganizing system;
volition is the (probably random) output of the reorganizing
system; the sense of "quality" is provided by the intrinsic
references, which are the reference inputs to the reorganizing
system.
Norman Hovda (2000.06.13.1020 MST) --
Would the following be an example of "reorganization"?
You betcha! Very good example.
Best
Rick
---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bruce Gregory (2000.06.13.1457)]
Rick Marken (2000.06.13.1120)
Bruce Gregory (2000.06.13.1206)--
> I have do doubt that you have tried various new strategies
> for moving on the court. Such behavior sounds like the result
> of reorganization.Right! I think the reorganizing system _is_ consciousness.
So if organism has a reorganizing system it must be conscious?
BG
[From Rick Marken (2000.06.1230)]
Bruce Gregory (2000.06.13.1457)--
So if organism has a reorganizing system it must be
conscious?
Yes. Good point. And since virtually all living systems have
some kind of capacity for behavioral reorganization, I would
say that all living organisms have some kind of consciousness.
This makes evolutionary as well as control theory sense to
me since it makes consciousness an adaptive aspect of the
behavioral organization of all living systems. Evolution
suggests that consciousness didn't spring full blown into the
brains of homo sapiens. Some kind of consciousness (reorganizing
system) must have been present in our ancestors. So we should
see different, but related, kinds of consciousnesses in our
mammalian cousins just as we see different, but related, kinds
of hands and feet in those animals.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com
[From Bill Powers (2000.06.13.1627 MDT)]
Bill Curry (2000.06.12.1315 EST) --
A formal hypothesis for the phenomena of consciousness seems a crucially
important missing link in a theory describing living control systems.
Just out of curiosity, what is the formal hypothesis for the phenomena of
consciousness that is present in any other theory about the nature of
living systems?
Best,
Bill P.
I
understand the reluctance to take speculative leaps, when so much basic
modeling of control processes needs to be done. What I don't understand
is how making such a hypothesis about awareness (or other missing links
such as memory) is distinguished from advancing a hypothesis that
specific control levels exist.Best,
Bill
--
William J. Curry
Capticom, Inc.
capticom@landmarknet.net
[From Bill Powers (2000.06.13.2014 MDT)]
Bruce Gregory (2000.06.13.0634)--
If Bill shares this view, I have misunderstood B:CP (a not unlikely
outcome). I understood consciousness ("the observer") to lack any ability
to influence the hierarchy. Nor can it, in my understanding, perceive the
entire hierarchy. Rather it can be aware of perceptions in the hierarchy
including memories. Consciousness can only infer the existence of reference
levels. It cannot perceive them directly or alter them. Reorganization
sometimes seems to follow consciousness, but consciousness has no control
over reorganization--that is, reorganization can be modeled without
invoking consciousness.
Things like this make me even more sure that I should keep my mouth shut
until I know what I'm talking about. All I know about consciousness is what
I experience of my own. And even then, I'm not sure what I'm looking at, or
how I'm looking at it, or where I'm standing, mentally, to make any of it
visible. I observe; therefore I am an observer. What else can be said?
Best,
Bill P.
My interpretation happens to be consistent with Buddhism as I understand
it, but it casts no light on motorcycle maintenance.BG
"Either the wallpaper goes, or I do."
--Oscar Wilde, last words
[From Bruce Nevin (2000.06.13.2323 EDT)]
It does not appear that awareness can observe its own observing. Douglas
Hofstadter notwithstanding, infinite regress is not another name for God.
Make a distinction between what is different and what is all the same.
Immediately the distinguisher is set apart. In the midst of what is all the
same, what is distinguished as different blazes forth. This further
establishes the distinguisher, as being neither different nor all the same.
This turmoil produces weariness. Seeking respite in categories and
regularities (dharmas) only deepens the turmoil and the weariness. (etc.
Shurangama Sutra, paraphrased recall.)
[From Bruce Gregory (2000.06.14.0514)]
Bill Powers (2000.06.13.2014 MDT)
Things like this make me even more sure that I should keep my mouth shut
until I know what I'm talking about. All I know about consciousness is what
I experience of my own. And even then, I'm not sure what I'm looking at, or
how I'm looking at it, or where I'm standing, mentally, to make any of it
visible. I observe; therefore I am an observer. What else can be said?
"What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence."
-Wittgenstein
_Tractatus_
BG
"Either the wallpaper goes, or I do."
--Oscar Wilde, last words
[Bill Curry (2000.06.14.1130 EST)]
Bill Powers (2000.06.13.1627 MDT)
>A formal hypothesis for the phenomena of consciousness seems a crucially
>important missing link in a theory describing living control systems.Just out of curiosity, what is the formal hypothesis for the phenomena of
consciousness that is present in any other theory about the nature of
living systems?
I get your point. This form of ghostbusting has been a treacherous
minefield in philosophy or science throughout recorded history.
Unfortunately the elegance and power of HPCT has the intoxicating side
effect of leading neophytes into believing it can or should explain
everything about everything. Not a realistic expectation at this state of
the game.
Thanks,
Bill
--
William J. Curry
Capticom, Inc.
capticom@landmarknet.net
[Martin Taylor 2000.06.17 09:04]
[From Rick Marken (2000.06.09.1430)]
I know this is old history by now, and the discussion has moved on,
but I'm just catching up after 2 weeks away (and I'm away for another
week starting tomorrow). Maybe this is still relevant. Anyway, it's
not too long.
I think "will" (or "volition") is a consciousness phenomenon.
It certainly makes no sense to associate it with the "difference
between a perception and a reference level" (error signal), as
Martin does.
A long time ago, when I was first learning PCT, Rick encouraged me
when I "correctly" identified "purpose" with a reference for
something to occur.
"Will" seemed to me to go beyond that, when I said: [Martin Taylor 2000.06.02]
The concept of "will" is a bit strange here, since it is recursive
within PCT. The "will" to change something is a reflection of a
difference between a perception and a reference level for that
perception. This imples that the thing to be changed is perceived,
and that for some purpose higher in the hierarchy the state of that
perception matters.
The implication of this is a bit different from what Rick' partial
quote suggests. To "will" something to occur implies a perception
that the thing willed is not now occurring. What is perceived is a
difference between a reference and a perception (i.e. the existence
of an error). One does not normally "will" an existing state of
affairs. One does not normally perceive the value of an error signal,
but to perceive oneself to be "willing" something necessarily asserts
that one perceives the existence of the error.
In "classic" HPCT the only signals that contribute to perceptual
signals are sensory signals or lower-level perceptions (and
imaginations). But in HPCT more generally, input to a perceptual
function can come from anywhere. The question one has to ask is
whether deviating from classic HPCT buys anything in describing a
phenomenon. This is a case where I think it does. Subjectively, one
clearly perceives that there is a state of affairs that needs
changing, which is, by definition, a perception of the existence of
error.
I've read enough beyond there to note that the concept of "conflict"
has showed up in the discussion on "will." That's natural, since
conflict (internal or external) is a prime reason why the error
exists. But it's not the only reason. One can "will" the mountain to
move, but it doesn't, unless one uses more than normal effort to move
it. So here's another correlate of "will"--the need to exert more
than normal effort, which is an ordinary consequence of conflict.
Also, I've read enough ahead to note that "reorganization" entered
the discussion. I think that's a red herring. Reorganization happens
when there is persistent error, which occurs when more than normal
effort is required to reduce the error. A good reorganization makes
the error go away by changing the mechanism for influencing the
perception (among other possibilities). That is not the experience of
"willing" something to happen.
The experience of a successful reorganization is "Why did I want that
so strongly, when this is so much better?" The experience of
successful "willing" is "I've succeeded in this difficult task that I
willed myself to do." Quite different.
----------------
I hope this isn't rehashing old ground others have said better.
Dropping in on these discussions sporadically is not the best way to
make useful contributions, but it's the best I can do right now.
Martin
[Bill Curry (2000.06.18.0800 EST)]
Martin Taylor 2000.06.17 09:04
>[From Rick Marken (2000.06.09.1430)]
I hope this isn't rehashing old ground others have said better.
Dropping in on these discussions sporadically is not the best way to
make useful contributions, but it's the best I can do right now.
Quite the contrary for me, Martin. A nice refinement of your thinking. Thanks.
....here's another correlate of "will"--the need to exert more
than normal effort, which is an ordinary consequence of conflict.
Also, I've read enough ahead to note that "reorganization" entered
the discussion. I think that's a red herring. Reorganization happens
when there is persistent error, which occurs when more than normal
effort is required to reduce the error. A good reorganization makes
the error go away by changing the mechanism for influencing the
perception (among other possibilities). That is not the experience of
"willing" something to happen.
The experience of a successful reorganization is "Why did I want that
so strongly, when this is so much better?" The experience of
successful "willing" is "I've succeeded in this difficult task that I
willed myself to do." Quite different.
Thus, the "will" (perception of error condition) exerts itself on an existing
(unreorganized) control system by increasing the gain on that system. The
weightlifter has flawless automatic control of the overhead press sequence. It
does not require reorganization. He "wills" himself beyond his personal best by
exerting exceptional effort. While HPCT envisions heirarchical control as one of
setting the states of lower level reference signals, it also needs a capacity for
controlling loop gains. WTP acknowledged this omission quite clearly at:
Bill Powers (991202.0453 MDT)
PCT is constructed around the concept of passing control from higher to lower
levels by means of varying
reference signals. That will remain the primary concept, because reference
signals determine the states of
experiences that are under control. But it is also possible that higher systems
may operate through changing
parameters of lower systems, such as their gain or their time constants. What is
affected by such changes is
the _character_ of control, not primarily the kind or level of experience being
controlled (although that can be
affected, too). For example, if you're trying to thread a needle and are too
tense, you hand will shake. So
without changing the reference condition of "thread-in-eye", you need to reduce
the amplification factor in the
output function to stop the oscillations. You wouldn't want to reduce the
sensitivity of the perceptual function
that is detecting the relationship between thread and needle, because then you'd
lose accuracy, and control
would get worse even if the oscillations stopped.
I am guessing that such a fundamentally apparent observation is omitted from HPCT
because no one has envisoned the wiring schema for such control (which would
require awareness and attention focusing mechanisms). True?
Best,
Bill
--
William J. Curry
Capticom, Inc.
capticom@landmarknet.net
[From Bill Powers (2000.06.18.0942 MDT)]
Bill Curry (2000.06.18.0800 EST)
I am guessing that such a fundamentally apparent observation [control by
varying parameters] is omitted from HPCT
because no one has envisoned the wiring schema for such control (which would
require awareness and attention focusing mechanisms). True?
The real reason is that I haven't come across an experimental situation
where control by parameters would be needed to explain observations. Once
you know what you have to model, the wiring scheme isn't hard to figure
out. The Artificial Cerebellum simulation does involve adaptive control,
but the adaptations aren't under control of a higher-level system (thoough
I suppose you could consider the cerebellum to be a higher level relative
to the spinal reflexes). And anyway, I've never set up an experiment
specifically to watch changes in parameter values as some new task is
learned. Good material for a doctoral thesis. I'm sure there are many
possibilities -- someone just has to take them seriously and do the work.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0618.1758)]
Martin Taylor 2000.06.17 09:04
A long time ago, when I was first learning PCT, Rick encouraged me
when I "correctly" identified "purpose" with a reference for
something to occur.
I think this identification is unfortunate. One doesn't normally think of
having a "purpose" or a "goal" to maintain one's body temperature at a
temperature of 98.6 F. Clearly it is reasonable to talk about a control
system in the hierarchy with this reference level, however.
"Will" seemed to me to go beyond that, when I said: [Martin Taylor 2000.06.02]
The concept of "will" is a bit strange here, since it is recursive
within PCT. The "will" to change something is a reflection of a
difference between a perception and a reference level for that
perception. This imples that the thing to be changed is perceived,
and that for some purpose higher in the hierarchy the state of that
perception matters.The implication of this is a bit different from what Rick' partial
quote suggests. To "will" something to occur implies a perception
that the thing willed is not now occurring. What is perceived is a
difference between a reference and a perception (i.e. the existence
of an error). One does not normally "will" an existing state of
affairs. One does not normally perceive the value of an error signal,
but to perceive oneself to be "willing" something necessarily asserts
that one perceives the existence of the error.
Again, I think this terminology is unfortunate since you can always
eliminate the need to perceive the existence of an error by postulating a
higher order control system. The thought "this isn't right" may have
nothing to do with error in the HPCT sense in which the term is used.
In "classic" HPCT the only signals that contribute to perceptual
signals are sensory signals or lower-level perceptions (and
imaginations). But in HPCT more generally, input to a perceptual
function can come from anywhere. The question one has to ask is
whether deviating from classic HPCT buys anything in describing a
phenomenon. This is a case where I think it does. Subjectively, one
clearly perceives that there is a state of affairs that needs
changing, which is, by definition, a perception of the existence of
error.
No, the problem here seems to be the ambiguous use of the term "perceive".
One does not perceive that something needs changing, one perceives a state
of affairs. If you have a reference state for that perception that differs
from the input, the hierarchy may act to eliminate error (assuming a lack
of conflict). You may have thoughts about those actions ("I really have to
do something about the mess in my office") but those thoughts are not an
essential part of the control process. That is, you can model the control
process without paying any attention to the thoughts.
I've read enough beyond there to note that the concept of "conflict"
Also, I've read enough ahead to note that "reorganization" entered
the discussion. I think that's a red herring. Reorganization happensThe experience of a successful reorganization is "Why did I want that
so strongly, when this is so much better?" The experience of
successful "willing" is "I've succeeded in this difficult task that I
willed myself to do." Quite different.
Again I differ. You may have any thought you like in association with
reorganization, but it is simply a "voice over" that needs to have nothing
to do with control. We seem to invite confusion when we identify thoughts
with actions of the hierarchy.
BG
"Either the wallpaper goes, or I do."
--Oscar Wilde, last words