First appoximation

[From Rick Marken (980811.0920)]

Well, I didn't hear any direct answers to my question:

what is it that you _want_ to hear us say about coercion?

So I guess I'll just have to try to piece it together from what I've
gotten so far.

···

--------
i.kurtzer (980811.0245) --

her accomplice in murder intended to rape her and did in fact
achieve coitus while unknowingly being recorded on 911 called in
by her. He intended to rape her, but it wasn't.

Kenny Kitzke (980811.0900 EDT) --

Rick (for the 4 billionth and one time), the stronger person is
controlling his perceptions of the actions of another by force if
necessary. Such self controlling can not be unilaterally defined
as a social interaction.

Bruce Nevin (980810.1754 EDT) --

I disagree with you that the stronger system is controlling
the *behavior* of the weaker one.

Bruce Gregory (980811.0940 EDT)

I found this post clear and compelling

--------

Ok. So here's a first approximation to the new, improved PCT
approach to coercion:

Coercion occurs when a stronger person forces a weaker person
to do something. Coercion is not control of behavior; it is
just two people, one strong and one weak, controlling their
own perceptions; the stronger person is controlling his
perceptions of the weaker person's behavior and the weaker
is controlling his perceptions, period.

In order to know that coercion is going on, you have to know
the intentions of both the weaker and the stronger person. If
their intentions are the same, then there is no coercion. If
their intentions are not the same, then there is coercion.

You can tell that the intentions of the stronger and weaker
persons are the same when the weaker person makes no effort
to resist the stronger one. So, if a stronger person offers a
weaker person a choice of doing either A or B, there is no
coercion if the weaker person choses either A or B. If the
weaker person choses C and the stronger person forces the
weaker person to do A or B, then there is coercion (although
the stronger person is not controlling the behavior of the
weaker person when he exerts this force).

Given this new, PCT approach to coercion, we can see that:

placing people in a position where they are arbitrarily
limited to only a few choices of actions (picked by someone
else), forced (physically, if necessary) to select one of
them (chosen by someone else), and are then told that the
choice was made by their own free will.

is coercion _only_ if the people placed in this situation
intend to chose actions other than those to which they have
been arbitrarily limited. If the people placed in this
situation choose one of the actions to which they have been
arbitrarily limited, they have not been coerced.

Is this about right?

Best

Rick
---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Rick Marken (980811.1215)]

Me:

Ok. So here's a first approximation to the new, improved PCT
approach to coercion:

Coercion occurs when...

Is this about right?

Bruce Nevin (980811.1321 EDT)

Sounds to me like a sarcastic attempt to make anyone who
disagrees with you sound silly.

It was an honest and serious attempt to articulate what seems
to be your (and many others') position on coercion. If it's
incorrect, all you have to do is correct it. Saying it sounds
sarcastic doesn't help me understand what is wrong with it.

This is a reference to the RTP question that so riled Bill. The
context of that question is a prior commitment, a commitment that
we are told was genuinely made by the child, to allow the teacher
to teach. That means, when an activity prevents the teacher from
teaching, the commitment is either not to do that or to go to the
RTP where what you do doesn't disrupt the class...Given that
prior commitment, which is like the prior commitment of the
employer to pay and the employee to work for pay, the question
is not condescending. The situation with the traffic cop is not
comparable.

The employer's committment to pay the employee is not what makes
the statement "I see you have chosen to get paid" non-condescending
in that case. What makes it non-condescending is the fact that
the employee actually intends to get paid; the employee _has_
chosen to get paid. In the case of the child, the genuineness
of the child's committment to let the teacher teach has nothing to
do with the disingenuousness of saying "I see you've chosen to
leave the class" when the child disrupts because the child does not
_intend_ to leave the class (just as you do not _intend_ to get a
ticket just because you have made a committment, when given your
driver's license, to follow the rules of the road).

Bruce Nevin (980811.1431 EDT) --

For the threat/offer forms of coercion, start with the diagrams
that I showed you in Vancouver, roughly represented in my
(980806.1715 EDT).

Could you send (or better, re-post) them. I don't have them.

Bruce Nevin (980811.1012 EDT) on "what is a model":

I'm afraid I find this post very confusing; I think you are
saying that we can use PCT to understand a particular
kind of behavior only after we have tested the PCT model of
that behavior. Is this what you mean. If so, then I wonder why
you remain interested in PCT since you have never tested a
PCT model of _any_ behavior at all. Are you just a glutton
for idle speculation?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

i.kurtzer (980811.1500)
[From Rick Marken (980811.1215)]

The employer's committment to pay the employee is not what makes
the statement "I see you have chosen to get paid" non-condescending
in that case. What makes it non-condescending is the fact that
the employee actually intends to get paid; the employee _has_
chosen to get paid. In the case of the child, the genuineness
of the child's committment to let the teacher teach has nothing to
do with the disingenuousness of saying "I see you've chosen to
leave the class" when the child disrupts because the child does not
_intend_ to leave the class (just as you do not _intend_ to get a
ticket just because you have made a committment, when given your
driver's license, to follow the rules of the road).

I am not a RTP person, but i see no reason why the child could not intend to
leave the class. In fact, I could well envision myself wishing to leave class
to deal with
the multitude of surban minutia of my life. When you say they "could not" you
are making a great number of presumptions about their lives. I do not think
that is reasonable at all. Of course, there are some children that do not
intend to go to the RTP; RTP is a unintended consequence. I have no say as to
whether this is good or bad. I'm still thinking about it. But I do think you
should not prima facia assume what the students' intentions are or ever could
be. I think that would be naive and wrong. I also do not think that is what
you intend.

i.

i.kurtzer (980811.1430)

Bruce Nevin (980811.1321 EDT)

> Sounds to me like a sarcastic attempt to make anyone who
> disagrees with you sound silly.

It was an honest and serious attempt to articulate what seems
to be your (and many others') position on coercion..........
I'm afraid I find this post Bruce Nevin (980811.1012 EDT) on "what is a

model":very > confusing; I think you are saying that we can use PCT to
understand a particular

kind of behavior only after we have tested the PCT model of
that behavior. Is this what you mean. If so, then I wonder why
you remain interested in PCT since you have never tested a
PCT model of _any_ behavior at all. Are you just a glutton
for idle speculation?

Rick, if you sincerely wish to have a scientific discussion then barbs and
innuendos will not get you what you want.

i.

i.kurtzer (980811.1500)

[From Rick Marken (980811.0920)]

Well, I didn't hear any direct answers to my question:
   what is it that you _want_ to hear us say about coercion?

I thought my reply was direct enough. Since you have paraphrased we can look
at that. In fact, that may be a better way for you to see what i intend.
i'll number each statement, and will see which ones to get rid of or revise.

1. Coercion occurs when a stronger person forces a weaker person
to do something.

unclear because of what "forces" implies. that is, maybe yes, maybe no.

2. Coercion is not control of behavior

this is Nevin's point, it is interesting and i tend to agree, but i'll let him
deal with that.

3; it is just two people, one strong and one weak, controlling their
own perceptions; the stronger person is controlling his
perceptions of the weaker person's behavior and the weaker
is controlling his perceptions, period.

i don't know here. maybe this is where nevin and i disagree, maybe not.
there comes a point where it seems ridiculous to me to say the weaker person
is controlling, but that does not mean the stronger person is controlling the
weaker's behavior per se.

4. In order to know that coercion is going on, you have to know
the intentions of both the weaker and the stronger person.

yes.

5. If their intentions are the same, then there is no coercion. If
their intentions are not the same, then there is coercion.

at a given level, yes. Some social interaction types might be better
understood across levels, such as deception and extortion. Things now need to
be worked out from the principle of #4

6. You can tell that the intentions of the stronger and weaker
persons are the same when the weaker person makes no effort
to resist the stronger one.

Noone except you and Bill has said this. Any conclusions based on this and
their subsequent refutation will be straw-men arguments.
The rest are derivitive of #6 . We can get back to the issues raised there,
but for now let us flesh out the difference in our positions. There's no
rush, so let's take our time.

i.

[From Bruce Nevin (980811.1321 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980811.0920)--

Is this about right?

Sounds to me like a sarcastic attempt to make anyone who disagrees with you
sound silly. You didn't wait very long for answers.

I didn't hear any direct answers to my question:

what is it that you _want_ to hear us say about coercion?

It isn't a case of wanting to hear you characterize coercion in a certain
way. It's a matter of looking at the characterization you have provided
(the spreadsheet), comparing it with what actually goes on, and saying "It
doesn't seem complete." Then there have been some quite specific proposals
about how to design a more adequate model. What is indirect about that?

Rick Marken (980810.2220)--

This just arrived in the same batch of email.

When I break the law (by speeding say) I'm never doing it in
order to get a ticket. So, if a policeman pulls me over and
says "I see you've chosen to get a ticket" I know (and I'm
sure he knows, too) that he is just being condescending; I
didn't chose to get the ticket.

This is a reference to the RTP question that so riled Bill. The context of
that question is a prior commitment, a commitment that we are told was
genuinely made by the child, to allow the teacher to teach. That means,
when an activity prevents the teacher from teaching, the commitment is
either not to do that or to go to the RTP where what you do doesn't disrupt
the class. At another time, it could be that the same activity is not a
disruption, depending on what the teacher and students are doing at the
time. Given that prior commitment, which is like the prior commitment of
the employer to pay and the employee to work for pay, the question is not
condescending. The situation with the traffic cop is not comparable.

It seems to me that you and Bill do not believe the assertion that the
child has genuinely bought into this prior commitment. If that is so, then
talk about that. That's the real issue. Don't bring up nonsense situations
with traffic cops that don't apply.

I can see that many of you (Isaac, Tim, Bruce G, Bruce N.
and apparently many others) are committed to objecting to
whatever Bill and I have to say about coercion.

That's one possible interpretation. Have you ruled out all possible
alternative explanations?

So I have a
suggestion. In an effort to stop this continual process of
going around in circles, could some (all?) of you answer a
couple of questions so I can at least understand what you want
from Bill and me?

1. What is it that Bill and I are saying that is so horribly
wrong about coercion?

It's counterfactual in ways that I have specified. It's incomplete in ways
that I have specified. It may be possible to make it more complete and to
make it account for what actually is observed in coercion if it is
augmented in ways that I have specified--that's a matter for empirical
verification. If what the victim of coercion actually does is by definition
irrelevant, then this is not possible. If merely making the reference value
of the weaker system in the spreadsheet equal to that of the stronger one
is considered to be a complete and adequate model of coercion by threat,
then this is not possible. If coercion of variable A by offering to cease
overwhelming force applied to variable B is not even considered, this is
not possible.

2. More important, what is it that you _want_ to hear us say
about coercion?

See opening paragraphs above.

  Bruce Nevin

[From Rick Marken (980911.1415)]

i.kurtzer (980811.1500)--

I am not a RTP person, but i see no reason why the child could
not intend to leave the class.

Of course they could intend to leave class; they could even intend
to go to the RTC room (the "frequent flyers" apparently do intend
to get to the RTC rather often). My point was that it seems rather
unlikely (as unlikely intending to get a ticket) that _all_
(even most) kids disrupt in order to get to the RTC room, as the
phrase "I see you've chosen to go to the RTC room" -- the phrase
said to all disrupting kids -- implies.

Of course, there are some children that do not intend to go to
the RTP; RTP is a unintended consequence. I have no say as to
whether this is good or bad.

Do you have any "say" in whether it's _truthful_ to say to _every_
kid who disrupts that they _do_ intend to go to the RTC room?

But I do think you should not prima facia assume what the
students' intentions are or ever could be. I think that
would be naive and wrong.

OK. If I shouldn't "prima facia" assume what the students'
intentions are, shouldn't the RTP teacher also not "prima
facia" assume what the students intentions are? When the
teacher says "I see you have chosen to go to the RTC room"
the teacher is "prima facia" assuming that the student intends
to go to the RTP room? Isn't this a clear _mistake_ in the
RTP program that could easily be fixed by simply eliminating
the requirement that teachers say "I see you have chosen to
go to the RTC room"?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[From Bruce Nevin (980811.1653 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980811.1215)--

Bruce Nevin (980811.1321 EDT)

For the threat/offer forms of coercion, start with the diagrams
that I showed you in Vancouver, roughly represented in my
(980806.1715 EDT).

Could you send (or better, re-post) them. I don't have them.

In a reply to Isaac, quoted in his (980806.0230), "Re: Models, Meanings,
Coercion", you referred to

the PCT model of a coercive
interaction.

In Vancouver, I talked with you, as well as with Bill and a number of other
people, about the varieties of coercion that the spreadsheet does not
describe. I showed you some little diagrams of interacting control systems.
Bill had added one, in which the whole interaction is imagined by the
control system that is complying with the imagined wishes of an
internalized coercer--parent figure, boogie man, guru, a concept of a
punitive God, whatever. I thought you would remember these discussions that
you and I had together in Vancouver. That is why I said in response to your
reference to "the PCT model of a coercive interaction":

...... quotation from Bruce Nevin (980806.1715 EDT) ......

Which PCT model? Remember the little loop diagrams I was drawing in
Vancouver? Here there are again, except that I can't draw circles very well.

In the following taxonomy, control loops are shown in the most skeletal
form, with only reference signals on the insides of control systems and a
value q or q' in the environment between two control systems. In the notes,
D is the dominant control system, and V is the victim. The variable q is in
the environment, and may represent either qi=qi' or qi=qo' (similarly for
q'). D, the coercer or extortionist, is above the observable variable q,
and V the victim is below q. Imagine the environment/system boundaries as
two horizontal lines drawn just above and just below q.

--rd- Coercion: D forces value of q,

    > V cannot affect value of q.

\ /
  \ /
   q
  / \
/ \

    >

--rv-

This alone is what was simulated in the spreadsheet. The spreadsheet
simulation (and this diagram) does not apply to obedient schoolchildren,
quiescent prisoners, compliant rape victims, etc. What does describe those
situations? Something for which we have not yet created a simulation or a
model. See below.

     -----Rd---- Extortion 1:
    /-------- \ I'll keep
   / \ \ controlling q'
  / ---------\---\ until you
/ / \ \ control q
---rd-- \--rd'-- to my value
\ / \ / for q. (Also:
\ / \ / maybe he'll
  \ / \ / stop if I
   q q' do what I
  / \ / \ think he wants.)
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
---rv-- --rv'--
\ \ / /
  \ ----------/--/
   \ /
    \-------- /
     -----Rv----

     -----Rd---- Extortion 2:
    /........ \ o(D)>0
   / . \ Don't interfere
  / ---------.---\ with my control
/ / . \ of q, or else
--rd- ...rd'... I'll control q'

    > . . to a value that

\ / . . you don't want.
  \ / o(D) . . (Dots indicate
   q q' imagination.)
  . . . . (Also the
. . . . victim's
. . . . hypothetical
...rv... ...rv'... as with 1)
. . . .
  . ..............
   . . .
    ......... .
     .....Rv....

     -----Rd---- Extortion 3:
    /........ \ o(D)=0
   / . \ Control q to my
  / ---------.---\ satisfaction,
/ / . \ or else
--rd- ...rd'... I'll control q'

    > . . to a value that

\ / . . you don't want.
  \ / o(D) . . (Also the
   q q' victim's
  . . . . hypothetical
. . . . as with 1)
. . . .
...rv... ....rv'..
. . . .
  . ..............
   . . .
    ......... .
     .....Rv....

     .....Rd.... Extortion 4, 5:
    ......... . V has internalized
   . . . the extortioner
  . .............. in either of the
. . . . above forms.
...rd... ...rd'...
. . . .
. . . .
  . . o(D) . .
   q q'
  / \ . .
/ \ . .
/ \ . .
---rv-- ...rv'...
\ \ . /
  \ ---------.---/
   \ . /
    \........ /
      -----Rv---

If you talk about coercion, please specify which flavor you have in mind.
They are not the same. Please do not use attributes of one to claim
conclusions about another.

You want to say that coercion is still going on even when the arm is not
being twisted. This is how the argument goes: The coercer is controlling
and can overpower the victim and (because there is no conflict within the
coercer about this) therefore will overpower the victim if and when the
victim ever resists. Because control continues even when there is no
disturbance, coercion so conceived continues even when there is no
disturbance from the victim.

Can this be true of extortion types 4 and 5? In extortion types 2 and 3 the
threat is effective in like manner to 4 and 5 because it is imagined by the
victim. Only in extortion type 1 is coercion present, and what
distinguishes it from frank coercion (the simple diagram/spreadsheet) is
that the victim imagines its cessation as a function of the extortionist's
offer. The offer in extortion type 1 is exactly parallel to the threat in
extortion types 2-5. Left out of the diagrams is the communication of the
offer or of the threat, the basis for imagining the offer or threat. But
even with communication (for example, witnessing or experiencing prior
extortion) the threat or the offer exists in the victim's imagination or
not at all. (Saying a thing is not the same as communicating it, the reason
for asking confirmation.)

...... End quotation from Bruce Nevin (980806.1715 EDT) ......

The higher level of control, represented by Rd and Rv, is just sketched
here as so much hand-waving: something is going on at a higher level that
can control q as means for controlling a perception of the coercer not
disturbing control of q'. The control of q (sell the store) was not means
for controlling q' (mobster hurts my wife and children, controlled at zero)
until the coercer communicated that contingency (the threat); and similarly
for the other four cases.

  Bruce Nevin

[From Bruce Nevin (980811.1918 EDT)]

i.kurtzer (980811.1500)
Rick Marken (980811.0920)

Thank you Isaac.

Rick, I said this was sarcastic and did not take it seriously because of
the various jabs and barbs and rhetorical parentheses that are sprinkled
through it, and because #6 and sequel are so tendentious. I'll go with
Isaac's redaction.

1. Coercion occurs when a stronger person forces a weaker person
to do something.

Coercion(1): two autonomous control systems are in conflict, one so much
stronger than the other that the weaker one cannot control the contested
variable. The weaker one goes up a level. It has no choice about
relinquishing control of the variable.

Coercion(2): one autonomous control system persuades another to control a
certain variable v to a certain value, or not to disturb the coercer's
control of v. The means of persuasion is to begin coercion(1) over a
different variable v', together with an offer to stop coercing(1) the other
if the other complies. The weaker one goes up a level to where control of v
to the requested value is means for controlling v' (removing the
disturbance to control of v'). At this level it has a choice about control
of v vs. control of v', an internal conflict introduced by and exploited by
the coercer.

(An alternative is to notice some variable the other is unable to control,
call attention to it, perhaps make control worse, and offer to enable
control. This shades from coercion into politicking and benign quid pro quo
horsetrading and negotiating.)

Coercion(3): one autonomous control system persuades another to control a
certain variable v to a certain value, or not to disturb the coercer's
control of v. The means of persuasion is a threat to begin a conflict over
a different variable that the other system cannot win. one autonomous
control system persuades another to control a certain variable v to a
certain value, or not to disturb the coercer's control of v. The means of
persuasion is a threat to begin coercion(1) over a different variable v',
together with an offer not to start coercing(1) the other if the other
complies. The weaker system imagines coercion(1), and goes up a level to
where control of v to the requested value is means for continued control of
v' (removing the threat to disturb control of v'). At this level it has a
choice about control of v vs. control of v', an internal conflict
introduced by and exploited by the coercer.

Coercion(4): A control system sets a reference signal to comply with the
imagined demand of an imagined or remembered coercer of type 2 or 3 who is
not present and will not be present in the foreseeable future.

The types do not map 1-1 onto the diagrams I sent earlier, but the
relationships should be obvious.

2. Coercion is not control of behavior

This is a semantic issue that we should drop. I believe that if you twist
my arm behind my back and I cannot move it then arm position is not an
aspect of my behavior, just as if my arm is amputated then arm position is
not an aspect of my behavior. You believe that when you twist my arm behind
my back and I cannot move it then you are controlling an aspect of my
behavior, namely arm position. Perhaps we can resolve this down the road.
While the maxim, you cannot control the behavior of an autonomous control
system, is important to me and I believe true, the issue is not important
for our present discussion.

3; it is just two people, one strong and one weak, controlling their
own perceptions; the stronger person is controlling his
perceptions of the weaker person's behavior and the weaker
is controlling his perceptions, period.

A preliminary quibble: two autonomous control systems, could be people, not
necessarily.

the stronger [one] is controlling his
perceptions of the weaker [one's] behavior

Tendentious, see point 2. Applies to control of qo' if you claim that e.g.
arm position (with arm twisted and can't move it) is the weaker one's
behavior. Applies to control of qi only if you claim that qi'=qi is the
weaker one's behavior. If I straighten a book on my shelf book position is
not my behavior, it's book position. What if the weaker one is trying to
control qi'=qo, trying to move the coercer's arm from blocking his way: is
he then controlling his perception of the coercer's behavior?

Much cleaner and simpler if you just say the stronger one and the weaker
one are controlling the same variable, but the weaker one cannot control
successfully.

The above formulation leaves out forms of threat and offer, coercion(2-5)
above.

4. In order to know that coercion is going on, you have to know
the intentions of both the weaker and the stronger person.

Seems that way to me. Your formulation is that coercion is just control by
a strong control system, and that because the weaker one's actions are
ineffectual its intentions are irrelevant. The issue is what happens when
the weaker system is not controlling the variable. (Or is controlling it
the way the coercer wants, a transient state, see below.) Your conclusion
from the above formulation that is that the weaker system is still being
coerced because if it ever tried to control the variable in conflict with
the coercer it would not be able to. It is because I disagree with this
that I say "yes" to this #4 statement.

5. If their intentions are the same, then there is no coercion. If
their intentions are not the same, then there is coercion.

You and Bill convinced me that for coercion(1), which is what you are
describing, this can only be a transient state if the weaker one is
controlling at all. Sooner or later they will come in conflict.

For you, coercion is a function of one being stronger than the other,
whether they are in conflict or not. For me, coercion is a form of conflict
in which one party can't control at all. No conflict, no coercion. So long
as their intentions are the same, there is no conflict, so no coercion.

For coercion(1) or coercion(2) conflict must be present. For coercion(2)
the victim must imagine a resolution of conflict in exchange for
compliance. For other forms of coercion conflict must be imagined by the
victim as an alternative to compliance. You certainly have to know about
intentions of both parties.

  Bruce Nevin

i.kurtzer (980811.2250)

[From Rick Marken (980911.1415)]

i.kurtzer (980811.1500)--

> I am not a RTP person, but i see no reason why the child could
> not intend to leave the class.

Of course they could intend to leave class; they could even intend
to go to the RTC room (the "frequent flyers" apparently do intend
to get to the RTC rather often).

o.k.

My point was that it seems rather unlikely (as unlikely intending to get a

ticket) that >_all_(even most) kids disrupt in order to get to the RTC room,
as the

phrase "I see you've chosen to go to the RTC room" -- the phrase
said to all disrupting kids -- implies.

O.K. Maybe it would be more accurate to say "I see that you have chosen to do
something that you know will result in you going to the RTP room" . I don't
know. I remember talking about this with Tim, but I don't know.

Of course, there are some children that do not intend to go to

> the RTP; RTP is a unintended consequence. I have no say as to
> whether this is good or bad.

Do you have any "say" in whether it's _truthful_ to say to _every_
kid who disrupts that they _do_ intend to go to the RTC room?

I would say that is unlikely. But i would also say they are cognizant of the
rules and what happens when they break the rules, in the slow ones. This
seems to be the case from what the teachers report. What is the function of
the quotes around "say"?

But I do think you should not prima facia assume what the

> students' intentions are or ever could be. I think that
> would be naive and wrong.

>OK. If I shouldn't "prima facia" assume what the students'
>intentions are, shouldn't the RTP teacher also not "prima
>facia" assume what the students intentions are? When the
>teacher says "I see you have chosen to go to the RTC room"
>the teacher is "prima facia" assuming that the student intends
>to go to the RTP room? Isn't this a clear _mistake_ in the
>RTP program that could easily be fixed by simply eliminating
>the requirement that teachers say "I see you have chosen to
>go to the RTC room"?

What is the function of the quotes around "prima facia"? I thought the
teachers first asked "what are you doing?" This seems consistant with asking
the kid what he intends.

i.