free will (from Mary)

[Bill_Leach1]

<[Bill Leach 940802.23:53 EST(EDT)]

[Mary Powers 9408.02]

Mary, are you postulating that the 'highest level' references establish
in a deterministic way the goals of the immediate level down...

Humm, as I even try to formulate the question, I realize that there
should be no problem with the idea. Please tell me if I am "on track"
here:

First to clear up a possible incorrect inference from my first
(incomplete) question. References set by any control loop for any other
control loop are 'deterministic' in nature though application of the term
for such a situation is probably a bit strange.

Our 'highest level' references, that is those for which there may be no
identifiable control loop contained wholy within the brain are probably
still control loops of some kind with a possibility that 'genetic'
encoding may provide the reference either directly or though some unknown
control loop to the brain.

Gads, my "new found wings" are certainly not capable of great altitudes.

I am about concluding that the term "free will" as it is commonly
understood is close to meaningless in PCT (and maybe not just close). I
know that some discussions centered on things like QE but it seems that
talking about variations due to the possible quantum nature of physics is
missing the point entirely.

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that (maybe short of QE) we
are absolutely deterministic from a PCT standpoint (ignoring the
complexity of any specific predictions) but what is even more important
is that this IS "free will" as we personally EXPERIENCE it!

We do not directly "see", "feel", or otherwise "perceive" our own highest
level "goals" (or references) and thus when we "choose" to perceive some
lower level goal this choice is the only one that we could have made
given our set of highest level references and the particular
environmental circumstances at the time (including, I presume memory of
past experiences).

Yet, if we perceive ourselves "making this decision" we perceive the act
as an "exercise of free will".

Am I even close?

-bill

[William_T_Powers2]

[from Mary Powers 9408.02]

[Jeff Vancouver 9407.18]
As I reread some of Locke and other psychologists I see the
issue of free will raised as central to their problem with PCT.
They often go too far - action is a function of conscious will.
Do you take the other extreme - action is random? Locke seems to
think you do. I think the answer is in between. Action is
indeterminable, but related to the perceptions one is
controlling. This moves the free will debate to the question of
will over perceptions to be controlled.

I really don't know what Locke and other psychologists are saying
about free will, but if they insist that it is about producing
actions and that it is always conscious then they will indeed
have a problem with PCT.

The PCT alternative to the conscious production of action is not
to assert that actions are random. Actions must be free to vary
in order to control perceptions in a changing environment (and
we've discussed the fact that the environment is always changing
because factors like muscle fatigue mean that no actions can ever
be exactly the same). But freedom to vary does not mean random.
Actions, although free to vary, are limited by the environmental
constraints which one perceives - I always leave a room by the
door because I haven't figured out how to walk through walls, nor
would a door in the ceiling be much use to me. In any case, I can
usually get out of the room, which is my intention, even if the
environment prevents me from doing it in certain ways, and
certain actions are more likely to be used than others, like
walking and twisting the door handle.

We leave rooms all the time without conscious intent. We may
become conscious of the problem if the door is locked, or if
there is a fire in the hall and leaving by the window seems like
a better idea. We intend to be out of the room, and do what we
must to have that perception.

As for choosing which perceptions are to be controlled:
eventually as you go up the hierarchy you come to very important
perceptions like "the self" which Locke and others seem to
believe are conscious. But we act to control perceptions all the
time which, if you trace the reference signals up, do maintain a
desired state of the self without there ever being consciousness
that that is the goal. I may be leaving the room to go to the
bathroom, but I do not have to be, and therefore am not,
conscious of maintaining my self as someone who does not wet her
pants in the room where the conference is meeting.

Another angle on free will as coming from a conscious, self level
is the idea that consciousness reaches the highest level there
is. I prefer the idea that it does not: that concepts like
creativity, intuition, and having a higher power, are a few of
the ways of referring to properties of the human organism which
are not accessible to consciousness, and which are the source of
reference levels which, when maintained at certain values, are
experienced as the self. But they do not come from the self.

I think that Locke and others see the self as not only conscious,
but also fixed at the highest level they can think of, which
seems to be the logic level - and of course as performing all
these huge calculations all the time to produce outputs. Thus
they see choosing, or intending, or having free will, as being
conscious and as being expressed as calculating those outputs.
This concept has to be a product of where they get to when they
introspect as to how they themselves function - informed, of
course, by a particular model of how the brain must work.

I believe that "having free will" is simply how it feels to
control one's perceptions. You don't feel you have it when the
environmental constraints are too severe, and you don't feel you
have it when you have reference signals that conflict with one
another - when you can't control one set of perceptions because,
awaredly or not, you also want the opposite thing, and you are
stuck in a position of being unable to achieve either. But these
are special cases.

Mary P.