From Greg Williams (930414 - 3)
Tom Bourbon [930413.1149 CDT]
I have seen many publications in which authors
spoke of the importance of shared *goals*, or *ideas*, or *standards,*
or some other construct. In virtually every case, the author meant that
people must share intentions for *actions*. In none of those cases could
one say the authors were speaking of reference signals a la PCT. In the
PCT model of a living control system, a reference signal "requests"
a specific perception; it does not specify a particular action. As
small as that difference might sound, it is the difference between a
system that can control under changing circumstances, and one that can
seem to control, but only when circumstances do not vary (ay all).
First, I want to thank Greg Williams for having the temerity to suggest
that sociologists might have something worthy of discussion and criticism.
Second,
while Tom Bourbon can and will speak knowledgeably and ably for himself, I
have a couple of comments on the remarks you quote from Little, with whose
work I am unfamiliar. Third, given the craziness of my year and the
insanity of my current situation, I have missed discussions of "RCT" vs.
PCT and may stick my foot in it. But here goes.
"Social phenomena result from the activities of human beings, and human
beings are AGENTS whose actions are directed by their beliefs, goals,
meanings, values, prohibitions, and scruples. Human beings, that is, are
INTENTIONAL creatures who act on the basis of reasons. This has a number
of implications for the social sciences.
As I have mentioned to many of you at CSG conferences for years, there is a
long tradition in sociology, stemming from Max Weber and from George H.
Mead that human beings are purposive actors rather than stimulus-response
puppets pushed about by external social structural constraints. This
provides a foot in the door for those who would proselytize PCT to the only
partially washed. Initially they seem to go only as far as understanding
PCT as the cognitive control of output. (Down Rick, down boy, down boy.
Be patient!) That was my initial understanding and it was very difficult
to get to the point of grasping the control of perceptual input. It is
difficult to convey that to my sociological colleagues but I will continue
to try and do so.
First, it implies that social
regularities derive from a different type of causal relation than do
natural regularities. The latter stem from the fixed, objective features
of the entities involved and the laws of nature that govern them, while
the former stem from the intentional states of agents.
I am uncomfortable with the static nature of "states of agents" but
otherwise I have no problem with this. Undoubtedly some of you will point
out that this is because I simply do not understand PCT.
Second, the
intentional character of social phenomena makes possible a type of
explanation for social science that is not available in natural science.
Many social phenomena can be explained as the aggregate consequenc of the
purposive actions of a large number of individuals. By coming to
understand what those persons wanted, what they believed, and how they
expected their actions to further their goals, we can explain the
occurrence of the aggregate consequence as well....
I think this is the argument I have been attempting to set forth for some
time. For people to act _together_, similar or related reference signals
are necessary; they may not be sufficient. First, at the most simplistic
level, those similar reference signals might be established independently
by two or more persons; for example, two or more persons are controlling
for the direction, velocity, proximity to one another, and for their
position on the sidewalk or their automobiles on the right hand side of the
highway (except in England and Australia). They do not converse with one
another nor negotiate; they simply independently control for "similar"
perceptions. (I know, I know; how can we know they are "similar". Set
that one aside for now.)
Second, two or more persons might encounter a mutual disturbance and be
unable to finess, resist, circumvent, or oppose it by themselves as
individuals. Hence they seek the assistance of another actor with whose
assistance or cooperation they might be able to oppose the disturbance.
Regretably people have to "communicate" (sorry, I just had to use the word)
with one another by touching, pulling, gesturing and even on occasion
"talking" with one another (sorry, I apologize for having to use these
unforgiveable conceptual devices). In the course of whatever is
politically correct to call what those two or more persons do with and in
relation to one another, they establish what Phil Runkel (and Muzafer
Sherif) call "superordinate reference signals", that is, "We both want to
solve this problem with which we are both confronted and which neither can
solve alone." At this point they may also establish some additional
reference signals (unfortunately still more "communication" is probably
required to get to this point even though it has not yet been established
by modeling or simulation that human beings can actually do this). Those
additional reference signals might be similar ("I think we should both
control for the sense of kinesthetic effort of pulling up on this object as
hard as each of us can until I nod or grunt and then we should each control
for the sense of kinesthetic effort of pushing the object away from us and
in X direction as hard as we can.") Or both persons might "agree" that one
will push [control for the perception of pushing] and the other will pull
[control for the perception of pulling] the object in question.
Sociologists call this a "division of labor" when people must fit together
two different actions (sorry, when two or more persons must control for two
more more different perceptual inputs, one the perception of pulling and
the other the perception of pushing) regarding a common goal (sorry,
regarding a "superordinate reference signal").
Third, two or more persons can "interact" (sorry) or "communicate" (sorry
again) on a mutually inclusive basis only up to a certain limit. As the
number of actors goes up arithmetically, the number of mutually inclusive
dyadic interactions (sorry, sorry, sorry) goes up geometrically such that
everyone cannot "interact" with everyone else. At some point they either
break up into multiple smaller "groups" within which mutually inclusive
interaction (sorry) can occur; or, one person by her knowledge, expertise,
experience, oratorical skills, etc., "speaks" (I apologize) with authority
to the problem at hand and the others decide "this person knows more than I
do about this problem and perhaps I will listen to what she or he has to
say". Now I know that no one on this net every says that about any
particular expert authority on anything, e.g., the principles of peceptual
control theory, but it does happen in other human groups. Thus, multiple
actors may "adopt" the reference signals of some such third party (e.g., a
coach, a Nobel prize winning authority, or simply a creative genius) and
control for their own perceptions of that reference signal to accomplish
matters they all want to accomplish or that the third party calls upon them
to accomplish.
It is at this point that collective action is of great interest to
sociologists because some of us understand that there are individuals on
the face of the earth who have control over resources on which a lot of the
rest of us depend; for example, water, food, jobs, paychecks, etc. Thus,
in PCT terms (I am probably on shaky grounds here), one person is in a
position to disturb a lot of other people more frequently and pervasively
than they are in a position to resist or disturb that one person. Hence,
the third party may "order" others to adopt to which they can reply "screw
you" (I would speak more vulgarly but would probably offend Rick) and
indeed that sometimes happens. More frequently it is my sense (and that of
a lot of other sociologists) is that "even good people knuckle under" and
adopt the reference signals presented by the the slave master, the boss,
the largest and strongest member of the group, etc. They do not agree or
they do not understand or they do not like the reference signals they are
asked/told/ordered to adopt, but they adopt nonetheless because they are
dependent upon resources over which the third party exercises control. They
want to provide food for their lovers, for their infant children, for their
aging parents, etc. (Sorry to use such mundane and human examples.)
The rational choice paradigm of explanation rests on one central
premise and a large set of analytical techniques. The premise is that
individual behavior is goal-directed and calculating. Individuals are
assumed to have a set of interests against which they evaluate
alternative courses of action; they assign costs and benefits to various
possible choices and choose an action after surveying the pros and cons
of each. Rational choice explanations thus depend upon the 'means-end'
theory of rational action. An action is rational just in case it is an
appropriate means of accomplishing a certain end, given one's beliefs
about the circumstances of choice. Therefore, to explain an individual's
action is to identify his or her background beliefs and goals and to show
how the action chosen is a reasonable way to achieve those goals given
those beliefs....
The problems with "rational choice" explanations are many. The most
familiar example of the rational choice principle is the minimax principle;
that is, confronted with a set of alternatives how do I maximize my
likelihood of overcoming the disturbances of most importance to me and
minimize the likelihood of creating even more disturbances of importance to
me. But like all principles or "laws" set forth by economists and
sociologists and others who flounder around at the upper levels of the
hierarchy, the rational choice principle is (1) a principle and (2) an
answer to the question of "why" people choose between one program, one
category, one relationship versus another. The rational choice theorists
do not tell us how. One of the reasons why I find PCT so exciting is that
it addresses both the how and the why questions.
How does the concept of individual rationality give rise to
explanations of SOCIAL phenomena -- the occurrence of collective action,
enduring social institutions, or processes of social and economic change?
The rational choice approach seeks to explain social outcomes on the
basis of rational calculations....
I dare not attempt to address this question in the diminishing time
available to me this morning except to say that people purposive seek out
others with whom they can work together or whom they can compell to work in
their behalf to proactively create arrangements which will more frequently
than not eliminate or minimize disturbances to the achievement or
realization of the perceptual signals for which they are controlling; and
they also create arrangements which will more frequently and consistently
disturb others who attempt to circumvent the aforementioned proactive
arrangements. "Keep those bastards (substitute the religious, ethnic,
language group of your choice) in line; better, yet, keep them out of my
line and away from my line."
Assume that a group is composed of rational individuals who have a
common interest -- an outcome that would benefit each of them if it were
to occur. Individuals are motivated by self-interest, described by a
consistent set of utilities. Every individual has a range of private
interests and chooses among available actions according to the costs and
benefits that each presents in terms of those private interests.... the
collective action of the group is the action [not assumed identical to
of others in the group] that is expected of each member in order to
achieve the common good....
Since Dan Miller mentioned my recent talk at the Midwest Sociological
Society, let me finish with an example that may be relevant to what I have
written here. My concerns were with purposive individual and collective
action, both nonviolent action and violent action. I spoke about a variety
of nonviolent actions, which are far more frequent that violent actions in
the course of riots, and about purposive individual and collective (not
"social") violent actions. The officers who beat Rodney King were
individually controlling for their perceptions of sufficient force to
oppose or subdue the disturbance of Rodney King. But they had "gone to
school", had previously "practiced or rehearsed", what their employer - the
Los Angeles Police Department - called for in those situations. However,
those police officers in that situation were under the surveillance and
supervision of a field commander. It could be argued here, as in all other
supervised work situations, that it was that Sgt's reference signals that
were important; that is, it was the comparison of his perceptions of their
actions against his perceptual standard (his reference signal) for
sufficient force to subdue or punish Rodney King. When his perception of
their actions fell short, he could urge them to act differently or
additionally; when their actions exceeded his standards, he could call them
off. No one was "out of control"; the question is (or at least one
question is) whose reference signal was critical here? Was it, as it
should have been, the reference signal of the supervisory or commanding
officer on the scene; or did that commanding officer cede supervisory
"control" (sorry) to each individual officer. In the former case, we may as
citizens want to see the reference signal changed; that is, we may want to
demand a change in L.A.P.D. policy. In the latter case where you let
every officer use the violence she or he is capable of using and wants to
use and the result is police "rioting" ranging from what we may have seen
in the Rodney King video tape and certainly did see in Grant Park in
Chicago in August of 1968 during the Chicago Police Riot, or in Orangeburg
South Carolina (S.C. State College) in 1967, or at Kent State in 1970.
Thanks,
Thanks for the opening!
best wishes,
Clark