Fw: [COMPLEX-M] Powers amd plenty of time for a beer or two.

[From Paul Stokes (991006.2139 GMT)]

Kim James has replied. Frankly I think the man is confused. He obviously
does not see that the PCT model actually incorporates most of his
desiderata! But that's what happens when theorists keep their heads stuck in
clouds. I am discharging a duty to the list by passing this on but I don't
expect you to enjoy it.

For now.

Paul

···

-----Original Message-----
From: kim <kim@PSY.CO.UK>
To: COMPLEX-M@HOME.EASE.LSOFT.COM <COMPLEX-M@HOME.EASE.LSOFT.COM>
Date: 06 October 1999 19:06
Subject: [COMPLEX-M] Powers amd plenty of time for a beer or two.

In reply to Paul A. Stokes and by proxy Ms Powers 05 October 1999

This is to set the record straight on one or two issues which for me
interweave and for others may be separate. That problem of interlinking by
one and separation for another is in fact my point of view on the essential
problem of management and complexity. I was amused by Frank's comments on
the airy-fairy notions of some theorists on the list. As one who is
intensely driven by theory in my practice I remember the immortal words of
Joseph V. Djugashivili that, "Theory without practice is sterile, but
practice without theory is barren".

Writing on the list is a peculiar thing. One is constrained to be short in
terms of length. This, however, means that one is too cryptic; frequently

in

situations where the importance of the subject warrants a long and studied
response. I would love to have the time, but earning a living for myself

and

being involved in the efforts of my colleagues to keep in the market, does
not leave a lot of time for intellectual discourse. Hence the reason why I
have upset Mary Powers, which I regret very much. I certainly would not

wish

to do a "hatchet job" on any respectable scientist. I must say that after
reading Ms Powers' statement that this does not seem to be a shared
characteristic. I much welcome the Powers' Web-site address that is very
useful.

William T Powers first book on "Behaviour: the control of Perception" was
for me a seminal work. My colleagues reminded me that I wrote a favourable
(though not uncritical review of this book in Leonardo some time in '73/74,
i will try and find it in our archives).It broke a long tradition of
classical approach to perception. When I wrote "Behaviour the control of
perception - Perception the control of Behaviour" it was not intended to be
a facetious comment. For me Powers book still has the fatal flaw that
perception is manufactured by the brain processes. It was not intended to
mean, as Mary Powers says, that "Powers was really talking about perception
the control of behaviour", because, as she rightly comments, everything

that

follows would be irrelevant. What I was trying to say is that, like
Maturana and Gibson , I take the stand that behaviour and perception are
linked, are indeed the same to all intents and purpose, two elements of the
same systemic function. The one cannot be divorced from the other. It is

the

observer who makes the distinction in her own domain of action.

I regret that Mary Powers considers that the description of the implicate
philosophy in Powers' book is "mechanical materialist" is tantamount to a
personal insult. I have too much respect for Powers and many others with
whom I disagree to indulge in insults. Those whom I do not respect find the
insults flagrant and unmistakable. Mechanical materialism is an honourable
term which can be attached to psychologists and scientists as great as
Helmholtz so there is a long tradition here. I take a philosophical stance
which is taken to Bohm, Gibson, Pask and Beer Varela and Maturana. Which

may

be roughly summed up as dialectical materialism or as Gordon Pask used to
say Dialogical. Such an approach does not make distinctions between
materialist and the spiritual but can accommodate both. I am talking

science

as does Eccles, Pilkington, Goodwin, Elstob and a complete rainbow of
beliefs.

My approach is neither bottom up nor top down in terms of functional
operation. To pose the problem in such terms is to fail to understand any
complex system in its total operation. As far as Gibson never having read
Powers being true or not I can't say. Certainly this does not materially
alter my criticism and that he would have altered his point of view on the
brain if he had done so I do not believe for one moment. We are on such a
different wave-length here it is useless to continue down that track.

Neither Kim nor Maturana nor Gibson Know but they can sure throw those

words around >
I am happy and very flattered to be put on the list alongside Maturana and
Gibson and I will attempt to answer the question of what is a relational
state of an active body-in-environment. An organism is a system whose
organisation defines a domain of interactions in which it can act with
relevance to the maintenance of itself and the process of perception is
conjoint with cognition, they are fields of interaction which pass across
the boundary of the system/environment. Living systems to be cognate with
their environment are perforce perceptual systems and living itself as a
process is a process of perception/cognition. I apologise for the length of
the following quotation from Maturana but it does serve to illustrate my
point of view.

"If a living system enters into a cognitive(perceptual) interaction its
internal state is changed in a manner relevant to its maintenance (of its
circularity of (energy) exchange which makes it a living system K.J) and it
enters into a new interaction without loss of its identity. In an organism
without a nervous system (or its functional equivalent) its interactions

are

of a chemical or physical nature ( a molecule is absorbed and an enzymatic
process is initiated; a photon is captured and a step in photosynthesis is
carried out). For such an organism the relations holding between the
physical events remains outside its domain of interactions. The nervous
system enlarges the domain of interactions of the organism by making its
internal states also modifiable in a relevant manner by "pure relations",
not only by physical events; the observer sees that the sensors of an

animal

(say, a cat) are modified by light, and that the animal (the cat) is
modified by a visible entity (say, a bird). The sensors change through the
physical interactions: the absorption of light quanta; the animal is
modified through its interactions that hold between the activated sensors
that absorbed the light quanta at the sensory surface. The nervous system
expands the cognitive domain of the living system by making possible
interactions with "pure relations; it does not create cognition (or
perception K>J) [Maturana's underline.

This is equivalent to Gibson's statement that what modifies the organism
with a perceptual/nervous system is the relations between the
quanta/activated cells on the retina these are not random relations but the
light falling on the retina is itself structured according to the laws of
ecological optics. " What is important is that the light on the retina
remains structured. What is next to what out there is what is next to what
on the retina".

We do indeed have an increasing knowledge of the bits and pieces ( although
the role of enzymes, hormones, proteins is only recently beginning to be
investigated) In my view the relations between the bits and pieces which
determine perception will eventually show that it need another tack to

solve

the problem of perception. I will look at Powers' recent work with the
attention it deserves since for me he represents a formulation of the
problem which I respect. With best wishes and apologies for an overlong

post

which is only a surface scratch in a deep problem area. Kim James
kim@psy.co.uk

http://www.psy.co.uk
Psi INTERNATIONAL web site

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